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Prisoner of war of the proxy war of America

US CONGRESS REPRESENTATIVES
August Term___________________, 2019
PETITION
__________
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) BRIGHT QUANG
Respondent ) Petitioner
V. )
Honorable House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ) Confidential Document:
Office of the Democratic Leader ) 532272
H-204, US Capitol ) _________
Washington, DC 20515 ) Self Help:
(202) 225–0100 ) Bright Quang
V. ) 217 5th Ave # 8 Honorable Jerrold Nadler ) Redwood City,
Chairman of the House Committee ) CA94063
On the Judiciary ) 650–278–9542
2132 Rayburn Building ) bright_qng@yahoo.com
Washington, DC 20515 )
(202) 225–5635 )
Website: https://nadler.house.gov/ )
V. )
Honorable Adam Smith ) Chairman of the House Committee ) On Armed Services ) 2216 Rayburn House Office Building, ) Washington, D.C. 20515 ) P: (202) 225–4151 | F: (202) 225–9077 )
V. )
Honorable Eliot L. Engel )
Chairman of the House Committee )
On Foreign Affairs )
2170 Rayburn House Office Building )
Washington, DC 20515 )
Phone: (202) 225–5021 )
Fax: (202) 225–5393 )
CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION/PRESENTED
I. How does he exactly take cognizance about to super legalistic values of the United States Treaties and International Agreements of the United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam to have solemnly declared in the protocols international relations when the proxy war of America’s fighting against communism to take place in South Vietnam?
II. What did his family and he grant for a livelihood when the Government of the United States of America has left him on the battlefield of the Vietnam War without had regrets?
III. How somehow does he firmly respectfully protect the statutorily of the United States of America to let’s understand about the burden of sufferings and unluckiness of the plaintiff- family — even though, his human dignity was humiliated by his allied partnership and to what masterminded the American leaders of the Vietnam War had self- confessed doing wrongful action in themselves?
IV. Whether the United States of America expresses exactly the righteousness, the human rights, the ethics, and the equality of the US Constitution, if not, the Justice of the arrogance of negligence of undisciplined-soldier of bankruptcy, and of the United States in the Vietnam War of prisoner of war for what’s means?
TABLE OF PARTIES

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TABLE OF CONTENTS

…………………………………………………………………………………page
I.QUESTIONS /PRESENTED………………………………………………….. i
II.THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA………………………………………. i
III.TABLE OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………….…..…IV to VI
IV.STATEMENT OF THE CASE ……………………………. .…………1 to 161
V. OPINIONS BELOW……………………………………………………………….1
VI. JURISDICTION.…….……………………………………………..……… 2
vii. INTRODUCTION……………………………………….. ………………..…….. 2
IV. BACKGROUND …………………………………………..…………….….. 3
V. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND…………………….. .3
Xi. DISCUSSION……………………………………………………………………96
Vii. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….159 Xii. APPENDIX..…………………………………..………………………..163 to 511
Xiii. ATTACHMENT……………………………………………………………511 to 512
28 U.S. C. § 453 — Oaths of justices ……………………………………………1
28 U.S.C§§ 1254- 1257………………………………….……………………1
28 U.S. C§§1254–1651-Jurisdiction………………………………………… 1
H. Res. 309 — Recognizing the 44th anniversary of the Fall of Saigon on
April 30, 1975……………………………………………………………………..1
S. 484 BRING THEM HOME ALIVE….………………………………………..5
9.11 Particular Rights — First Amendment……………………………..……..6
28 U.S.C §1346b –June25,1948………………………………………………….7
22 U.S.C § 2451 — Pub. L 87–256§ 101, Sept. 21, 1961, 75 Stat.527…….….8
22 U.S.C. § 7103. Pub. L. 106–386, div. A, § 105.
Oct. 28, 2000–114 Stat. 1473………………………………………………….9
22. U.S.C§ 2403.Pub. L. 87–195, pt. III, § 644, Sept. 4, 1961,
75 Stat. 461……………………………………………………………………..19
18 U.S.C§ 2381, June 25,1948,Ch.645, 62 Stat 807; Pub L 103–322………21
10 U.S.C § 2733.[a] Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 153;
Pub. L. 85–729……………………………………………………………….23
22 U.S.C§§1571_1604. Pub. L 329–81st Congress, 63 Stat 714.Dec. 23,1950…………………………………………………………………………..29
H.R.5490 Foreign Assistance Act of 1963…………………………………….30
H.R.7885- Pub. L, 88–205. Approved- December 16, 1963………………….32
22 USC§ 2151(a)(b) Pub. L. 87–195, pt. I, § 101, formerly § 102, Sept.4, 1961……………………………………….……………………………………35
22 U.S.C.§ 2151n- Human Rights and development Assistance
Dec. 20, 1975..………………………………………………………………….36
5 U.S.C. §702 -Right of Review .Sep. 6,1966…………………………………37
18 U.S.C. § 227(a)-Wrongfully-influencing.Sep.14,2007…………………..39
26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1)(2)(5). Definition Aug.16,1954…………………….40
28 U.S.C. § 1621-Perjury general-June 25, 1948…………………………….41
1 U.S.C.§ 112 a United States Treaties.- Sept. 23, 1950…………………….43
1 U.S.C.§ 112-General Provision-July 30,1947………………………………46
1 U.S.C.§ 112.b(a) (b)©. United States International agreement-Aug. 22, 1972………………………………………………………………………………48
37 U.S.C§ 552; Sep. 6, 1966………………………………………… ………..51
5 U.S.C. § 552 a-December 31,1974…………..…………….………….……53
38 U.S.C. § 101-Definitions. Sep.2, 1958………………………………….…56
38 U.S. Code § 1311 -July 30, 1947………….……………………..…………59
1 U.S. Code § 113. “Little and Brown’s” July 30, 1947………………..……64
22U.S.C.§7108. — Sep.22, 1961………………………………….…………65
35 U.S.C. § 183 Right to compensation. April 2, 1982……………………..66
9.Civil Rights Action-42 U.S.C. § 1983……………………….……………….71
42 U.S. Code § 1983.Civil action for deprivation of rights.……… …….…72
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims against individuals……………..……………………74
VI CRA of 1964–42 U.S.C. § 2000 D…………………………………………..73
Or 9.Civil Rights Actions_42 U.S.C. § 1983…………………………………73
28 U.S.C. § 4101-Definitions; Aug. 10, 2010……………….………………..75
California Vehicle Code Section 14103, 14105, and 13953………………..78
18 U.S.C. §1705 — Destruction of letter boxes or mail; June 25, 1948……79
California Civil Code§§§ 44, 45 a, and 46-Defamation, Libel, Slander…..80
§46 Division 1. Person [38–86]………………….………………..…………..80
42 U.S.C. § 1395- Prohibition against any Federal interference;
Aug. 14, 1935…………………….………………..……………….…………81
17 U.S.C. § 1203 Civil remedies; Oct. 28, 1998…………………………….82
17 U.S.C. § 411-Registration and Civil infringement action;
Oct. 19, 1976.. ………………………………………………………………….84
42 U.S.C. §12101- Findings and purpose; July 26, 1990…………………….87
CACI Nos. 3940–3949-DAMAGES-………………………..…………………..89
CACI NO:3949.Punitive Damages_ Individual……………………………….91
28 U.S.C. § 1871 Fees; June 25, 1948…………………………………………92
44 U.S.C. § 3507- Public information collection activities;
May 22, 1995…………………………………………………………………. 96
5 U.S.C. § 3579-Student loan repayments-…………..………………..…….98
S 2040 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism..…………………….………101
50 U.S.C. §4105- Prisoners of War-June 24, 1970;………………………..102
50 U.S.C. §4101 (a)(b)©Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
the United States; July 3,1948…….…………………………………………107
28 U.S.C § 1346 [32] the United States as the defendant…..…..……..110
28 U.S.C Section1346b -June 25, 1948-Chapter 171_Tort Claims Procedure……………………………………………………………………114
28 U.S.C. §2671- Definitions-June 25, 1948;…..………………………….116
28 U.S.C. §2672- Administrative adjustment of Claims; June 25, 1948.. 117
28 U.S.C. §2673- Report to Congress-June 25, 1948………………………120
28 U.S.C. §2674 Liability of United States-June 25, 1948……………… 120
28 U.S.C. § 2675 Disposition by federal agency as
Prerequisite; evidence…………………………………………………….….122
28 U.S. Code § 2676 Judgment as bar……………………….………….…123
28 U.S.C. §2677- Compromise-June 25, 1948…………………………….124
28 U.S.C. § 2678 — Attorney fees; penalty…………………….…………….125
28 U.S. Code § 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy ………………..……. .….126
28 U.S. Code § 2680. Exceptions…………………………………..………..129
22 U.S.C. § 1622 a-U.S. Code — Un-annotated Title 22.
Transfer of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of
the United States to Department of Justice………………………..………134
22 U.S.C. § 1622 b- Transfer of functions………………………….……….135
22 U.S.C. § 1622c- Membership of Foreign Claims……………………….137
22 U.S.C. § 1622d- Appointment and compensation……………………..139
22 U.S.C. § 1622e- Vesting of all non-adjudicatory…………………………141
22 U.S.C. § 1622f-Foreign Relations and Intercourse-
March 14, 1980……………………………………………………………….142
22 U.S.C. § 1622 g-Independence of Foreign Claims Settlement………143
18 U.S.C. § 2340 A- Torture…………………………………………. ……….145
28 U.S. C. § 357(a)(b)© — Review of orders and actions.
(Added Pub 107–273 div.C. title I, §11042 (a), Nov.2,2002, 116 Stat.1853.)…………………………………………………………………..149
28 U.S. Code § 1502- [35] Treaty cases………….………………………..151




Petitioning
I. OPINION BELOW
The opinion of U.S. Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor of General has to order Bright Quang that he'd be legal actions the first lower courts to determine whether who did wrongful actions in Vietnam. He'd give ear to it. He's been taken legal action form Superior Court of San Mateo County. Since, it was filed Confidential Document: 532272 on June 1, 2017, his case has appellant to 1st District Court of Appeal in San Francisco [1]. For the masterminds of the Vietnam War of the US were confessed wrongful actions oneself, but, it always created difficulties in order to return his document because it violated 28 U.S. C. § 453 [2] - Oaths of justices and judges. Therefore, he'd like to submit his case to the U.S. Department of Justice determines. But, it did not only throw his statement of the case to garbage on July 2, 2018. Suddenly, U.S. Department of Justice-Civil Rights Division on Mar. 8, 2019 has pushed him to Criminal Section-PHB within politics actions. During Supreme Court of the US - Office of the Clerk has reviewed his settlement case on March 21, 2019, it pushed him to return a U.S. Court of appeals or by Highest State Court within 28 U.S.C§§ 1254- 1257 when his jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C§§ 1254-1651 and now has H. Res. 309 – Recognizing the 44th anniversary of the Fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, which is why the US Department of Justice and US Supreme Court discriminated his prisoner of war. But, he continuously pursues litigation because of American law is American law, no one changed it. But, in 2001, the US Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor General did _________________________________________________________
[1]
1. Returned document April 21, 2017
2. Returned Document May, 15, 2018
3. Returned document June 5, 2018-
4. Returned document May 7, 2018-
[2] a. H.Res. 309-116th Congress (2019-2020) Congress.Gov
b. U.S. Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor General
c. Supreme Court of the United States -Office of the clerk Mar.21, 2019
d. U.S. Department of Justice-Civil Rights Division-Criminal Section-PHB- JFF:ma:kyb-144-11-0-107279
not order him to appeal to any High Courts of the state of California which is why the US Supreme Court did not transfer his statement to The US Department of Justice by statutorily of Congressional enacted.

II. JURISDICTION

His jurisdiction is within all of Congress established Act having issued for relative to the Vietnam War and the prisoner of war. Because of his petition for the benefit's prisoner of war (POW) of the Vietnam War, his real properties were lost by the Foreign Assistance Act in 1963 and protocols of international relations are between the Government of the US and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam within the American law- and another is the mental case of the state of California is defaming, libeling, and slandering, which have destroyed his intellectual property and a treasure of literature and artwork. Therefore, he would like to petition to the United States Congress without had political actions and criminal case.

III. INTRODUCTION

The petition, Lieutenant Police of the Republic of Vietnam (ROV), is represented for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam when he would like to ask for his real property, small business, and benefit of POW- and includes, for his intellectual property, in which were all lost by Foreign Assistance Acts - and therefore, the bases on the Federal Tort Claims Act. Those were great values of a personal life. In fact, the defendant's US has violated the US Constitution. As a result, the judge of the low court has ordered the matter dismissed without prejudice on February 16, 2017. That's why he has had affirmed for his true case, his exact documents and burden of sufferings have been complainant to the California Court of Appeal in 350 McAllister Street, San Francisco, CA 94102 for many times, but there was not reviewed and returned his statement of the case. Ironically, the US Department of Justice and the US Supreme Court are always discriminating for his so many burdens of proof. When he is common Vietnamese American citizen without had powerful, his legal foundationless is the claim that rationality within American law and knowledge rest on a firm foundation of self-evident truths.


IV. BACKGROUND

He is a victim of the Vietnam War of America Proxy War, but he, therefore, was left on the battlefield of the Vietnam War on April 30, 1975, by the US and Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, by the International Treaty. After that, the foe of the US and ROV did not only nationalize his real properties but also sent him too many jails in South Vietnam. In condition, his children and his wife were homeless from April 30, 1975, to November 22, 1993. During living in the US, he always expresses to be good Vietnamese American citizen without crimes, but, it suddenly put a mental case on his head when evaluations of his doctors have confirmed him to no mental illness. But, it still forced him to writ for the mandate from the Court because it was taken over his driver license- during it defamed him, destroyed his intellectual copyrights and a treasure of his artwork. After five years, he does not only meet so much burden of suffering, sorrowful and miserable life by local government but also he was miserable for the nightmare of prisoner of war for the long run. It is the same as a suspended sentence for long life. So, it is exact evidence of his petition submits to Speaker of the U.S. House and Chairman of Justice Committee, Chairman of on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman of on Armed Services Committee in order to seek the American justice of the Vietnam War of prisoner of war without had political actions and criminal section.





V. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

To be exact Prisoners of War case, the Vietnam War is gone by the forty-four years, but, the American Government could not compensate the imprisoned benefit insurance and property in which are injured by the American Government from on April 30, 1975, to present time. Significantly, when the Government of the United States of America did not only recognize the Republic of Vietnam that’s to be a neo-colonial war of the United States of America because of the American Government has sold the Republic of Vietnam to communism but also realized all of the Southern Officers, and Military to be adopted by America - and therefore, the American Government must bring them Home by a special bill. But this bill has not corresponded with Prisoners of War; he, therefore, would like to carry out the American law of prisoners of war than refugee bill.
In contrast, the exchange of the grant of P.O.W to the refugee that does not correspond with the US Congress enacted statutorily to the Vietnam War. Because of US Congress has had endorsed him to be a prisoner of war, his benefits of prisoner of war should be corresponded within his merits were good servicing for a core of interests of the Government of the United States of America. Therefore, the petitioner would like to take legal action with the American Government within American law is the rule of law without have rule by law. When the bases on the First and the Fourteen Amendments to the US Constitution because he is a Vietnamese American citizen, but, which is why the bill was changed to refugee status. So, the United States Congress contradicted oneself. Significantly, the United States Congress has enacting Bring Them Home that means that United States Congress is entirely endorsing him as Vietnamese Officer of the Republic of Vietnam who is serviced the Vietnam War for the American Government Significantly, the right enforcement of American law of prisoner of war because of the United States of America has been approving for all of the international conventions, which is why the Government of the United States of America could not carry out for the Vietnam War of the Republic of Vietnam of prisoner of war because of this war was belongs to Government of the United States of America's mastermind in American law.
The pursuant S.484 [3] BRING THEM HOME ALIVE Act of 2000 Pub.L.106-484. Nov. 9, 2000. 114 Stat- Passed Senate amended (05/24/2000)
Bring Them Home Alive Act of 2000 - Directs the Attorney General to grant refugee status in the United States to any alien (and the parent, spouse, or child of such alien) who: (1) is a national of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, China, or any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union; and (2) personally delivers into U.S. custody a living American Vietnam War POW or MIA.

Requires the granting of the same status to any alien (and parent, spouse, or child) who is a national of North Korea, China, or any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union and who personally delivers a living American Korean War POW or MIA.
Directs the International Broadcasting Bureau to broadcast to such foreign countries information that promotes such ("Bring Them Home Alive") refugee programs. Requires: (1) a minimum programming level for such broadcasting; and (2) the Bureau to ensure that such information is made available on the Internet.
Expresses the sense of the Congress that RFE/RL, Inc., Radio Free Asia, and any other recipient of Federal grants that broadcasts to such countries should also broadcast such information.
______________
[3] Certificate of Dismissal from camp # 293-258078061142 by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and his picture of lieutenant Police of the Republic of Vietnam, the certificates of birth of his family and his small business of the ROV, and licensed Small Business of the Republic of Vietnam.

To proving 9.11 Particular Rights - First Amendment [4] "Citizen" Plaintiff, as previously explained, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the act of the defendant's US deprived the plaintiff of particular rights under the US Constitution. In case, the plaintiff alleges the defendant deprived him of his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution

In the meanwhile, the refugee of the United States Congress bill was not suitable for P.O.W, because of his wonderful nation looked like America sovereignty, he had democracy, freedom, and justice which is why the US did not only have violated his national sovereignty by America’s proxy war but also sold him to Communism without had the protocol of international relations between the US and the Republic of Vietnam. Let the US sell-off South Vietnam to communism and played handoff policy. How would the US think about to equal opportunity under America law? All of the super values of his Republic of Vietnam were destroyed by the United States plan in the Vietnam War- ever before, the United States Congress has enacted the bill which is Foreign Assistance Act in 1963 for the Republic of Vietnam. That’s why lets the American Government have forced him to demean oneself a modern slavery war in the United States of America. Therefore, he would like to enforce this bill let him say publicly a right plaintiff because of some of American Government employees who were wrongful actions of the Vietnam War.
_____________
[4]. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances


As previously explained, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the act’s 28 U.S.C. § 1346 b -June 25,1948 of the defendants are the Kissinger, the Barbara P. Schmidt, and the Jackie Chahal deprived the plaintiff of particular rights under the United States Constitution. In this case, the plaintiff alleges the defendant deprived him of his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution when his statement of the case of the settlement factual basis of the plaintiff claims; he has been a petition to the American Court system for many years in the past. Agencies have distorted the American law of the United States Congress.
Under the First Amendment, a citizen has the right to carry out the American law to petition the United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Secret Service Office of Government Liaison & Public Affairs 950H Street, N.W. Suite 8400 Washington, DC 20223. In order to prove the defendant deprived the plaintiff of this First Amendment right, the plaintiff must prove the following additional elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity;
2. The defendant’s actions against the plaintiff would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and
3. The plaintiff’s protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.
[I instruct you that the plaintiff’s [speech in this case about [specify]] [specify conduct] was protected under the First Amendment and, therefore, the first element requires no proof.]
A substantial or motivating factor is a significant factor.

Statutorily is 22 U.S. Code § 2451[5] - Congressional statement of purpose. (Pubic L. 87–256, § 101, Sept. 21, 1961, 75 Stat., 527)-
The purpose of this chapter is to enable the Government of the US to increase mutual understanding between the people of the US and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the US and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the US and the other countries of the world.
According to the American bill is without had assassinated any foreign leaders that is why American President had ordered to assassinate the president of the Republic of Vietnam. What happened? That is why; this statutory was exchanged from the rights to the wrong.
When the United States bill had ordered Republic of Vietnam to fight anti-communism, but, it came to prohibit the Republic of Vietnam that did not win the victory the Vietnamese communist regime.
In contrast, Task Force had to help for the enemy of the Republic of Vietnam let's seize whole South Vietnam. The financial aid and
______________
[5] Tape recorded November 4, 1963, 35th President dictates a memo seeming to regrets the assassination of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem, following a coup 35th President endorsed. Only weeks before his own assassination 35th President recorded, “I feel that we must bear a good deal of responsibility, in part beginning with our cable of early August, in which we suggested the coup, period. In my judgment that wire was badly drafted, comma, it should never have been sent on a Saturday."




Republic of Vietnam let us fight for anti-communism for taking the victory.
Armed Services helped for the South Vietnam. That is why Secretary of State and Secretary of defense who sold all of the manpower of South Vietnam to communism when the United States did not only help us to fight anti-communism but also supported financially to let us fight anti-communism. In fact, Task Force of the American Government has been sent to the Republic of Vietnam.
22 U.S. Code § 7103 [6] Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
The proving this bill of the United States Congress is anti- Combat Traffickers which is why the United States Congress has enacted the Foreign Assistance Act in 1963 for helping the Republic of Vietnam that's fighting anti-communism in order to protect a core of interest of the United States of America, but, in contrast, the US has taken advantage of American law in order to apply neo-colonial war in the Republic of Vietnam. The US has thought about the Vietnamese people who looked like the American products, which have been exchanging on the world or so-called is the free trading relations because the US has seized the whole South Vietnam, the US has begun playing free trading relations policy. The US has freely sold the manpower of the Republic of Vietnam to communism and then the US had re - brought him to the America without had paid any pennies in the trader, in the meanwhile, he has been paying for a high price to Vietnamese communist regime if the US has never had any trafficking him which is why the US did not tell him to follow with the US on April 30, 1975, when the US cut and run out of the Republic of Vietnam.
In fact, the African slave trade in the past when the American traders
____________

[6] Protocol of international Relations of Paris Peace Accords was no chapter and article in which allowed the Government of the US to throw garbage it. The American law enacted the right way but did the wrongful path. 108. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) 1Washington, March 14, 1962 (See appendix) 1963-1965
came to the African. They paid and received so many of slavers, so the modern slavery war of the Republic of Vietnam that the US has never paid any pennies to the parents of Southern officers after we were serviced war for the United States of America. Even condition, when he just came to the United States of America, the International Association has donated him the two thousand dollars to let him rebuild a new life, but the American local government has subtracted it within had the eight-months benefits of the refugee policy. However, the US has never had to remind for prisoner of war when the US does not only approve the international Convention for Prisoner of War but also the US enacted the law for prisoner of war again. The look down one nose of the US had thought about the Vietnamese prisoner of war of American proxy war that we are stupid in the American laws. Let the US continue to fool him in the United States of America. If he lived in the communist government without had democracy, freedom, and justice when he did not have any own properties, he wished to come to American nation in order to demean to be making a slave.
Ironically, the modern slavery war of the Vietnam war must pay for the whole airplane ticket within had loan by the Government of the United States of America. So he can do. In fact, the protocol international relations of the US had been recognized the Republic of Vietnam to be American adequate partnership when the Republic of Vietnam has corresponded with America policy because of we were together endorsement Capitalism, we strongly gathered to fight anti-communism, but, which is why the US has sold us to communism- and then, the US has brought us from the Vietnamese communist government hand without paid any pennies in protocol international relations which is why the US has been used us to be a combat- trafficker of yours.







(a)ESTABLISHMENT
The President shall establish an Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking.
(b)APPOINTMENT
The President shall appoint the members of the Task Force, which shall include the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of the Treasury, the United States Trade Representative, and such other officials as may be designated by the President.
(c)CHAIRMAN
The Task Force shall be chaired by the Secretary of State.
(d)ACTIVITIES OF THE TASK FORCE The Task Force shall carry out the following activities:
(1)
Coordinate the implementation of this chapter.
(2)
Measure and evaluate progress of the United States and other countries in the areas of trafficking prevention, protection, and assistance to victims of trafficking, and prosecution and enforcement against traffickers, including the role of public corruption in facilitating trafficking. The Task Force shall have primary responsibility for assisting the Secretary of State in the preparation of the reports described in section 7107 of this title.
(3)
Expand interagency procedures to collect and organize data, including significant research and resource information on domestic and international trafficking and providing an annual report on the case referrals received from the national human trafficking hotline by Federal departments and agencies. Any data collection procedures and reporting requirements established under this subsection shall respect the confidentiality of victims of trafficking.
(4)
Engage in efforts to facilitate cooperation among countries of origin, transit, and destination. Such efforts shall aim to strengthen local and regional capacities to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers and assist trafficking victims, and shall include initiatives to enhance cooperative efforts between destination countries and countries of origin and assist in the appropriate reintegration of stateless victims of trafficking.
(5)
Examine the role of the international “sex tourism” industry in the trafficking of persons and in the sexual exploitation of women and children around the world.
(6)
Engage in consultation and advocacy with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, among other entities, to advance the purposes of this chapter, and make reasonable efforts to distribute information to enable all relevant Federal Government agencies to publicize the National Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline on their websites, in all headquarters offices, and in all field offices throughout the United States.
(7)Not later than May 1, 2004, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, a report on Federal agencies that are implementing any provision of this chapter, or any amendment made by this chapter, which shall include, at a minimum, information on—
(A)
the number of persons who received benefits or other services under subsections (b) and (f) [1] of section 7105 of this title in connection with programs or activities funded or administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Labor, the Attorney General, the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation, and other appropriate Federal agencies during the preceding fiscal year;
(B)
the number of persons who have been granted continued presence in the United States under section 7105(c)(3) of this title during the preceding fiscal year and the mean and median time taken to adjudicate applications submitted under such section, including the time from the receipt of an application by law enforcement to the issuance of continued presence, and a description of any efforts being taken to reduce the adjudication and processing time while ensuring the safe and competent processing of the applications;
(C)
the number of persons who have applied for, been granted, or been denied a visa or otherwise provided status under subparagraph (T)(i) or (U)(i) of section 1101(a)(15) of title 8 during the preceding fiscal year;
(D)
the number of persons who have applied for, been granted, or been denied a visa or status under clause (ii) of section 1101(a)(15)(T) of title 8 during the preceding fiscal year, broken down by the number of such persons described in sub clauses (I), (II), and (III) of such clause (ii);
(E)
the amount of Federal funds expended in direct benefits paid to individuals described in subparagraph (D) in conjunction with T visa status;
(F)
the number of persons who have applied for, been granted, or been denied a visa or status under section 1101(a)(15)(U)(i) of title 8 during the preceding fiscal year;
(G)
the mean and median time in which it takes to adjudicate applications submitted under the provisions of law set forth in subparagraph (C), including the time between the receipt of an application and the issuance of a visa and work authorization;
(H)
any efforts being taken to reduce the adjudication and processing time, while ensuring the safe and competent processing of the applications;
(I)
the number of persons who have been charged or convicted under one or more of sections 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592, or 1594 of title 18 during the preceding fiscal year and the sentences imposed against each such person;
(J)
the amount, recipient, and purpose of each grant issued by any Federal agency to carry out the purposes of sections 7104 and 7105 of this title, or section 2152d of this title, during the preceding fiscal year;
(K)
the nature of training conducted pursuant to section 7105(c)(4) of this title during the preceding fiscal year;
(L)
the amount, recipient, and purpose of each grant under sections 20702 and 20705 of title 34; 1
(M) Activities by the Department of Defense to combat trafficking in persons, including—
(i)
Educational efforts for, and disciplinary actions taken against, members of the United States Armed Forces;
(ii)
the development of materials used to train the armed forces of foreign countries;
(iii)
All known trafficking in persons cases reported to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness;
(iv)
efforts to ensure that United States Government contractors and their employees or States Government subcontractors and their employees do not engage in trafficking in persons; and
(v)
all trafficking in persons activities of contractors reported to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;
(N)
activities or actions by Federal departments and agencies to enforce—
(i)
section 7104(g) of this title and any similar law, regulation, or policy relating to States Government contractors and their employees or United States Government subcontractors and their employees that engage in persons, the procurement of commercial sex acts, or the use of forced labor, including debt bondage;
(ii)
section 1307 of title 19 (relating to prohibition on importation of convict-made goods), including any determinations by the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive the restrictions of such section; and
(iii)
prohibitions on the procurement by the United States Government of items or services produced by slave labor, consistent with Executive Order 13107(December 10, 1998);
(O)
the activities undertaken by the Senior Policy Operating Group to carry out its responsibilities under subsection (g); and [2]
(P)
the activities undertaken by Federal agencies to train appropriate State, tribal, and local government and law enforcement officials to identify victims of severe forms of trafficking, including both sex and labor trafficking;
(Q)the activities undertaken by Federal agencies in cooperation with State, tribal, and local law enforcement officials to identify, investigate, and prosecute offenses under sections 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592, 1594, 2251, 2251A, 2421, 2422, and 2423 of title 18, or equivalent State offenses, including, in each fiscal year—
(i)
the number, age, gender, country of origin, and citizenship status of victims identified for each offense;
(ii)
the number of individuals charged, and the number of individuals convicted, under each offense;
(iii)
the number of individuals referred for prosecution for State offenses, including offenses relating to the purchasing of commercial sex acts;
(iv)
the number of victims granted continued presence in the United States under section 7105(c)(3) of this title;
(v)
the number of victims granted a visa or otherwise provided status under subparagraph (T)(i) or (U)(i) of section 1101(a)(15) of title 8;
(vi)
the number of individuals required by a court order to pay restitution in connection with a violation of each offense under title 18, the amount of restitution required to be paid under each such order, and the amount of restitution actually paid pursuant to each such order;
(vii)
the age, gender, race, country of origin, country of citizenship, and description of the role in the offense of individuals convicted under each offense;
(viii)
the number of convictions obtained under chapter 77 of title 18 aggregated separately by the form of offense committed with respect to the victim, including recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, advertising, maintaining, patronizing, or soliciting a human trafficking victim; and 2
(R)
the activities undertaken by the Department of Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services to meet the specific needs of minor victims of domestic trafficking, including actions taken pursuant to subsection (f) and section 20702(a) 1 of title 34, and the steps taken to increase cooperation among Federal agencies to ensure the effective and efficient use of programs for which the victims are eligible; and
(S)
tactics and strategies employed by human trafficking task forces sponsored by the Department of Justice to reduce demand for trafficking victims.
(e)OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING
(1)IN GENERAL
The Secretary of State shall establish within the Department of State an Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking, which shall provide assistance to the Task Force. Any such Office shall be headed by a Director, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with the rank of Ambassador-at-Large. The Director shall have the primary responsibility for assisting the Secretary of State in carrying out the purposes of this chapter and may have additional responsibilities as determined by the Secretary. The Director shall consult with nongovernmental organizations and multilateral organizations, and with trafficking victims or other affected persons. The Director shall have the authority to take evidence in public hearings or by other means. The agencies represented on the Task Force are authorized to provide staff to the Office on a no reimbursable basis.
(2)UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE The Director shall be responsible for—
(A)
all policy, funding, and programming decisions regarding funds made available for trafficking in persons programs that are centrally controlled by the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking; and
(B)
Coordinating any trafficking in persons programs of the Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development that are not centrally controlled by the Director.
(f)REGIONAL STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Each regional bureau in the Department of State shall contribute to the realization of the anti-trafficking goals and objectives of the Secretary of State. Each year, in cooperation with the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, each regional bureau shall submit a list of anti-trafficking goals and objectives to the Secretary of State for each country in the geographic area of responsibilities of the regional bureau. Host governments shall be informed of the goals and objectives for their particular country and, to the extent possible, host government officials should be consulted regarding the goals and objectives.
(g)SENIOR POLICY OPERATING GROUP
(1)ESTABLISHMENT
There shall be established within the executive branch a Senior Policy Operating Group.
(2)MEMBERSHIP; RELATED MATTERS
(A)In general
The Operating Group shall consist of the senior officials designated as representatives of the appointed members of the Task Force (pursuant to Executive Order No. 13257of February 13, 2002).
(B)Chairperson
The Operating Group shall be chaired by the Director of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking of the Department of State.
(C)Meetings
The Operating Group shall meet on a regular basis at the call of the Chairperson.
(3)DUTIES
The Operating Group shall coordinate activities of Federal departments and agencies regarding policies (including grants and grant policies) involving the international trafficking in persons and the implementation of this chapter.
(4)AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
Each Federal department or agency represented on the Operating Group shall fully share all information with such Group regarding the department or agency’s plans, before and after final agency decisions are made, on all matters relating to grants, grant policies, and other significant actions regarding the international trafficking in persons and the implementation of this chapter.
(5)REGULATIONS
Not later than 90 days after December 19, 2003, the President shall promulgate regulations to implement this section, including regulations to carry out paragraph (4).
(Pub. L. 106–386, div. A, § 105, Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1473; Pub. L. 108–193, § 6(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), Dec. 19, 2003, 117 Stat. 2880, 2881; Pub. L. 109–164, title I, § 104(a), title II, § 205, Jan. 10, 2006, 119 Stat. 3564, 3571; Pub. L. 110–457, title I, §§ 101, 102, title II, § 231, title III, § 304(a), Dec. 23, 2008, 122 Stat. 5045, 5072, 5087; Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title XVII, § 1707, Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2098; Pub. L. 113–4, title XII, §§ 1201, 1203(a), 1231, Mar. 7, 2013, 127 Stat. 136, 138, 144; Pub. L. 114–22, title VI, § 602, May 29, 2015, 129 Stat. 259; Pub. L. 115–392, §§ 16, 18(a), Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5257, 5258; Pub. L. 115–425, title I, § 121(a), title II, § 201, Jan. 8, 2019, 132 Stat. 5478, 5482.)

Statutorily 22 USC§ 2403 (a) [7] - Definitions - Pub. L. 87–195, pt. III, § 644, Sept. 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 461...As used in this chapter—
22 U.S. Code § 2403. Definitions
In exact proves Statutory 22 USC§ 2403, which has all of the American manpower and the American materials and American products were
supported by the war power of yours in the Vietnam War by the American people taxes but which are why after you used them in the
Republic of Vietnam, you have had donated all of your products to communist Vietnam. In contrast, you have been maltreated the Southern Officers for them that we did not only fight anti-communism in order to protect your core of interests but also you have never compensated any pennies benefits of prisoner of war. Why did you use us to be the cheapest of modern slavery war of yours when no parents of our human beings were
_______________

[7]As a result, all American men of talent and of the American manpower must use to service for the Vietnam War by this law. But, how was The My_Lai Massacre and Court-Material: An Account? And Vietnam War: The Early Years, 1965-1976 construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this subsection; or How would you think about the American armed for operating in the Republic of Vietnam? (See appendix)


born the child to lets them service your war power without had any benefits of the prisoner of war?
U.S. Code
Notes
Authorities (CFR)
prev | next
As used in this chapter—
(a) “Agency of the United States Government” includes any agency, department, board, wholly or partly owned corporation, instrumentality, commission, or establishment of the United States Government.
(b) “Armed Forces” of the United States means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
(c) “Commodity” includes any material, article, supply, goods, or equipment used for the purposes of furnishing nonmilitary assistance.
(d) “Defense article” includes—
(1) Any weapon, weapons system, munitions, aircraft, vessel, boat or another implement of war;

(2) Any property, installation, commodity, material, equipment, supply, or goods used for the purposes of furnishing military assistance;
(3) Any machinery, facility, tool, material supply, or other items necessary for the manufacture, production, processing repair, servicing,
Storage, construction, transportation, operation, or use of any article listed in this subsection; or
(4) Any component or part of any article listed in this subsection; but
Shall not include merchant vessels or, as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011), source material (except uranium depleted in the isotope 235 which is incorporated in
Defense articles solely to take advantage of high density or hydrophobic characteristics unrelated to radioactivity), by-product material, special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities, or atomic weapons or articles involving Restricted Data.
(e) “Defense information” includes any document, writing, sketch, photograph, plan, model, specification, design, prototype, or other recorded or oral information relating to any defense article or defense service, but shall not include Restricted Data as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], and data removed from the Restricted Data category under section 142d of that Act [42 U.S.C. 2162(d)].
(f) “Defense service” includes any service, test, inspection, repair, publication, or technical or other assistance or defense information used for the purposes of furnishing military assistance, but does not include military educational and training activities under part V of subchapter II of this chapter.
(g) “Excess defense articles” means the quantity of defense articles (other than construction equipment, including tractors, scrapers, loaders, graders, bulldozers, dump trucks, generators, and compressors) owned by the United States Government, and not procured in anticipation of military assistance or sales requirements, or pursuant to a military assistance or sales order, which is in excess of the Approved Force Acquisition Objective and Approved Force Retention Stock of all Department of Defense Components at the time such articles are dropped from inventory by the supplying agency for delivery to countries or international organizations under this chapter.
(h) “Function” includes any duty, obligation, power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, discretion, or activity.


The statutorily is 18 USC§ 2381 [8] Treason (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 807; Pub. L. 103–322,
Why did the US Secretary of state 56th that declare and say, “Hanoi wanted victory?” And therefore, he is torn shred the Paris Peace Accords when he has been taken all of the American citizen's taxes for supporting the Vietnam War let him donate the Republic of Vietnam to North Vietnam
____________
[8] No chapters and no articles of the Paris Peace Accords had sold him to Hanoi, Vietnam and deleted the Republic of Vietnam. (See Appendix)


by the sale of the Republic of Vietnam to communism. And then, he has had said, “Vietnam Failures we did to ourselves." Therefore, this is exact evidence of the Vietnam War, which is had treason by the Government of the United States of America. From the first to the end of the Vietnam War, the United States Congress did not enact any statutes in order to betray the Republic of Vietnam which is why you had transferred the Republic of Vietnam to the hand of communism when you did not respect the protocols international relations of yours with the Republic of Vietnam. For exact good evidence, the mastermind of the Vietnam War of the United States of America is the Kissinger who self has been confessed wrongful actions in the Vietnam War, so the American law is American law, you can not distort the American justice. What would does he believe the American law when you enacted the law? Why did the Government of the United States of America enforce the American law and the international treaties of the Vietnam War? On the other hand, the United States Congress has enacted American law, which looked like a nail hammed into hardwood; it is different with water off a duck's back. That’s treason of the Kissinger when he was against his the United States Congress. In fact, the Republic of Vietnam is not the same as a pool of the gym, lets whoever is easily coming in and easily get out. However, the gym has gym rule lets everyone follow the rule of the gym which is why the Republic of Vietnam as likes National America builds so hard, but easily destroyed in South Vietnam without had any American laws.
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 807; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016(2)(J), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2148.) United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.


10 U.S. Code § 2733 [9] Property loss; personal injury or death: incident to non-combat activities of Department of Army, Navy, or Air Force
According to this statutory is proved with his father killed on May 30, 1965 when the war was taken place, his dead father had without governments which were giving any Death Certificates - during his real property, his small business, and his prisoner of war benefits from May 30, 1965, and his great values of the intellectual property was entirely destroyed by the mental case of the State of California in 2009 to the presenting time, which is totally summarized for the one hundred million dollars ($ 100,000,000.00) in compensation. Because no great power of the world enacted a law to invade a weak country, a great power has been destroyed all of the natural resources and manpower of the Republic of Vietnam without had compensation. Especially, the United States Congress has solemnly been signed for agreements and treaties in order to approve the sovereignty and the self-determination of the Republic of Vietnam, but after that, the Government of the United States of America barbarously betrayed the Republic of Vietnam. How would you think about your American justice when you opened the war in the Republic of Vietnam? What would you realize super values of Americanism concerned with the study of moral value in the Vietnam War? For that reason, General William Westmoreland was the commanding general of U.S. military forces in Vietnam when the United States Congress has approved Foreign Assistance in 1963. Indeed, the Vietnam War was just taking place, so General William Westmoreland was in the Republic of Vietnam in March 1964, when he was a highly decorated veteran of World War II and the Korean War. Furthermore, when Westmoreland first took command in Saigon; the United States had fewer than 17,000 military “advisors” helping for South Vietnam. Their job was to
________________
[9] His small business of the Republic of Vietnam, his prisoner of war, and family was injured by the American Army. His Certificate of Dismissal from Camp
train and advise the Republic of Vietnam of Military in order to fight against communism and the Viet Cong. For Westmoreland continually pressed Washington to send combat troops, he came to the shores of Da Nang in March 1965, the American phase of the Vietnam War had animatedly begun. However, as President John F. Kennedy had predicted just a few years earlier – he quickly ordered sending his American soldiers that had 450.000 soldiers to the Republic of Vietnam in summer 1967, the American soldiers were fighting for anti-communism.
In the meanwhile, the Republic of Vietnam Military has strongly been attacking the Vietnamese communist soldiers. The enemy of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States were cut and run to escape in highlands. On other hands, the American soldiers were strongly finding out all of the Vietnamese peasants to transfer them to the free-zones of the Republic of Vietnam, but most of them were completely assassinated by the American soldiers and the Korean soldiers. For example, the Vietnamese common peasants were in the East Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai province; they were completely strongly gathered by the American soldiers as like My-Lai assassination took place in 1967. In the West Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai province, the innocent peasants were together concentrated in one place and assassinated by the Korean soldiers. Because of this time was the Phoenix Program of the United States of America was taking place for Central Intelligence Agency, the Phoenix Program is in operation between 1965 and 1972, and the result of the Phoenix Program has had been neutralization arresting for the 81,740 suspected VC operatives, in which were killed approximately between 26,000 and 41,000 Vietnamese communist spies. Ironically, all of them would highly like to adore their Republic of Vietnam, but, which are why they had left the Republic of Vietnam. Because of the coup of the year’s 1963 took place, they were secretly mobilized by the Vietnamese communist spies when the Southern soldiers did not follow where sides are. Therefore, the Southern soldiers have left their local governments and checkpoints. In the meanwhile, the Vietnamese communist guerillas were stood up and robbed whole local governments and checkpoints of South Vietnam.
The outcome of the coup did not only all lose the heart of the Southern people but also lost all of the battlefields and checkpoints. Therefore, the Vietnam War was eroded by the public world support for the Vietnam War, and then, in October 1967, Gallup found for the first time ever that more Americans (46 percent) thought that it had been a mistake to send U.S. troops to fight in Vietnam War than thought it hadn’t (44 percent). In condition, when Lyndon B. John has begun American President, he has nominated Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. So the discussions inside the administration gave President Lyndon B. John no reason to believe that he would soon have good news for the American public. For Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, one of the architects of the Americanization of the war had concluded by the spring of 1967 that the war couldn’t be won and pressed Johnson to scale back the U.S. effort. Meanwhile, Westmoreland, with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that the war could be won, but only if he sent 200,000 more American troops to the Republic of Vietnam and enlarged the mid-air campaign.
In contrast, when President Nixon was won by his powerful term, he would change the Government of the United States of America policy. His Advisory who’s the Kissinger is born out a New World Orders when he has got the Republic of Vietnam to be a test- experience for his New World Orders. Therefore, the American war of the Vietnam War did not want any victories when he has torn shred Paris peace Accords and all of protocol international relations between the Republic of Vietnam and the American Government were too. Therefore, the seven hundred million dollars should be supporting the Republic of Vietnam, which was cut to stop by the United States Congress which is why the Republic of Vietnam is betrayed by the American Government allies. In the meantime, the US Department of Justice who is Robert Kennedy came to Saigon, the Republic of Vietnam when he declared and said, “The Vietnam War must be won communism.” In proving, under Sections 552 (c) (2) and 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended. Or so-called he self said, “Vietnam Failures we did to our selves says the Kissinger”
(a) Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, he, or, subject to appeal to him, the Judge Advocate General of an armed force under his jurisdiction, or the chief Counsel of the Coast Guard, as appropriate, if designated by him, may settle, and pay in an amount not more than $100,000, a claim against the United States for—
(1)
Damage to or loss of real property, including damage or loss incident to use and occupancy;

(2)
damage to or loss of personal property, including property bailed to the United States and including registered or insured mail damaged, lost, or destroyed by a criminal act while in the possession of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, as the case may be; or
(3)
Personal injury or death;
either caused by a civilian officer or employee of that department, or the Coast Guard, or a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, as the case may be, acting within the scope of his employment, or otherwise incident to non-combat activities of that department, or the Coast Guard.
(b) A claim may be allowed under subsection (a) only if—
(1)
it is presented in writing within two years after it accrues, except that if the claim accrues in time of war or armed conflict or if such a war or armed conflict intervenes within two years after it accrues, and if good cause is shown, the claim may be presented not later than two years after the war or armed conflict is terminated;
(2)
It is not covered by section 2734 of this title or section 2672 of title 28;
(3)
It is not for personal injury or death of such a member or civilian officer or employee whose injury or death is incident to his service;
(4)
the damage to, or loss of, property, or the personal injury or death, was not caused wholly or partly by a negligent or wrongful act of the claimant, his agent, or his employee; or, if so caused, allowed only to the extent that the law of the place where the act or omission complained of occurred would permit recovery from a private individual under like circumstances; and
(5)
It is substantiated as prescribed in regulations of the Secretary concerned.
For the purposes of clause (1), the dates of the beginning and ending of an armed conflict are the dates established by concurrent resolution of Congress or by a determination of the President.
(c)
Payment may not be made under this section for reimbursement for medical, hospital, or burial services furnished at the expense of the United States.
(d)
If the Secretary concerned considers that a claim in excess of $100,000 is meritorious, and the claim otherwise is payable under this section, the Secretary may pay the claimant $100,000 and report any meritorious amount in excess of $100,000 to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment under section 1304 of title 31.
(e)
Except as provided in subsection (d), no claim may be paid under this section unless the amount tendered is accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction.
(f)
For the purposes of this section, a member of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or of the Public Health Service who is serving with the Navy or Marine Corps shall be treated as if he were a member of that armed force.
(g)
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, an officer or employee under the jurisdiction of the Secretary may settle a claim that otherwise would be payable under this section in an amount not to exceed $25,000. A decision of the officer or employee who makes a final settlement decision under this section may be appealed by the claimant to the Secretary concerned or an officer or employee designated by the Secretary for that purpose.
(h)
Under such regulations as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, he or his designee has the same authority as the Secretary of a military department under this section with respect to the settlement of claims based on damage, loss, personal injury, or death caused by a civilian officer or employee of the Department of Defense acting within the scope of his employment or otherwise incident to non-combat activities of that department.
(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 153; Pub. L. 85–729, § 1, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 813; Pub. L. 85–861, § 1(54), Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1461; Pub. L. 89–718, § 8(a), Nov. 2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1117; Pub. L. 90–522, Sept. 26, 1968, 82 Stat. 875; Pub. L. 90–525, §§ 1, 3–5, Sept. 26, 1968, 82 Stat. 877, 878; Pub. L. 91–312, § 2, July 8, 1970, 84 Stat. 412; Pub. L. 93–336, § 1, July 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 291; Pub. L. 96–513, title V, § 511 (94), Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 2928; Pub. L. 98–564, § 1, Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2918; Pub. L. 104–316, title II, § 202 (e), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3842.)









Exact evidence is 22 U.S.C. §§ 1571_1604. [10] P.L 329, 81st Congresses - 63 Stat- 714- December 23, 1950
The Government of the United States of America volunteer came to Saigon, Vietnam and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. They have solemnly signed this United States Treaty and to be international Agreement. After that, the United States Congress was quickly endorsed to enact the American law, the United States Congress did not only recognize the defense of the United States that protected the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia, and Laos but also respected the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam. Especially, this United States Treaty has to order small nations in which South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were ruled controlled by the Government of the United States of America. As a result, all of the super values of the American powerful have cast within this United States Treaty and the American honorable was proud of this International Agreement in Saigon, Vietnam.
___________
[10] Furthermore, the United States and Viet-Nam are parties to the agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950 (TIAS 2447; 3 U.S.T. 2756) which was concluded pursuant to P.L. 329, 81st Congress (63 Stat. 714, 22 U.S.C. 1571-1604). This agreement provides for the furnishing by the United States to Viet-Nam, among others, of military assistance in the form of equipment, material, and services. Article IV, paragraph 2, of the agreement, states that “To facilitate operations under this agreement, each Government agrees … to receive within its territory such personnel of the United States of America as may be required for the purposes of this agreement ….”



H.R. 5490[11] Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearing before of Representatives- Eighty-Eighth Congress-From April 23, 24, 25, and 29, 1963- A question 3:
After some days of the United States Congress were hearings for supporting the Republic of Vietnam. In condition, the United States Congress did not only approve the Republic of Vietnam sovereignty but also enacted American law supported the Republic of Vietnam to fight anti- communism to victory. In the meanwhile, the United States of Secretary of state was solemnly endorsed the Republic of Vietnam within protocols international relations – and therefore, the United States Congress has approved in all.
with Q.1.-How well does the present situations vis-à-vis the Vietcong- in its military, political, economic, and social aspects - compare with 6 months ago? What is December 21, 1951? Excerpt from Mutual Security Act of 1951 Public Law 165—82d Congress Chapter 479—1st Session H.R. 5113
or of the situation is first the confidence of the people in a system which can give them final victory over communism...The evidence on which your appraisal is based?
__________
[11] Why did the United States Congress approve the United States Treaty In December 23, 1950 Saigon, Vietnam but other the United States treaties did not approve as like Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973?



A. 1. - The most obvious indication of an improvement
Q. 2. - When the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the US are working and fighting for the same aim, why is there some mutual irritation, evident and continuous, apparent on both sides? What is the remedy?
A. 2. - One must consider the relationship between the US and Vietnam as well as the relationship between the US and the undeveloped countries as contacts between different culture and civilizations and not as a mere temporary pooling of material means to fight against Communist invasion, as people generally think, both among the Vietnam and the America.
Q. 3. - Even go good a friend of Vietnam as Senator Mansfield recently reaffirmed his respect for you, while complaining against "Authoritarian rule." How do you interpret the Senator's remarks?
A. 3. - I have already dealt with the problem of democracy underdevelopment which not only Vietnam but all the underdeveloped countries have to face, and with different ways in which these countries have sought to solve this historic problem during the last 20 years. I have said how South Vietnam, while fighting a war and carrying out a revolution,
Now I find that if it is unfair to assess the situation in South Vietnam and in Southeast Asia by the Mansfield report, it would be equality unfair to judge our good friend Senator Mansfield only by this collective and hasty report as well as by the publicity accorded it.



H.R. 7885—[12] Public law, 88-205, approved December 16, 1963
Authorized $3,599,050,000 in foreign aid funds for fiscal 1964
Why did the Government of the United States of America promise to win communism but not keep it after seized whole the Republic of Vietnam , the American Government was torn shred American laws of the Vietnam War? What were the super values of American law in the Vietnam War? What does the United States Congress enact the statutory the Vietnam War without had rightly enforce happened? In proving, President Kennedy has secretly ordered to assassinate President Ngo Dinh Diem, so South Vietnam belongs to the neo-colonial war of the Government of the United States of America. As a result, the Vietnam War was controlled by the Government of the United States of America that President Kennedy approves sending 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other U.S. military advisers to South Vietnam. On the same day, he orders the start of clandestine warfare against North Vietnam to be conducted by South Vietnamese agents under the direction and training of the CIA and U.S. Special Forces troops. Kennedy’s orders also called for South Vietnamese forces to infiltrate Laos to locate and disrupt communist bases and supply lines there, but why did the Government of the United States of America sell the Republic of Vietnam to communism during did not adequately enforce this American law of the Vietnam War of the United States Congress? Uncertain, the protocol of international
______________
[12] 108 letters of the Government of the United States of America have solemnly been promised with the Republic of Vietnam

relations of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam looked like water off a duck’s back. How would super values of Great Power of the United States when congress enacted law helped for a weak nation?
The administration had requested $4.5 billion, the House passed $3.5 billion, and the Senate passed $3.7 billion. Major provisions are:
Funds for fiscal years 1964
Development loans......... .....................$925,000,000
Development grants..................................$220,000,000
School and hospitals abroad.......................$19,000,000
Alliance for Progress.................................$525,000,000
International organizations......................$136,050,000
Supporting assistance...............................$380,000,000
Contingency fund......................................$160,000,000
Military assistance................................$1,000,000,000 Administration............................................$54,000,000
Latin American development...................$180,000,000 Total.......................................................$ 3,599,050,000
Expressed as the sense of Congress that the institution of full investment guaranty programs with all recipient countries would be regarded as a significant measure of self-help by such as countries improving the climate for private investment both domestic and foreign- Also expressed as the sense of Congress that aid should be extended to or withheld from the Government of South Vietnam in the discretion of the President, to further the objectives of victory in war against communism
and the return to their homeland of Americans involved in that struggle. Bars assistance under the Development Loan Fund unless the President determines the project is a part of the economic development of the country and specifically provides for appropriate participation by private enterprise. Reduced the development Loan Fund authorization from $1.5 billion to $925 million for fiscal year 1964 Authorizes a total of $220 million in new authority for development grants and technical cooperation (excluding Alliance for progress) in fiscal year 1964
SEC. 406 There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964, and for each fiscal year thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the cost of administering the provisions of this Act FEDERAL CONTROL NOT AUTHORIZED
SEC. 407 No department, agency, officer, or employee of the US shall, under authority of this Act, exercise any direction, supervision, or control over, or impose any requirements or conditions with respect to, the personnel, curriculum, methods of instruction, or administration of any educational institution. Approved Dec. 16, 1963, 11 a.m






The proving is 22 USC§2151(a) (b) [13]. Sept. 4, 1961
If the Government of the United States of America did rightly enforce of the United States Congress enacted law, so his Republic of Vietnam did not only adore the United States of America but also thanked so much of time to the American people because of the United States of America and the American people had protecting super values of American justice, which had been transferred to the Republic of Vietnam which is why the Government of the United States of America had applied neo-colonial war in his Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, the Vietnam War was wrongful actions, so the war was to be a neo-colonial war. The American Government has seized a weak nation and then, sold off the Republic of Vietnam to communism. Let the American Government protect national interests. How would you think about your American law of the Vietnam War? Why did the United States defendant fool a weak the Republic of Vietnam in the American law?

(a)US development cooperation policy The Congress finds that fundamental political, economic, and technological changes have resulted in the interdependence of nations. The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the States are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world’s limited resources in an open and equitable international economic system for needy people.
_________________
[13] According to the between the Government of the United States of America and the government of the Republic of Vietnam were not only be equal each other and be logic in all, but, when they’re the same as democracy, freedom, and justice which is why the Government of the United States of America was sold his small business and his patriotic right for communism. Why did the Government of the US fool the Republic of Vietnam? What did American law do for American justice?
When the United States Congress has had to declare for one way, but, the United States Congress enforced another way in the Vietnam War. Because of America’s fundamental policy is anti-policy oneself, the Republic of Vietnam did not betray policy with the Government of the United States of America which is why the Government of the United States of America has fooled the Republic of Vietnam in the Vietnam War.
No assistance may be provided under subchapter I of this chapter to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.
(b)  Information to Congressional committees for realization of assistance for needy people; concurrent Resolution terminating assistance...
(c)  Factors considered. In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions of subsection
Statutory 22 USC§ 2151 n [14] Human rights and development assistance - Dec. 20, 1975, (a)  Violations barring assistance; assistance
In condition, this statutory is very perfectly in the protocol of international relations between the Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America which is why the American Military did not only kill too many of Vietnamese innocence but also destroyed the economic resources of the Republic of Vietnam. Lets the economy of the Republic of Vietnam has been depended on the American Government when the Vietnam War is taken place. Even worst, the Government of the United States of America has assassinated President South Vietnam. Why was the Government of the United States self sitting on the United States Constitution oneself when an American president has ordered to assassinate a foreign President Ngo Dinh Diem without had American law.
______________

[14] Vietnam War photographer on taking My Lai massacre photos: 'It was just unreal' By ANTHONY RIVAS May 28, 2019, and, Vietnam War: 44 years on, birth defects from America's Agent Orange are increasing (see appendix)



enacting? Obviously, the American Government has threatened to behead of President Nguyen Van Thieu if he did not endorse the Paris
Peace Accords in order to follow with the American Government’s decision of the Paris Peace Accords. When the protocol international relations are of the American Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam had never had an agreement this. In fact, the Native American has exactly been reflecting the Vietnam War of the United States of America because of the American citizens does wish to repay the self-evident truth for the Vietnam War in order to protect super values of American justice or so-called the formal principle of
Justice of the Government of the United States of America has perfectly been presenting for the whole world learning when the American
Government is a great power which is why the United States of America did not protect super justice to correspond with the American law of the United States Congress enacted, which is why the American Government has self- ruin American justice within the Vietnam War.

The pursuant 5 U.S.C§ 702 [15] - Right of review (Public L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966)
Why did the government of the United States of America self recognize defendant oneself when the individual person was self- confessed wrongful actions in the Vietnam War which is why the American court system did not compensate for his injuries and prisoner of war benefits, his lost small business but discriminate national origin with a Vietnamese American prisoner of war? Perhaps, the American court system seemed for contempt the United States Congress’s enacting American law. Whatever America statutory which is relative with
__________
[15] Low court has orders and mad the marks a letter zero and a mark’s straight.


Settlement case of a petitioner, so the American Court system must be judged without had discriminated national origin in order to express the American justice because of unmitigated punishment for offenders. The American system should be enforced the formal principle of justice because the United States of America is a modern civil society worldwide. Even no good, he does not only imprison but also he nationalized real property by the United States of America policy. When he would like to struggle for equality under the law, let him protect the super values of his national America without having any treason when he has taken an oath loyalty to his patriotic America. Of course, the duty and the responsibility of the American Court system must be reviewed and judged all cases of the American citizens which is why the American Court system did not only discriminate national origin but also prejudiced mainly American laws by its Congress enacted.
Exactly, the duty and the responsibility of the American Court system must be reviewed and judged all cases of the American citizens which is why the American Court system did not only discriminate national origin but also prejudiced mainly obstruction 's American laws by its Congress enacted. When the chair chiefs of the courts were voted by the American citizens, they have against their people by no review the statement of the cases. Obviously, no American courts, which had marked on the decision on the court-ordered as like his settlement case. In fact, the local court of San Mateo had marked a letter zero and a mark- upright, which meant was no appeal to any high courts. Therefore, his appeals were returned by the Supreme Court of Clerk- Courts. Ironically, the US Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor did not only throw his statement of the case to the garbage but also did not view his case. Another, US Department of Justice-Civil Rights Division has ordered him to petition within political action but should petition at Federal Bureau investigator ay his local which is why they did not view his settlement's case, but also pushed him into political action and crime section. When he is simply based on the American law of prisoner of war has had enacted, let him a petition for his exact benefits in statutorily. To which is why the American Court system did not only has distorting American Justice but also objected his settlement's case. Which American citizen is protected by the US Supreme Court and Department of Justice and which American citizen is discriminated American Law by the US Supreme Court and Department Justice when they are together American voter?
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the US seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the US is an indispensable party. The US may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the US: Provided, that any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.
Proving 18 U.S. Code § 227(a) [16] - Wrongfully influencing a private entity’s employment decisions by a Member of Congress or an officer or employee of the legislative or executive branch-(Added Pub. L. 110–81, title I, § 102(a), Sept. 14, 2007, 121Stat. 739; amended Pub. L. 112–105, § 18(a), Apr. 4, 2012, 126 Stat. 304.)
As you understood about the American citizens that seemed never is voting for any congressman or senator to let you enacted to the statutory in order to invade to weak foreign nations as like the United States Congress has
_________________

[16] The United States Congress has enacted the law to the Vietnam War, but the Government of United States of America did not achieve the Vietnam War which was wrongful; therefore, the duty and responsibility of compensation is belongs to the American Government.
been enacting for the American law in order to seize the Republic of Vietnam by statutory war? Because the sovereign national the Republic of Vietnam looked like our American sovereignty without had foreign invaders, but, why did the Government of the United States of America have invading for the Republic of Vietnam by American law when the Government of the US (our US) was freely destroying whole the Republic of Vietnam. However, according to war law (Section 1091 of Title 18, United States Code prohibits genocide whether committed in time of peace or time of war. Genocide is defined in § 1091 and includes violent attacks with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. There is Federal jurisdiction if the offense is committed within the United States. There is also Federal extraterritorial jurisdiction when the offender is a national of the United States. As like in My-Lai Court-Materials) But he has never had any petition for this case of war law, he thought about the war which often takes place without had to the objective of genocide because of war is barbarous. Therefore, the compensation of mastermind of the Vietnam War is a self-evident truth. We would like to respect.)
(a)Whoever, being a covered government person, with the intent to influence, solely on the basis of partisan political affiliation, an employment decision or employment practice of any private entity—
Following 26 U.S. C. § 7701(a) (1) (2) (5)-[17] Definitions
Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68a Stat. 911; Pub. L. 86–70
According to this statutory which are individuals of American leaders who take advantage of Great American power let them distort American justice because of the American justice had never had to allow for each
________________

[17] As like the Kissinger has quotes, “It is an act of insanity and national humiliation to have a law prohibiting the President from ordering assassination.” (Statement at a National Security Council meeting, 1975,
The Kissinger reported the Paris Peace Accord (See appendix}



person to wrongfully enforce of the American law within the Vietnam War. Therefore, the Government of the United States of America has enacted a statutory as the United States as a defendant. Ironically, after the United States of America recognized the sovereignty of Republic of Vietnam partnership; the American Government did not only make rain and wind in the Republic of Vietnam but also had sold the Republic of Vietnam to communism in order to protect a core of interests of the US. What is American law having equal? Because of the United States Congress was wrongfully interfered for the Vietnam War by the cut off financial aid after the American Government cut and run out of the Republic of Vietnam within the handoff policy.
(a)When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof—
(1)Person
The term “person” shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.
(2)Partnership and partner
The term “partnership” includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term “partner” includes a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organization.
(3)Corporation
The term “corporation” includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies.
(5)Foreign
The term “foreign” when applied to a corporation or partnership means a corporation or partnership which is not domestic.
To prove 18 U.S.C § 1621-Perjury generally, June 25, 1948, ch 645, 62 Stat 773; Public L. 88–619
Most of the American leaders have taken an oath loyalty on the United States Constitution when they’re jointly doing for the Vietnam War which is why they were perjury in the Vietnam War. They did not rightly enforce the American law of the Vietnam War when the United States
Congress had enacting the statutory for the Vietnam War. Because they were humiliated the Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people when they are undeveloped people and the weakest nation, yet, the
Government of the United States of America is the super nation of the world. The bases on of the Government of the United States of America is the atomic weapon and long-range missiles without had human-rights and ethics. Why was the Government of the United States of America have authorized invading to the Republic of Vietnam when the United States Constitution has never had ordered? Therefore, the American leaders were perjury oneself in order to invade other nations as like the Republic of Vietnam. When his Republic of Vietnam is less modern more than the United States of America’s defendant, it has never had perjury with the Government of the United States of America in the Vietnam War.

Whoever—
(1)
having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or
(2)
in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 773; Pub. L. 88–619, § 1, Oct. 3, 1964, 78 Stat. 995; Pub. L. 94–550, § 2, Oct. 18, 1976, 90 Stat. 2534; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016 (1) (I), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)
Proving 1 U.S.C. § 112a – [18] U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 1. General Provisions § 112a United States Treaties and Other International Agreements; contents; admissibility in evidence.
He would like to ask for the United States Congress that you must understand about to this law which is why the Government of the United States of America could not enforce all the United States Treaties and other International Agreements with the Republic of Vietnam when you have signed them. What was the United States Congress enacting American laws to be meant because the American law is American law when you are represented oneself by your great power of the world you could not fool the weak Republic of Vietnam in the Vietnam War? During yours, the academic honorary degree is high more than the Southern leaders, but they were loyalty oneself to enforce all of the United States Treaties and International Agreements with yours. But, which is why you have been fooled the Republic of Vietnam on the Paris Peace Accords and all of the protocols International relations, you enforced the law in order to build invading war without had any truths. When the sacred of each national sovereignty is the layout by God, we were not violate invaded each other without had fooled power oneself.
_____________
[18] The actual evidence is the Geneva Convention relative to the Treaties of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. His prisoner of war of the United States of America of the Vietnam War was not enforced by the Government of the United States of America. 50 U.S.C §4105 Prisoner of War-June 24, 1970, and Paris Peace Accords and so on


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(a)
The Secretary of State shall cause to be compiled, edited, indexed, and published, beginning as of January 1, 1950, a compilation entitled “United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,” which shall contain all treaties to which the United States is a party that have been proclaimed during each calendar year, and all international agreements other than treaties to which the United States is a party that have been signed, proclaimed, or with reference to which any other final formality has been executed, during each calendar year. The said United States Treaties and Other International Agreements shall be legal evidence of the treaties, international agreements other than treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and agreements, therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the Territories and insular possessions of the United States.
(b)The Secretary of State may determine that publication of certain categories of agreements is not required, if the following criteria are met:
(1)
such agreements are not treaties which have been brought into force for the United States after having received Senate advice and consent pursuant to section 2(2) of Article II of the Constitution of the United States;
(2)
the public interest in such agreements is insufficient to justify their publication, because (A) as of the date of enactment of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, the agreements are no longer in force,[1] (B) the agreements do not create private rights or duties, or establish standards intended to govern government action in the treatment of private individuals;(C) in view of the limited or specialized nature of the public interest in such agreements, such interest can adequately be satisfied by an alternative means; or (D) the public disclosure of the text of the agreement would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States; and
(3)
copies of such agreements (other than those in paragraph (2)(D)), including certified copies where necessary for litigation or similar purposes, will be made available by the Department of State upon request.
(c)
Any determination pursuant to subsection (b) shall be published in the Federal Register.
(d)
The Secretary of State shall make publicly available through the Internet website of the Department of State each treaty or international agreement proposed to be published in the compilation entitled “United States Treaties and Other International Agreements” not later than 180 days after the date on which the treaty or agreement enters into force.
(Added Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1001, § 2, 64 Stat. 980; amended Pub. L. 103–236, title I, § 138, Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 397; Pub. L. 108–458, title VII, § 7121(a), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3807.)














For proving is 1 U.S.C. § 112 [19] - U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 1. General Provisions § 112. Statutes at Large; contents; admissibility in evidence
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________________

[19] Text from TIAS 7542 (24UST 4-23, which was to be law of America Executive .The public evidences of the America presidents were recorded by the proclamation of 37th U.S. president was declared,
There, on the embassy rooftop, over 420 Vietnamese stared into the empty skies looking for signs of returning American helicopters. Just hours earlier, they had been assured by well-intentioned Marines, "No one will be left behind").
Including for the US Attorney General Robert Kennedy had come to the Republic of Vietnam and declared, “The Vietnam War must be won communism.” But the Government of the United States of America has sold Republic of Vietnam to communism; the America was wrongful actions in the Vietnam War by American law.
* He has threatened to behead off Ex President Nguyen Van Thieu if he'll not sign in the Paris Peace Accords When President Thieu was owned self sovereignty.
* The 43rd president declared, "The South Vietnam did not fight for their freedom which is why they did not have it today,"
Where was the United States Justice showing place?









So much statutory of the Government of the United States of America have solemnly enacting for helping the Republic of Vietnam which are archaized by the United States Law which are super values of self-evident truth of the Government of the United States of America of the Vietnam War which is why the Government of the United States of America did not enforce them when the Government of the United States of America is super great power, but the United States of America has been playing a trick on a poor of the Republic of Vietnam and his suffering life was servicing for the war power of the United States of America. Where is the ethical conscience of the United States of America placing on the world whilst the Government of the United States of America has been enacting for human rights law? Why was a great Power of the United States of America deceiving a people who were very poor life? As we understand about the weak life is under strongly attacked by the great powers- however, on the playing yard game of wars is equal when the Power had destroyed the weak people, they must be compensated all of injuring damages in corresponds that archivist is fair in American law. Why was not Paris Peace Accords archaized by the American archivist after the United States Congress enacted American law because this belonged to International Agreement of the United States Treaty and International Agreement? Why was not Foreign Affairs submit the Paris Peace Accords to a president whose signature oneself to submitting for the United States Congress to be enacting American law?
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The Archivist of the United States shall cause to be compiled, edited, indexed, and published, the United States Statutes at Large, which shall contain all the laws and concurrent resolutions enacted during each regular session of Congress;  all proclamations by the President in the numbered series issued since the date of the adjournment of the regular session of Congress next preceding;  and also any amendments to the Constitution of the United States proposed or ratified pursuant to article V thereof since that date, together with the certificate of the Archivist of the United States issued in compliance with the provision contained in section 106b In the event of an extra session of Congress, of this title. The Archivist of the United States shall cause all the laws and concurrent resolutions enacted during said extra session to be consolidated with, and published as part of, the contents of the volume The United States Statutes at Large shall for the next regular session. Be legal evidence of laws, concurrent resolutions, treaties, international agreements other than treaties, proclamations by the President, and proposed or ratified amendments to the Constitution of the United States therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the Territories and insular possessions of the United States.
Ratified pursuant to article V thereof since that date, together with the certificate of the Archivist of the US issued in compliance with the provision contained in section 106b of this title. In the event of an extra session of Congress, the Archivist of the United States shall cause all the laws and concurrent resolutions enacted during said extra session to be consolidated with, and published as part of, the contents of the volume for the next regular session. The United States Statutes at Large shall be legal evidence of laws, concurrent resolutions, treaties, international agreements other than treaties, proclamations by the President, and proposed or ratified amendments to the Constitution of the United States therein contained, in all the courts of the United States, the several States, and the Territories and insular possessions of the United States.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 636; Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1001, § 1, 64 Stat. 979; Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 3, 65 Stat. 710; Pub. L. 98–497, title I, § 107(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2291.)

Proving is 1 U.S.C. § 112 b (a) (b) (c) [20]- US international agreements; transmission to Congress- Added Pub. L. 92–403, § 1, Aug. 22, 1972, 86 Stat. 619. The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement (including the text of any oral
_______________
[20]. The Paris Peace Accords was not enacted the American Statutory by the US Congress. What are protocol international relations of the Government of the United States of America meaning in American law? ( See appendix is United States Treaty case)

The petition would like to find out about the great contradictions of the American Archivist and Foreign Affairs Department in the American law of Vietnam War because according to this statutory- so the American Archivist and Foreign Affairs must edit and format the texts; admissibility in evidence of the Paris Peace Accords perfected and then, they ought to submit the texts to the United States Congress let's enact to be an American law. In other words, no one changed American law because American law is American law, which did not only represent the super values of the American Justice but also contained the American divinity truths in the Vietnam War. In contrast, if someone has masterminded to distort American bill who is treason which is why the Paris Peace Accords could not enact the American law, which looked like the United States Treaty on December 23, 1950, in Saigon, Vietnam to be 22 U.S.C.§§ 1571_1604. Surely, the Paris Peace Accords couldn’t be torn shred by the Kissinger. However, seemingly masterminds of the American archivist or Foreign Affairs Department has not had a complete text which is why the United States Congress that could not have any self-evident truths of the Paris Peace Accords in order to enact the American law. Therefore, the Paris Peace Accords couldn’t be had great values of American law, which pushed Saigon fall on April 30, 1975, without had regrets.

International agreement, which agreement shall be reduced to writing), other than a treaty, to which the US is a party as soon as practicable after such agreement has entered into force with respect to the US but in no event later than sixty days thereafter. However, any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the US shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President. Any department or agency of the US Government which enters into any international agreement on behalf of the US shall transmit to the Department of State the text of such agreement not later than twenty days after such agreement has been signed...
(b)
Not later than March 1, 1979, and at yearly intervals thereafter, the President shall, under his own signature, transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report with respect to each international agreement which, during the preceding year, was transmitted to the Congress after the expiration of the 60-day period referred to in the first sentence of subsection (a), describing fully and completely the reasons for the late transmittal.
(c)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an international agreement may not be signed or otherwise concluded on behalf of the United States without prior consultation with the Secretary of State. Such consultation may encompass a class of agreements rather than a particular agreement.
(d)
(1)The Secretary of State shall annually submit to Congress a report that contains an index of all international agreements, listed by country, date, title, and summary of each such agreement (including a description of the duration of activities under the agreement and the agreement itself), that the United States—
(A)
has signed, proclaimed, or with reference to which any other final formality has been executed, or that has been extended or otherwise modified, during the preceding calendar year; and
(B)
has not been published, or is not proposed to be published, in the compilation entitled “United States Treaties and Other International Agreements”.
(2)
The report described in paragraph (1) may be submitted in classified form.
(e)
(1)
Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of State shall determine for and within the executive branch whether an arrangement constitutes an international agreement within the meaning of this section.
(2)
(A)
An arrangement shall constitute an international agreement within the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c)) irrespective of the duration of activities under the arrangement or the arrangement itself.
(B)Arrangements that constitute an international agreement within the meaning of this section (other than subsection (c)) include the following:
(i)
A bilateral or multilateral counterterrorism agreement.
(ii)
A bilateral agreement with a country that is subject to a determination under section 6(j)(1)(A) [1]of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)(A)), section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371(a)), or section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)).
(f)
The President shall, through the Secretary of State, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
(Added Pub. L. 92–403, § 1, Aug. 22, 1972, 86 Stat. 619; amended Pub. L. 95–45, § 5, June 15, 1977, 91 Stat. 224; Pub. L. 95–426, title VII, § 708, Oct. 7, 1978, 92 Stat. 993; Pub. L. 103–437, § 1, Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4581; Pub. L. 108–458, title VII, § 7121(b)–(d), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3807, 3808.)

The proving 37 U.S.C. § 552 Sep. 6, 1966 Pay and allowances; continuance, while in a missing status; limitations Un-annotated Title 37. Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services §
The base on this statutory that his family and he are receipted the benefits of prisoner of war by the Government of the United States of America because he was serviced war for the US. Or so-called he is to be paid-soldier of the Government of the United States of America in the Vietnam War because of the Government of the United States has continuously been supporting financial aid from December 23, 1950, to the ended war, but, the supporting financial aid of the Government of the United States of America has suddenly cut in 1975, and therefore, the Republic of Vietnam was fallen by no support financial aid of the Government of the United States of America. In fact, the Government of the United States of America has sold him and his family, and his Republic of Vietnam to communism- Therefore, his salary and benefits of his family and his real properties have belonged compensation of the Government of the United States of America, which is rightly suitable to the American law.

(a) A member of a uniformed service who is on active duty or performing inactive-duty training, and who is in a missing status, is-- (b) Notwithstanding the death of a member while in a missing status, entitlement to pay and allowances under subsection (a) ends on the date-- 
(c) A member is not entitled to pay and allowances under subsection (a) for a period during which he is officially determined to be absent from his post of duty without authority, and he is indebted to the US for payments from amounts credited to his account for that period. 
(d) A member who is performing full-time training duty or inactive-duty training is entitled to the benefits of this section only when he is officially determined to be in a missing status that results from the performance of duties prescribed by competent authority. 
(e) A member in a missing status who is continued in that status under  section 555 of this title or under chapter 76 of title 10 is entitled to be credited with pay and allowances under subsection (a).
(Added Pub. L. 89–554, § 5(b), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 625; amended Pub. L. 92–169, § 1, Nov. 24, 1971, 85 Stat. 489; Pub. L. 92–482, Oct. 12, 1972, 86 Stat. 796; Pub. L. 93–26, § 1, Apr. 27, 1973, 87 Stat. 26; Pub. L. 102–25, title VII, § 702(b)(1), (c), Apr. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 117; Pub. L. 104–106, div. A, title V, § 569(c)(2), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 351; Pub. L. 115–91, div. A, title VI, § 618(g), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1427.)

Proving 5 U.S.C § 552 (a)(f). Records maintained on individuals [23] Added Pub. L. 93–579, § 3, Dec. 31, 1974, 88 Stat. 1897.
This statutory ought to prove to his petition that he forever lives in the United States when the Government of the United States of America has been admit his individual prisoner of war of the Vietnam War. Therefore, his family and he must receive adequate benefits of prisoner of war as like Native Americans who are American veterans. Obviously, he has been serviced Vietnam War for a core of interests of the Government of the United States of America, but not serviced war for the Republic of Vietnam- during the Government of the United States of America has gradually been seizing his Republic of Vietnam. In fact, the Vietnam War was strongly controlled by American Advisers and the American Army. So most of the battlefields in the Republic of Vietnam were ruled and led by the American specialists when the Vietnamese leaders of the Republic of Vietnam looked like a puppet without had any right decision in the Vietnam War. Therefore, the Government of the United States of America ought to bring them home Act.
PRIVACY ACT
5 U.S.C. § 552a
As Amended
§ 552a. Records maintained on individuals
(a) Definitions For purposes of this section—
(1) the term "agency" means agency as defined in section 552(f) of this title; (2) the term "individual" means a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
(3) the term "maintain" includes maintain, collect, use or disseminate;
(4) the term "record" means any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph;
(5) the term "system of records" means a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual;
(6) the term "statistical record" means a record in a system of records maintained for statistical research or reporting purposes only and not used in whole or in part in making any determination about an identifiable individual, except as provided by section 8 of Title 13;
(7) the term "routine use" means, with respect to the disclosure of a record, the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected;
(8) the term "matching program"—
(A) means any computerized comparison of—
(i) two or more automated systems of records or a system of records with non-Federal records for the purpose of—
(I) establishing or verifying the eligibility of, or continuing compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements by, applicants for, recipients or beneficiaries of, participants in, or providers of services with respect to, cash or in-kind assistance or payments under Federal benefit programs, or
(II) recouping payments or delinquent debts under such Federal benefit programs, or (ii) two or more automated Federal personnel or payroll systems of records or a system of Federal personnel or payroll records with non-Federal records,
(f) Agency rules In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency that maintains a system of records shall promulgate rules, in accordance with the requirements (including general notice) of section 553 of this title, which shall-- (1) establish procedures whereby an individual can be notified in response to his request if any system of records named by the individual contains a record pertaining to him; (2) define reasonable times, places, and requirements for identifying an individual who requests his record or information pertaining to him before the agency shall make the record or information available to the individual; (3) establish procedures for the disclosure to an individual upon his request of his record or information pertaining to him, including special procedure, if deemed necessary, for the disclosure to an individual of medical records, including psychological records, pertaining to him; (4) establish procedures for reviewing a request from an individual concerning the amendment of any record or information pertaining to the individual, for making a determination on the request, for an appeal within the agency of an initial adverse agency determination, and for whatever additional means may be necessary for each individual to be able to exercise fully his rights under this section; and (5) establish fees to be charged, if any, to any individual for making copies of his record, excluding the cost of any search for and review of the record. The Office of the Federal Register shall biennially compile and publish the rules promulgated under this subsection and agency notices published under subsection (e)(4) of this section in a form available to the public at low cost.

Title VII, § 7201 (b) (1), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1388–334; Pub. L. 103–66, title XIII, § 13581(c), Aug. 10, 1993, 107 Stat. 611; Pub. L. 104–193, title I, § 110(w), Aug. 22, 1996, 110 Stat. 2175; Pub. L. 104–226, § 1(b)(3), Oct. 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 3033; Pub. L. 104–316, title I, § 115(g)(2)(B), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3835; Pub. L. 105–34, title X, § 1026 (b)(2), Aug. 5, 1997, 111 Stat. 925; Pub. L. 105–362, title XIII, § 1301 (d), Nov. 10, 1998, 112 Stat. 3293; Pub. L. 106–170, title IV, § 402 (a)(2), Dec. 17, 1999, 113 Stat. 1908; Pub. L. 108–271, § 8 (b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814; Pub. L. 111–148, title VI, § 6402 (b) (2), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 756; Pub. L. 111–203, title X, § 1082, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2080; Pub. L. 113–295, div. B, title I, § 102 (d), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 4062.)

(2)
the term “individual” means a citizen of the US or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
(3) The term “maintain” includes maintain, collect, use, or disseminate;
(4)the term “record” means any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, ...



Proving 38 U.S.C. § 101 (29) A -- Definitions. Public .law, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat., 1106 - (29) the term “Vietnam era” means the following:
He would like to petition to the United States Congress that you are fair to review the American laws, which you have been enacted for the Vietnam War. Those were right or wrongful actions in the Republic of Vietnam, which is approximant twenty – five in the past- at that time, how would have you had developed your nation and your people? In compare, how did you think about the Republic of Vietnam safety and the Southern people who were happy or they've been the burden of sufferings from the Government of the United States of America? If you were opened the war in the Republic of Vietnam when you built peacefully and future prosperity, so did not only the Republic of Vietnam and all of us would like to have millions and million times so thankful to great- adored of your American people. However, in the twenty-five years of the war have gone by, you had barbarously been destroyed the natural resources and manpower of Southern Vietnam, but you have never had compensated any pennies to us. When you have to enact the law in which native Americans and prisoners of war to be equality in all- how would have you enacted the bill of American Veterans benefits and what did you endorse this law of the prisoners of war somehow during we are the Vietnamese American veterans become to be nothing? When you are living on a luxurious modern Age, you have pushed him and his family to the Stone Age.
In contrast, if you were a Vietnamese-American veteran, how would you think about it? In fact, you have been enriching for your own life when your children are freely going to many famous schools. Thus, his children were not going to any schools when they were homeless life without had any delicious food and medicines for the treatment illness. Therefore, he would like to have a well-reasoned speech to describe the barbarous war of yours take place in the Republic of Vietnam. And you must pay the veterans benefits to him.
For the purposes of this title—
(29)The term “Vietnam era” means the following:
(A)
The period beginning on February 28, 1961, and ending on May 7, 1975, in the case of a veteran who served in the Republic of Vietnam during that period.
(B)
The period beginning on August 5, 1964, and ending on May 7, 1975, in all other cases.
(30)
The term “Mexican border period” means the period beginning on May 9, 1916, and ending on April 5, 1917, in the case of a veteran who during such period served in Mexico, on the borders thereof, or in the waters adjacent thereto.
(31)
The term “spouse” means a person of the opposite sex who is a wife or husband.
(32)The term “former prisoner of war” means a person who, while serving in the active military, naval or air service, was forcibly detained or interned in line of duty—
(A)
by an enemy government or its agents, or a hostile force, during a period of war; or
(B)
by a foreign government or its agents, or a hostile force, under circumstances which the Secretary finds to have been comparable to the circumstances under which persons have generally been forcibly detained or interned by enemy governments during periods of war.
(33)
The term “Persian Gulf War” means the period beginning on August 2, 1990, and ending on the date thereafter prescribed by Presidential proclamation or by law.
(34)
The term “agency of original jurisdiction” means the activity which entered the original determination with regard to a claim for benefits under laws administered by the Secretary.
(35)
The term “relevant evidence” means evidence that tends to prove or disprove a matter in issue.
(36)
The term “supplemental claim” means a claim for benefits under laws administered by the Secretary filed by a claimant who had previously filed a claim for the same or similar benefits on the same or similar basis.
(Pub. L. 85–857, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1106; Pub. L. 86–195, Aug. 25, 1959, 73 Stat. 424; Pub. L. 87–674, § 1, Sept. 19, 1962, 76 Stat. 558; Pub. L. 87–815, § 3, Oct. 15, 1962, 76 Stat. 927; Pub. L. 88–450, § 4(c), (d), Aug. 19, 1964, 78 Stat. 504; Pub. L. 89–311, § 2(c)(1), Oct. 31, 1965, 79 Stat. 1155; Pub. L. 89–358, § 4(d), Mar. 3, 1966, 80 Stat. 24; Pub. L. 90–77, title II, § 201, Aug. 31, 1967, 81 Stat. 181; Pub. L. 91–24, §§ 1(a), (b), 16, June 11, 1969, 83 Stat. 33, 35; Pub. L. 91–262, § 1, May 21, 1970, 84 Stat. 256; Pub. L. 91–588, § 9(a), (b), Dec. 24, 1970, 84 Stat. 1584; Pub. L. 91–621, § 6(a)(1), (2), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1864; Pub. L. 92–198, § 5(a), Dec. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 664; Pub. L. 92–540, title IV, § 407, Oct. 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 1092; Pub. L. 94–169, title I, § 101(1), Dec. 23, 1975, 89 Stat. 1013; Pub. L. 94–417, § 1(b), Sept. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 1277; Pub. L. 95–126, § 3, Oct. 8, 1977, 91 Stat. 1108; Pub. L. 95–202, title III, § 309(a), Nov. 23, 1977, 91 Stat. 1446; Pub. L. 95–588, title III, § 301, Nov. 4, 1978, 92 Stat. 2506; Pub. L. 96–22, title IV, § 401, June 13, 1979, 93 Stat. 62; Pub. L. 97–37, § 3(a), Aug. 14, 1981, 95 Stat. 936; Pub. L. 97–295, § 4(2), (95)(A), Oct. 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 1304, 1313; Pub. L. 97–306, title I, § 113(a), Oct. 14, 1982, 96 Stat. 1432; Pub. L. 98–223, title II, § 201, Mar. 2, 1984, 98 Stat. 41; Pub. L. 99–576, title VII, § 702(1), Oct. 28, 1986, 100 Stat. 3301; Pub. L. 100–322, title I, § 103(a), title III, § 311, May 20, 1988, 102 Stat. 493, 534; Pub. L. 100–456, div. A, title VI, § 633(c), Sept. 29, 1988, 102 Stat. 1987; Pub. L. 101–237, § 2(a), Dec. 18, 1989, 103 Stat. 2062; Pub. L. 102–25, title III, § 332, Apr. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 88; Pub. L. 102–40, title IV, § 402(d)(1), May 7, 1991, 105 Stat. 239; Pub. L. 102–54, § 14(a)(1), June 13, 1991, 105 Stat. 282; Pub. L. 102–83, §§ 4(a)(3), (4), (b)(1), (2)(E), 5(c)(1), Aug. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 404–406; Pub. L. 103–446, title XII, § 1201(a)(1), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4682; Pub. L. 104–275, title V, § 505(a), Oct. 9, 1996, 110 Stat. 3342; Pub. L. 106–419, title III, § 301(a), Nov. 1, 2000, 114 Stat. 1852; Pub. L. 107–14, § 4(a)(2), June 5, 2001, 115 Stat. 26; Pub. L. 107–296, title XVII, § 1704(d), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2315; Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title V, § 515(e)(1), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3236; Pub. L. 109–444, § 8(b)(1), Dec. 21, 2006, 120 Stat. 3313; Pub. L. 109–461, title X, §§ 1004(b)(1), 1006(b), Dec. 22, 2006, 120 Stat. 3466, 3468; Pub. L. 110–389, title IV, § 402(b), Oct. 10, 2008, 122 Stat. 4174; Pub. L. 115–55, § 2(a), Aug. 23, 2017, 131 Stat. 1105.)

38 U.S. Code § 1311 [21].Dependency and indemnity compensation to a surviving spouse

He would like to prove this statutory which was enacted by the United States Congress which is why he did not only have any benefits of American veterans but also his wife and children did not have benefits . Why did the United States Congress enact the law of the Vietnam War but not pay any benefits of prisoner of war and his wife and children without had any benefits?
Why did the Government of the United States of America need the war and his life, but did not pay any benefits of prisoner of war and American veterans? Why does the service war for the United States of America, but his merit did not record in the Secretary of Veterans Affairs because the Vietnam War belonged to the Government of the United States of America from 1963 to 1975?
________________

[21] Married Certificate and seven Birth Certificates












His family has a wife and seven children did not have benefits of American Veterans. Why did not the Government of the United States of America pay to his surviving wife when he was imprisoned by the United States policy in war? Why is the United States Congress to be unfair for his family when he imprisoned by the law of the United States Congress enacted because he was serviced for the proxy war of the United States of America by the American statutorily and the United States Treaties had signed with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam?
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(a)
(1)
Dependency and indemnity compensation shall be paid to a surviving spouse at the monthly rate of $1,154.
(2)
The rate under paragraph (1) shall be increased by $246 in the case of the death of a veteran who at the time of death was in receipt of or was entitled to receive (or but for the receipt of retired pay or retirement pay was entitled to receive) compensation for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for a continuous period of at least eight years immediately preceding death. In determining the period of a veteran’s disability for purposes of the preceding sentence, only periods in which the veteran was married to the surviving spouse shall be considered.
(3)
In the case of compensation paid to a surviving spouse that is predicated on the death of a veteran before January 1, 1993, the monthly rate of such compensation shall be the amount based on the pay grade of such veteran, as set forth in the following table, if the amount is greater than the total amount determined with respect to that veteran under paragraphs (1) and (2):
2 If the veteran served as Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commandant of the Marine Corps, or Commandant of the Coast Guard, at the applicable time designated by section 1302 of this title, the surviving spouse’s rate shall be $2,643.
1 If the veteran served as sergeant major of the Army, senior enlisted advisor of the Navy, chief master sergeant of the Air Force, sergeant major of the Marine Corps, or master chief petty officer of the Coast Guard, at the applicable time designated by section 1302 of this title, the surviving spouse’s rate shall be $1,419.
(b)
If there is a surviving spouse with one or more children below the age of eighteen of a deceased veteran, the dependency paid monthly to the surviving shall be increased by $286 for each such child.
(c)
The monthly rate of dependency and indemnity compensation payable to a surviving spouse shall be increased by $286 if the spouse is (1) a patient in a nursing home or (2) blind, or so nearly blind or significantly disabled as to need or require the regular aid and attendance of another person.
(d)
The monthly rate of dependency and indemnity compensation payable to a surviving spouse shall be increased by $135 if the surviving spouse is, by reason of disability, permanently housebound but does not qualify for the aid and attendance allowance under subsection (c) of this section. For the purposes of this subsection, the requirement of “permanently housebound” will be considered to have been met when the surviving spouse is substantially confined to such surviving home (ward or clinical areas, if institutionalized) or immediate premises by reason of a disability or disabilities which it is reasonably certain will remain throughout such surviving spouse’s lifetime.
(e)
In the case of an individual who is eligible for dependency and indemnity compensation under this section by reason of section 103(d)(2)(B) of this title who is also eligible for benefits under another provision of law by reason of such individual’s status as the surviving spouse of a veteran, then, notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than section 5304(b)(3) of this title), no reduction in benefits under such other provision of law shall be made by reason of such individual’s eligibility for benefits under this section.
(f)
(1)
Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), if there is a surviving spouse with one or more children below the age of 18, the dependency and indemnity compensation paid monthly to the surviving spouse shall be increased by $250 (as increased from time to time under paragraph (4)), regardless of the number of such children.
(2)
Dependency and indemnity compensation shall be increased under this subsection only for months occurring during the two-year period beginning on the date on which entitlement to compensation commenced.
(3)
The increase in dependency and indemnity compensation of a surviving spouse under this subsection shall cease beginning with the first month commencing after the month in which all children of the surviving spouse have attained the age of 18.
(4)
Whenever there is an increase in benefit amounts payable under title II of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) as a result of a determination made under section 215(i) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 415(i)), the Secretary shall, effective on the date of such increase in benefit amounts, increase the amount payable under paragraph (1), as such amount was in effect immediately prior to the date of such increase in benefit amounts, by the same percentage as the percentage by which such benefit amounts are increased. Any increase in a dollar amount under this paragraph shall be rounded down to the next lower whole dollar amount.
(5)
Dependency and indemnity compensation under this subsection is in addition to any other dependency and indemnity compensation payable under this chapter.
(Pub. L. 85–857, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1127, § 411; Pub. L. 87–268, § 1(b), Sept. 21, 1961, 75 Stat. 566; Pub. L. 88–21, § 1, May 15, 1963, 77 Stat. 17; Pub. L. 88–134, § 1, Oct. 5, 1963, 77 Stat. 223; Pub. L. 91–24, § 4(b), June 11, 1969, 83 Stat. 33; Pub. L. 91–96, § 3, Oct. 27, 1969, 83 Stat. 144; Pub. L. 91–588, § 3(a), Dec. 24, 1970, 84 Stat. 1583; Pub. L. 92–197, § 1, Dec. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 660; Pub. L. 92–455, § 4, Oct. 2, 1972, 86 Stat. 761; Pub. L. 93–295, title II, § 201, May 31, 1974, 88 Stat. 182; Pub. L. 94–71, title II, § 201, Aug. 5, 1975, 89 Stat. 396; Pub. L. 94–433, title II, § 201, Sept. 30, 1976, 90 Stat. 1375; Pub. L. 95–117, title II, § 201, Oct. 3, 1977, 91 Stat. 1064; Pub. L. 95–479, title II, § 201, Oct. 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 1562; Pub. L. 96–128, title II, § 201, Nov. 28, 1979, 93 Stat. 984; Pub. L. 96–385, title II, § 201, Oct. 7, 1980, 94 Stat. 1529; Pub. L. 97–66, title II, § 201, Oct. 17, 1981, 95 Stat. 1028; Pub. L. 97–253, title IV, § 405(e), Sept. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 804; Pub. L. 97–306, title I, §§ 104, 107, Oct. 14, 1982, 96 Stat. 1430, 1431; Pub. L. 98–223, title I, § 104, Mar. 2, 1984, 98 Stat. 38; Pub. L. 98–543, title I, § 104, Oct. 24, 1984, 98 Stat. 2736; Pub. L. 99–238, title I, § 104, Jan. 13, 1986, 99 Stat. 1766; Pub. L. 99–576, title I, § 104, Oct. 28, 1986, 100 Stat. 3251; Pub. L. 100–180, div. A, title XIII, § 1314(d)[(1)], Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1176; Pub. L. 100–227, title I, § 104, Dec. 31, 1987, 101 Stat. 1554; Pub. L. 100–687, div. B, title XI, § 1104, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4124; Pub. L. 101–237, title I, § 104, Dec. 18, 1989, 103 Stat. 2063; Pub. L. 102–3, § 5, Feb. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 9; renumbered § 1311 and amended Pub. L. 102–83, § 5(a), (c)(1), Aug. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 406; Pub. L. 102–152, § 5, Nov. 12, 1991, 105 Stat. 986; Pub. L. 102–568, title I, § 102(a), (b), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4321, 4322; Pub. L. 103–78, § 4, Aug. 13, 1993, 107 Stat. 768; Pub. L. 103–140, § 5, Nov. 11, 1993, 107 Stat. 1486; Pub. L. 105–98, § 5, Nov. 19, 1997, 111 Stat. 2156; Pub. L. 105–178, title VIII, § 8207(a), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 495; Pub. L. 106–117, title V, § 502(b), Nov. 30, 1999, 113 Stat. 1574; Pub. L. 106–118, § 5, Nov. 30, 1999, 113 Stat. 1602; Pub. L. 107–94, § 5, Dec. 21, 2001, 115 Stat. 901; Pub. L. 107–330, title III, § 309(d), Dec. 6, 2002, 116 Stat. 2830; Pub. L. 108–183, title I, § 101(b), Dec. 16, 2003, 117 Stat. 2652; Pub. L. 108–454, title III, §§ 301(a), 307(d), Dec. 10, 2004, 118 Stat. 3610, 3613; Pub. L. 109–111, § 2(d), Nov. 22, 2005, 119 Stat. 2363; Pub. L. 109–233, title V, § 502(3), June 15, 2006, 120 Stat. 415; Pub. L. 109–361, § 4, Oct. 16, 2006, 120 Stat. 2063; Pub. L. 109–444, § 9(d), Dec. 21, 2006, 120 Stat. 3315; Pub. L. 109–461, title X, §§ 1005(d), 1006(b), Dec. 22, 2006, 120 Stat. 3467, 3468; Pub. L. 110–324, § 3(d), Sept. 24, 2008, 122 Stat. 3551; Pub. L. 111–37, § 3(d), June 30, 2009, 123 Stat. 1929; Pub. L. 111–275, title VI, § 602, Oct. 13, 2010, 124 Stat. 2884.)
(2)
The rate under paragraph (1) shall be increased by $246 in the case of the death of a veteran who at the time of death was in receipt of or was entitled to receive (or but for the receipt of retired pay or retirement pay was entitled to receive)
To prove 1 U.S. Code § 113 [22] “Little and Brown’s” edition of laws and treaties; slip laws; Treaties and Other International Acts Series; admissibility in evidence
The contradiction of the Government of the United States of America of the Vietnam War is contrasted by American law. When Department Foreign Affairs did not submit the Paris Peace Accords to the United States Congress in order to enact American law, consequently, the United States Foreign Affairs did not only hold the great superpower for the long run, but also the voice of Great Power of the United States of America of the peace will be resounding victory. When the Government of the United States of America easily conquers all of the hearts of human beings without had any modern weapons. In contrast, the US Foreign Affairs did not submit the Paris Peace Accords to the United States Congress and therefore, the Kissinger who has freely torn shred United States Treaty to the United States Congress that did not only have the United States Treaty but also belonged to the International Agreement of the United States of America. Significantly, his opinion think that the Government of the United States of America is a great superpower, but the super values of the Government of the United States of America have entirely left within the Paris Peace Accords, thus the Government of the United States of America has arrogantly disregarded no one respective with the United States of America. As a great superpower ought to respect the worldwide, so the world should have peace – and therefore, the great superpower will rule the world for the long run. In other words, the Government of the United States of America is arrogant in the Vietnam War, not only disregarded the human
 ___________
[22] The exact evidence is the Paris Peace Accords was not enacted American law by the United States Congress.
Vietnamese but also trampled down the formal principle of justice by the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973. When a Great Power has received a weak nation to be a partner, the American power is fooled the Republic of Vietnam. How the defendant would’s the US think about this war?
Authorities (CFR)
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The edition of the laws and treaties of the United States, published by Little and Brown, and the publications in slip or pamphlet form of the laws of the United States issued under the authority of the Archivist of the United States, and the Treaties and Other International Acts Series issued under the authority of the Secretary of State shall be competent evidence of the several public and private Acts of Congress, and of the treaties, international agreements other than treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and international agreements other than treaties, as the case may be, therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the United States, and of the several States, without any further proof or authentication thereof.
(July 30, 1947, ch. 388, 61 Stat. 636; Pub. L. 89–497, § 1, July 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 271; Pub. L. 98–497, title I, § 107(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2291.)

For proving is 22 U.S.C. § 7108 Sep. 22, 1961- Actions against significant traffickers in persons Un- annotated Title 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse §
The petitioner is lieutenant police of the Republic of Vietnam which is why he was sold to communism by the defendant's US when he didn't have violated crime with Americanism and communism. Why did the Vietnam War become to traffickers of the Government of the United States of America? Because the protocol of international relations of the Government of the United States of America has never had to sell the Republic of Vietnam to communism, the Government of the United States of America has more been promised to defeat communism. But in the end, the Government of the United States of America was sold the Republic of Vietnam to communism, so the South officers were begun foreign persons that who were owned benefits by the Government of the United States of America. Let the American Government sell them off to communism on April 30, 1975. So the Government of the United States of America did think us to be the American products when the American Government has exchanged with communism or the so-called the Southern officers looked like the African slave when the American Government is the owned trader.
Authority to sanction significant traffickers in persons (1)  In general
The President may exercise the authorities set forth in section 1702 of Title 50 without regard to section 1701 of Title 50 in the case of any of the following persons:(A) Any foreign person that plays a significant role in a severe form of trafficking in persons, directly or indirectly in the US.(B) Foreign persons that materially assist in, or provide financial or technological support for or to, or provide goods or services in support of, activities of a significant foreign trafficker in persons identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).  (C) Foreign persons that are owned, controlled, or directed by, or acting for or on behalf of, a significant foreign trafficker identified pursuant to subparagraph (A). 
(2)  Penalties
.The penalties set forth in section 1705 of Title 50 apply to violations of any license, order, or regulation issued under this section.
 Report to Congress on identification and sanctioning of significant traffickers in persons
Exact 35 U.S.C. § 183- Right to compensation. Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 160 (a), Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 48;
The petitioner is compensated by the defendant of The United States of America because H.Res 309 recognized the 44th anniversary of the Fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, when, Federal Tort Claims Act. House.gov has endorsed, the United States Congress has enacted 28 U.S. Code 1346- the United States as the defendant. Therefore, the masterminds of the Vietnam War of the Government of the United States of America are self-confessed wrongful actions by Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, and Advisory Kissinger. As a result, litigation would not be hearing when the defendant has self-confessed wrongful actions of the Vietnam War. When the legal procedure has been progressed done by the petitioner, he has carried out exact American laws enforcement. If Congressional would accept the self-evident truths, Congressional will not be hearing. However, his duty and responsibility should need for a hearing. Let the American people who should clearly understand about the Vietnam War, this was distorted America justice by a few of the American citizens. Therefore, the compensation of the Government of the United States of America must be rightly enforced for prisoner of war in law.
In prove that American President has confirmed by protocol international relations with the Republic of Vietnam in the Vietnam War of the proxy war of the United States of America which is why the Government of the United States of America has sold off the republic of Vietnam to communism without had protocol international relations. Ironically, the American military has been coming to the Republic of Vietnam by the American statutorily and the United States treaties, but after the American military has aggressively seized from the central government to the local government of the Republic of Vietnam after that, the Government of the United States has never had to enforce to the American laws and the United States Treaties of the proxy war of the United States of America had signed with the Republic of Vietnam what is why the American law and the United States Treaties could not value after enactments and signed names.


applicant, his successors, assigns, or legal representatives, whose patent is withheld as herein provided, shall have the right, beginning at the date the applicant is notified that except for such order, his application is otherwise in condition for allowance, or February 1, 1952, whichever is later, and ending six years after the patent is issued thereon, to apply to the head of any department or agency who caused the order to be issued for compensation for the damage caused by the order of secrecy and/or for the use of the invention by the Government, resulting from his disclosure. The right to compensation for use shall begin on the date of the first use of the invention by the Government. The head of the department or agency is authorized, upon the presentation of a claim, to enter into an agreement with the applicant, his successor’s assigns, or legal representatives, in full settlement for the damage and/or use.
This settlement agreement shall be conclusive for all purposes notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary. If full settlement of the claim cannot be effected, the head of the department or agency may award and pay to such applicant, his successors, assigns, or legal representatives, a sum not exceeding 75 per centum of the sum which the head of the department or agency considers just compensation for the damage and/or use. A claimant may bring suit against the US in the US Court of Federal Claims or in the District Court of the US for the district in which such claimant is a resident for an amount which when added to the award shall constitute just compensation for the damage and/or use of the invention by the Government. The owner of any patent issued upon an application that was subject to a secrecy order issued pursuant to section 181, who did not apply for compensation as above provided, shall have the right, after the date of issuance of such patent, to bring suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims for just compensation for the damage caused by reason of the order of secrecy and/or use by the Government of the invention resulting from his disclosure. The right to compensation for use shall begin on the date of the first use of the invention by the Government. In a suit under the provisions of this section the United States may avail itself of all defenses it may plead in an action under

9. Civil Rights Actions-42 U.S.C. § 1983 [23] Section 1498 of title 28.
This section shall not confer a right of action on anyone or his successors,
assigns, or legal representatives who, while in the full-time employment or service of the United States, discovered, invented, or developed the invention on which the claim is based.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the US or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other Proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
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[23] Why did the American Court system discriminate national origin and under color with a Vietnamese American prisoner of war because he is requested benefits merits of his served war for the Government of the United States of America? When he has based on America law by the United States Congress enacted. His petition looks like Native Americans when he did not violate to political action or a criminal section. That is why; the US Department of Justice of Civil Rights Division Office has pushed his settlement case that is into the political actions and the criminal section on March 8, 2019, in order to distort his civil right case, when, he carried out the imprisoned benefits Insurance by the United States Congress has enacted law. Who is the American court system protecting?



exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. This chapter is organized to provide separate "elements" instructions for
42 U.S. Code § 1983.Civil action for deprivation of rights
The discrimination of the American Court system did not only obstruct for America justice but also distorted American law in order to build unfair American societies. Because the American Court system carried out for rule by law in order to trample down the rule of law. Obviously, when the local government built unfair social American, the American court has deprived the right of the American citizen because he has had proved adequate statutory, but, the American court system always created difficulties to return his statement of the case in order to obstruct for democracy. As a result, the conception of unmitigated punishment for offenders of the American Court system was nothing when it abuses of power in order to distort American justice. Let’s protect rule by law or its dictator system has ordered to punish the American pieces of innocence. In fact, the Vietnam war exactly was evidence of the Government of the United States of America did not only trample down the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam but also sold all of the super values of the Republic of Vietnam to communism when the protocols International relations are between the Government of the United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam have never had recorded it. He would like to ask the United States Congress that why did you endorse the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam by the American law, but you have sold it to communism? What did you enforce perfect American law when you enacted it?
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
for the right other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
(R.S. § 1979; Pub. L. 96–170, § 1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. 104–317, title III, § 309(c), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.)
In the capacity of a Vietnamese American prisoner of war, he is very proud of American civic life. Therefore, he must struggle for an equal society in order to protect the super values of a Great America when his foundationless the claim that rationality and knowledge rest on a firm foundation of self-evident truths. That is why he would like to enforce this statutory because he has been petitioning for settlement case of prisoner of war of the Vietnam War, which is against a core of interests of the United States of America- However, his view that only his own mind and thoughts exist; nothing beside them is really real. With the results that view that we should have good evidence in support of a petition before we accept it as true. Because of the state of California has in contempt of its Californian citizen without had any California law and American law had ordered, it, therefore, the state of California must wish to stop his mouth by a mental case in which should be destroyed to his lawsuit is a prisoner of war in order to protect the wrongful action of the Vietnam War in the past.
Title VI of CRA of 1964- 42 U.S.C§2000D
0r 9. CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS—42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., was enacted as part of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. It prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. As President 35th said in 1963:
The American law has ordered for all of the American citizens who have the rights to petition in order to request his or her injured damaged benefits that did not discriminate national origins and under color skin or so-called is not discriminating for Native Americans, immigration, and prisoners of war which are why the American court system has distorted American law in order to against civil rights– the American democracy. An American judge the chief was voted by the American citizens, but the judge was betrayed American voters in order to protect its rule by law. As a result, the problem of evil in the broad sense of the American Court system is applied for a super scientist civilization in order to anti- American democracy because of most of the Vietnamese American refugees who have stupid. When they lived in an undeveloped - poor nation, they have come to modern civilization- they do respect money than human dignity. Therefore, they do not have care for America justice and American law when they forgot their nation's full democracy, adequate freedom, and unmitigated punishment of offenders - justice in the ex-wonderful Republic of Vietnam. Let them make modern enslaving war in the United States of America. If they did not find out the evil problem of American court of explaining, they are making sense of evil existence. So an objective sense, the difficulty of deletion the existence of the evil of the American court system, which overturned with the existence of perfectly, good, all-powerful of American justice. Because of his exact properties, benefits imprisoned insurance and his intellectual property are protected by American statutorily. Why the American Court system was obstructed American law by its power?

Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races [colors, and national origins] contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial [color or national origin] discrimination.
If a recipient of federal assistance is found to have discriminated and voluntary compliance cannot be achieved, the federal agency providing the assistance should either initiate fund termination proceedings or refer the matter to the Department of Justice for appropriate legal action. Aggrieved individuals may file administrative complaints with the federal agency that provides funds to a recipient, or the individuals may file suit for appropriate relief in federal court. Title VI itself prohibits intentional discrimination. However, most funding agencies have regulations implementing Title VI that prohibit recipient practices that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of race color, or national origin.
To assist federal agencies that provide financial assistance, the wide variety of recipients that receive such assistance, and the actual and potential beneficiaries of programs receiving federal assistance, the U.S. Department of Justice have published a Title VI Legal Manual. The Title VI Legal Manual sets out Title VI legal principles and standards. Additionally, the Department has published an Investigation Procedures Manual to give practical advice on how to investigate Title VI complaints. Also available on the Federal Coordination and Compliance Website are a host of other materials that may be helpful to those interested in ensuring effective enforcement of Title VI.
Exact 28 U.S.C§ 4101[24] - Definitions- (Added Pub. L. 111–223, § 3 (a), Aug. 10, 2010, 124 Stat. 2381.)
Bright Quang, plaintiff, he has never had prosecuted any criminal section and violated traffic laws by any the American courts. When he looks like the Native Americans that he always respects American law and protects the United States Constitution because he was firmly trained American law by the jury - people of the local court.
He always respects many of all of the super values of the United States of America when he always creates few American society's books and philosophy books and he, sometime, creates quotes and for pieces of
____________
[24].California DMV- Customer Receipt Copy- Driver License/ Identification Card-Information request 01/09/15
* Doctors Medical Evaluation is 2009, 2010, and 2012

artwork during he takes good care his family. In fact, he has been taught his children that they are seven children when they were successful in the social American, they have never had violated crime of America laws why the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of California was defamed, libeled, and slandered him to have a mental case? In his opinion, that though the state of the California was borrowed the police hands in order to kill him because he'd been petitioning for the United States Department of Justice in order to request compensation for the prisoner of war of the Vietnam War. When his benefit of the refugee has not corresponded with benefits of prisoner of war, he has compared between a humbugger cake and a potato, in which he should be chosen one of both- and as he must be chosen hamburger cake than a potato. Therefore, it has secretly seemed of the states of the California or other secret government agencies, let's stop the plaintiff's mouth of the Vietnam War of prisoner of war case of the United States of America that has had taken place in the Republic of Vietnam because of his petition seemed to decide adversely to the Government of the United States of America. For example, he has been submitting his case to the United States Department Justice for many years in the past. So the US Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor General has sent it’s a letter to him and had ordered, “April 20, 2001, Thank for your correspondence to the Office of the Solicitor General. The task of the Office of the Solicitor General is to supervise and conduct government litigation in the United States Supreme Court. The Solicitor General determines the case in which Supreme Court Review will be sought by the government and the position the government will take before the court. The Office also reviews all cases decided adversely to the government in the lower courts to determine whether they should be appealed and, if so, what position should be taken. In your letter, you requested compensation due to the impact of the Vietnam War on your life. Because the duties of our Office are limited to the conduct and management of appellate litigation and matters before the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General is not the appropriate office to address your request. For further advice or assistance in the matters, you may wish to seek counsel. Again, thank you for your correspondence. Sincerely Valerie H. Hall- Executive Office- Office of the Solicitor General. “
When he began to progress the case at the lower court in San Mateo County, his case was no had any American attorney and Law companies helped for him because they have known this case which is belonged to self-evident truth of the Vietnam War. Even though, he’d like to apply in order to make an appointment for some counsel law. However, they ought to think about to adversely to the Government of the United States of America and the state of California- therefore, no lawyers wanted to help him because all of the Californian lawyers must accept to sink his case to mud. In fact, the Department of Motor Vehicles did not review evaluations of his doctors when it was freely defaming, libeling and slandering him by the mental case in order to borrow the police hands let them may easily murder him. Therefore, he would think about the American law which is why the United States Congress has enacted American law, but the American law could not enforce when the American citizen who is oppressed by the American law. Or so-called a Vietnamese American prisoner of war was discriminated national origin and under color skin by the government employees.
(1) Defamation.—
The term “defamation” means any action or other proceeding for defamation, libel, slander, or similar claim alleging that forms of speech are false, have caused damage to reputation or emotional distress, have presented any person in a false light, or have resulted in criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person.
(2)Domestic court.—
The term “domestic court” means a Federal court or a court of any State. (A)
a. US citizen;
(B)
An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the US;
(D)
a business entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or place of operation in, the US.

C.V.Code Section 14103, 14105, 13953[25]14103- Failure to respond to a notice given under this chapter within 10 days is a waiver of the right to a hearing, and the department may take action without a hearing or may, upon request of the person whose privilege of driving is in
14105 (a)The decision shall take effect as stated in the notice, but not less than four nor more than 15 days question, or at its own option, reopen the question, take evidence, change, or set aside any order previously made, or grant a hearing.
Ironically, the Department of Motor Vehicles of California has decided prohibiting him to drive any cars when he is main manpower of labor of his family during; he has been taken case for his little sons. They have studying at University and High School, but he was jobless and prohibited driving car by Department of Motor Vehicles. In the meanwhile, he must be deciding for study the American law in order to struggle for the American Justice because of the statutorily of the United States Congress did not change any law because the American law is American law. When some of government Agencies have distorted the law, the Government of the United States of America should follow with the American law in order to compensate to injuries damage because of formal principle of justice has had released within American law.
To which is why the American Attorneys and Law firm Companies were refused counsel to him. Other sides, Department of Motor vehicles has pushed him to local court review a writ for mandate when he has been written a writ for mandate, the local court was denied. In fact, the unfair local government is discriminated by the Administrative law because the local government did need the American citizen to should report matter within the ten days, but the American citizens ought to request government helped for. The local government is said to need within the
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[25] He had submitted his evaluation of his doctors to Department of Motor Vehicles by the US mail. But it told him did not submit it.
three months, which will be complete. For example, the court judges were voted by the American citizens, but the Court judges have never respected any the American citizens' opinion after the citizen had paid court fee, the court turned back one's head with their citizen which is why the American law enacted good way, but the American judges did not enforce good law.
(Amended by Stats. 1991, Ch. 13, Sec. 34. Effective February 13, 1991.)
after the notice is mailed. Notice of the decision shall include a statement of the person's right to a review. Upon the conclusion of a hearing, the hearing officer or hearing board shall make findings and render a decision on behalf of the department and shall notify the person involved.  
The decision may be modified at any time after issuance to correct mistakes or clerical errors. (b)
13953. This document provides guidelines for evaluating and taking action against the driving privilege of drivers with physical or mental conditions or disabilities that may impair the ability to drive.

Statutory 18 U.S.C§ 1705[26]-June 25, 1948- Destruction of letter boxes or mail- June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 779
He was submitted his document to Department of Motor Vehicles Licensing Operating Division- Drive Safety Branch, 377 Fell Street, 2nd Floor-San Francesco, CA 94117-2296, but it did not only review but also had not respond any words to him. It told him do not submit document on time when it did not return it to him. Next, he has submitted his petitions to the ___________________
[26] Why did Department of Motor Vehicle in San Francisco throw garbage his evaluation’s Doctor when he had sent it to Department of Motor Vehicles. It told that it did not receipt his document, but his document did not return by mail. And other federal government offices, he had submitted his Settlement case’s document.

US Department of Justice on July 26, 2018, but the US Department of Justice did not resolve his petitions when he did think his document, which was legal of the American law which is why the US Department of Justice was thrown it to garbage. Finally, he would like to submit his settlement case to Federal Bureau of Investigation – Head Quarter, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW - Washington, D.C. 20535-0001(202) 324-3000, which had returned by a receiver's signature, but he could not receive any responds . In the meanwhile, he has submitting his Settlement case's document to U.S. Secret Service Office of Government Liaison & Public Affairs 950H Street, N.W. Suite 8400- Washington, DC 20223 by United States Postal Service on April 8, 2019, but there did not return any signature Receiver when he had brought the returned ticket. Therefore, he could not know about his document to there or wrong office addresses service because this law had carrying out Destruction of letter boxes or mail in order to prove to his settlement case, which had submitting to some of Federal Government offices, but he could not know how to his case.
Whoever willfully or maliciously injures, tears down or destroys any letter box or other receptacle intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail on any mail route, or breaks open the same or willfully or maliciously injures, defaces or destroys any mail deposited therein, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both
To prove Ca. Civil Code §§§44, 45a and 46
§44. Defamation is affected by either of the following:
(a) Libel.
(b) Slander
§45.Libelis a false unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. 
Libel, what.
§ 46. DIVISION 1. PERSONS [38 - 86]
( Heading of Division 1 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 12.)
PART 2. PERSONAL RIGHTS [43 - 53.7] (Part 2 enacted 1872. )
46.
Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or any mechanical or other means which:
1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime;
2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease;
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits;
4. Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; or
5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage?
Statutory 42 USC §1395- Prohibition against any Federal interference-(Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, title XVIII, § 1801, as added Pub. L. 89–97, title I, § 102 (a), July 30, 1965, 79 Stat. 291.)
According to this bill which is why the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of California has interference to health care of him because its decision has self endorsed he to be mental case without had any medical centers recognized. Because of the Department of Motor vehicles was against - democracy, it self used the rule by law in order to trample down a Vietnamese American prisoner of war or so-called is the jungle law of communism in order to make money an innocent American citizen or it discriminated national origin because he was not Native American? When the Department of Motor Vehicles has pushed him to a local court, he ought to pay the court fee and lost job.
The interferences of the Department of Motor Vehicles have been pouring for the burden of weights of the sufferings on his life without had regrets. When he is an innocent citizen, he has never had violated crime and traffic law which is why it has built the unfairness and maltreated him by the American law. If he were crime, he was strongly punished by the American law.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or employee of any institution, agency, or person providing health services; or to exercise any supervision or control over the administration or operation of any such institution, agency, or person.
Proving 17 U.S.C§ 1203 [27]. Civil remedies - U.S. Code - Un- annotated Title 17. Copyrights
Civil Actions. (a) --Any person injured by a violation of section 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in an appropriate US district court for such violation.
Powers of the court. (b) -In an action brought under subsection (a), the court
The masterminding of the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of California does not only destroy to his intellectual property but also insults to A Vietnamese American Artist when he just graduated Bachelor Degree, he wishes to earn a little money let him repay Student loan. But all of his hopeful is bankrupted by the
unfairness of the Department of Motor Vehicles, it did not only destroy to his wonderful life but also pushes him to the violent crime if the calm of his heart was not peaceful in oneself, he should be begun a violated crime because the unfairness of the Department of Motor Vehicles has poured on his honest life. Therefore, he ought to make oneself free with any ways when he will do because of the class oppressions of the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of California has oppressed a Vietnamese American prisoner, writer, and artist without had main reason. However, he is peace of his mind when he does believe on the American justice.
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[27]. TX 7-780-619, TX 0007748469-2013-07-08, TX 6-404-116, TX 6-377-842, TX 8-288-591
(1) May grant temporary and permanent injunctions on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation, but in no event shall impose a prior restraint on free speech or the press protected under the 1st amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) at any time while an action is pending, may order the impounding, on such terms as it deems reasonable, of any device or product that is in the custody or control of the alleged violator and that the court has reasonable cause to believe was involved in a violation; 
(3) may award damages under subsection (c); 
(4) in its discretion may allow the recovery of costs by or against any party other than the US or an officer thereof; 
(5) in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party;  and
(6) may, as part of a final judgment or decree finding a violation, order the remedial modification or the destruction of any device or product involved in the violation that is in the custody or control of the violator or has been impounded under paragraph (2). In general (1) --Except as otherwise provided in this title, a person committing a violation of section 1201 or 1202 is liable for either--
Award of damages.-- (c)

(A) The actual damages and any additional profits of the violator, as provided in paragraph (2),
(B) or (B) statutory damages, as provided in paragraph (3). 
Actual damages. 
(2) --The court shall award to the complaining party the actual damages suffered by the party as a result of the violation, and any profits of the violator that are attributable to the violation and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages, if the complaining party elects such damages at any time before final judgment is entered.
Statutory damages.-
-(A) (3) At any time before final judgment is entered, a complaining party may elect to recover an award of statutory damages for each violation of section 1201 in the sum of not less than $200 or more than $2,500 per act of circumvention, device, product, component, offer, or performance of service, as the court considers just. 
(B) At any time before final judgment is entered, a complaining party may elect to recover an award of statutory damages for each violation of section 1202 in the sum of not less than $2,500 or more than $25,000. 
Repeated violations. (4) --In any case in which the injured party sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that a person has violated section 1201 or 1202 within 3 years after a final judgment was entered against the person for another such violation, the court may increase the award of damages up to triple the amount that would otherwise be awarded, as the court considers just.
Innocent violations.-- (5)
In general. (A) --The court in its discretion may reduce or remit the total award of damages in any case in which the violator sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that the violator was not aware and had no reason to believe that its acts constituted a violation.
Nonprofit library, archives, educational institutions, or public broadcasting entities.-- (B)
Definition. (i) --In this subparagraph, the term “public broadcasting entity” has the meaning given such term under section 118(f) .
In general. (ii) --In the case of a nonprofit library, archives, educational institution, or public broadcasting entity, the court shall remit damages in any case in which the library, archives, educational institution, or public broadcasting entity sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that the library, archives, educational institution, or public broadcasting entity was not aware and had no reason to believe that its acts constituted a violation.

17 U.S.C § 411[28] - Registration and civil infringement actions-Pub.
L. 94–553, title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat.- 2583
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[28] the state of California was directly destroyed his intellectual property by the mental case when he did not have any mental ill in order to borrow the police hands let them should be killed him in order to stop his mouth when he has been petition for his settlement case of prisoner of war.

His intellectual properties were registered by the American law of copy-rights when he is the same as Native Americans. He does not only respect the United States Constitution but also protects the American law without had violated crime which is why the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of California has discriminated national origin with him when it has been created difficulties for the non-law of the statutorily to put on his head. The Department of Motor Vehicles is represented by the American law, but it did not only build the unfairness but also tramples down an honest citizen. When the United States
Congress has enacting for 42 USC § 1981, Equal rights under the law, the Department of Motor Vehicles has distorted the American law in order to build an unfair society.
(a)
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author under section 106A (a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b),[1] no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until pre registration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights. The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registry ability of the copyright claim by entering an appearance within sixty days after such service, but the Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine that issue.

(b)
(1)A certificate of registration satisfies the requirements of this section and section 412, regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information, unless—
(A)
The inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and
(B)
The inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.
(2)
In any case in which inaccurate information described under paragraph (1) is alleged, the court shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.
(3)
Nothing in this subsection shall affect any rights, obligations, or requirements of a person related to information contained in a registration certificate, except for the institution of and remedies in infringement actions under this section and section 412.
(c)In the case of a work consisting of sounds, images, or both, the first fixation of which is made simultaneously with its transmission, the copyright owner may, either before or after such fixation takes place, institute an action for infringement under section 501, fully subject to the remedies provided by sections 502 through 505 and section 510, if, in accordance with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, the copyright owner—
(1)
serves notice upon the infringer, not less than 48 hours before such fixation, identifying the work and the specific time and source of its first
transmission, and declaring an intention to secure copyright in the work; and
(2)
makes registration for the work, if required by subsection (a), within three months after its first transmission.
Proving 42 U.S. Code § 12101 [29] - Findings and purpose (Pub. L. 101–336, § 2, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 328; Pub. L. 110–325, § 3, Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat. 3554.) (a) Findings
The law of the United States Congress has defined that's a mental case when the mental of a person must not participate in all of the aspects of the American society which is why the Department of Motor vehicles has put a label of mental on his head in order to borrow the police hand to let them kill him because of the lives him to the rule of law, but not rule by law to lets government employee freely sit on his head of an innocent citizen. What is the United States Congress enacting for the American law to whom is protected by American law? Why was the Department of Motor Vehicles to be contemptuous to its citizen, but it does need the traffic tax and to voting register when the Californian Government does not look like fish and water? The Department of Motor Vehicles is not Psychiatric Hospital Center, which decides the mental patient which is why the Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of California has sat on the head of its citizen. It did not only against-democracy but also trampled down human rights of the federal law because it did think the Californian citizen who looked like its children. Therefore, it did not only freely discriminate national origin but also barbarously repressed on the innocent Californian citizen. But the Californian court has been protection for its employee; it was always made money of the honest citizen by the court orders which combined with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Therefore, the Department of Motor Vehicles acted with trickery and deceit.
The Congress finds that—
_______________

[29]. Notice of findings and decision for A mental Case of Driver license # B4547245 Section 14103






(1)
physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from doing so because of discrimination; others who have a record of a disability or are regarded as having a disability also have been subjected to discrimination;
(2)
historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
(3)
discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services;
(4)
unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
, (5)
individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
(6)
census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, educationally, economically, and educationally;
(7)
the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(8)
the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the US billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non productively.
(b)Purpose It is the purpose of this chapter—
(1)
to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2)
to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3)
to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4)
to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.

CACI Nos. 3940-3949- DAMAGES
“The high court in T; O [T; O Production Corp., supra] and BMW [BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559 [116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809]] has refine the disparity analysis to take into account the potential loss to plaintiffs, as where a scheme worthy of punitive damages does not fully succeed. In such cases, the proper ratio would be the ratio of punitive damages to the potential harm to plaintiff.” (Sierra Club Found. v. Graham (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1162, fn. 15 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 726], original italics.) Secondary Sources 6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 1559, 1562, 1572–1577, 1607–1623 Hanning et al., California Practice Guide: Personal Injury, Ch. 3-E, Punitive Damages, 3:255–3:281.15 (The Rutter Group) California Tort Damages (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Punitive Damages, §§ 14.1–14.12, 14.39 4 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 54, Punitive Damages, §§ 54.01–54.06, 54.20–54.25 (Matthew Bender) 15 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 177, Damages, § 177.51 (Matthew Bender) 6 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 64, Damages: Tort, §§ 64.141 et seq., 64.174 et seq. (Matthew Bender)
“The high court in TXO [TXO Production Corp., supra] and BMW [BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559 [116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809]] has refine the disparity analysis to take into account the potential loss to plaintiffs, as where a scheme worthy of punitive damages does not fully Succeed. In such cases, the proper ratio would be the ratio of punitive damages to the potential harm to plaintiff.” (Sierra Club Found. v. Graham (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1135, 1162, fn. 15 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 726], original italics.)
“The high court in TXO [TXO Production Corp., supra] and BMW [BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559 [116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809]] has refine the disparity analysis to take into account the potential loss to plaintiffs, as where a scheme worthy of punitive damages does not fully succeed. In such cases, the proper ratio would be the ratio of punitive damages to the potential harm to plaintiff.” (Sierra Club Found. v. Graham (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1135, 1162, fn. 15 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 726], original italics.)
6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 1559, 1562,
1572–1577, 1607–1623
Hanning et al., California Practice Guide: Personal Injury, Ch. 3-E, Punitive
Damages, 3:255–3:281.15 (The Rutter Group)
California Tort Damages (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Punitive Damages, §§ 14.1–14.12,14.39
4 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 54, Punitive Damages, §§ 54.01–54.06,
54.20–54.25 (Matthew Bender)
15 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 177, Damages, § 177.51
(Matthew Bender)
6 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 64, Damages: Tort, §§ 64.141 et seq.,
64.174 et seq. (Matthew Bender)
CACI No: 3949. Punitive Damages—Individual and Corporate Defendants (Corporate Liability Based on Acts of Named Individual)—Bifurcated Trial (Second Phase) You must now decide the amount, if any, that you should award [name of plaintiff] in punitive damages. The purposes of punitive damages are to punish a wrongdoer for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff and to discourage similar conduct in the future. There is no fixe formula for determining the amount of punitive damages and you are not required to award any punitive damages. If you decide to award punitive damages, you should consider all of the following factors separately for each defendant in determining the amount: (a) + ow reprehensible was that defendant’s conduct? In deciding how reprehensible a defendant’s conduct was, you may consider, among other factors: 1. Whether the conduct caused physical harm; 2. Whether the defendant disregarded the health or safety of others; 3. Whether [name of plaintiff] was financially weak or vulnerable and the defendant knew [name of plaintiff] was financially weak or vulnerable and took advantage of [him/her/it];
4. Whether the defendant’s conduct involved a pattern or practice; and 5. Whether the defendant acted with trickery or deceit. (b) Is there a reasonable relationship between the amount of punitive damages and [name of plaintiff]’s harm [or between the amount of punitive damages and potential harm to [name of plaintiff] that the defendant knew was likely to occur because of [his/her/its] conduct]? (c) In view of that defendant’s financial condition, what amount is necessary to punish [him/her/it] and discourage future wrongful conduct? You may not increase the punitive award above an amount that is otherwise appropriate merely because a defendant has substantial financial resources. [Any award you impose may
not exceed that defendant’s ability to pay.] [Punitive damages may not be used to punish a defendant for the impact of [his/her/its] alleged misconduct on persons other than [name of plaintiff].]

To prove 28 USC § 1871 Fees; June 25, 1946-ch. 646, 62 Stat. 953

Lets the petitioner would like to argue with the defendant's US when the defendant had taken an oath loyalty the US Constitution. For him did not only realize for the national independence but also carried out for Rule of law in order to express to "All men are creative equal" - and to protect the national interests which is why the Californian Court did not carry out the United States Congress when it has been forced him to attendance Jury court. But it did not pay $40.00 [30] to him, it forced him to service jury court without had any payment. In fact, he was attendance for two times in jury court, so a first time of jury court did not pay any pennies, but, the second times he was paid $17.00 by the Jury Court.
If these sublime subjects of the America is day for actual attendance at the place of trial or hearing. A jury shall also be paid the attendance fee
for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from such place at the beginning and end of such service or at any time during such service.
Law values was not exactly express for the American legislative,
Executive, and justice enacting, so Americanism seems to be contemptuous for the American citizens, because local government does not only carry out the law of the United States Congress but also had distorted the rule in order to service private interests of the state of California when it is _________________
[30] The court judged didn't give him to take a part in the courtroom; it had ordered him to take a part in jurors. But it didn't pay for jurors fees. So, it had awarded a good letter to him when it pushed him into political action of his mental case. It told him to have a mental case. When he attended in jurors without attending his driver license case's A 128855 June 24, 2010, which was the same as Jurors day. The second jurors were paid by $ 17. 00 and cents within had a letter award which is why his mental case has become a political case-during, the court judged him to be absent when he's attending for the jurors but did not pay any pennies to follow this statutory.
contemptuous for the weak citizens, but the federal government seemed not check the local government that is reason the local government has left the American citizens behind American law.
(a)
Grand and petit jurors in district courts appearing pursuant to this chapter shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this section. The requisite fees and allowances shall be disbursed on the certificate of the clerk of court in accordance with the procedure established by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Attendance fees for extended service under subsection (b) of this section shall be certified by the clerk only upon the order of a district judge.
(b)
(1)
A juror shall be paid an attendance fee of $50(before 2018 is $40 per day for actual attendance at the place of trial or hearing.) A juror shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from such place at the beginning and end of such service or at any time during such service.
(2)
A petit juror required to attend more than ten days in hearing one case may be paid, in the discretion of the trial judge, an additional fee, not exceeding $10 more than the attendance fee, for each day in excess of ten days on which he is required to hear such case.
(3)
A grand juror required to attend more than forty-five days of actual service may be paid, in the discretion of the district judge in charge of the particular grand jury, an additional fee, not exceeding $10 more than the attendance fee, for each day in excess of forty-five days of actual service.
(4)
A grand or petit juror required to attend more than ten days of actual service may be paid, in the discretion of the judge, the appropriate fees at the end of the first ten days and at the end of every ten days of service thereafter.
(5)
Certification of additional attendance fees may be ordered by the judge to be made effective commencing on the first day of extended service, without reference to the date of such certification.
(c)
(1)
A travel allowance not to exceed the maximum rate per mile that the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has prescribed pursuant to section 604(a)(7) of this title for payment to supporting court personnel in travel status using privately owned automobiles shall be paid to each juror, regardless of the mode of transportation actually employed. The prescribed rate shall be paid for the distance necessarily traveled to and from a juror’s residence by the shortest practical route in going to and returning from the place of service. Actual mileage in full at the prescribed rate is payable at the beginning and at the end of a juror’s term of service.
(2)
The Director shall promulgate rules regulating interim travel allowances to jurors. Distances traveled to and from court should coincide with the shortest practical route.
(3)
Toll charges for toll roads, bridges, tunnels, and ferries shall be paid in full to the juror incurring such charges. In the discretion of the court, reasonable parking fees may be paid to the juror incurring such fees upon presentation of a valid parking receipt. Parking fees shall not be included in any tabulation of mileage cost allowances.
(4)
Any juror who travels to district court pursuant to summons in an area outside of the contiguous forty-eight States of the United States shall be paid the travel expenses provided under this section, or actual reasonable transportation expenses subject to the discretion of the district judge or clerk of court as circumstances indicate, exercising due regard for the mode of transportation, the availability of alternative modes, and the shortest practical route between residence and court.
(5)
A grand juror who travels to district court pursuant to a summons may be paid the travel expenses provided under this section or, under guidelines established by the Judicial Conference, the actual reasonable costs of travel by aircraft when travel by other means is not feasible and when certified by the chief judge of the district court in which the grand juror serves.
(d)
(1)
A subsistence allowance covering meals and lodging of jurors shall be established from time to time by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts pursuant to section 604(a)(7) of this title, except that such allowance shall not exceed the allowance for supporting court personnel in travel status in the same geographical area. Claims for such allowance shall not require itemization.
(2)
A subsistence allowance shall be paid to a juror when an overnight stay is required at the place of holding court, and for the time necessarily spent in traveling to and from the place of attendance if an overnight stay is required.
(3)
A subsistence allowance for jurors serving in district courts outside of the contiguous forty-eight States of the United States shall be allowed at a rate not to exceed that per diem allowance which is paid to supporting court personnel in travel status in those areas where the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has prescribed an increased per diem fee pursuant to section 604(a)(7) of this title.
(e)
During any period in which a jury is ordered to be kept together and not to separate, the actual cost of subsistence shall be paid upon the order of the court in lieu of the subsistence allowances payable under subsection (d) of this section. Such allowance for the jurors ordered to be kept separate or sequestered shall include the cost of meals, lodging, and other expenditures ordered in the discretion of the court for their convenience and comfort.
(f)
A juror who must necessarily use public transportation in traveling to and from court, the full cost of which is not met by the transportation expenses allowable under subsection (c) of this section on account of the short distance traveled in miles, may be paid, in the discretion of the court, the actual reasonable expense of such public transportation, pursuant to the methods of payment provided by this section. Jurors who are required to remain at the court beyond the normal business closing hour for deliberation or for any other reason may be transported to their homes, or to temporary lodgings where such lodgings are ordered by the court, in a manner directed by the clerk and paid from funds authorized under this section.
(g)
The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out his authority under this section.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 953; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 97, 63 Stat. 103; July 14, 1949, ch. 333, 63 Stat. 411; Pub. L. 85–299, Sept. 7, 1957, 71 Stat. 618; Pub. L. 89–165, Sept. 2, 1965, 79 Stat. 645; Pub. L. 90–274, § 102(a), Mar. 27, 1968, 82 Stat. 62; Pub. L. 95–572, § 5, Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. 2454; Pub. L. 101–650, title III, § 314(b), Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5115; Pub. L. 102–572, title IV, § 402, Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4511; Pub. L. 110–406, § 3(a), Oct. 13, 2008, 122 Stat. 4292; Pub. L. 115–141, div. E, title III, § 307(a), Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 556.)


VI. DISCUSSION

The pursuant 44 U.S.C § 3507 - Added Pub. L. 104–13, § 2, May 22, 1995, 109 Stat. 176 Public information collection activities; submission to Director; approval and delegation (a)An agency shall not conduct or Sponsor the collection of information unless in advance of the adoption or revision of the collection of information—
(1) the agency has—
(A)
Conducted the review established under section 3506(c) (1);
(B)
Evaluated the public comments received under section 3506(c) (2);
Why did not total the prisoner of war of the Vietnam War of the United States collect adding within his retirement when he was servicing for the US War in Vietnam- and therefore, he was lost benefit in the retirement? Why did the Government of the United States of America carry out slave traders in the past to apply for the enslave to modern Age when the American Government did not only exploit to the bone and marrow him but also cleansed lemon juice out threw lemon skin policy? Because of when he was young, he serviced war for the Government of the United States of America. But he was older, he is exploited using for modern slavery war. In any case, the American Government did not need the Vietnam War again so the Government of the United States of America did not use him again. So the American Government did not only sell him to his communist foe. Lets the Vietnamese communist enemy imprison him and nationalize all of his property- and then, the American Government has re-bought him through the Vietnamese communist hand. He came to his second mother of American when he is demeaning for working a modern slavery war. Until he was old, his benefit's retirement did not count a half and six years of his prisoner of war. As a result, when he'll be dead, he will not be able to buy any tomb's part. So his body death will be without had any tomb's part. If his children will buy a tomb's part within five years, after that, his children will not be unable to paying for tomb tax so the local government will be dug his tomb's up and thrown his bones of the death to everywhere. For the reason, his offspring will have become robbers because of their grandfather bones are completely lost the bones of the death under tomb's part. Therefore, the American people have never understood about to tomb's part of the slavery death without had a tomb. Specially, the only have irreligious person who did not believe the bones of the death. He thought the bones of the death, which looked liked the grass and waste. He has never esteemed his or her father’s bones of death. Because of when the father is alive, he or she was the burden of weight family; he had hardly been working for full-time in order to earn good money during him or her
took good care family. But he was died by the illness; his bones of the death were not esteemed place by the altar. Therefore, he ought to struggle for his benefits of prisoner of war that is equal to all men when he had serviced war for the United States of America.
(C)
submitted to the Director the certification required under section 3506(c)(3), the proposed collection of information, copies of pertinent statutory authority, stating that the agency has made such submission; and
(ii) Setting forth—
(I) a title for the collection of information;
Proving 5 U.S.C § 3579 - Student loan repayments. Added Public L. 101–510, div. A, title XII, § 1206 (b)
(1), Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1659 ;( a) (1) For the purpose of this section
If he was earned benefits of prisoners of war by the American Government, he could not loan in order to study. In contrast, his properties were sold to communism by the defendant's US – because of the American Government has sold out the Republic of Vietnam in order to protect national interests of the United States - and then, his loan was retaken his properties and small business by the American Government. In fact, the US had declared and said, “The Vietnam War required us to emphasize the national interest’s rather abstract principle. What the 37th U.S. President and I tried to do unnatural. And that is why we did not make it.” By defendant's US has accumulated his properties by the Vietnam War when the Kissinger has had recognized his national interests of the United States, which is the Vietnam War. Therefore, the Government of the US did not only seize properties of the Republic of Vietnam but also re-sold it to communism in order to protect a core of interests. And then, the US has given him re-loan let him study in the University which is why the US is a very great rich nation, but the US has to apply for modern colonist policy in the Republic of Vietnam. Or so-called is neo-colonial war. Ironically, the Government of the United States of America has invaded the Republic of Vietnam by the United States Congress law, murdered the Vietnamese innocence, did sell the Republic of Vietnam Officers to communism, lets the Vietnamese communists imprison the Southern Officers, and then, the Government of the United States of America has re-bought them. Let them make modern slavery war in their second mother of American but also fooled the Republic of Vietnam Army. So the United States has clearly brainwashed them by the American dollars, American enrichment, and American civilization. The US Lets they do not realize where the American justices are and self - evident truth of the Vietnam War of the United States. If the moral truth of the Government of the United States compensated for prisoner of war benefits, let him welcome to modern American society in order to delete his oldest undeveloped stupidest after he serviced war of the United States of America. But the Government of the United States of America robbed his properties, the United States has given him re-loan let him study which is why the wisdom of the American Government has been fooling him for the long run. Why did the United States Congress enact American law for the Vietnam War, but not enforce law? So who are the American citizens protect by the American Law? Which are the American citizens left behind the American Law?
(A) the term “agency” means an agency under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E) of section 4101(1) of this title, the Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden, and the Office of Congressional Accessibility Services; and
(B) the term “student loan” means— (i)
a loan made, insured, or guaranteed under part B of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1071 et seq.);
(ii)
a loan made under part D or E of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq., 1087aa et seq.); and
(iii)
a health education assistance loan made or insured under part A of title VII of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 292 et seq.) or under part E of title VIII of such Act (42 U.S.C. 297a et seq.)
(2)
An employee shall be ineligible for benefits under this
section if the employee occupies a position that is excepted from the competitive service because of its confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character.
(b)
(1)
The head of an agency may, in order to recruit or retain highly qualified personnel, establish a program under which the agency may agree to repay (by direct payments on behalf of the employee) any student loan previously taken out by such employee.
(2)Payments under this section shall be made subject to such terms, limitations, or conditions as may be mutually agreed to by the agency and employee concerned, except that the amount paid by an agency under this section may not exceed—
(A)
$10,000 for any employee in any calendar year; or
(B)
a total of $60,000 in the case of any employee.
(3)
Nothing in this section shall be considered to authorize an agency to pay any amount to reimburse an employee for any repayments made by
such employee prior to the agency’s entering into an agreement under this section with such employee.
(c)
(1)An employee selected to receive benefits under this section must agree in writing, before receiving any such benefit, that the employee will—
(A)
remain in the service of the agency for a period specified in the agreement (not less than 3 years), unless involuntarily separated; and
(B)
if separated involuntarily on account of misconduct, or voluntarily, before the end of the period specified in the agreement, repay to the Government the amount of any benefits received by such employee from that agency under this section.
(2)
The payment agreed to under paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection may not be required of an employee who leaves the service of such employee’s agency voluntarily to enter into the service of any other agency unless the head of the agency that authorized the benefits notifies the employee before the effective date of such employee’s entrance into the service of the other agency that payment will be required under this subsection.
(3)If an employee who is involuntarily separated on account of misconduct or who (excluding any employee relieved of liability under paragraph (2) of this subsection) is voluntarily separated before completing the required period of service fails to repay

The Act is S 2040 Justice against Sponsors of terrorism
The Southern officers have never had terrorized the American people and the American military, but we, self-evident truth of the benefactor of the American military when we have destroyed a Vietnamese communist terrorist network. As a Vietnamese communist's secret spy Nguyen Van Troi is terrorist when he was secretly bombed Secretary of Defense McNamara and U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. on Congly Bridge in the spring of 1963 in Saigon, Vietnam, the Southern police spies have destroyed his schedules which is why the Government of the US has terrorized Southern Vietnam by the sale of Republic of Vietnam to communist Vietnam. Where is the moral truth of the American Government faith? Why did the American Government terrorize the Southern Officers when the US allowed communist Vietnam to arrest sent us to jails? Most of Southern Officers were imprisoned by the American Government indirection through the Vietnamese communist regime. He would like to request the United States Congress that ought to review the American laws which American laws have dropped off the Republic of Vietnam and which laws have sold off the Republic of Vietnam for the North Vietnam communist government? He would like to the United States Congress exactly affirm American laws of the Vietnam War.
Summary S. 2040 would allow the victims and families of victims of terror attacks to sue foreign states that aid and abet acts of terror that occur on U.S. soil. Specifically, the legislation amends the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to narrow the immunity granted to foreign states and their employees or agents from lawsuits by victims of terrorist acts on U.S. soil. The Department of Justice may seek a stay of any litigation if the Secretary of State certifies that the U.S. government is involved in good-faith discussions to resolve the matter. The legislation applies to any civil action pending on, or commenced on or after the date of enactment, as well as any civil action that arises out of an injury to a person, property,
The pursuant 50 U.S. Code § 4105 [31] – Prisoner of War
For proving this is law that the Government of the United States of America has exactly affirmed by the United States Congress enacted law by prisoner of war. In fact, the masterminding of prisoner of war of the Vietnam War was carried out by the American Government policy.
First, the Government of the United States treaties was signed between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam or so-called protocols international relations were solemnly declared by the American Government of the Vietnam War, but not carry out the American laws of the Vietnam War belong to the Government of the United States of America without had decided by the Republic of Vietnam.
Next, the sale of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to communism was belongs to the American Government, and the Southern Officers were imprisoned by the United States strategist. Therefore, the prisoners of war of the Vietnam War were belongs to the duty and responsibility of the United States of America. In his opinion that the United States Congress must compensate the injuries damage of his prisoner of war which corrected the American law which is why the American court system and the US Department of Justice were discriminated national origin with his petitions.
_______________
[31] Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. Geneva Convention and the Rules of War (See Appendix)

In fact, when the United States Congress has just enacted law of HR 7885 Pub-law, 88-205-Approved December 16, 1963, for the Vietnam War, So, Executive Organ was quickly ordered the Four hundreds of American citizens coming to the Republic of Vietnam within a day of the Congress approved, and next, the US Department of Justice who was Robert Kennedy quickly came to Saigon, Vietnam and declared, " The Vietnam War must-win communism." But the compensation of prisoner of war of the Government of the United States of America was deceit, the American Government is destroyed oneself the ethical conscience of super great power. Why does the Government of the United States of America prejudice with the Vietnamese American prisoner of war when the United States Congress enacted this law and the United States Treaties did not only control but also ruled South Vietnam from the central government to the local government of the proxy war. Therefore, the prisoner of war was belonging to the Government of the United States of America? Why did the United States Congress approve the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, but the Government of the United States of America has exploited so many of merits of the prisoner of war of the proxy war but also trampled him down?
Prisoners of war (July 3, 1948, ch. 826, title I, § 6, 62 Stat. 1244; Sept. 30, 1950, ch. 1116, 64 Stat. 1090; Apr. 9, 1952, ch. 167, § 1, 66 Stat. 47; Apr. 9, 1952, ch. 168, § 2, 66 Stat. 49; Aug. 21, 1954, ch. 784, § 2, 68 Stat. 761; Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1162, title I, § 102(a)(1), 68 Stat. 1034; Pub. L. 87–846, title I, § 102, Oct. 22, 1962, 76 Stat. 1107; Pub. L. 91–289, §§ 1, 2, June 24, 1970, 84 Stat. 323.)

(a)“POW” defined
As used in subsection (b) of this section, the term “prisoner of war” means any regularly appointed, enrolled, enlisted, or inducted member of the military or naval forces of the US who was held as a POW for any period of time subsequent to December 7, 1941, by any government of any nation with which the US has been at war subsequent to such date.
(b)Payment of claims; rate allowed; certification of claims The Commission is authorized to receive, adjudicate according to law,
and provide for the payment of any claim filed by any POW for compensation for the violation by the enemy government by which he was held as a POW, or its agents, of its obligation to furnish him the quantity or quality of food to which he was entitled as a POW under the terms of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. The compensation allowed to any POW under the provisions of this subsection shall be at the rate of $1 for each day he was held as a POW on which the enemy government or its agents failed to furnish him such quantity or quality of food. Any claim allowed under the provisions of this subsection shall be certified to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out of the War Claims Fund established by section 4110 of this title.

(c)Persons entitled to payments Claims pursuant to subsection (b) shall be paid to the person entitled thereto, and shall in case of death of the persons who are entitled be payable only to or for the benefit of the following persons:
(1)
Widow or husband if there is no child or children of the deceased;
(2)
Widow or husband and child or children of the deceased, one-half to the widow or husband and the other half to the child or children of the deceased in equal shares;
(3)
Child or children of the deceased (in equal shares) if there is no widow or husband; and
(4)
Parents (in equal shares) if there is no widow, husband, or child.
(d)Additional definition of “POW”; payment of claims; rate allowed; persons entitled to payments
(1)
As used in this subsection the term “prisoner of war” means any regularly appointed, enrolled, enlisted, or inducted member of the military or naval forces of the US, who was held a POW for any period of time subsequent to December 7, 1941, by any government of any nation with which the US has been at war subsequent to such date.
(2)The Commission is authorized to receive, adjudicate according to law, and to provide for the payment of any claim filed by any POW for compensation—
(A)
for the violations by the enemy government by which he was held as a POW, or its agents, of such government’s obligations under title III, section III, of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relating to labor of POW; or
(B)
for inhumane treatment by the enemy government by which he was held, or its agents. The term “inhumane treatment” as used herein shall include, but not be limited to, violation by such enemy government, or its agents, of one or more of the provisions of articles 2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 13, 21, 22, 54, 56, or 57, of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929.
(3)Compensation shall be allowed to any POW under this subsection at the rate of $1.50 per day for each day he was held as a POW on which he alleges and proves in a manner acceptable to the Commission—
(A)
The violation by such enemy government or its agents of the provisions of title III, section III, of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929; or
(B)
any inhumane treatment as defined herein.
Any claim allowed under the provisions of this subsection shall be certified to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out of the War Claims Fund established by section 4110 of this title. In no event shall the compensation allowed to any POW under this subsection exceed the sum of $1.50 with respect to any one day.
(4)Claims pursuant to subsection (d)(2) shall be paid to the person entitled thereto, or to his legal or natural guardian if he has one, and shall, in case of death of the persons who are entitled be payable only to or for the benefit of the following persons:
(A)
Widow or husband if there is no child or children of the deceased;
(B)
widow or husband and child or children of the deceased, one-half to the widow or husband and the other half to the child or children of the deceased in equal shares;
(C)
Child or children of the deceased (in equal shares) if there is no widow or husband; and
(D)
Parents (in equal shares) if there is no widow, husband, or child.
(f)Vietnam conflict; definitions; authority of Commission; classes of claims; rate of compensation; certification for payment; persons entitled to payments; filing date; determination of claims; fund for payment; appropriations
(1)As used in this subsection—
(A)
the term “Vietnam conflict” relates to the period beginning February 28, 1961, and ending on such date as shall thereafter be determined by Presidential proclamation or concurrent resolution of the Congress; and
(B)
the term “POW” means any regularly appointed, enrolled, enlisted, or inducted member of the Armed Forces of the US who was held as a POW for any period of time during the Vietnam conflict by any force hostile to the US, except any such member who, at any time, voluntarily, knowingly, and without duress, gave aid to or collaborated with, or in any manner served, such hostile force.
(2)
The Commission is authorized to receive and to determine, according to law, the amount and validity, and provide for the payment of any claim filed by any POW for compensation for the failure of the hostile force by which he was held as a POW, or its agents, to furnish him the quantity or quality of food prescribed for POW under the terms of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949. The compensation allowed to any POW under the provisions of this paragraph shall be at the rate of $2 for each day on which he was held as a POW and on which such hostile force, or its agents, failed to furnish him such quantity or quality of food.
(3)The Commission is authorized to receive and to determine, according to law, the amount and validity and provide for the payment of any claim filed by any POW for compensation—
(A)
for the failure of the hostile force by which he was held as a POW, or its agents, to meet the conditions and requirements prescribed under chapter VIII, section III, of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, relating to labor of POW; or
(B)
for inhumane treatment by the hostile force by which he was held, or its agents. The term “inhumane treatment” as used in this subparagraph shall include, but not be limited to, failure of such hostile force, or its agents, to meet the conditions and requirements of one or more of the provisions

Proving 50 U.S. Code § 4101 (a) (b) (c) - Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US
Why did the American Court system discriminate with Vietnamese American prisoners of war when he serviced for the America War in Vietnam- and therefore, the United States Congress enacted for this law? Perhaps, most of the Vietnamese American prisoners of war were narrow-mind when they were fooled by the American powerful in the law. They do not dare directly struggle with the Government of the US in order to grant their benefit of prisoner of war. What does he do American law when the United States Congress enacted this law because of the Native Americans and Immigrations are equal under American law? Uncertainty, this law seems to be the ideology of demagogy let’s trap the unlearned prisoner of war. In the meanwhile, they were trapped the Vietnam War by the United States Congress enacted American law of the Vietnam War. Today, the United States Congress was fooled the prisoner of war of the Vietnam War by the American law again because of most of them did not understand about the American Justice and the American law- Therefore, they always are trapped by the super values of the American law.
(a)
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission” may, in accordance with the provisions of the civil-service laws and chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, appoint and fix the compensation of such officers, attorneys, and employees, and may make such expenditures, as may be necessary to carry out its functions. Officers and employees of any other department or agency of the Government may, with the consent of the head of such department or agency, be assigned to assist the Commission in carrying out its functions. The Commission may, with the consent of the head of any other department or agency of the Government, utilize the facilities and services of such department or agency in carrying out the functions of the Commission.
(b) Rules and regulations; delegation of functions; time limit on filing of claims
The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions, and may delegate functions to any member, officer, or employee of the Commission. The Commission shall give public notice of the time when, and the limit of time within which, claims may be filed, which notice shall be published in the Federal Register. The limit of time within which claims may be filed with the Commission shall in no event be later than March 31, 1952. The Commission shall take immediate action to advise all persons entitled to file claims under the provisions of this subchapter administered by the Commission of their rights under such provisions, and to assist them in the preparation and filing of their claims.
(c) Subpoenas; issuance; contempt; witness fees; administration of oaths
(1)
For the purpose of any hearing, examination, or investigation under this subchapter, the Commission and those employees designated by the Commission shall have the power to issue subpenas requiring persons to appear and testify or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place where such hearing, examination, or investigation is being held. The Commission or any employee so designated shall, upon application of a claimant, issue to such claimant subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of documents, or both, required by such claimant in hearings upon his claim: Provided, That the claimant making such application pay the witness fees and mileage of any witness or witnesses subpenaed upon his request. The production of a person’s documents at any place other than his place of business shall not be required, however, in any case in which, prior to the return date specified in the subpena with respect thereto, such person either has furnished the issuer of the subpena with a copy of such documents (certified by such person under oath to be a true and correct copy) or has entered into a stipulation with the issuer of the subpena as to the information contained in such documents.
(2)
The Commission may, in case of a failure or refusal on the part of any person to comply with any such subpena, invoke the aid of any United States district court within the jurisdiction of which the hearing, examination, or investigation is being conducted, or such person resides or transacts business. Such court may issue an order requiring such person to appear at the designated place of hearing, examination, or investigation, there to give or produce testimony or documentary evidence concerning the matter in question. Any failure to obey such order of the court shall be punishable by such court as contempt thereof. All process in any such case may be served in the judicial district wherein such person resides or transacts business or wherever such person may be found.
(3)
Witnesses subpenaed under this subsection shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are allowed and paid witnesses in United States district courts.
(4)
Any member of the Commission, and any employee of the Commission authorized by the Commission to do so, may administer to, or take from, any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit when such action is necessary or appropriate in the performance of the functions or activities of the Commission.
(July 3, 1948, ch. 826, title I, § 2, 62 Stat. 1240; May 27, 1949, ch. 145, § 1(1), 63 Stat. 112; Oct. 28, 1949, ch. 782, title XI, § 1106(a), 63 Stat. 972; Aug. 16, 1950, ch. 718, 64 Stat. 449; Apr. 5, 1951, ch. 27, 65 Stat. 28; 1954 Reorg. Plan No. 1 §§ 2, 4, eff. July 1, 1954, 19 F.R. 3985, 68 Stat. 1279; Aug. 21, 1954, ch. 784, § 3, 68 Stat. 762; Pub. L. 87–846, title I, §§ 102, 104(a), Oct. 22, 1962, 76 Stat. 1107, 1113; Pub. L. 96–209, title I, § 108, Mar. 14, 1980, 94 Stat. 97.)

Proving 28 U.S.C § 1346 [32] the United States as the defendant
That’s why the United States Supreme Court has discriminated against national origin with the settlement case of the Vietnam War of prisoner of war when he has provided adequate details of American laws of the Vietnam War of prisoner of war. Even though, the main masterminds of the Government of the United States of America of the Vietnam War were self-recognized as defendant oneself, so the defendant’s the US could not create difficulties in order to anti-plaintiff. If the defendant’s US has distorting for the American laws lets against the plaintiff, which is why the United States Congress had to enact the American law. Indeed, the Government of the United States of America is Great Power when he is a common of a Vietnamese American citizen, he seeks American justice without had political actions and crime sections because of the Vietnam War is taken place by the Government of the United States of America.
___________
[32] President Kennedy was self-confessed in himself when he had ordered to assassinate President Ngo Dinh Diem because of the US Constitution did not have any Articles to allow the American leaderships who assassinated any foreign leader. (See appendix)





If the United States of America were the Republic of Vietnam, how would the American court system think about it?
When the United States of America is one super great Government, one super great Congressional, and one super great justice, the American Government has never had changed any statutorily — therefore, the super values of the United States of America should be enforced perfectly in all of the American law. When he does not only respect the United States Constitution but also protected the American law in order to seek American justice. Because of when he just came to the United States of America, he has surely trained to protect the United States Constitution and American law by the local court system, or so-called is jury-people
If the United States Congress did not enact any of the American laws of the Vietnam War, the United States Congress did not enforce the law- How would the United States Congress think about the American Justice when you enacted it? If the United States Congress did not enact American law of the Vietnam War, the Government of the United States of America did not compensate any pennies to him that is correctly in American law. Why didn’t the United States Congress respect self-determination of the Republic of Vietnam when the United States Congress enacted statutorily to approve sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam, but in the end the United States of America did not only sell off his wonderful nation to communism but also borrowed the Vietnamese communist regime sending him to concentration camps? Why does the United States of America respect peace and prosperity in oneself, but the United States of America does not only push his Republic of Vietnam to the Stone Age but also the American citizens are freely enriching and discovering to Mars, but the American Government ought to push him and his family to the dirty mud?
U.S. Code
Notes
(a)The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of:
(1)
Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal revenue laws;
(2)
Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort, except that the district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against the United States founded upon any express or implied contract with the United States or for liquidated or un-liquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort which are subject to sections 7104(b)(1) and 7107(a)(1) of title 41. For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United States.
(b)
(1)
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
(2)
No person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while awaiting sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring a civil action against the United States or an agency, officer, or employee of the Government, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of title 18).
©
The jurisdiction conferred by this section includes the jurisdiction of any set-off, counterclaim, or other claim or demand whatever on the part of the United States against any plaintiff commencing an action under this section.
(d)
The district courts shall not have jurisdiction under this section of any civil action or claim for a pension.
(e)
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action against the United States provided in section 6226, 6228(a), 7426, or 7428 (in the case of the United States district court for the District of Columbia) or section 7429 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
(f)
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States.
(g)
Subject to the provisions of chapter 179, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action commenced under section 453(2) of title 3, by a covered under chapter 5 of such title.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933; Apr. 25, 1949, ch. 92, § 2(a), 63 Stat. 62; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 80(a), (b), 63 Stat. 101; Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 50(b), 65 Stat. 727; July 30, 1954, ch. 648, § 1, 68 Stat. 589; Pub. L. 85–508, § 12 (e), July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 348; Pub. L. 88–519, Aug. 30, 1964, 78 Stat. 699; Pub. L. 89–719, title II, § 202 (a), Nov.
2, 1966, 80 Stat. 1148; Pub. L. 91–350, § 1(a), July 23, 1970, 84 Stat. 449; Pub. L. 92–562, § 1, Oct. 25, 1972, 86 Stat. 1176; Pub. L. 94–455, title XII, § 1204(c)(1), title XIII, § 1306(b)(7), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1697, 1719; Pub. L. 95–563, § 14(a), Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2389; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 129, Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 39; Pub. L. 97–248, title IV, § 402(c)(17), Sept. 3, 1982, 96 Stat. 669; Pub. L. 99–514, § 2, Oct. 22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; Pub. L. 102–572, title IX, § 902(b)(1), Oct. 29, 1992, 106 Stat. 4516; Pub. L. 104–134, title I, § 101[(a)] [title VIII, § 806], Apr. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–75; renumbered title I, Pub. L. 104–140, § 1(a), May 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 1327; Pub. L. 104–331, § 3(b)(1), Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4069; Pub. L. 111–350, § 5(g)(6), Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3848; Pub. L. 113–4, title XI, § 1101(b), Mar. 7, 2013, 127 Stat. 134.)
Proving 28 U.S.C. sections 1346b:
28 U.S. Code Chapters 171 - TORT CLAIMS PROCEDURE
In the protocol of international relations is between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam were solemnly declaring for the whole world knowing in which did not use Vietnam to be testing for the American bombs as the Kissinger who has quoted. Therefore, he proves the Federal Tort Claims Act and Department of Motor Vehicles of the state of California. When it violated its American law because he did not violate any traffic laws and mental case, but it did not only defame him but also had libeled and slandered in order to anti- him to have a petition of prisoner of war. In condition, it did not only destroy his treasure of artwork but also defamed to his literature when his job looks like Native Americans doing.
The Kissinger has quotes, "Bombing Vietnam: “its wave after wave of planes. You see, they can't see the B52 and they dropped a million pounds of bombs... I bet you we will have had more planes over there in one day than President had in a month... each plane can carry about 10 times the load of World War II plane carry."
*Assassination: “It is an act of insanity and national humiliation to have a law prohibiting the President from ordering assassination." (Statement at National Security Council meeting. 1975,)
For that reason, the Kissinger has never had respected the Republic of Vietnam sovereignty - in the meanwhile, the United States Congress has had to endorse the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam and which the Government of the United States of America has solemnly been promised many international treaties and few of the United Sates treaties with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in treaty signed. Therefore, the Kissinger did not only violate the United States Constitution but also the American Government was too. As a result, the Republic of Vietnam is small less than the state of California which is why the Government of the United States of America did not only test the modern weapons but also used all the toxic orange in order to murder a small people and to destroy all of the natural resources. In the meanwhile, the American people have been investing in Mars and Venus - in contrast, the Vietnamese people do not only be lost their Islands on the East Sea but also had been treating illness of the toxic orange for the long run which is why the United States has discriminating for the weak Vietnamese people in the some of the sides, In fact, the United States of America has been fooling for the prisoner of war, for deceiving the Republic of Vietnam in proxy war, and selling off of the Republic of Vietnam Army to communism which is why the Southern people were demeaned by Great Americanism? Where is the American justice staying and why is the American ethical conscience trampling down for the weak Vietnamese people? In prove, the Congress. Gov has enacted H. Res 309 on April 10, 2019, the US Court has releasing for Federal Tort Claims against Federal Judiciary Personnel, and United States House of Representatives is releasing for Federal Tort Claims Act, and the US. Department of Veterans Affairs is releasing for Federal Tort Claims Act. Therefore, he does believe on the American Justice that ought to compensate to his injuries damages within the American law is statutorily.


U.S. Code
Notes
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§ 2671. Definitions
§ 2672. Administrative adjustment of claims
§ 2673. Reports to Congress
§ 2674. Liability of United States
§ 2675. Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite; evidence
§ 2676. Judgment as bar
§ 2677. Compromise
§ 2678. Attorney fees; penalty
§ 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy
§ 2680. Exceptions
§ 2671.Definitions
To prove is§ 2671, which is the Kissinger and Mrs. Barbara P. Schmidt, and Mrs. Jackie Chahal are belongs to the Government of the United States of America because they were wrongful actions.
Notes
Authorities (CFR)
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As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401(b) of this title, the term “Federal agency” includes the executive departments the judicial and legislative branches, the military departments independent establishments of the United States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor with the United States
“Employee of the government” includes (1) officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under section 115, 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505 of title 32, and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation, and (2) any officer or employee of a Federal public defender organization, except when such officer or employee performs professional services in the course of providing representation under section 3006A of title 18.
“Acting within the scope of his office or employment”, in the case of a member of the military or naval forces of the United States or a member of the National Guard as defined in section 101(3) of title 32, means acting in line of duty.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 982; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 124, 63 Stat. 106; Pub. L. 89–506, § 8, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307; Pub. L. 97–124, § 1, Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1666; Pub. L. 100–694, § 3, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4564; Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title VI, § 665(b)], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–169; Pub. L. 106–518, title IV, § 401, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2421.)

§ 2672- Administrative adjustment of claims
According to this statutory that he has been petitioning to the US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and
U.S. Secret Service- Office of Government Liaison & Public Affairs
950 H Street, N.W. Suite 8400-Washington, DC 20223- However, Federal Bureau of investigation and the US Department of Justice were returned receivers by USP mail, yet US. Secret Service- Office of Government Liaison & Public Affairs did not return any signature and receiver to him to from April 2019.
The head of each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, may consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money damages against the United States for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred: Provided, That any award, compromise or settlement in excess of $25,000 shall be effected only with the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his designee. Notwithstanding the proviso contained in the preceding sentence, any award, compromise, or settlement may be affected without the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his or her designee, to the extent that the Attorney General delegates to the head of the agency the authority to make such award, compromise, or settlement. Such delegations may not exceed the authority delegated by the Attorney General to the United States attorneys to settle claims for money damages against the United States. Each Federal agency may use arbitration, or other alternative means of dispute resolution under the provisions of subchapter IV of chapter 5 of title 5, to settle any tort claim against the United States, to the extent of the agency’s authority to award, compromise, or settle such claim without the prior written approval of the Attorney General or his or her designee.

Subject to the provisions of this title relating to civil actions on tort claims against the United States, any such award, compromise, settlement, or determination shall be final and conclusive on all officers of the Government, except when procured by means of fraud.

Any award, compromise, or settlement in an amount of $2,500 or less made pursuant to this section shall be paid by the head of the Federal agency concerned out of appropriations available to that agency. Payment of any award, compromise, or settlement in an amount in excess of $2,500 made pursuant to this section or made by the Attorney General in any amount pursuant to section 2677 of this title shall be paid in a manner similar to judgments and compromises in like causes and appropriations or funds available for the payment of such judgments and compromises are hereby made available for the payment of awards, compromises, or settlements under this chapter.

The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement shall be final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any claim against the United States and against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, by reason of the same subject matter.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983; Apr. 25, 1949, ch. 92, § 2 (b), 63 Stat. 62; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 125, 63 Stat. 106; Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1010, § 9, 64 Stat. 987; Pub. L. 86–238, § 1 (1), Sept. 8, 1959, 73 Stat. 471; Pub. L. 89–506, §§ 1, 9(a), July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 306, 308; Pub. L. 101–552, § 8(a), Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2746.)

§ 2673- Reports to Congress
That is why the US Department of Justice did not report the settlement case of prisoner of war to statutorily to the United States Congress, but it has thrown his document to garbage. In fact, the US General of Justice who was Robert Kennedy came to the Republic of Vietnam in 1963 and declared, “Vietnam War must win communism.” That is self-evident truth of the US Department of Justice, but it did not enforce the American law. The US Department of Justice was contemptuous the United States Congress, but it insulted the Vietnamese American prisoner of war because of the Vietnamese American prisoner of war is modern slavery war of the United States of America. . Ironically, the US Department of Justice is organ to not only enforce the American law but also represented for the American Justice. When it has known his settlement case, which is belonged to the United States Congress, but it did not report the case to Congressional. Let's review the settlement case because the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam have together been signed few the United States treaties and the International Agreements in protocol international relations, but the United States Department of Justice discriminated the petition
.2011 US Code
Title 28 - Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
Part VI - PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS (§§ 2201 - 4105)
Chapter 171 - TORT CLAIMS PROCEDURE (§§ 2671 - 2680)
Section 2673 - Reports to Congress
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28 USC § 2673 (2011)
The head of each federal agency shall report annually to Congress all claims paid by it under section 2672 of this title, stating the name of each claimant, the amount claimed, the amount awarded, and a brief description of the claim.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983.)
§ 2674-Liability of United States
The American Law has solemnly said about the Liability of the United States because of the prisoner of war of the Vietnam War was masterminded by the Government United States. In fact, the United States Congress has enacted the law of the Vietnam War. In contrast, President Kennedy had ordered to assassinate President Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Kissinger who had confirmed and said, “The Vietnam War requested us to emphasize the national interest rather than abstract principle, what President Nixon and I tried to do was unnatural. And that is why we did not make it.” And therefore, the Kissinger has confessed oneself when he said, “Vietnam failures we did to ourselves.” Therefore, the base on of self-evident truths of the United States is correct within this law, so the Government of the United States of America must compensate the injured damage of the prisoner of war because he was servicing for the proxy war of the United States of America in the Vietnam War, but in the end he was betrayed by the US Supreme Court and the US Department of Justice have discriminated him by they're abuser of the American powerful. The United States of America is a great power. It ought to realize about the American law and the American Justice because of these super values of the United States of America are symbolized by a Great Power. If a Great Power has enacted the law but the law is not enforced by a Great Power which is demagogic democracy. Because of a great democracy is symbolized by the American law and the American Justice which is why the American Justice and the American law did not carry out, so the American democracy is nothing or so-called a great democracy is deceit. What meant the American law enacted in super values of American law? Who are protected by the American Law?
US code
Notes
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The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof.
With respect to any claim under this chapter, the United States shall be entitled to assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defenses to which the United States is entitled.
With respect to any claim to which this section applies, the Tennessee Valley Authority shall be entitled to assert any defense which otherwise would have been available to the employee based upon judicial or legislative immunity, which otherwise would have been available to the employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority whose act or omission gave rise to the claim as well as any other defenses to which the Tennessee Valley Authority is entitled under this chapter.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983; Pub. L. 100–694, §§ 4, 9(c), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4564, 4567.)

§ 2675-Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite; evidence
The petition has adequately submitting the self-evident truths of prisoner of war of the Vietnam War. For example, before his petitions requested compensation of benefits prisoner of war, he was applied to beg the order of the US Department of Justice-Therefore; the US Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor General has ordered him to go the local the lower Courts. There should be endorsed who were wrongful actions of the Vietnam War. He has adequately been proved documents of the Vietnam War within the American law. However, he only requests compensation of the prisoner of war, property and intellectual property without had politics and the criminal action in his case which is why the US Department of Justice did not only solve but also had pushed him to the criminal section to what did they do the American law when they represented for the American justice of the Vietnam War of prisoner of war?
The results of the Vietnam War of prisoner of War were proved by self-evident truth which did not only have the United States Congress enacted the American laws but also masterminded the wrongful actions of the American leaders when they were self confessed oneself that did not only have the written texts but also had openly declared on publicly on the nationwide media and world. In prove, the Kissinger said and said, “Vietnam failures we did to ourselves." And President Kennedy self secretly made published his tape when he had secretly ordered his American diplomat to assassinate president of the Republic of Vietnam. During the Government of the United States of America and the United States Congress had been approving for sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam in which had protocols international relations and the American law- and the prisoner of War was enacted laws by the United States Congress and approved International Convention of prisoner of war. Uncertainly, a Great power of the United States of America wouldn't affirm endorsement self-evident truths of the Vietnam War of prisoner of war after the American Government did not only tear the Paris Peace Accords but also sold off the Republic of Vietnam to communism.
(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim.
(b) Action under this section shall not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim.
(c) Disposition of any claim by the Attorney General or other head of a federal agency shall not be competent evidence of liability or amount of damages.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 983; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 126, 63 Stat. 107; Pub. L. 89–506, § 2, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 306.)
28 U.S. Code § 2676. Judgment as bar

That is why the Government of the United States of America has ordered Bar in order to help for all of American citizens who need to American Associations or bar which is why he has been made an appointment to meet them, but no American attorneys and no Bars helped him? In fact, he was appointment to Boston counsel when it will be helping for two years when the petition has appointment. However, there did not respond any worlds including Bar Association in the state of California why did they discriminate national origin him when they have understood about unmitigated punishment for offenders?
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The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984.)
The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984.)
28 U.S. Code § 2677.Compromise
Ironically, the US Department of Justice Attorney General Jeff Sessions did not only have to order any his designees to solve his settlement case but also had thrown his settlement case to garbage when he is represented by the American Justice which is why he was unfair with a Vietnamese American prisoner of war. When he is seeking for the American justice, he has never violated political action and crime section. Especially, his settlement case was confessed masterminded by the American leaders who were wrongful action of the Vietnam War, but he is only requesting compensation for his prisoner of war and his properties, and intellectual property without had political actions and criminal section. However, the US Department of Justice did not only solve his case but also discriminated national origin when the US Department of Justice is, moral principle, represented by the American Justice. Who is protected by American law? Why does the United States Congress enact American law for what when the law compromises to compensate to him, but the US Department of Justice didn’t enforce any law?
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The Attorney General or his designee may arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, after the commencement of an action thereon.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984; Pub. L. 89–506, § 3, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307.)

§ 2678 - Attorney fees; penalty
The American law has ordered to Bar Association and the American attorney companies to share 25% total grant of the case, however, no Bar Association and no attorney companies helped for his case. Therefore, he ought to choose the Self- help when he has been studied American law for ten years in oneself. That is why the American law system has discriminated national origin and under color skin when he would like to protect American law and American justice within the United States Constitution has allowing for all American citizens.
No attorney shall charge, demand, receive, or collect for services rendered, fees in excess of 25 per centum of any judgment rendered pursuant to section 1346(b) of this title or any settlement made pursuant to section 2677 of this title, or in excess of 20 per centum of any award, compromise, or settlement made pursuant to section 2672 of this title.
Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered in connection with such claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if recovery be had, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984; Pub. L. 89–506, § 4, July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307.)
28 U.S. Code § 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy
According to this law has clearly affirmed that he would like to petition for his prisoner of war, real property, and intellectual property which is why the government employees were wrongful actions in the Vietnam War and in the state of California without had the lawsuit let him take the win. When he'd like to affirm to not litigation the state of California and the Government of the United States of America, he did not only taken an oath loyalty to respect his second mother of American but also solemnly protected the United States Constitution. Because he ought to find out which is why his refugee benefits have not corresponded with his prisoner of war benefits, he has rightly compared when he eats potato and eats a delicious hamburger. Therefore, he does love a delicious hamburger than a potato very tasteless. That is why the US Department of Justice and the American Court system did not only prejudice him but also discriminated him by their lack of objective moral principle.
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(a)
The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall be exclusive.
(b)
(1)
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government—
(A)
which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or
(B)
which is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.
(c)
The Attorney General shall defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government or his estate for any such damage or injury. The employee against whom such civil action or proceeding is brought shall deliver within such time after date of service or knowledge of service as determined by the Attorney General, all process served upon him or an attested true copy thereof to his immediate superior or to whomever was designated by the head of his department to receive such papers and such person shall promptly furnish copies of the pleadings and process therein to the United States attorney for the district embracing the place wherein the proceeding is brought, to the Attorney General, and to the head of his employing Federal agency.
(d)
(1)
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an action against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.
(2)
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such claim in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. This certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.
(3)
In the event that the Attorney General has refused to certify scope of office or employment under this section, the employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment. Upon such certification by the court, such action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. A copy of the petition shall be served upon the United States in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4(d) (4)  [1] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event the petition is filed in a civil action or proceeding pending in a State court, the action or proceeding may be removed without bond by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place in which it is pending. If, in considering the petition, the district court determines that the employee was not acting within the scope of his office or employment, the action or proceeding shall be remanded to the State court.
(4)
Upon certification, any action or proceeding subject to paragraph (1), (2), or (3) shall proceed in the same manner as any action against the United States filed pursuant to section 1346(b) of this title and shall be subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable to those actions.
(5) Whenever an action or proceeding in which the United States is substituted as the party defendant under this subsection is dismissed for failure first to present a claim pursuant to section 2675(a) of this title, such a claim shall be deemed to be timely presented under section 2401(b) of this title if—
(A)
the claim would have been timely had it been filed on the date the underlying civil action was commenced, and
(B)
the claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within 60 days after dismissal of the civil action.
(e)
The Attorney General may compromise or settle any claim asserted in such civil action or proceeding in the manner provided in section 2677, and with the same effect.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 984; Pub. L. 87–258, § 1, Sept. 21, 1961, 75 Stat. 539; Pub. L. 89–506, § 5(a), July 18, 1966, 80 Stat. 307; Pub. L. 100–694, §§ 5, 6, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4564.)

28 U.S. Code § 2680. Exceptions
- Exceptions
The exceptions of his case are not belonging to 28 U.S. Code § 2680. Exceptions - however, the exceptions of his is very important to his case because the Government of the United States of America did not interfere with the self-determination of the Republic of Vietnam if the Government of the United States of America did not trample down the independence of the Republic of Vietnam. So the Government of the United States of America did respect self-determination of the Republic of Vietnam when the United States Congress has enacted American law that was confirmed by the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, during President Nixon has solemnly declared and said, " The United States respected self-determination of the Republic of Vietnam - and no one will be left behind." However, the Government of the United States of America has been doing for the Vietnam War when no the United States Constitution, no the American law, and no the American justice has ordered seizing the Republic of Vietnam and selling out to communism which was exceptions of the United States Constitution, the American law, and the American justice, but the exceptions of the United States of America is to be beginning a self - evident justice. That the Government of the United States of America has entirely had obligations' compensation the injured damages of his case of prisoner of war and so on. Because of the Government of the United States of America is a Great Power, when, all world is knowing, the United States Constitution, the American law, and American justice are symbolized for the Vietnam War.
But the Vietnam War of the Government of the United States of America has become to Neo-colonial war of the United States; the United States Congress has enacted American law which is Foreign Assistance Act in 1963 when the Government of the United States of American was strongly progressing for the proxy war in the Republic of Vietnam and then, the American Government has sold off the Republic of Vietnam to communism. In contrast, why did the Government of the United States of American to had been oppressing force, weak Vietnamese people, that we ought to serve the proxy war of the United States for the thirty years in the past, but the American Government did not give us win communism when the United States Congress enacted the law? That is why in the end the Government of the United States of America did not only sell off the Republic of Vietnam to communism but also destroyed all of the Republic of Vietnam Army that totally is one million talent soldier, but the Government of the United States of America has never compensated any pennies to us. In his opinion that no parents of the human world were born the children to let them service proxy war of America without had any benefit but also lost in all properties of their lives. Where is the ethical conscience of the American Government put into the proxy war in the Republic of Vietnam when the American Government is a super modern civilized society? Or so-called the exception of the United States Congress and Constitution was bankrupted by the American Revolution, so the American law of the proxy war of the United States of America of the Vietnam War of the Republic of Vietnam was not existed by America. As a result, the compensation of prisoner of war of the Vietnam War of the American Government is nothing.
That is why; he’d like to prove this article, which talks about Ex. vice president, as he is Ex-senator of the American Government when he was approved Foreign Assonance Act in 1963, but now says Ex Biden no obligation for the Southern Officers of the Vietnam War of the Republic of Vietnam - so the article’s saying : 'The US has no obligation': Biden fought to keep Vietnamese refugees out of the US - Joe Biden, the 2020 Democratic presidential front-runner, and advocate of large-scale immigration, once tried to block the evacuation of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese refugees who had helped the United States during the Vietnam War.
As a senator, the future vice president, now 76, was adamant that the U.S. had "no obligation, moral or otherwise, to evacuate foreign nationals," dismissing concerns for their safety as the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong swept south toward Saigon in 1975.
His position was in stark contrast to the one he took nearly 30 years later over Iraqi and Afghan interpreters who had worked with U.S. forces. "We owe these people," his then top foreign policy adviser Tony Blinken said in 2012. "We have a debt to these people. They put their lives on the line for the United States."
Chief Political Correspondent Byron York on the expanded Washington Examiner magazine
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Biden said in 2015 that keeping Syrian refugees out of the U.S. would be a win for ISIS and tweeted in 2017 that "we must protect, support, and welcome refugees" to maintain the promise of America.
As South Vietnam collapsed at the end of the Vietnam War in the spring of 1975, President Gerald Ford and the U.S. government undertook to evacuate thousands of South Vietnamese families who had assisted the U.S. throughout the war. The leading voice in the Senate opposing this rescue effort was then-Sen. Joe Biden.
Hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese allies were in danger of recriminations from the Communists, but Biden insisted that “the United States has no obligation to evacuate one — or 100,001 — South Vietnamese.”
In April 1975, Ford argued that, as the last American troops were removed from the country, the U.S. should evacuate the South Vietnamese who had helped the U.S. during the war, too.
“The United States has had a long tradition of opening its doors to immigrants of all countries … And we’ve always been a humanitarian nation,” Ford said. “We felt that a number of these South Vietnamese had been very loyal to the United States and deserved an opportunity to live in freedom.”
But Biden objected and called for a meeting between the president and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to voice his objections to Ford’s funding request for these efforts. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who led the meeting, told the senators that “the total list of the people endangered in Vietnam is over a million” and that “the irreducible list is 174,000.”
Biden said U.S. allies should not be rescued: “We should focus on getting them [the U.S. troops] out. Getting the Vietnamese out and military aid for the GVN [South Vietnam’s government] are totally different.”
Kissinger said there were “Vietnamese to whom we have an obligation,” but Biden responded: “I will vote for any amount for getting the Americans out. I don’t want it mixed with getting the Vietnamese out.”
Ford was upset with Biden’s response, believing that failing to evacuate the South Vietnamese would be a betrayal of American values: “We opened our door to the Hungarians … Our tradition is to welcome the oppressed. I don't think these people should be treated any differently from any other people — the Hungarians, Cubans, Jews from the Soviet Union.”
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the bill be passed by the full Senate by a vote of 14 to 3. Biden was one of just three senators on the committee who voted nay. The conference report also passed the Senate as a whole by a vote of 46-17, where Biden again voted against it.
Saigon fell on April 30, 1975, and hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese who did not manage to escape the country were eventually sent to reeducation camps, where they were often abused, tortured, or killed.
Julia Taft, who headed the U.S.’s Inter-Agency Task Force on Indochinese Refugee Resettlement in 1975, told NPR in 2007 that the refugees should have been helped. “I mean, they'd worked with us," she said. "They'd been translators. They'd been employees. They'd been part of the South Vietnamese army, which was an ally, and just general victims of the whole chaos.”
Despite opposition from Biden, and from other leading Democrats at the time, the U.S. military evacuated over 130,000 Vietnamese refugees in the immediate wake of the collapse of South Vietnam, and hundreds of thousands more were resettled inside the U.S. in the following years.
One of those refugees was Quang Pham, who wrote a 2010 autobiography, A Sense of Duty: Our Journey from Vietnam to America, about his escape to the U.S. in 1975 at the age of 10 with his mother and his three sisters, aged 11, 6, and 2. His father, a member of the South Vietnamese military, did not make it out with them and spent over a decade in a reeducation camp before making it to the U.S. in 1992.
Speaking with the Washington Examiner, Pham praised Ford for saving Vietnamese refugees such as his family and criticized Democrats such as Biden for trying to keep them out, saying, “When we needed help, I remember who helped us — and who didn’t.”
Pham, who grew up in the U.S., joined the Marines and served in the First Gulf War, said, "The Vietnamese refugees from 1975 had a lot of help from Americans who lived near the refugee camps and from Vietnam vets who felt they had a debt to help us. And I’m grateful for that."
“When you look at the biggest supporters of Vietnam refugees, it definitely wasn’t Sen. Biden,” Pham said. “The people who wanted us weren’t necessarily who you’d expect — the openness wasn’t coming from Democrats.”
Referring to Biden, Pham said, “You have to look at foreign policy and humanitarianism. The Vietnam refugee crisis was a big deal in 1975. Even if you were against the war, why wouldn’t you support the refugees? Why wouldn’t you support the families and women and children who were trying to escape?”
“If we get involved in wars, there will be refugees ... So we need to think about our moral obligation to non-Americans, especially to our allies,” Pham said.
Asked whether he thought it was fair to judge Biden based on his actions from 1975, Pham replied, “As someone running for President, its part of his record, just like everything else."
A famous leadership of the United States Congress is a great power, but he was mistaken for the right enforcement of the American law and American Justice, so his life is bankrupted by these wrongful actions why is why the American citizens who are freely investing for what they want, but in contrast, the Southern people and officers were discriminated by the American Government policies. When the Government of the United States of America has pushed us to the Stone Age, the American citizens have discovering Mars, high-technology, and civil society which is why the Government of the United States of America has used the Vietnamese people and the Republic of Vietnam Army in the war game.
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Authorities (CFR)
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Authorities (CFR)
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The provisions of this chapter and section 1346b- Federal Tort Claims Act of this title shall not apply to—
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1–31 of Title 50, Appendix.[2]
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of quarantine by the United States.

To Prove 22 U.S.C. § 1622a. Transfer of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US to Department of Justice - U.S. Code - Un-annotated Title 22. Foreign Relations and Intercourse §
Why the US Department of Justice and the American Court system did not only prejudice him but also discriminated him when the United States Congress had never had discriminations a for all persons born or naturalized in the US? What is he doing for his American citizen when he was naturalizing in the US, while, his prisoner of war could not have earned benefits and do not have rights of equality under the law, but the American Government forces him to respect the American law and he must obey law to do a vote and pay income tax, during, he has had left all of wonderful nation and many super values of his Republic of Vietnam were left behind? What means is he becoming an American citizen? What does he earn good benefits from his American citizen? Even though, his American citizen could not help for his life because of an American citizen is not protect his life by the American law, but the American citizen ought to pay income tax, protect the US Constitution, and respect American law. In contrast, the Government of the United States does not protect his life by American law when his former is a nation's the Republic of Vietnam is the same as the capital system Americanism which is why the American Government has destroyed a capital system of the Republic of Vietnam. Let the American Government sell off it to communism- in the meanwhile, the American Government did not only enact American law to mobilize the Republic of Vietnam that fights anti-communism but also the American Government sold off the Republic of Vietnam to communism without had any protocol international relations. But the American Government has torn shred the Paris Peace Accords when the American Government would solemnly like to sign this United States Treaty and to be International Agreement. Why did the Government of the United States of American fool a weak national Republic of Vietnam when the American Government is a Great Power? Therefore, he carries out Title 22- Foreign Relations and Intercourse § in order to request the compensation's benefits of prisoner of war.
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US, established under Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of 1954, is hereby transferred to the Department of Justice as a separate agency within that Department.
(Pub. L. 96–209, title I, § 101, Mar. 14, 1980, 94 Stat. 96.)
§ 1622b
§ 1622c
§ 1622d
§ 1622e
§ 1622f
§ 1622g

§1622b Transfer of functions, powers, and duties of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US Foreign Relations and Intercourse§
He would like to appreciate the American Justice that he first made an appointment at the Compensation of war victim Committee of the state of California. However, it should be solved within three months; his long neck was waiting for its responded because of the Californian law should be responding within fifteen days. But after three months have gone by, he'd send his letter to ask there. It responded by its letter that your case should solve by American law. Therefore, he'd like to submit his case to the US Department of Justice by Title 22 U.S.C. § 1622- ironically, the US Department of Justice - Civil Rights Division has sent its a letter to him said, " Thank you for your correspondence. The Civil Rights Division relies on information from community members to identify potential civil rights violations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies conduct investigations for the Division. Therefore, you may want to contact your local FBI or visit www.FBI.gov, and so on. In case, he has copied his document's Settlement case, which sent to the US Supreme Court, the US Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation - Head Quarter in 9xx Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 2053 and other U.S. Secret Service Office of Government Liaison & Public Affairs 950H Street, N.W. Suite 8400 Washington, DC 20223, but some of them could not yet respond to him. Specially, he does believe the American justice, which can not swallow any American laws when the United States Congress has been enacting for American law.
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All functions, powers, and duties of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission established by Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of 1954 are hereby transferred with the Commission, together with personnel, assets, liabilities, unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds held, used, available, or to be made available in connection with the statutory functions of the Commission. The Commission shall continue to perform its functions as provided by the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended [2001 et seq. 50 App. U.S.C.A. § ], the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended [ 1621 et seq. 22 U.S.C.A. § ], and Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of 1954.

§ 1622c. (a)(b)(c)Membership of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the USA
According to 22 USC § 1622c that he is entirely adequately compensated for all of his properties, benefits of prisoner of war, and intellectual property by the American Government- because of his Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States of America are recognized membership each other did not only have the American law that was approved by the United States Congress but also the protocols International Relations of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States of America were publicly signed in the International Agreements and the United States Treaties. Next, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Socialist of Republic of Vietnam did not have any protocols of international Relations in diplomatic, during the Government of the United States of America has strongly been affirmed solemnly for Socialist of Republic of Vietnam that it was evilly enemy for both nations which are the United States and South Vietnam. Even though the Republic of Vietnam was sold off to Socialist of the Republic of Vietnam by the Government of the United States of America - However, the United States Congress has never had approved to this role. Therefore, all of the great super values of the Republic of Vietnam still vivid in American law, Constitution, and Congressional, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has legally existed within the Government of the United States of America. As a result, the American people and the American Government must be compensated for all of the lost properties of him that's legal compensation. In contrast, the United States Congress has recognized the fall of Saigon on April 10, 2019, or so-called the sale of the Republic of Vietnam after the forty-four years- the United States Congress has known oneself to be wrongful for the Vietnam War by enacting bill's H.Res 309- recognized the 44 the anniversary of the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. On the other hand, the diplomatic of the Government of the United States of America with Socialist of Republic of Vietnam was begun on July 11, 1995, so the real values of properties the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is as important as the more many properties of the American Government. Therefore, the obligation of the Government of the United States of America must repay to the Southern Officers as an alike prisoner of war and the great values of properties were sold to Socialist of Republic of Vietnam by the defendant's the United States. That is suitable within 22 USC § 1622c enacted by the United States Congress.
(a)  Composition of Commission; appointment and compensation of Chairman
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and two members. The Chairman shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve on a full-time basis for a term of three years, and compensated at the rate provided for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of Title 5 .
(b)  Appointment and compensation of members other than Chairman
The other members of the Commission shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and serve on a part-time basis, and be compensated on a per diem basis at a rate of compensation equivalent to the daily rate for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of Title 5for each day that such member is employed in the actual performance of official business of the Commission as may be directed by the Chairman. Each member shall be reimbursed for travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of Title 5 for persons in Government service employed intermittently.
(c)  Terms of office
The terms of Office of the Chairman and members of the Commission shall be for three years, except the Chairman and members first appointed after the enactment of this subsection shall be appointed to terms ending respectively September 30, 1982, September 30, 1981, and September 30, 1980. The incumbent of any such office may continue to serve until a successor takes office.
§1622d- Appointment and compensation of officers and employees of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US; allowances and benefits; utilization of other Federal facilities
The American law says the compensation for the war victim which is perfect which is why his settlement case did not enforce. When the American court system always creates difficulty in order to obstruct for justice, the American Court carries out the law for that whom when a Vietnamese American prisoner of war was not protected by the American law which is why the American law invaded the Republic of Vietnam without the American Court system prevented invader of the Government of the United States of America. Because of the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam was recognized by the United States Congress in American law. Ironically, the Government of the United States of America was freely enacting the law for invading a weak nation like the Republic of Vietnam. When the proxy war of the United States has been destroying for all of the natural resources, the innocent people, and then the sale of the Republic of Vietnam to communism without had any protocols of International relations. But the compensation of the Government of the United States of America is fooling for weak people. Where is the ethical conscience of the Government of the United States showing? Because of in the protocol international relations of the Article of war law has never had allowed any great powers that invaded a small nation, but, they'd not compensate any pennies. The only have Government of the United States of America is the brute-headstrong when the American Government has been assassinating for the weak Vietnamese people, the United States of America did not only compensate any pennies but also caught the Southern Officers making slavery for the Government of the United States under the mark of human rights. Because he had a wonderful nation, super values of democracy, freedom, and justice that are why the Government of the United States of America has all destroyed them, the American Government has come to the Republic of Vietnam by individual laws of the United States- and then, the American Government has oppressed him and his nation to follow with the America policy. When the Government of the United States of America has played handoff policy in the Vietnam War, the American Government did not only sow so much of war crime of the Vietnam War but also fooled a weak people who are low minds in the knowledge of the study law. Let the American Government easily fool the Vietnam War and deceive by American law. Why does his nod-head taking unfairness of the American Government of prisoner of war compensation? What does he express the formal principle of the American Justice of the Vietnam War? He should express his theory of knowledge in American law without had violated crime and political sections because of his wisdom's cast into American law?

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The Commission is authorized, in accordance with civil service laws and in accordance with Title 5 to appoint and fix the compensation of such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Commission. The Commission is authorized to employ experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of Title 5 without compensation or at rates of compensation not in excess of the maximum daily rate prescribed for GS-18 under section 5332 of Title 5 . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commission is further authorized to employ nationals of other countries who may possess special knowledge, languages, or other expertise necessary to assist the Commission. The Commission is authorized to pay expenses of packing, shipping, and storing personal effects of personnel of the Commission assigned abroad, and to pay allowances and benefits similar to those provided by Title IX of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. The Commission is authorized, with the consent of the head of any other department or agency of the Federal Government, to utilize the facilities and services of such department or agency in carrying out the functions of the Commission. Officers and employees of any department and agency of the Federal Government may, with the consent of the head of such department or agency, be assigned to assist the Commission in carrying out its functions. The Commission shall reimburse such department and agency for the pay of such officers or employees.
§ 1622e-Vesting of all non-adjudicatory functions, powers, and duties in Chairman of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US
Clearly, to prove § 1622e that statutorily has ordering to the American Court system that his settlement case could not need any adjudicating because of Vietnam was exactly enacted American law by the United States Congress. That is why the American Court system always created difficulties in order to sink his case to the dirty mud. Because of the contemptuous of the American attorney, the American Bar Association, and the American Court system had humiliated him by their Injustice power, they did think about him to be an unlearned man. In the meanwhile, he came to the United States of America in order to earn good money. Therefore, the lack of knowledge of the prisoner of war did not understand American law, not realize about any super modern American society, and not reach out for the high - the grace of American scholars. Therefore, they have freely discriminated against national origin when the scales of power belong to them. His human body of a prisoner of war has belonged by the powers of their hands. If they released him out, they'd given him a living way. During them crumpled him, they did not give him alive. Therefore, they have never had reviewed his claimed case. As a result, the American lawyers, the US Department of Justice, and the American Court system had thrown his document to garbage.
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All functions, powers, and duties not directly related to adjudicating claims are hereby vested in the Chairman, including the functions set forth in section 3 of Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of 1954 and the authority to issue rules and regulations.
Administrative support and services to Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US by Attorney General
The pursuant is 22 U.S.C. § 1622f- Administrative support and services to Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the US by Attorney General.
The statutorily of the United States Congress enacted every attractively of the American democracy which is why the US Department of Justice did not enforce the American law, but it has thrown his settlement case to garbage. In contrast, if he violated American law, the US Department of Justice quickly arrested him and exported him to his former nation. In fact, his exact prisoner of war has put a label on misfortune's misery of his life by the Government of the United States of America of the Vietnam War when he's never wished it. In case he was the weakest of man, therefore, his Government of the Republic of Vietnam has strongly seized by a Great America. If the American defendant would adequately to give democracy, freedom, and justice to him, the defendant's the United States is the greatest of benefactor. But the Government of the United States of America has had never respected the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam - therefore, the United States Congress enacted this law. That is why the US Department of Justice has walking on the old way of its American Government; let's trample down American democracy, American freedom, and American justice. When it is itself protects of arrogant democracy, it has never esteemed to the democracy of its American citizen. .As a result, his document case was thrown to the garbage by the US Department of Justice. Ironically, the US Department of Justice has pushed him to the local federal bureau of Investigation because of he was a criminal section and political action. In the meanwhile, the US Department of Justice does not only represent the American Justice but also enforced American law which is why it holds blood in one's mouth and erupts on him when the American democracy will not have libeled game to its citizen. It does not only contempt congressional but also trampled down super values of the United States when it has expressed its dictatorship without had respected American law or so-called it distorts the justice. Uncertainty, the super values of his nation and people, his honors, and his properties and his human dignity were exchanged by a bad price of his refugee lets his demand for making modern slavery in the United States. If the US Attorney General were his life to should would he accept to be made modern slavery in the Republic of Vietnam or not when the US Department of Justice has never respected its American law?

USC Notes
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The Attorney General shall provide necessary administrative support and services to the Commission. The Chairman shall prepare the budget requests, authorization documents, and legislative proposals for the Commission within the procedures established by the Department of Justice, and the Attorney General shall submit these items to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as proposed by the Chairman.
(Pub. L. 96–209, title I, § 106, Mar. 14, 1980, 94 Stat. 97.)

Special proving to 22 U.S. Code § 1622 g. Independence of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States; finality of Commission decisions
For him realizes that the United States Congress enacted this statutory that it did not only have equality in the proxy war of the United States of America taking place in the Vietnam War but also had the highest of great values of the American Justice. Because of the equal playing yard of the wars of the Government of the United States of America is fair to each other. when the declaration of America played proxy war in the Republic of Vietnam, we could not care to the loss or to the win, but the Government of the United States of America has had decided compensation for the weak national damage which was negatively influenced by its proxy war by the congressional law that is right which is why the US Department of Justice did not respect the independent obligation, but it distorted justice in order to libel him. Because of the US Department of Justice has played "large-breasted covered a baby mouth." or the powerful has oppressed the weaker without had independent justice. In fact, the US Department of Justice has to push his case to political action and the crime section when he is only requesting for his imprisoned benefit insurance. Because he has never had violated crime or terrorized to the United States of America and the American people which is why the American Government has borrowed the Vietnamese communist hands. Let them imprisoned him and nationalized his real property. Obviously, not only the United States Congress and the US Army also recognized the Southern Officers that we are to be the benefactor of the American citizens in the Vietnam War. That is why the US Department of Justice has distorted the Justice of America.
Next, the shameful illness of the arrogance of the US Department of Justice has trampled down the independent of the American law, but it defamed to anti- the plaintiff in order to anti - the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and to take off the democracy of his American citizenship.
Third, the American law has had to order the independent commission of the US Department of Justice that did not only enforce American law but also kept an independent path in the war of the United States of America. When it is symbolized by the Justice of America, it is representing for the superpower of Americanism. But the US Department of Justice did not only discriminate against national origin but also prejudiced law with a Vietnamese American prisoner of war again. Because of the Republic of Vietnam was fallen by the proxy war of the United States of America played, but, the American law of the Vietnam War is not bankrupted by the United States Congress and Constitution.
USC Notes
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Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish the independence of the Commission in making its determinations on claims in programs that it is
authorized to administer pursuant to the powers and responsibilities conferred upon the Commission by the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended [50 U.S.C. 4101 et seq.], the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended [22 U.S.C. 1621 et seq.], and
Reorganization Plan Numbered 1 of 1954. The decisions of the Commission with respect to claims shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and shall not be subject to review by the Attorney General or any other official of the United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise.

For proving 18 U.S. Code § 2340A [33] – Torture
That is why he would like to prove the history of the international relations between the Government of the United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam. Since the Government of the United States of America has endorsed only recognized one sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the United States of America did not only made the international relationship but also did recognized self-determination of Southern Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam by the protocols of the international relations and the United States Congress has approved by the America law which why the Government of the United States of America has had betrayals the Republic of Vietnam and South people.
In fact that the Government of the United States of America did not only tear shred the American law, the United States treaties, and the protocols of the international relations on oneself. Let's the United States welcome to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or so-called is communism. When North Vietnam has never had any protocols of the international relations with the Government of the United States of America or no the United States treaties or no the United States law, or no the United States Congress endorsements, let’s the United States has sold off the Republic of Vietnam to communism without had protocols of the international relations formally.
._________________
[33] *Vietnam https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm#.WzluwVCE2IQ
* San Mateo Medical Center- Audiologist services by Doctor Jeanette Aviles

As a result, he’d like to point out both nations having the historic thickest of the foreign invaders. First, America was invaded by Britain, French, Russian, and Portuguese in the past, but they had never sold to any American soldiers to their enemies because of the national personality dignity of great power was respectfully kept honor in themselves that had never sold off their ethical conscience. Next, Vietnam was of invaded more than four thousand years by China, Mongolian and French - however, they had never sold a little Vietnamese-soldier to their enemies. During the cut and run out of Vietnam, they were heavily defeated by the Vietnamese people, but they could not be left any of their paid-soldiers on the battlefield. Ironically, we, the Southern officers, were left on the battlefield when the Government of the United States of America cut and run out of South Vietnam. Let's our enemy freely revenge us. In shame, let our enemy murder us, imprison us, and torture us without had any international public law helped for us. According to him in the Vietnamese communist jails, his wisdom did not only conquer the heart of the Vietnamese communist spies but also had hidden the melancholy mystery of the shames of his life's believing the United States of America policy. Therefore, the Vietnamese communist spies could not murder him when they have tortured him in order to take so good newsreels of his Republic of Vietnam system as he was tortured by his enemy.

In contrast, the only have the Government of the United States of America is applied by the Stone-Age law. No respectfulness conscience of great power is of American dignity because of the Government of the United States of America did not only sell of the Republic of Vietnam to communism by oneself but also allowed communism to torture the allied memberships of America without had regrets. If the ethical conscience of America ought to be loved the Southern officers which is why the Paris Peace Accords had no chapter and no Articles in which could give to the lost war of the Southern Officers that they've free time to go behind of the Government of the United States of America when the United States of America wouldn’t request the Vietnamese communist government to allow the American prisoners of war in the Paris Peace Accords to let them freely go home. When many American strategists have earned master’s degrees, their bits of intelligence were super. Because they have been designed for the proxy war in the Vietnam War, they ought to predict a successful war without destroyed their Republic of Vietnam allied. As luck would have it, the betrayals of the Government of the United States of America have previously firmly counted, which means the Government of the United States of America had secretly allowed Socialist of the Republic of Vietnam that it freely killed, imprisoned, and tortured Southern Officers. Therefore, he was tortured by the police of Socialist of the Republic of Vietnam in the concentration camp after the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975; as a result, his left ear was broken up, so his ear injured deaf. When the American law has prohibited torturing for any humans, because of, the American human - rights are as important as the United States Constitution. For example, in June of 1975, he was on the way of escaping the assassination of the fall of Saigon in 1975 when he's from Saigon to Dalat City. He has identified a face by the secret Vietnamese communist policeman, so he arrested by this Vietnamese communist. In the meanwhile, it sent him to a concentration camp, so some of the Vietnamese communist policemen. For them exploited information about the Republic of Vietnam of Department police system. He'd answered and said, “America had donated South Vietnam to you already - therefore, you could not exploit me to report it." As one of them had beaten him on his left head by his gun- butt stock, when the Vietnamese communist told, “Our revolution has won Americanism which is why you slandered us." At that time, he was fallen on the floor when his ear's bleeding out. For them carry him to a secret room without had light and food for a few days. In prove, his life was faded by the proxy war of America. So the burden of suffering of a prisoner of war without had any American leaders readily knew. Why did his life endure so much unlucky by the proxy war of America - in the meanwhile, the American citizens have been enriching for the good life, discovering to Mars, and investing for the high-technology, and civilizing society. In contrast, his life has fallen by the proxy war of America; he looks like a young tree which was fallen by the biggest tree in the eldest mountain pressed without human which had to hear to his voice. Where are American human rights to be true or untrue?
In prove, if the United States Congress may allow him to the hearing day in the Congressional, he would like to request the Congress that may give a Vietnamese translator. Because of his ear was heavy deaf, his hears and speaks the English language are very poor. If not, when the hearing day will take place, the many questions of the memberships of Congressional to should be written on the paper. He'll be known to let him answer to all. As you understand about his life when his parents who were born him without had any disease, his dream looks like the Native American which is why the proxy war of yours has adequately robbed to his whole dream's life. If you could not enact any law of the Vietnam War, better you would enjoy so much of his talent works as like piece of artwork and nonfiction stories of the human world. But your proxy war did not only destroy to his peak intelligence but also had restricted to his development’s wisdom, he'd no violated crime what to the American people and the United States. His dream is a natural guy when he loved peace and developed values of philosophy studies. For example, his life always respects the humankind when he'd composed a human doctrine and said, "Its happiness looked like his own, It’s a source of life is as important as his life, and It’s the burden of suffering looked like his own." That belongs to the forgiveness and ethical conscience of a man or the so-called is moral discipline oneself, but his entire dream was bankrupted by your proxy war in the Republic of Vietnam. Rather than you may share the burden of the sufferings of his soul, heart, mind or you may continue to trample down all of his body-human and soul and mind forever.
(a) Offense.—
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b)Jurisdiction.—There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if—
(1)
the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2)
the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
(c)Conspiracy.—
A person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.
(Added Pub. L. 103–236, title V, § 506(a), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 463; amended Pub. L. 103–322, title VI, § 60020, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1979; Pub. L. 107–56, title VIII, § 811(g), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 381.)
28 U.S. Code § 357 [34] - Review of orders and actions
.His settlement case has submitted to the US Department of Justice and the US Supreme Court. However, he did not understand them because before his case would like to petition to them. He had made an appointment to beg the opinion of the US Department of Justice- therefore; the US Department of Justice has had to order him by a letter, which said,
“You to first petition at the local courts and then, the US Supreme Court ought to review your case." As a result, the local court of San Mateo of the county in the state of California that has ordered that a confidential Document: 532272 on June 1, 2017, because he was mistaken about the United States as the defendant and the Kissinger's defendant. But he was adjusted in which the Kissinger belonged to the government employee- therefore, he submitted by a written form, which is the defendant is the United States of America, but before he carried out a part of the title 22 transfer of foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States to
___________
[34]* US. Department of Justice- Civil Rights Division Mar.8, 2019
* Supreme Court of the US- Office of the Clerk, Washington, Dc 20543-0001- March 21, 2019
Department of Justice. Therefore, he continued to appeal to the District Court in San Francisco, but there did not review to return his document. He also tried to appeal for the five times, but it always created difficulties in return. In the meantime, he has submitted his document to both two American Government offices. One was the US Department of Justice and the US Supreme Court in Washington D.C. After two times submitted his document to the US Department of Justice, So, the first time it did not review that he seemed to think that it had to throw his document to the garbage, but the second time it has to order him that he ought to report the case to the local federal Bureau of Investigation. In his opinion that is why the US Department of Justice did not order its federal bureau of investigation when it pushed him to crime sections and political actions and self report to the local federal bureau of investigation. Another, the
US Supreme Court has reviewed his case, but it has ordered him to go to a High Court in the state of California since the US Department of Justice had no ordered to him that must appeal to any the high-courts of the state of California. Because the US Department of Justice has to push him to the local Federal Bureau of Investigation, let's find out to the crime section of him. And, the US Department of Justice wanted to push him to political action in order to obstruction of justice when it wished him to violate political action. Therefore, he'd like to carry out this 28 U.S.C. § 357. Review of orders and actions when he would like to petition the Judicial Committee of the United States Congress for review for his settlement case. He would seek equality when he always worries in the very fear of political action and crime sections by the US Department of Justice ordered him.

U.S. Code
• Notes
(a)Review of Action of Judicial Council.—
A complainant or judge aggrieved by an action of the judicial council under section 354 may petition the Judicial Conference of the United States for review thereof.
(b)The action of judicial Conference —
The Judicial Conference, or the standing committee established under section 331, may grant a petition filed by a complainant or judge under subsection (a).
(c)No Judicial Review.—
Except as expressly provided in this section and section 352(c), all orders and determinations, including denials of petitions for review, shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise.
(Added Pub. L. 107–273, div. C, title I, § 11042 (a), Nov. 2, 2002, 116
Stat. 1853.)
Especial proving 28 U.S. Code § 1502- [35] Treaty cases
He does believe in statutorily of his settlement case when the United States Congress has enacted this Act because of he has been bringing the burden of sufferings of prisoner of war for going - through his innocent life from April 30, 1975, to presenting time. In fact, at the night he always has a nightmare of the proxy war and imprisoned victimization in the concentration camps, which always torn prolonged for destroying to his heart, soul, and mind, on the daylight he always oppressed by so much of
__________
[35]
* Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950, or the United States treaty signed December 23, 1950 in Saigon, Vietnam. (See appendix page 260)
* Geneva conference – July 20, 1954
* The Paris Peace Accords- January 27, 1973(See appendix)



American social unfairness. So, sometimes he wanted to suicide to end his suffered-life, but he did think if he died in a suicide, which was easy, but, his death did not help for his honest life. In the meantime, his children's group and his innocent wife must be feeling helpless - life when their father and her husband were useless and valueless, he'd lived in American modern civilization in which is a glorious luxury richest which is why he must be suicide. Let's he be left behind of so much of bad thing when his former fatherland, his relatives, and his offspring were burdening for the suffering-beloved very misery. On the other hand, if he was suicide, his death looked the smallest shrimp in the largest sea, which can not make the dirty sea-water. Moreover, the Vietnamese communist enemy did not only humiliate him but also ashamed him when he has run behind Great America and died in humiliation. Therefore, he should come to calm when he ought to stand strongly up lets he struggles for American justice without had fearless in the powerful American. For that reason, he did think that his settlement case has had belonged for 28 U.S.C § 1502 - Treaty case because the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam did not only sign some of the United States Treaties each other but also had a few of International Agreements and the more protocols International relations each other. Therefore, he would like to carry out this special statutory to submit to the United States Congress determined
First of all, from December 23, 1950, to April 30, 1975, the total American Government has solemnly been signed with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam within three super values of the United States Treaties in which included so many protocols international relations. Those were in highest respectfully super values of the United States has had strongly promised defense the Republic of Vietnam. In case, the base on of those the United States Treaties and to be the International Agreements was endorsed by the Government of the United States of America- and therefore, the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnamese people, and Southern properties have firmly adequately protected by the Government of the United States of America each other.
First, the Government of the United States of America has established diplomatic relations with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam in 1950 after the French Union invader ought to repay independence for Vietnam; but, France continued to oversee Vietnam’s defense and foreign policy. In 1954, Vietnamese nationalists fighting for full independence defeated France, and now-divided Vietnam entered into two decades of civil war. The United States did not recognize North Vietnam’s government, maintaining the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam, supporting the South Vietnam fighting against North Vietnam by a special solemn United States Treaty on December 23, 1950, in Saigon, Vietnam that the Government of the United States of America has solemnly defense the Government of the Republic of Vietnam by Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950 (TIAS 2447; 3 U.S.T. 2756) – in which to be self evident truth is 22 U.S.C. §§ 1571_1604. [10] P.L 329, 81st Congresses - 63 Stat- 714- December 23, 1950 - Mutual Defense Assistance Programs.
The protocol of the International Relations is the self-evident truth of the Republic of Vietnam sovereignty was solemnly firmly endorsed by the United States Congress. For that reason, the government of the United States of America has freely been made the wind and the rain in his nation. In contrast, if the United States looked like South Vietnam at this time - how would do you think about it? When your National America has freely been investing for high-technology, modern sciences, and making the rich, you have pushed the Republic of Vietnam to fight against to communism in order to destabilize in Vietnam.
Second, in the especial autumn of 1954, the French invader has realized that it was defeat out of Vietnam by the Vietnamese people. In the meanwhile, The Government of the United States of America has co-paying for entire France's invaded war expenses; the United States was unable to persuade the French to continuously fight on. Therefore, the French invader would like to request an international conference that was held in Geneva, Switzerland to discuss the problems of Indochina. On July 20 and 21, 1954, this convention created the number of agreements that were supposed to settle the neo-colonial war.

The Geneva Accords stated that Vietnam was to become an independent nation. Elections will be held on July 1956, under international supervision, to choose a government for Vietnam. During the two-year destabilization until the whole national elections, the Vietnamese people will be reunited. In the case, the country would be divided into two parts; the North and the South. The dividing line is chosen at the seventeenth parallel, which is far of a little north of the Hue City that is an Imperial City and was quite close to the line that had separated the two halves of Vietnam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

All Viet Minh soldiers should go to the North; and all soldiers who had fought for the French invader that they must go to the South. Especial case, the whole Vietnamese people of both sides that they would also be able to chose for what side if they wished to can be. As a result, one million of Vietnamese Catholic Vietnamese and civilians have left the North. They were freely transferred from North to South Vietnam in 1954 and 1955. In contrast, a smaller number of Viet Minh sympathizers moved from South to North - for that reason, before the Viet Minh soldiers transfer to the North, they have gotten a secrete orders from Uncle Ho Chi Minh that they are freely getting marry with all of the Southern women, if some women didn't agree marry, the Vietnamese soldiers are authorized assassinating them without had given judgment. In condition, the Viet Minh soldiers shall have so much of son or girl that their children ought to drop off in the South Vietnam. After the two years, the Viet Minh soldiers will be back. For Ho Chi Minh wished to want these children that they could secretly connect in relatives with the North soldiers for the long run. Lets Ho Chi Minh will build war in the South.

For Viet Minh did think about the Geneva Accords, to look like a gamble. The Viet Minh ruled controlled entirely Vietnam from 1945 to 1954 because of the Viet Minh had taken advantage of Nguyen Dynasty when it allowed the whole nation fought against French invader. Therefore, Vietnam was to be divided by two parts, so the patriotic sympathy of the Vietnamese people was decently seized by the Viet Minh.
Under oppression from China and the Soviet Union, both of which wanted peace than war when they took advantage of Geneva Conference, they reduce international tension at this time. So the Viet Minh ought to decide to accept the Geneva Accords, and gamble by dropping off territory within two year in order to win control of all of Vietnam in 1956. For the cut-divide of Vietnam was supposed to be purely temporary. Who were talent leaderships to prevent the two sections from being rejoined in 1956? In the meanwhile, the French had cut and run out of hopeless of ruling control in any part of Vietnam.

As a result, the United States and the state of Vietnam would not want the Geneva Conference successful because of this Conference was an interest in North Vietnam than the South. In the meanwhile, which recognized Communist control of North Vietnam and created the likelihood that the Communists would take the South in two years later, the Viet Minh ought to easily seize South Vietnam in the future. Therefore, the Government of the United States of America has ruled to force the State of Vietnam. As they could have refused to promise in order to obey the Geneva Accords. For that reason, the Geneva Accords was not enacted the American law by the United States Congress. On the other hand, the Government of the United States of America has helped in support Ngo Dinh Diem when he lived in the American. He must return to South Vietnam on October 26, 1956. In the meanwhile, the State of Vietnam was powerless, and the South was influenced by the United States in all. The American leaders themselves were by no means confident that they would be able to prevent the reunification of Vietnam from occurring on schedule in 1956. Instead of, organization a national general election should take place in 1956, but, the United States of America has built up a national referendum through Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Dinh in order to dethrone Bao Dai King.

In conclusion, the objective of the Geneva Accords was held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1954. That the main topic of the United States ought to kick the French invader out of the state of Vietnam to lets the United States change the French leg. Because the French have been ruled the state of Vietnam for one hundred years, the French invader didn't conquer all of the hearts of the Vietnamese people. Therefore, the United States wanted to alter a new power. Let America fight against communism out of the state of Vietnam. In contrast, the United States supported the French because the Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh were communist and was strongly supported by the Soviet Union and China and were a major threat to the core of interests of America. In the case of, in 1954 the French would like to request for tactical air support and the use of an atomic weapon to help the French battalion trapped at Diem Bien Phu. But, the United States did not support the French militarily because of the threat of a war with the Soviet Union and the lack of support from other Allies and therefore, the French lost the Dien Bien Phu battlefield.
For the French declaring Vietnam an Independent country, the United States quickly intervened in the Geneva Conference to separate the state of Vietnam two parts of South Vietnam and North Vietnam. So the United States deemed dividing into two parts the necessary of the state of Vietnam. Because of the theory of Containment and the Domino Theory, the United States wanted to contain communism influence within North Vietnam and put outward pressure from South Vietnam, supported by the United States. The United States Domino theory declared the fall of several Southeast Asian countries that would lead to a domino effect on other countries in the region. With the foreign policy of containment and the Domino theory, the United States sought Vietnam as a center of focus in the region to anti-communism.
Third, he would like to totally summary of the Paris Peace Accords in which has the Nine Chapters and the twenty-three Articles, but, no chapters and n articles had sold the Republic of Vietnam to Socialist of the Republic of Vietnam and had imprisoned the Southern officers-in the meanwhile,
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam in which
Cease-fire in-place and troop withdrawal – the United States pledged to cease hostilities (ground, air, naval, deactivate or destroy mines in all waterways). Cease-fire in-place also applied to other belligerents. The United States should have total withdrawal to be completed within 60 days.
In prove, the Paris Peace Accords has to order that Four-Power Joint Military Commission (see Article 16) will oversee cease-fire and troop and adviser withdrawal, to be completed in 60 days, and Military bases of the United States to be dismantled in same period.
Ironically, this United States Treaty to be International Agreement, it did no introduction (by either Vietnamese party) of new troops, advisers, etc. or arms and war materials into their respective cease-fire zones; this article to be supervised by Four-Power Joint Military Commission (created in Article 16) which is why the lack of the importance of Agreement of the Government of the United States of America had no care to enemy of North Vietnam.
All parties committed to no further acts of force on ground, in the air, and on the sea. This prohibition also included terrorism and reprisals. Both Vietnamese sides were permitted to replace arms and war materials destroyed, damaged, or worn-out, under supervision of the Joint Military Commission.
Return of all captured military personnel and foreign civilians within 60 day period, also under supervision of the Joint Military Commission.
The self evident truth, this Agreement has never had allowed each party to use force in order to revenge each other. Even good, the inmates are civilians and soldiers to must release within 60 days. That is why, he was imprisoned by this Paris Peace Accords when the masterminds of this Agreement had belongs to the Government of the United States of America.
In condition, Exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-determination -- six articles dealt with declaration of this right, asserting the 1954 division of Vietnam as provisional and not political or territorial in nature (citing the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference).
North and South Vietnam must have to begin peaceful negotiations on establishing normal relations and reunification.
Implementation of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace would be under three bodies (see Articles 16, 17, and 18): the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, and the International Commission on Control and Supervision. Article 19 provided for an International Conference (within thirty days) to acknowledge the signed agreements, guarantee the ending of the war, the peace of Indochina, and the right of self-determination by the South Vietnamese people. On the contrary, he was lost Exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-determination by the Government of the United States of America. In prove, in April 30, 1975, the North Vietnamese Army invaded the Republic of Vietnam by force. In the meanwhile, General William Westmoreland of the US Army Command in Vietnam commented and said: "We (the United States) have not lost the battle in Vietnam. But we have not kept our commitment to the Republic of Vietnam Army. On behalf of the United States Army, I apologize to the South Vietnamese Army veterans because we have abandoned you. ”(On behalf of the United States Armed Forces, I would like to apologize to the veterans of the South Armed Forces for abandoning you guys. For this reason, How would does Congress Government think about this true evidence?
In conclusion, the Agreement has declared to rebuilding for injured war in which Articles 21 and 22 anticipated reconciliation and normalization of relations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The former promised postwar reconstruction aid. But no promised took his real property to transfer to Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Signatories
For the U.S. -- William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Republic of Viet-Nam -- Tran Van Lam, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam -- Nguyen Duy Trinh, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Provisional Revolutionary Government of Viet-Nam -- Nguyen Thi Binh, Minister for Foreign Affairs




VII.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing real reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests that the U.S. Congress gives an order for granting the compensation benefits for suitable with statutory of the US of America in the prisoner of war of the Vietnam War and his intellectual properties were injured by the mental case.
Respectfully Yours






Bright Quang


I declare under penalty of perjury under laws of the state of California and of the United States of America that the information, which has had 51,850 words. I have proved on this form and all attachments are true and correct.
Date____________________



BRIGHT QUANG ID: xxx-xx-9115





Sign Name__________














Appendix page 163 to 512……………………………………………….Page
Table of Contents
1/ page 5
From page …………………………………………………………………..165 to 166
4/page 6
Particular Rights - First Amendment
First Amendment to the Constitution is from page………………………… 166 to 169
7/page 9
Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
From page……………………………………………………………….169 to 237
7/ page 19
From is Page …………………………………………………………….237 to 251
8/page 21
18 USC§ 2381 [8/22] Treason (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 807; Pub. L. 103–322,
Page……………………………………………………………………….. 251-254

9/page23
Page ………………………………………………………………………255 to 257

10 U.S. Code § 2733 [9] Property loss; personal injury or death: incident to non-combat activities of Department of Army, Navy, or Air Force
From page ………………………………………………………….….257 to 262
First's evidence is The My Lai Massacre and Courts-Martial: An Account is from page ………………………………………………………………….236 to 250
10/page 23
From page……………………………………………………………... 256 to 2261

22 U.S.C. §§ 1571_1604. [10] P.L 329, 81st Congresses - 63 Stat- 714- December 23, 1950
From page…………………………………………………………… 257 to 262
to include
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE IN INDOCHINA AGREEMENT SIGNED AT SAIGON DECEMBER 23, 1950; ENTERED INTO FORCE DECEMBER 23, 1950
V. SAI G. de LATTRE
14/page 36
USC§ 2151 n [14] Human rights and development assistance - Dec. 20, 1975, (a)  Violations barring assistance; assistance
Page ………………………………………………………………………..261 to 268
17/page 40
26 U.S. C. § 7701(a) (1) (2) (5)-[17] Definitions
Page……………………………………………………………………. 269 to 295
Including a draft of the Paris Peace Accords of the Kissinger reported to the American people the public community standards and the worldwide media.
31/page 103
50 U.S. Code § 4105 [31] – Prisoner of War
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28 U.S.C § 1346 [32] the United States as the defendant

18 U.S. Code § 2340A [33] – Torture
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28 U.S. Code § 1502- [35] Treaty cases
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1/ page 5
From page 165 to 166
In contrast, the defendant's the United States has ordered to murder President Republic of Vietnam who was Ngo Dinh Diem-herein:
Kennedy White House tapes offer new insight
By Bill Delaney/CNN
BOSTON (November 24) -- The Kennedy Library has released 37 hours of tape recordings of meetings, memos, phone calls and dictation of President John F. Kennedy, including four hours of tape long held by Kennedy secretary Evelyn Lincoln.


John F. Kennedy
The disclosure marks the largest single release ever of Kennedy recordings and offers important new insights into the president's reaction to unraveling events in Vietnam not long before his death.
On one tape recorded November 4, 1963, Kennedy dictates a memo seeming to regret the assassination of South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem, following a coup Kennedy endorsed.
Only weeks before his own assassination Kennedy recorded, "I feel that we must bear a good deal of responsibility, in part beginning with our cable of early August, in which we suggested the coup, period. In my judgment that wire was badly drafted, comma, it should never have been sent on a Saturday."
The dictation continues until Kennedy was interrupted by his son John Kennedy Jr. Kennedy asks his son, "Why do the leaves fall? And why does the snow come on the ground? Why do the leaves turn green?"
Kennedy then returns to the memo, saying, "I was shocked by the death of Diem Ngo. I met Diem with Justice Douglas many years ago. He was a extraordinary character. While he became increasingly difficult in the last months, nevertheless over a 10-year period he held his country together."
The tapes offer insight, but no new conclusions about what might have occurred in Southeast Asia had Kennedy lived.
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Particular Rights - First Amendment
First Amendment to the Constitution [4]
The petitioner is a good Vietnamese American citizen- and therefore, his rights carry out First Amendment to the Constitution in order to express his good citizen. When he lives and works in accordance with the constitution and the law of the United States which is why he was prejudiced national origins under color by the American Court system. Therefore, he carries out the First Amendment to the Constitution in order to seek American justice because of a prisoner of war of the proxy war of the United States does not only pay for income-tax but also voted for choosing many American leaders. That is not meant for the values of a Vietnamese American prisoner of war. The event truth is often for whatever citizen who lives wherever in the world who must do that in order to express for the best of the citizen who lives in modern civilization. The providing copy is the First Amendment to the Constitution.
First Amendment:
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression from government interference. It prohibits any laws that establish a national religion, impede the free exercise of religion, abridge the freedom of speech, infringe upon the freedom of the press, interfere with the right to peaceably assemble, or prohibit citizens from petitioning for a governmental redress of grievances. It was adopted into the Bill of Rights in 1791. The Supreme Court interprets the extent of the protection afforded to these rights. The First Amendment has been interpreted by the Court as applying to the entire federal government even though it is only expressly applicable to Congress. Furthermore, the Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the rights in the Amendment from interference by state governments.
Freedom of Religion
Two clauses in the First Amendment guarantee freedom of religion. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from passing legislation to establish an official religion or preferring one religion over another. It enforces the "separation of church and state." However, some governmental activity related to religion has been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court. For example, providing bus transportation for parochial school students and the enforcement of "blue laws" is not prohibited. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government, in most instances, from interfering with a person's practice of their religion.
Freedom of Speech / Freedom of the Press
The most basic component of freedom of expression is the right of freedom of speech. The right to freedom of speech allows individuals to express themselves without government interference or regulation. The Supreme Court requires the government to provide substantial justification for the interference with the right of free speech where it attempts to regulate the content of the speech. Generally, a person cannot be held liable, either criminally or civilly for anything written or spoken about a person or topic, so long as it is truthful or based on an honest opinion, and such statements.
A less stringent test is applied for content-neutral legislation. The Supreme Court has also recognized that the government may prohibit some speech that may cause a breach of the peace or cause violence. For more on unprotected and less protected categories of speech see advocacy of illegal action, fighting words, commercial speech and obscenity. The right to free speech includes other mediums of expression that communicate a message. The level of protection speech receives also depends on the forum in which it takes place.
Despite popular misunderstanding the right to freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment is not very different from the right to freedom of speech. It allows an individual to express themselves through publication and dissemination. It is part of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. It does not afford members of the media any special rights or privileges not afforded to citizens in general.
Right to Assemble / Right to Petition
The right to assemble allows people to gather for peaceful and lawful purposes. Implicit within this right is the right to association and belief. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that a right to freedom of association and belief is implicit in the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This implicit right is limited to the right to associate for First Amendment purposes. It does not include a right of social association. The government may prohibit people from knowingly associating in groups that engage and promote illegal activities. The right to associate also prohibits the government from requiring a group to register or disclose its members or from denying government benefits on the basis of an individual's current or past membership in a particular group. There are exceptions to this rule where the Court finds that governmental interests in disclosure/registration outweigh interference with First Amendment rights. The government may also, generally, not compel individuals to express themselves, hold certain beliefs, or belong to particular associations or groups.
The right to petition the government for a redress of grievances guarantees people the right to ask the government to provide relief for a wrong through the courts (litigation) or other governmental action. It works with the right of assembly by allowing people to join together and seek change from the government.
7/page 9 Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
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Combat Trafficking [6] of 22 U.S. C. § 7103 Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking.
To prove, the American Army of the United States of America had been combating against trafficking of the Vietnamese Communists because it had been trafficking from the North Vietnam to the South Vietnam - and then, it arrested the Southern sent to the North. Therefore, the American Army was operating in South Vietnam from early years, which were 1965 to 1967.
Vietnam War: The Early Years, 1965-1967
Hovering U.S. Army helicopters pour machine gun fire into a tree line to cover the advance of South Vietnamese ground troops in an attack on a Viet Cong camp 18 miles north of Tay Ninh, near the Cambodian border, in March of 1965.
On May 07, 1954, Viet Minh forces won the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and ended French involvement in Indochina. This victory led to the Geneva Conference where the French and Viet Minh negotiated a ceasefire agreement. Under the terms of Geneva Accords, France agreed to withdraw its troops from Indochina while Vietnam was temporarily divided into North and South Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai respectively, at the 17th parallel. Civilians were able to move freely between two states for a 300-day period. General elections were to be held within two years, by July 1956, to unify the country.
However, the accords apparently did not please the United States. First, they feared that the general elections would not be fair and free under the communists’ influence. Second and most importantly, if the communists won in Vietnam, communism could spread throughout Southeast Asia and become a greater threat to the U.S. In a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem – the new Prime Minister of the Bao Dai government on October 23, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised American support to his government to ensure a non-communist Vietnam. Following through on that commitment, American aid to South Vietnam began as early as in January, 1955. The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina was also re-organized into MAAG, Vietnam to train South Vietnamese army.
An American officer serving with the South Vietnam forces poses with group of Montagnards in front of one of their provisionary huts in a military camp in central Vietnam on November 17, 1962. They were brought in by government troops from a village where they were used as labor force by communist Viet Cong forces. The Montagnards, dark-skinned tribesmen numbering about 700,000, live in the highlands of central Vietnam. The government was trying to win their alliance in its war with the Viet Cong.
By early 1955, Diem had consolidated his power and control over South Vietnam. He also launched many political repression and anti-communist campaigns across the country, in which 25,000 anti-government activists and communists were arrested and more than 1,000 killed as claimed by the communists. In return, communist insurgents also assassinated hundreds of South Vietnamese officials. In July 1955, Diem rejected the national election, claiming South Vietnam was not bound by the Geneva Accords. In October, he easily ousted Bao Dai and became President of the new Republic of Vietnam (ROV).
Nevertheless, Diem’s political repression and attacks on Buddhist community made him more and more unpopular among ordinary South Vietnamese people. Realizing the increasingly unpopularity of Diem regime, Hanoi established the National Liberation Front (NLF), better known as the Viet Cong, on December 20, 1960, which consisted of all anti-government activists – both communists and non-communists, as a common front to fight against Diem.
Vietnamese airborne rangers, their two U.S. advisers, and a team of 12 U.S. Special Forces troops set out to raid a Viet Cong supply base 62 miles northwest of Saigon, on August 6, 1963. As the H-21 helicopters hovered six feet from the ground to avoid spikes and wires and under sniper fire, the troops jumped out to attack.
In May 1961, Kennedy sent 400 U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Beret) troops into South Vietnam’s Central Highlands to train Montagnard tribesmen in counterinsurgency tactics. He also tripled the level of aid to South Vietnam. A steady stream of airplanes, helicopters, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and other equipment poured into the South. By the end of 1962, there were 9,000 U.S. military advisers under the direction of a newly‐created Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), commanded by U.S. Army Gen. Paul Harkins. Under U.S. guidance, the Diem government also began construction of “strategic hamlets.” These fortified villages were intended to insulate rural Vietnamese from Vietcong intimidation and propaganda.
U.S. and South Vietnamese leaders were cautiously optimistic that increased U.S. assistance finally was enabling the Saigon government to defend itself. On 2 January 1963, however, at Ap Bac on the Plain of Reeds southwest of Saigon, a Viet Cong battalion of about 320 men inflicted heavy damage on an ARVN force of 3,000 equipped with troop‐carrying helicopters, new UH‐1 (“Huey”) helicopter gunships, tactical bombers, and APCs.
Ap Bac represented a leadership failure for the ARVN and a major morale boost for the anti government forces. The absence of fighting spirit in the ARVN mirrored the continuing inability of the Saigon regime to win political support. Indeed, many South Vietnamese perceived the strategic hamlets as government oppression, not protection, because people were forced to leave their ancestral homes for the new settlements.
A South Vietnamese Marine, severely wounded in a Viet Cong ambush, is comforted by a comrade in a sugar-cane field at Duc Hoa, about 12 miles from Saigon, on August 5, 1963. A platoon of 30 Vietnamese Marines was searching for communist guerrillas when a long burst of automatic fire killed one Marine and wounded four others.
While Viet Cong guerrillas scored military successes, leaders of Vietnam’s Buddhist majority protested against what they saw as the Diem regime religious persecution. In June, a monk dramatically burned himself to death at a busy Saigon intersection. The “Buddhist crisis” and dissatisfaction with Diem by top Vietnamese Army leaders made U.S. officials receptive to the idea of a change in South Vietnam’s leadership. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not interfere as a group of ARVN officers plotted a coup.
On 1 November 1963, the generals seized power, and Diem and his unpopular brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were murdered. Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated, and U.S. policy in Vietnam was again at a crossroads. If the new government in Saigon failed to show progress against the insurgency, would the United States withdraw its support from a lost cause, or would it escalate the effort to preserve South Vietnam as an anti communist outpost in Asia?
Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the Vietnam dilemma. As Senate majority leader in the 1950s and as vice‐president, he had supported Eisenhower and Kennedy’s decisions to aid South Vietnam. Four days after Kennedy’s death, Johnson, now president, reaffirmed in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 273 that the U.S. goal was to assist South Vietnam in its “contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy.” U.S. policy defined the Vietnam War as North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam.
Napalm air strikes raise clouds into gray monsoon skies as houseboats glide down the Perfume River toward Hue in Vietnam on February 28, 1963, where a battle for control of the old Imperial City ended with a Communist defeat. Firebombs were directed against a village on the outskirts of Hue.
North Vietnam infiltrated troops and matériel into South Vietnam by sea and along the so‐called Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Throughout his administration, Johnson insisted that the only possible negotiated settlement of the conflict would be one in which North Vietnam recognized the legitimacy of South Vietnam’s government. Without such recognition, the United States would continue to provide Saigon as much help as it needed to survive.
The critical military questions were how much U.S. assistance was enough and what form it should take. By the spring of 1964, the Vietcong controlled vast areas of South Vietnam, the strategic hamlet program had essentially ceased, and North Vietnam’s aid to the southern insurgents had grown. In June, Johnson named one of the army’s most distinguished officers, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then commandant of West Point, as commander U.S. MACV.
Westmoreland immediately asked for more men, and by the end of 1964 U.S. personnel in the South exceeded 23,000. Increasingly, however, the U.S. effort focused on the North. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and other key White House aides remained convinced that the assault on South Vietnam originated in the ambitious designs of Hanoi backed by Moscow and Beijing.
Thich Quang Duc, a Buddhist monk, burns himself to death on a Saigon street on June 11, 1963, to protest alleged persecution of Buddhists by the South Vietnamese government. President Ngo Dình Diem, part of the Catholic minority, had adopted policies that discriminated against Buddhists and gave high favor to Catholics.
Throughout 1964, the United States assisted South Vietnam in covert operations to gather intelligence, disseminate propaganda, and harass the North. On the night of 2 August, North Vietnamese gunboats fired on the USS Maddox, a destroyer on an intelligence‐collecting mission, in the same area of the Gulf of Tonkin where South Vietnamese commandos were conducting raids against the North Vietnamese coast. Two nights later, under stormy conditions, the Maddox and another destroyer, the Turner Joy, reported a gunboat attack.
Although doubts existed about these reports, the president ordered retaliatory air strikes against the North Vietnamese port of Vinh. The White House had expected that some type of incident would occur eventually, and it had prepared the text of a congressional resolution authorizing the president to use armed force to protect U.S. forces and to deter further aggression from North Vietnam. On 7 August 1964, Johnson secured almost unanimous consent from Congress (414–0 in the House; 88–2 in the Senate) for his Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which became the principal legislative basis for all subsequent military deployment in Southeast Asia.
Flying low over the jungle, an A-1 Skyraider drops 500-pound bombs on a Viet Cong position below as smoke rises from a previous pass at the target, on December 26, 1964.
Johnson’s decisive but restrained response to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents helped him win the 1964 election, but Saigon’s prospects continued to decline. The president wanted to concentrate on his ambitious domestic program, the Great Society, but his political instincts told him that his leadership would be damaged fatally if America’s client state in South Vietnam succumbed. Instability mounted in South Vietnam as rival military and civilian factions vied for power and as Vietcong strength grew.
A consensus formed among Johnson’s advisers that the United States would have to initiate air warfare against North Vietnam. Bombing could boost Saigon’s morale and might persuade the North to cease its support of the insurgency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) favored a massive bombing campaign, but civilians in the State and Defense Departments preferred a gradual escalation.
Using as a pretext a Vietcong attack on 7 February 1965 at Pleiku that killed eight American soldiers, Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing north of the Demilitarized Zone along the 17th parallel that divided North and South Vietnam. Within a week, the administration began ROLLING THUNDER, a gradually intensifying air bombardment of military bases, supply depots, and infiltration routes in North Vietnam. Flying out of bases in Thailand, U.S. Air Force fighter‐bombers—primarily F‐105 Thunder chiefs and later F‐4 Phantoms—joined U.S. Navy Phantoms and A‐4 Skyhawks from a powerful carrier task force located at a point called Yankee Station, seventy‐five miles off the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Partially covered, a dying Viet Cong guerrilla raises his hands as South Vietnamese Marines search palm groves near Long Binh in the Mekong Delta, on February 27, 1964. The guerrilla died in a foxhole following a battle between a battalion of South Vietnamese Marines and a unit of Viet Cong.
In 1965, U.S. aircraft flew 25,000 sorties against North Vietnam, and that number grew to 79,000 in 1966 and 108,000 in 1967. In 1967 annual bombing tonnage reached almost a quarter million. Targets expanded to include the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and factories, farms, and railroads in North Vietnam.
From the beginning of the bombing, American strategists debated the effectiveness of air power in defeating a political insurgency in a predominantly agricultural country. Despite the American bombs, dollars, and military advisers, the Vietcong continued to inflict heavy casualties on the ARVN, and the political situation in Saigon grew worse. By June 1965, there had been five governments in the South since Diem’s death, and the newest regime, headed by General Nguyen Van Thieu and Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky, inspired little confidence.
As U.S. “Eagle Flight” helicopters hover overhead, South Vietnamese troops wade through a rice paddy in Long An province during operations against Viet Cong guerrillas in the Mekong Delta, in December of 1964. The “Eagle Flight” choppers were loaded with Vietnamese airborne troops who were dropped in to support ground forces at the first sign of enemy contact.
To stave off defeat, the JCS endorsed Westmoreland’s request for 150,000 U.S. troops to take the ground offensive in the South. When McNamara concurred, Johnson decided to commit the forces. The buildup of formal U.S. military units had begun on 8 March 1965, when two battalions of Marines landed at Da Nang. In June, Marine and army units began offensive unit operations—“search and destroy” missions. On 28 July, Johnson announced that 50,000 U.S. troops would go to South Vietnam immediately. By the end of the year, there were 184,300 U.S. personnel in the South.
Although Johnson’s actions meant that the United States had crossed the line from advising the ARVN to actually fighting the war against the Vietcong, the president downplayed the move. The JCS wanted a mobilization of the reserves and National Guard, and McNamara proposed levying war taxes. Such actions would have placed the United States on a war footing. With his ambitious social reform program facing crucial votes in Congress, the president wanted to avoid giving congressional conservatives an opportunity to use mobilization to block his domestic agenda. Consequently, he relied on other means. Monthly draft calls increased from 17,000 to 35,000 to meet manpower needs, and deficit spending, with its inherent inflationary impact, funded the escalation.
A father holds the body of his child as South Vietnamese Army Rangers look down from their armored vehicle on March 19, 1964. The child was killed as government forces pursued guerrillas into a village near the Cambodian border.
With U.S. bombs pounding North Vietnam, Westmoreland turned America’s massive firepower on the southern insurgents. Johnson’s choice of gradual escalation of bombing and incremental troop deployments was based upon the concept of limited warfare. Risks of a wider war with China and the Soviet Union meant that the United States would not go all out to annihilate North Vietnam. Thus, Westmoreland chose a strategy of attrition in the South. Using mobility and powerful weapons, the MACV commander could limit U.S. casualties while exhausting the enemy that is, inflicting heavier losses than could be replaced.
Escalation of the air and ground war in 1965 provoked Hanoi to begin deploying into the South increasing units of the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA), or People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), as it was called. In October, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the PAVN commander, launched a major offensive in the Central Highlands, southwest of Pleiku. Westmoreland responded with the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Air Mobile). Through much of November, in the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley, U.S. and North Vietnamese forces engaged each other in heavy combat for the first time.
Marines wade ashore with heavy equipment at first light at Red Beach near Da Nang in Saigon on April 10, 1965.
The Americans ultimately forced the NVA out of the valley and killed ten times as many enemy soldiers as they lost. Westmoreland used helicopters extensively for troop movements, resupply, medical evacuation, and tactical air support. USAF tactical bombers and even huge B‐52 strategic bombers attacked enemy positions. The battle convinced the U.S. commander that “search and destroy” tactics using air mobility would work in accomplishing the attrition strategy. Soon after the PAVN departed the battlefield, however, so too did the American air “cavalry.” Clearly, control of territory was not the U.S. military objective.
During 1966 Westmoreland requested more ground troops, and by year’s end the U.S. ground force level “in country” reached 385,000. These were organized into seven divisions and other specialized airborne, armored, special forces, and logistical units. With U.S. aid, the ARVN also expanded to eleven divisions, supplemented by local and irregular units. While MACV was getting men and munitions in place for large‐unit search and destroy operations, army and marine units conducted smaller operations. Although the “body count”—the estimated number of enemy killed—mounted, attrition was not changing the political equation in South Vietnam. The NLF continued to exercise more effective control in many areas than did the government, and Viet Cong guerrillas, who often disappeared when U.S. forces entered an area, quickly reappeared when the Americans left.
In 1967, Westmoreland made his big push to win the war. With South Vietnam’s forces assigned primarily to occupation, pacification, and security duties, massive U.S. combat sweeps moved to locate and destroy the enemy. In January, Operation Cedar Falls was a 30,000‐man assault on the Iron Triangle, an enemy base area forty miles north of Saigon. From February through April, Operation Junction City was an even larger attack on nearby War Zone C. There was major fighting in the Central Highlands, climaxing in the battle of Dak To in November 1967.
With the persuasion of a Viet Cong-made spear pressed against his throat, a captured Viet Cong guerrilla decided to talk to interrogators, telling them of a cache of Chinese grenades on March 28, 1965. He was captured with 13 other guerrillas and 17 suspects when two Vietnamese battalions overran a Viet Cong camp about 15 miles southwest of Da Nang air force base.
U.S. forces killed many enemy soldiers and destroyed large amounts of supplies. MACV declared vast areas to be “free‐fire zones,” which meant that U.S. and ARVN artillery and tactical aircraft, as well as B‐52 “carpet bombing,” could target anyone or anything in the area. In Operation RANCH HAND, the USAF sprayed the defoliant Agent Orange to deprive the guerrillas of cover and food supplies. Controversy about the use of Agent Orange erupted in 1969 when reports appeared that the chemical caused serious damage to humans as well as to plants.
Late in 1967, with 485,600 U.S. troops in Vietnam, Westmoreland announced that, although much fighting remained, a cross‐over point had arrived in the war of attrition; that is, the losses to the NVA and Vietcong were greater than they could replace. This assessment was debatable, and there was considerable evidence that the so‐called “other war” for political support in South Vietnam was not going well. Corruption, factionalism, and continued Buddhist protests plagued the Thieu‐Ky government.
Despite incredible losses, the Vietcong still controlled many areas. A diplomatic resolution of the conflict remained elusive. Several third countries, such as Poland and Great Britain, offered proposals intended to facilitate negotiations. These formulas typically called upon the United States and DRV to coordinate mutual reduction of their military activities in South Vietnam, but both Washington and Hanoi firmly resisted even interim compromises with the other. The war was at a stalemate.
Thousands attend a rally on the grounds of the Washington Monument in Washington on April 17, 1965, to hear Ernest Gruening, a Democratic senator from Alaska, and other speakers discuss U.S. policy in Vietnam. The rally followed picketing of the White House by students demanding an end to Vietnam fighting.
A nurse attempts to comfort a wounded U.S. Army soldier in a ward of the 8th army hospital at Nha Trang in South Vietnam on February 7, 1965. The soldier was one of more than 100 who were wounded during Viet Cong attacks on two U.S. military compounds at Pleiku, 240 miles north of Saigon. Seven Americans were killed in the attacks.

Flag-draped coffins of eight American Servicemen killed in attacks on U.S. military installations in South Vietnam, on February 7, are placed in transport plane at Saigon, February 9, 1965, for return flight to the United States. Funeral services were held at the Saigon Airport with U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor and Vietnamese officials attending.

Injured Vietnamese receive aid as they lie on the street after a bomb explosion outside the U.S. embassy in Saigon, Vietnam, on March 30, 1965. Smoke rises from wreckage in background. At least two Americans and several Vietnamese were killed in the bombing.

Four “Ranch Hand” C-123 aircraft spray liquid defoliant on a suspected Viet Cong position in South Vietnam in September of 1965. The four specially equipped planes covered a 1,000-foot-wide swath in each pass over the dense vegetation.

A Vietnamese battalion commander, Captain Thach Quyen, left, interrogates a captured Viet Cong suspect on Tan Dinh Island, Mekong Delta, in 1965.

A strategic air command B-52 bomber with externally mounted, 750-pound bombs heads toward its target about 56 miles northwest of Saigon near Tay Ninh on November 2, 1965.

General William Westmoreland talks with troops of first battalion, 16th regiment of 2nd brigade of U.S. First Division at their positions near Bien Hoa in Vietnam, in 1965.

Flares from planes light a field covered with the dead and wounded of the ambushed battalion of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division in the Ia Drang Valley, Vietnam, on November 18, 1965, during a fierce battle that had been raging for days. Units of the division were battling to hold their lines against what was estimated to be a regiment of North Vietnamese soldiers. Bodies of the slain soldiers were carried to this clearing with their gear to await evacuation by helicopter.

A Viet Cong fighter in Vietnam in an undated photo.

A U.S. Marine newly arrived in South Vietnam on April 29, 1965, drips with perspiration while on patrol in search of Viet Cong guerrillas near Da Nang air base. American troops found 100-degree temperatures a tough part of the job. General Wallace M. Greene Jr., a Marine Corps commandant, after a visit to the area, authorized light short-sleeved uniforms as aid to troops’ comfort.

In Berkeley-Oakland City, California, demonstrators march against the war in Vietnam in December of 1965.
A Vietnamese litter bearer wears a face mask to keep out the smell as he passes the bodies of U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers killed in fighting against the Viet Cong at the Michelin rubber plantation, about 45 miles northeast of Saigon, on November 27, 1965.
Pedestrians cross the destroyed Hue Bridge in Hue, Vietnam, in an undated photo.
Wounded and shocked civilian survivors of Dong Xoai crawl out of a fort bunker on June 6, 1965, where they survived murderous ground fighting and air bombardments of the previous two days.
A U.S. Air Force Douglas A-1E Skyraider drops a white phosphorus bomb on a Viet Cong position in South Vietnam in 1966.
A Vietnamese girl, 23 years old, was captured by an Australian patrol 30 feet below ground at the end of a maze of tunnels some 10 miles west of the headquarters of the Australian task force (40 miles southeast of Saigon). The woman was crouched over a World War II radio set. About seven male Viet Cong took off when the Australians appeared—but the woman remained and appeared to be trying to conceal the radio set. She was taken back to the Australian headquarters where she told under sharp interrogation (which included a “water probe”; see her wet clothes after the interrogation) that she worked as a Viet Cong nurse in the village of Hoa Long and had been in the tunnel for 10 days. The Australians did not believe her because she seemed to lack any medical knowledge. They thought that she may have possibly been the leader of the political cell in Long Hoa. She was being led away after interrogation, clothes soaked from the “water probe” on October 29, 1966.
Left: Pilot Leslie R. Leavoy in flight with other jets in the background above Vietnam in 1966. Right: Army nurse 2nd Lieutenant Roberta “Bertie” Steele in South Vietnam, on February 9, 1966.
Women and children crouch in a muddy canal as they take cover from intense Viet Cong fire at Bao Trai, about 20 miles west of Saigon, on January 1, 1966. Paratroopers, background, of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade escorted the South Vietnamese civilians through a series of firefights during the U.S. assault on a Viet Cong stronghold.
A napalm strike erupts in a fireball near U.S. troops on patrol in South Vietnam in 1966.
A Marine, top, wounded slightly when his face was creased by an enemy bullet, pours water into the mouth of a fellow Marine suffering from heat during Operation Hastings along the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam on July 21, 1966.
Left: A Vietnamese child clings to his bound father who was rounded up as a suspected Viet Cong guerrilla during “Operation Eagle Claw” in the Bong Son area, 280 miles northeast of Saigon on February 17, 1966. The father was taken to an interrogation camp with other suspects rounded up by the U.S. 1st air cavalry division. Right: The body of an American paratrooper killed in action in the jungle near the Cambodian border is raised up to an evacuation helicopter in War Zone C, Vietnam, in 1966.

The singing group the “Korean Kittens” appear on stage at Cu Chi, Vietnam, during the Bob Hope USO Christmas show, to entertain U.S. troops of the 25th Infantry Division.
A grim-faced U.S. Marine fires his M60 machine gun, concealed behind logs and resting in a shallow hole, during the battle against North Vietnamese regulars for Hill 484, just south of the demilitarized zone, on October 10, 1966. After three weeks of bitter fighting, the 3rd battalion of the 4th Marines took the hill the week of October 2.
Lieutenant Commander Donald D. Sheppard, of Coronado, California, aims a flaming arrow at a bamboo hut concealing a fortified Viet Cong bunker on the banks of the Bassac River, Vietnam, on December 8, 1967.
A U.S. Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter comes down in flames after being hit by enemy ground fire during Operation Hastings, just south of the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam, on July 15, 1966. The helicopter crashed and exploded on a hill, killing one crewman and 12 Marines. Three crewmen escaped with serious burns.
A man brews tea while a U.S. Marine examines a pinup in Vietnam in September of 1967.
A trooper of the U.S. 1st cavalry division aims a flamethrower at the mouth of cave in An Lao Valley in South Vietnam, on April 14, 1967, after the Viet Cong groups hiding in it were warned to emerge.
Sergeant Ronald Payne, 21, of Atlanta, Georgia, emerges from a Viet Cong tunnel holding his silencer-equipped revolver with which he fired at guerrillas fleeing ahead of him underground. Payne and others of the 196th light infantry brigade probed the massive tunnel in Hobo Woods, South Vietnam, on January 21, 1967, and found detailed maps and plans of the enemy. The infantrymen who explored the complex are known as “Tunnel Rats.” They were called out of the tunnels on January 21, and nauseating gas was pumped in.

Military police, reinforced by Army troops, throwback anti-war demonstrators as they tried to storm a mall entrance doorway at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on October 21, 1967.
Rick Holmes of C Company, 2nd battalion, 503rd infantry, 173rd airborne brigade, sits down on January 3, 1966, in Vietnam.
U.S. Navy Douglas A-4E Skyhawk from Attack Squadrons VA-163 Saints and VA-164 Ghost Riders attack the Phuong Dinh railroad bypass bridge, 10 kilometers north of Thanh Hoe, North Vietnam, on September 10, 1967. Note the attacking Sky hawk in the lower right and one directly left of the explosions on the bridge.
U.S. troops of the 7th and 9th divisions wade through marshland during a joint operation on South Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, in April of 1967.
In the protocols International relations are between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam that have never had sold the Republic of Vietnam to communism herein: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962
108. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright)1
Washington, March 14, 1962.
Dear Mr. Chairman: In Governor Harrimanʼs absence, I am forwarding the Departmentʼs replies to the questions which were presented to him as a result of the executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee concerning Viet-Nam.2 The questions were those put by Senator Morse at the meeting and then by letter subsequently.
The enclosed material is provided with the understanding that those portions which are classified are for the sole information of the Committee.
If I may be of further assistance, I will appreciate you letting me know.
Respectfully,
Frederick G. Dutton3
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[Enclosure]
ANSWERS TO SENATOR WAYNE MORSEʼS QUESTIONS OF FEBRUARY 21, 1962 ON VIET-NAM
Q. No. 1. (Unclassified) From what provisions of the Constitution or treaty or statute does President Kennedy derive the right to order United States military personnel to transport South Vietnamese troops into combat, to return the fire of North Vietnamese, to patrol the sea approaches to South Viet-Nam and to drop propaganda leaflets over areas held by the guerrillas opposing the Government of South Viet-Nam?
Answer: (Unclassified) Article II of the Constitution makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and vests in him the executive power. Article II has also been interpreted as making the President the “sole organ of the nation” in the field of foreign affairs (United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 318 ff. (1936)). These constitutional powers give the President authority to deploy United States military personnel abroad.
In addition to the Presidentʼs constitutional powers, the Congress has enacted Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which authorizes the President to furnish military assistance abroad, inter alia, by” … assigning or detailing members of the armed forces of the United States … to perform duties of a noncombatant nature, including those related to training or advice.”4
Furthermore, the United States and Viet-Nam are parties to the agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950 (TIAS 2447; 3 U.S.T. 2756) which was concluded pursuant to P.L. 329, 81st Congress (63 Stat. 714, 22 U.S.C. 1571-1604). This agreement provides for the furnishing by the United States to Viet-Nam, among others, of military assistance in the form of equipment, material and services. Article IV, paragraph 2, of the agreement states that “To facilitate operations under this agreement, each Government agrees … to receive within its territory such personnel of the United States of America as may be required for the purposes of this agreement … .”
Under these provisions the United States has since 1950 provided military assistance to Viet-Nam in the form of training, equipment and logistic support. The activities mentioned in the question are an expansion of this training and logistic support role. The transportation or troops is logistic support. The sea patrols referred to are carefully limited to training operations and the exchange of intelligence with [Page 223]Vietnamese naval units. Our assistance to the Vietnamese in dropping leaflets over isolated parts of Viet-Nam has similarly been confined to training and logistic aspects of the operation.
Given the activities in which they are engaged, and the character of guerrilla warfare, in which hostilities occur sporadically at scattered points throughout the country, we had to face the possibility that United States personnel would come under hostile fire. In these circumstances, it was obvious that they would have to be able to defend themselves, and the President has accordingly authorized them to fire, if fired upon, if necessary for self-defense.
Q. No. 2. (Unclassified) Would you discuss the differences and similarities between the present use of United States forces in Viet-Nam and their use in Korea in 1950 and in Lebanon in 1958?
Answer: (Unclassified) United States military personnel are presently in Viet-Nam pursuant to a request of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam of December 14, 1961 (attached)5 and to an Agreement for Mutual Defense Assistance in Indochina of December 23, 1950. These personnel are engaged in activities of a noncombatant nature, primarily in training, logistic and advisory capacities, designed to assist the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to counter the indirect aggression directed against it from the North.
United States forces were sent into direct combat operations in South Korea to repel the aggressive armed attack launched on June 25, 1950 by North Korea against the Republic of Korea. On the same day the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the situation. The Korean National Assembly, on June 26, appealed both to the United States and the United Nations for assistance. On June 27, 1950 the Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the attack. The Security Council, on July 7, established a United Nations Command under the United States. In these circumstances, the President on the basis of his constitutional authority sent United States forces to Korea.
United States forces were deployed in Lebanon in 1958 pursuant to an urgent request from the Government of Lebanon which felt itself threatened by externally inspired civil strife. These troops were sent to Lebanon under the President’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. President Eisenhower stated that United States forces had been sent to Lebanon “to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity.”
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It will be recalled that pursuant to President Eisenhower’s request the Congress had on March 9, 1957, passed a joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East which provided in part, “if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism:” (P.L. 85-7, 85th Congress). In sending United States troops to Lebanon, the President did not make use of this joint resolution since the Lebanon situation did not involve Communist armed aggression as contemplated by the resolution.
In the Lebanon situation, United States forces neither engaged in combat operations as in the Korean conflict nor in training or advisory functions as is the case today in Viet-Nam. Their mere presence in Lebanon had the desired effect of helping to restore order and tranquility there.
Q. No. 3. (Unclassified) Would it be appropriate under the Constitution for the President to submit to the Congress a resolution covering the situation in Viet-Nam which would be comparable to the Formosa Resolution of 19556 and the Middle East Resolution of 1957?
Answer: (Unclassified)
As indicated in question 1 above the President has power under the Constitution to take the actions presently being carried on in Viet-Nam.
It is obviously desirable that the Congress understands the basis for Presidential actions of this character and fully supports them. Traditionally these objectives have been achieved by consultation between officers of the Executive Branch and members and Committees of Congress having responsibility in the premises, particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the present case the President has asked that the fullest and freest consultation with the Committee and the Congressional leadership be maintained. He has himself met with appropriate members of the Congress on several occasions to discuss the problems in Viet-Nam. The Secretary has frequently testified before this Committee on the same subject, and has discussed it informally on many occasions with the members of the Committee. The Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs with appropriate members of his staff is and has been available for the purpose of consultation.
On two occasions in the past, where it seemed possible that the President would wish to commit United States forces to combat operations, President Eisenhower decided to invite Congress to associate itself with his exercise of his constitutional functions as Commander-in-Chief, primarily in order to provide a convincing demonstration of United States unity on the issues there involved. We have not thought [Page 225]that such action has been called for to this point. However, should circumstances develop in which a formal expression of Congressional support seems desirable, the President undoubtedly would not hesitate to seek an appropriate resolution.
Q. No. 4. (Unclassified) To what extent are the actions by United States military personnel in South Viet-Nam considered to be combat actions?
Answer: (Unclassified) As the President said in his Press Conference on February 14, “We have not sent combat troops in the generally understood sense of the word.”7 The United States is assisting Vietnamese combat units with training, logistic, transportation and advisory personnel.
The nature of the activities in which United States military personnel are engaged in Viet-Nam is dictated by the very character of guerrilla war. Hostilities are not concentrated in any well-defined area; rather, fighting is likely to break out sporadically and without warning in any part of the country. The “front” is not fixed as in the classical situation; the front literally is everywhere. In these circumstances, as indicated in Question 1 above, the President has ordered our military personnel in Viet-Nam to fire back in self-defense if fired upon.
As noted above, United States military personnel in Viet-Nam are noncombatants. In the seven years since 1955 violence in Viet-Nam has claimed about 26,000 casualties. Of these, fifteen have been American personnel (four killed, ten wounded, one missing). Despite our increased activities in Viet-Nam, we would hope that these casualties can continue to be kept at a minimum.
Q. No. 5. (Unclassified) Is the action of the United States in Viet-Nam inconsistent with the agreement of July 1954 on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, having particular reference to Chapter III entitled “Ban on Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Arms and Munitions, Military Bases”? (End Unclassified)
Answer: (Confidential) The United States did not sign the 1954 Geneva Accords and is not a party thereto. At the time of conclusion of the Accords, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith stated that the United States “would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the … agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.” We have maintained the view expressed in General Smithʼs statement, and our present actions in Viet-Nam are fully in accord with that policy.
However, North Viet-Nam which is a party to the Accords has consistently violated the agreements by directing, assisting, supplying, and reinforcing guerrilla forces in South Viet-Nam and by illegal introduction into North Viet-Nam of military personnel and war materials.
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International law recognizes the principle that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the other party is prepared to observe its obligations. Both the United States and Viet-Nam have made it clear that if North Viet-Nam would comply with the provisions of the Geneva Accords, increased United States assistance would no longer be necessary. Legally, the actions of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in requesting and receiving additional assistance from the United States are fully consistent with the above principle.
Justification for the application of the principle of law outlined above gains force in the present context from the fact that actions being taken by the Government of Viet-Nam can be related to the requirements of legitimate self-defense necessitated by the breaches of the other party. (End Confidential)
Q. No. 6. (Unclassified) Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to assist a friendly country by providing defense articles and by assigning military personnel “to perform duties of a noncombatant nature”. To what extent are the operations of United States Forces in Viet-Nam being paid for out of appropriations made pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961? (End Unclassified)
Answer: (Begin Confidential) As of March 1, 1962, fiscal year 1962 operations in Viet-Nam have been funded to the extent of $151.3 million from appropriations made pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and $49.6 million from Department of Defense appropriations. These figures are subject to adjustment by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in accordance with the following guideline issued by the Secretary of Defense:
“Under MAP financing procedures, reimbursement is made to the Military Service for materiel and/or services delivered or furnished to a recipient country against an approved and funded Military Assistance Program. On the other hand, where a Military Service has been assigned a U.S. military mission in a foreign country by the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all costs involved will be charged to the Military Service Appropriation.”
Salaries of all military personnel are, of course, funded from their Service appropriations and are not included in the above estimates. (End Confidential)
Q. No. 7. (Unclassified) What are the plans of this Administration, if any, to bring the South Viet-Nam issues before the United Nations?
Answer: (Confidential) The Administration has no present plans to bring the Viet-Nam situation before the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly for debate or action. However, Viet-Namʼs case has been officially brought to the attention of the United [Page 227]Nations and its members. The State Department paper on Viet-Nam entitled “A Threat to the Peace” was transmitted to the Secretary General and all members on December 8, 1961. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Namʼs own presentation of the facts has been made known to the members. The Secretary General, at the request of the Australian Delegation, circulated to all United Nations members copies of Vietnamese Notes to the International Control Commission on January 10, 1962. (End Confidential)
Q. No. 8. (Unclassified) What do we consider to be our obligation to SEATO in regard to supplying military aid and economic aid to South Viet-Nam?
Answer: (Confidential) Under Article IV (1) of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty, the United States is committed, in the event of Communist aggression by means of armed attack against the Republic of Viet-Nam, to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. In the case of a threat to Viet-Nam other than armed attack, the parties to the Treaty have agreed under Article IV (2) to consult in order to agree on measures which should be taken for the common defense.
Under Article IV (3) of the Treaty, no action can be taken on the territory of Viet-Nam except at the invitation or with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. There has been no request by Viet-Nam for SEATO action.
There is, of course, nothing in the Treaty which prevents the United States from taking action bilaterally with the Republic of Viet-Nam outside the framework of the Treaty.
Several years before the creation of SEATO, the United States began to supply military assistance (1950-TIAS 2447) and Economic Aid (1951-TIAS 2346). A good working relationship for dealing with the fast-moving complexities of a guerrilla war has been established.
We have consulted regularly in the SEATO Council Representatives with our Treaty partners on the situation in Viet-Nam. We have informed them of our efforts there and have urged them to join in helping Viet-Nam. A majority of the members are doing so. (End Confidential)
Q. No. 9. (Unclassified) What is the Administration’s answer to the cumulating evidence that the Government of Viet-Nam is not an effective government, that it is a corrupt government, and that it is a government that will probably fall at some time in the absence of U.S. support? (End Unclassified)
Answer: (Begin Secret) The effectiveness of the Vietnamese Government can only be judged against its circumstances. It is a new country emerging from fifteen years of war and eighty years of colonial control. During half its six years of existence it has fought off the threat of Communist conquest. Its political policy has been to lay the [Page 228]infrastructure of democracy” through education, transportation and communication. Despite the war the number of children in Vietnamese elementary schools has grown in five years to 1,100,000, an increase of 272%, and a far better record than that of Communist North Viet-Nam. The Government of Viet-Nam has also made a proud record in expanding transportation, communication and health services. Its per capita food production and per capita gross national product are growing and are both higher than in North Viet-Nam. This is a good indication that the Government of free Viet-Nam with U.S. help has made more effective progress than has North Viet-Nam under Communist control. Statistical evidence carefully compiled from the best sources available is enclosed.8
On the other hand Government effectiveness in South Viet-Nam has been hampered by over-centralization, overlapping agencies and insufficient understanding between the governing and the governed. While this is partly due to the lack of competent administrators, it is also true that a greater number of competent administrators could have been developed if they had been given more responsibility and authority.
Another fact which has hampered the effectiveness of the Government of Viet-Nam is that President Diem does not possess the magnetic qualities needed to rally his people enthusiastically to his Government’s programs.
There is evidence of corruption in the Government of Viet-Nam. There is no evidence of corruption on the part of President Diem and he has carried on an extensive and well-publicized campaign to punish corrupt officials. Several have been publicly tried and punished.
Some official corruption is endemic in Southeast Asian countries. The amount of corruption in Viet-Nam does not appear to be greater than in neighboring countries. However, it has damaged the prestige of the Government of Viet-Nam because exaggerated stories of official corruption are widely believed. We have checked these stories carefully and find no evidence for many of them. However, the Government of Viet-Nam has not done an effective job setting the record straight with its own people.
Two attempts have been made against President Diem. Both were military in origin and seem to have been motivated by the feeling that the government was not giving them the authority to press on vigorously with the anti-Communist struggle. The attempts failed. President Diem is clearly in control as the legitimate and elected head of the government. No other group has any appreciable degree of popular support. In the circumstances of war and tension existing in Viet-Nam, [Page 229]some discontent must be expected. Also the trouble lies partly with Diemʼs inability to project adequately his own many good qualities of leadership to his people. (End Secret)
Q. No. 10. (Unclassified) What actions has President Diem taken in regard to the 9 points for reform which he and Ambassador Nolting agreed to in December?9
Answer: (Unclassified) Varying progress has been made on all the points on which President Diem and Ambassador Nolting reached agreement in early December. Since their understanding intimately affects the interests of both governments and the prosecution of Viet-Namʼs defense effort, it cannot be spelled out in detail.
However, the following has clearly emerged in the intervening three months:
1.
There is a much closer and more effective working relationship between the United States Government and the Government of Viet-Nam.
2.
American military advisers have been accepted and listened to in a variety of roles.
3.
The Vietnamese National Internal Security Council (War Cabinet) has met more frequently and is playing a somewhat greater role.
4.
There has been increased freedom of debate in the National Assembly.
5.
The military command structure has been strengthened, but considerable improvement is still needed.
6.
U.S. and Vietnamese officials have embarked on joint studies of local conditions.
7.
Civic action and plans for village and hamlet defense are being made. Further coordination and better implementation are needed.
8.
Provincial Councils are being created. It is too soon to judge their usefulness.
9.
There have been increases in military salaries and benefits.
10.
A wide range of sound measures have put the economy on a sounder basis.
11.
A National Economic Council has been formed and has commenced examination of government development plans. Its activities will be slow and cautious.
12.
The effectiveness of military intelligence has been greatly increased.
13.
Flood relief and rehabilitation have been carried out with good effect.
14.
The President has increased his travels to the provinces.
15.
Public information has definitely improved.
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Q. No. 11. (Unclassified) Do the Attorney Generalʼs remarks10 at the Saigon Airport represent the policy of the Administration? Were they cleared by the President or the Department of State in advance?
Answer: (Unclassified) The Attorney General received intensive briefings on the situation in Viet-Nam before his departure for the Far East. He made a stop in Viet-Nam at the Saigon Airport only for purposes of refueling his aircraft. His remarks there were informal and consisted largely of answers to questions from the press. In these circumstances there was no formal clearance of his statements. However, his remarks reflect the policy of the Administration toward Viet-Nam.
Q. No. 12. (Unclassified) To what extent are our allies and other non-Communist states contributing to and supporting the combined U.S.-Vietnamese effort to preserve the independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam?
Answer: (Unclassified) Since it became independent Japan, France, Germany and Australia have made available to Viet-Nam various forms of aid whose total value is about $100 million. In addition there have been other programs involving students, teachers, technicians, commodities and equipment from these countries as well as from Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, China, Malaya, India, FAO, WHO, ILO, ICAO, UNESCO and UNTAO.
The United States is, moreover, presently trying to stimulate expanded Free World aid to Viet-Nam as evidence of financial and political solidarity with Viet-Nam in its struggle.
Q. No. 13. (Unclassified) What precisely is the present attitude of the Indian Government toward the conflict in Viet-Nam? Heretofore, India has appeared to observe a strict and uncritically neutral role in its function as Chairman of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam. I would like to know whether this continues to be the case.
Answer: (Unclassified) India, as Chairman of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam, has, according to its lights, sought to play an impartial role dealing with the problems of Viet-Nam as they relate to the Geneva Accords of 1954. (End Unclassified)
Q. No. 14. (Unclassified) What is our intelligence estimate of the possibility that the Communist bloc will escalate the conflict in Viet-Nam above the level of subversion and guerrilla warfare? (End Unclassified)
Answer: (Secret) The Communist objective remains that of eliminating United States influence and presence from Viet-Nam and of replacing it by Communism. They have so far maintained coordination [Page 231]within the Communist bloc in their attempts to attain this objective. While the tempo of Viet Cong activity is likely to increase in Viet-Nam, there seems little prospect at present that the pattern of this activity will change quickly and drastically.
In looking further it must be remembered that Hanoi and Peking are more militantly revolutionary than Russia and consider their interests to be more directly involved in Viet-Nam than Russiaʼs.
If Viet-Namʼs efforts to defend itself are more successful, Hanoi, with military forces of 300,000 available, will be strongly tempted to increase the strength of its attacks. To Hanoi the struggle is at least as much a struggle for national reunification as an ideological struggle. It has largely committed its prestige to this struggle.
However, the following factors are likely to deter an overt escalation by North Viet-Nam in a situation where South Viet-Nam is defending itself with increasing success:
1.
Hanoi would not welcome the presence of a large number of Chinese Communist troops in North Viet-Nam. China is the traditional enemy. North Viet-Nam does not want to become another Chinese sphere of influence.
2.
North Viet-Nam fears Free World retaliation.
3.
Hanoi desires to retain some latitude of action by playing off Moscow and Peking.
4.
Moscow might increase its military aid to Hanoi, but would probably prefer to see a conference on Viet-Nam rather than a full scale war m Viet-Nam, an area which Russia probably does not consider vital to its interests.
5.
There appears to be some Communist belief, particularly in Moscow, that even if South Viet-Nam is able to resist temporarily, it will, in the long run, fall to Communism.
If Viet Cong success increases, the present guerrilla struggle will be likely to move up the scale, in the pattern of Communist wars of “national liberation”, towards open war involving increasingly large troop formations. A “liberated” area and “liberation government” would probably be established. However, the formation of a “liberation government” would not be an automatic signal for Communist military escalation.
It appears more likely that the present pattern, a long, wearing struggle, will continue. The South Vietnamese effort, with U.S. support is designed to meet this challenge. Time is not necessarily on the side of the guerrilla, as shown in Greece, the Philippines and Malaya. The Viet Cong probably must escalate their guerrilla war to open war in order to conquer the country. If they should decide to escalate to larger, open formations, it will be a particularly dangerous time for them. On the other hand continuation of present guerrilla destruction risks angering the peasant without winning the war. Since Communist propaganda carries limited conviction in Viet-Nam, where so many [Page 232]have already lived under their domination, the Viet Cong guerrillas must operate through fear and coercion as well as through propaganda and persuasion to obtain men and food. The South Vietnamese counter-guerrilla strategy seeks to save the peasant, conserve his property and deprive the Viet Cong of their needs so that they will have to take increasingly cruel measures to obtain food, arms and men. (End Secret)
Q. No. 15. (Unclassified) I find myself unclear as to the Soviet Unionʼs attitude toward and role in the Viet-Nam conflict. I would like an assessment of that question. More specifically, I would like to know whether Russian and Czech arms are being made available to the Viet Cong-if so, whether the levels of such assistance are appreciable or token.
Answer: (Begin Secret) As indicated above the Soviet Union for the present probably desires to avoid an enlargement of the struggle in Viet-Nam to the point which would increase the likelihood of a major war. If, however, South Viet-Namʼs defensive efforts become more successful, the USSR might feel constrained to redress the balance by increased aid to North Viet-Nam in order to reduce the likelihood of a large scale Chinese Communist intervention. Moscow cannot appear to oppose Communist expansion in underdeveloped areas.
While the Soviet attitude towards Viet-Nam will be largely influenced by developments in Laos, as well as by its own relations with Communist China and by developments on disarmament and in Berlin, it seems probable that at present Moscow does not want any major escalation in Viet-Nam. This attitude will not prevent the continuation of Russian and Communist bloc military aid to North Viet-Nam.
Communist bloc military aid to North Viet-Nam has been large and effective. However, the Viet Cong have sought to avoid the use of Communist manufactured arms in South Viet-Nam. (End Secret)
Q. No. 16. (Unclassified) If President Diem should depart the political scene—either as a result of a military coup such as was attempted in November 1960, or otherwise—are there elements, military or civilian, which could cope effectively with the situation, in our judgment?
Answer: (Unclassified) We believe there are. We are following this most sensitive subject very closely. (End Unclassified)
1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51K/2-2162. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but a copy of a similar letter that was not sent is attached, listing Wood as the drafter with clearances by Aldrich and Vance (DOD) as well as Oakley, Chayes, Rice, Cottrell, and Sarris in the Department of State. The source text lists as attachments: (1) Questions and Answers on Vietnam; (2) Letter to [from] Senator Morse, (3) Letter from President Kennedy to President Diem; and (4) “The Economics of North and South Vietnam.” Only the first two are attached and only the first is printed. The letter from Senator Morse, February 21, submitted additional questions to Harriman, which are included in the attached Questions and Answers.↩
2. The transcript of the Executive Session at which Harriman testified on February 20, is in National Archives, RG 46, SFRC Files.↩
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩
4. P.L. 87-195, September 4, 1961; 75 Stat. 424. These and subsequent ellipses are in the source text.↩
5. Not attached to the source text, but presumably a reference to Kennedy’s letter of December 14; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 322.↩
6. See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, p. 2486.↩
7. See footnote 3, Document 68.↩
8. Not attached to the source text.↩
9. The Joint Memorandum of Understanding, December 4, 1961, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 756 from Saigon, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-461)↩
10. During his tour of Asia, Attorney General Robert Kennedy stopped in Saigon for about an hour while his
11. plane was refueled. In response to a question from a newsman, he made a statement to the effect that the United States was in South Vietnam to win.↩
257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, November 15, 1961, 9:02 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cottrell and Heavner on November 14 and cleared with McConaughy, U. Alexis Johnson, Rusk, and the President.
________________________________________
258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 16, 1961, 2 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1661. Secret. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, Bangkok, Paris, London, CINCPAC for PolAd, Manila, Tokyo, and Hue.
________________________________________
259. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 16, 1961.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, Presidential Status Reports. Top Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which is attached to a brief covering memorandum from Hilsman to McGeorge Bundy, dated November 16, which reads:
“Alex has passed the attached to Max Taylor and Walt Rostow. The main study and a summary of lessons and findings should be ready by Monday [November 20].”
________________________________________
260. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)
Washington, November 16, 1961.
Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, R. Johnson Chron. Secret.
________________________________________
261. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 16, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1661. Top Secret. Drafted by Chayes and sent to the Secretary through S/S and Johnson (U). Initialed by both Chayes and Johnson. Attached to the source text is the following note of November 16 from Chayes to the Secretary: “This preparation of this memorandum and its attachments was undertaken before yesterday’s NSC decisions. I believe that the analysis and observations given below will continue to be relevant, both in the carrying out of those decisions and in deliberations on further steps in the future.”
________________________________________
262. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev
Washington, November 16, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, JFK-Khrushchev 1961-62. Top Secret.
________________________________________
263. Editorial Note
________________________________________
264. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)
Washington, November 17, 1961.
Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Sept.-Dec. 1961. Secret.
________________________________________
265. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Far East (Neilson), to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)
Washington, November 17, 1961.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306,USIA/TOP Files: FRC 67 A 222, IAF Defoliation 1963. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to Wilson, Sorenson (IOP), and Slaton (IAF). The source text is Sorenson’s copy and bears his typewritten name in the margin and the handwritten notation, “TCS. Must reading. BY.” “BY” has not been identified.
________________________________________
266. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 18, 1961, 2 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1861. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
267. Editorial Note
________________________________________
268. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 21, 1961,2 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00.11-2161. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Vientiane, London, Paris, Geneva for FECON, and Phnom Penh.
________________________________________
269. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President
Washington, November 21, 1961.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, Memos and Reports. Secret. Initialed by Rostow.
________________________________________
270. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 22, 1961, noon.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 350 GVN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
271. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
Washington, November 22, 1961.
Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-185-69. Top Secret. Attached to a brief covering memorandum of November 28 from Lemnitzer’s staff assistant, Richard R. Day, to Taylor, indicating that Lemnitzer had asked that the memorandum be sent to Taylor for his information. For William Bundy’s comments, in a memorandum to McNamara, November 25, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, p. 449.
________________________________________
272. National Security Action Memorandum No. 111
Washington, November 22, 1961.
Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. A note on the source text indicates that information copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and General Taylor. Printed also in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 11, pp. 419-421, and in Declassified Documents, 1979, p. 107A.
________________________________________
273. Memorandum From the Counselor of Embassy in Viet-Nam (Mendenhall) to the Public Affairs Officer in Viet-Nam (Anspacher)
Saigon, November 22, 1961.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 335, GVN-Government of Viet-Nam 1961. Secret. Initialed by Mendenhall; also addressed to McGarr, Gardiner, and Colby.
________________________________________
274. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President
Washington, November 24, 1961.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Top Secret. The source text is neither signed nor initialed by Rostow and bears no indication that the President saw the memorandum. Under cover of a brief letter of November 25, Rostow sent to Galbraith a copy of his memorandum to the President and of a memorandum from McGhee to McGeorge Bundy on “Counter-Guerrilla Campaigns in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Department of Defense) In the letter to Galbraith, Rostow wrote: “Whatever we achieve or fail to achieve with respect to Vietnamese administration and politics, we should not kid ourselves that we are up against a serious and major offensive mounted from Hanoi; and it will take hard and purposeful labor on many fronts, both inside and outside South VietNam, to save that area without a war.” (Ibid., Meetings and Memos Series, Staff Memos-Rostow-Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare)
________________________________________
275. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President
Washington, November 24, 1961.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, Reports &Memos. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the “original” was given to Rostow and the “enclosure” to McGeorge Bundy. A draft of the memorandum, prepared by U. Alexis Johnson, was submitted to the Secretary of State for his signature under cover of a memorandum of November 22, in which Johnson wrote:
________________________________________
276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, November 24, 1961, 8:22 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2461. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared with McConaughy, and initialed by Johnson for the Secretary. Repeated information to CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
277. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 25, 1961—noon.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.56311/11-2561. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
278. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 25, 1961, 6 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/11-2561. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Geneva for FECON, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
279. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the British Ambassador (Ormsby Gore)
Washington, November 25, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Correspondence with UK Officials-Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy and C. Chapman of the Viet-Nam Task Force.
________________________________________
280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, November 25, 1961, 7:10 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wood; cleared with Cottrell, McConaughy, U. Alexis Johnson, and the Office of the Secretary; initialed by Pezzullo of the Executive Secretariat for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
281. Editorial Note
________________________________________
282. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
New Delhi, November 26, 1961, 5 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2661. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Saigon and to Geneva for Harriman.
________________________________________
283. Memorandum From the Under Secretary-Designate for Political Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 27, 1961.
Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, HO Chron. Secret.
________________________________________
284. Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President
Washington, November 27, 1961.
Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-185-69. Secret. An attached note indicates that copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, U. Alexis Johnson, Lemnitzer, Bundy (apparently McGeorge), and Rostow.
________________________________________
285. Notes of a Meeting, The White House
Washington, November 27, 1961, 5:30 p.m.
Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, L-217-71. Top Secret. Handwritten by Lemnitzer. According to the source text, the following people were present: Rusk, Johnson, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Taylor, William Bundy, Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Hamilton, and Lansdale. Neither Lemnitzer’s nor Taylor’s Appointment Books at the National Defense University lists the participants at the meeting. Rusk’s Appointment Book lists as participants the President, Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Taylor, Johnson, Bell, Rostow, Hamilton, and Bundy (without specifying William or McGeorge). (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books) The President’s log indicates that the meeting was off the record and was attended by the President, Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, McNamara, William Bundy, Lemnitzer, Lansdale, Hamilton, Dulles, Taylor, Rostow, and McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, JFK Logs) The source text seems to indicate that the President joined the meeting in progress.
________________________________________
286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, November 27, 1961, 8:28 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11 2261. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and Rostow, cleared with S/S and initialed by Johnson for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd and Bangkok.
287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, November 27, 1961, 8:32 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.56311/11-2561. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood; cleared with William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, McConaughy, and Cottrell; and initialed by McConaughy for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.

________________________________________
288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, November 28, 1961, 7:37 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2861. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Tubby; cleared by Tubby with Sylvester (Defense), Wilson (USIA), Salinger (White House), and Heavner; and signed by Tubby for the Secretary.
________________________________________
289. Telegram From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr)
Washington, November 28, 1961.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Viet-Nam 1961-Taylor Recommendations. Top Secret; Priority. Time of transmission is not indicated on the source text. William Bundy’s draft of this telegram, which differs only slightly from the final version as sent, is in Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron.
________________________________________
290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India
Washington, November 28, 1961, 8:41 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11 2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood, Heavner, and Horgan; cleared with Anderson (SEA) and Weil (SOA); and initialed by Weil for the Secretary. Repeated to Saigon, Geneva for FECON, and USUN.
________________________________________
291. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Secretary of State
Washington, November 28, 1961.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, Reports & Memos. Secret. Attached to a brief transmittal memorandum of November 29, from Battle to McGeorge Bundy. A handwritten note on the transmittal memorandum from Bromley Smith to Robert Johnson indicates that Taylor also had a copy of Hilsman’s memorandum.
________________________________________
292. Paper Prepared by Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff
Washington, November 28, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2561. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A copy of this paper was attached to a memorandum of November 30 from Bagley to Taylor, which reads:
________________________________________
293. Letter From the Secretary of Defense’s Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to General Samuel T. Williams
Washington, November 28, 1961.
Source: Hoover Institution Archives, Williams Papers, 1961 Letters. Handwritten by Lansdale.
________________________________________
294. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
Washington, November 28, 1961.
Source: USAMHI, Kraemer Papers, VN 61-63. Confidential; Noforn/Continued Control.
________________________________________
295. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
Washington, November 29, 1961.
Source: USAMHI, Kraemer Papers, VN 61 63. Confidential, Noforn/Continued Control.
________________________________________
296. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 29, 1961, 6 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-2961. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma
Washington, November 29, 1961, 9:12 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1461. Confidential. Repeated to Saigon. Previous drafts of the enclosed letter, one of which bears the handwritten notation “changed by White House 11/27/61,” are ibid., 751K.00/11-2261.
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298. Letter From the Ambassador in Viet-Nam (Nolting) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
Saigon, November 30, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Johnson Files, Official and Classified Letters. Confidential; Official-Informal.
________________________________________
299. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 30, 1961, 8 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-3061. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
300. Editorial Note
________________________________________
301. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
Washington, December 1, 1961.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382, Viet-Nam 1961-2 Dec. Top Secret. Copies sent to Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and Wheeler.
________________________________________
302. Memorandum for the Record by the Public Affairs Officer in the Embassy in Viet-Nam (Anspacher)
Saigon, December 1, 1961.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 335, Press July-December 1961. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum of December 1 to Nolting, in which Anspacher wrote that the recent press campaign was the first one in his experience that had taken on such proportions.
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303. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, December 1, 1961, 8 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-161. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd. Another copy of this telegram, which had been sent to the White House, was marked with the handwritten notation, “P[resident] has seen. Dec. 2.” (Kennedy Library, National Security File, Viet-Nam Country Series) Printed also in Declassified Documents, 1976, p. 211A.
________________________________________
304. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, December 2, 1961, 2 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-261. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Vientiane, Paris, and London.
________________________________________
305. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, December 3, 1961, 9 p.m.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Box 309. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, December 4, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-461. Secret; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared with Harriman, Rusk, and the President; and initialed by Johnson for Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd and Bangkok. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text.
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307. Letter From the Ambassador in Viet-Nam (Nolting) to President Diem
Saigon, December 5, 1961.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files FRC 66 A 878, POL US Foreign Policy. Secret. Drafted by Toussaint.
________________________________________
308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, December 5, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-561. Secret; Niact, For Ambassador Nolting. Drafted by Cottrell, cleared with the President, and initialed by Cottrell for Rusk. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text.
________________________________________
309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, December 5, 1961, 2:07 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K 00/12-561. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cottrell, cleared with Harriman and with McGeorge Bundy (in substance), and signed by Cottrell for the Secretary. Repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd and Bangkok.
________________________________________
310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, December 5, 1961, 4:19 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1261. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman (TF/VN) on November 28; redrafted by U. Alexis Johnson on December 4; cleared with Cottrell, Salans, Cleveland, Anderson, and Cross (all SEA), McConaughy, Cleveland (IO), and the Secretary. Repeated to ten posts.
________________________________________
311. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President
Washington, December 6, 1961.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Secret.
________________________________________
312. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Secretary of State
Washington, December 7, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5811/12-761. Top Secret.
________________________________________
313. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
New Delhi, December 7, 1961, 6 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-761. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Saigon. Received in the Department at 3:32 a.m.

314. Telegram From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President, at Palm Beach
Washington, December 7, 1961, 4:50 p.m.
Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-29-71. Top Secret; Priority. The President was staying at his father’s residence after addressing the delegates to the National Convention of the AFL-CIO in Miami earlier in the day.

315. Editorial Note
________________________________________
316. Memorandum of a Conversation
Quai d’Orsay, Paris, December 11, 1961, 10:30 a.m.
Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret. Drafted by Brown. There is no indication on the source text that it was approved by the Secretary. Rusk was in Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial meetings.
317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, at Paris
Washington, December 12, 1961, 6:57 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1261. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared with Cottrell, Wallace C. Magathan, and Harriman, and initialed by Johnson for Acting Secretary Ball.
________________________________________
318. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, December 13, 1961, 7 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K 00/12-1361. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Repeated to Paris eyes only for the Secretary.
________________________________________
319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
Washington, December 13, 1961, 7:52 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1361. Confidential. Drafted by Robert S. Lindquist (FE); cleared with Wood, Harriman, and SPA; and initialed by Harriman for the Acting Secretary. Repeated to Canberra, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Paris for the Secretary of State, and Geneva.
________________________________________
320. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 13, 1961.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/12-761. Secret. Drafted by Cottrell and Johnson.
________________________________________
321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, December 14, 1961, 8:02 p.m.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12-1461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Heinz and Wood, cleared with Cottrell, DOD/ISA, and USIA, and initialed by Harriman for the Acting Secretary. Also sent to CINCPAC for PolAd.
________________________________________
322. Editorial Note
________________________________________
323. Letter From the Charge in Viet-Nam (Trueheart) to the Director of the Viet-Nam Task Force (Cottrell)
Saigon, December 15, 1961.
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, 320 GVN-U.S. Secret; Official-Informal.
Congress; all proclamations by the President in the numbered series issued since the date of the adjournment of the regular session of Congress next preceding; and also any amendments to the Constitution of the United States proposed or ratified pursuant to article V thereof since that date, together with the certificate of the Archivist of the United States issued in compliance with the provision contained in section 106b of this title.
Again, to prove the archivist of the United States that's relative to the Vietnam War that should be the laws:
American concerns in Laos centered on use of its territory by the North Vietnamese to funnel men and supplies into South Vietnam
Although he initially increased American forces in Vietnam, as presaged by this letter, by the end of his life Kennedy had determined “to bring Americans out of there.”
The goal of U.S. policy when Kennedy was elected was combating the spread of Communism in Asia and Africa. And the first foreign policy crisis faced by President-elect John F. Kennedy was not in any of the better-known hot spots of the Cold War, but in landlocked, poverty stricken Laos. This was the major issue Kennedy and his foreign policy team—Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy—focused on during the days leading up to Kennedy’s inauguration on January 20, 1961. Kennedy met with President Eisenhower the day before his inauguration and his substantive focus was on Laos. “I was anxious,” he recounted, “to get some commitment from the outgoing administration as to how they would deal with Laos which they were handing to us.”
The Eisenhower administration was leaving Kennedy a confused, complex, and intractable situation. Laos was a poverty-stricken and weak state, but was the “cork in the bottle,” as Eisenhower summarized in his meeting with Kennedy; the outgoing President expected its loss to be “the beginning of the loss of most of the Far East.” This was the domino theory, and initially Kennedy accepted it as a fact. The Eisenhower administration had worked for years to create a strong anti-Communist bastion in Laos, as a bulwark against Communist China and North Vietnam. But by 1961 Laos was fragmented politically, with three factions vying for control. The American supported faction was unable to prevail, the Communist-backed insurgents controlled a key portion of the land, and as the Eisenhower administration reached its final days, the United States was faced with the prospect of unilateral military intervention in a desperate attempt to salvage the situation. Beyond the vast logistics issues associated with intervention, the insertion of U.S. forces raised the substantial risk of a U.S.-Soviet military confrontation.
Kennedy faced a choice between two strategies: pursue a military solution, with a 60,000 man commitment of American ground troops in southern Laos considered; or adapt a major shift in policy, seeking a cease-fire and a neutralization of Laos. He rejected the military option, and opened his press conference on March 23, 1961, with an extended discussion of Laos, calling for an end to hostilities and negotiations leading to a neutralized and independent Laos. But the North Vietnamese Army contingent in Laos conducted an offensive in southern Laos, capturing the terrain necessary to extend the Ho Chi Minh Trail that funneled North Vietnamese supplies and troops into South Vietnam through Laos. So Laos became a major topic at the Vienna Summit on June 4, 1961, with Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreeing on a common goal of a ceasefire, neutrality, and a coalition government. Kennedy considered Laos a test case for the prospects of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, in areas where the superpowers could reach common objectives and avoid confrontation. Negotiations took place for some time.
Norman Cousins was the Editor-in-Chief of the Saturday Review, a widely read and well respected weekly magazine of the arts and sciences. He also became a leading advocate for world peace and nuclear disarmament, and was co-chairman of the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Cousins began his efforts to end nuclear weapons explosions in the 1950s. In 1957 Cousins established a major nuclear disarmament organization: the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. SANE became the key player in the anti-nuclear testing firmament. President Eisenhower’s correspondence with Cousins led to suspension of U.S. nuclear testing. Later Cousins served as intermediary between Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and was instrumental in engineering the Test Ban Treaty in 1963.
Typed letter signed, on White House letterhead, Washington, February 1, 1962, to Cousins, showing that Kennedy was acutely aware of the dangers to the U.S. in getting sucked into a land war in Asia, and intended to avoid that. “I appreciate your sending me the latest copy of SATURDAY REVIEW. The article on Congo was excellent. Although things have gone better recently the matter continues to be of great concern because of the widespread misery. Laos is still full of danger. There is no place where the policy of recent years has been more short sighted. To extricate ourselves without war or surrender is a most difficult operation, but we shall persist.”
Laotian groups reached an agreement on the composition of a coalition government on June 12, 1962, and a Geneva conference agreed upon a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos on July 23. But these agreements broke down quickly. As this was going on, North Vietnam extended its territorial control in southern Laos to further secure its logistics lines to the battle areas in South Vietnam. The issue of Laos would soon pale next to that of its neighbor, Vietnam.
700 American advisors were present in Vietnam in the Eisenhower era. Kennedy sent 500 more in mid-1961, and by the end of 1962 that number increased to 12,000. At one time JFK stated that “to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So, we are going to stay there.” But Kennedys feelings on South Vietnam evolved quickly. In September 1963 he called for victory. But in October he ordered the withdrawal of 1,000 American advisors, and at a press conference on November 12 he publicly restated his Vietnam goals. They were no longer victory, but “to intensify the struggle” and “to bring Americans out of there.” Ten days later he was dead, and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson did not share his goal of bringing Americans “out of there.” From 1964-1973, 2,709,918 Americans were sent to Vietnam; some 58,000 were killed and 300,000 wounded.
Despite the importance of Laos and Vietnam, Kennedy letters relating to either are virtually impossible to find. We cannot recall seeing any others, and a search of public sale records going back 40 years fails to disclose any on either subject.
As for Kennedy’s other reference in this letter, the Republic of the Congo gained its independence in 1960, but soon after became the stage of a proxy conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. It had been hoped that the Congo would develop a pro-Western government, but a series of civil wars soon set up a dangerous dynamic that included involvement from the United Nations, Belgium, and the Soviet Union. That crisis would continue until 1965.

June 26th, 1961
President John F. Kennedy Names the General to Formulate and Spearhead Policies in His Great Cold War Challenges: Cuba, Vietnam, and Berlin
He appoints Gen. Maxwell Taylor Military Representative of the President, a counterweight to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
“You will wish to confer with the officials responsible for the planning for critical areas such as Southeast Asia and Berlin.”
Just weeks after his inauguration, Kennedy was asked to approve an operation planned under the Eisenhower administration, which had trained and equipped a guerrilla army of Cuban exiles to invade Cuba and overthrow the Communist-leaning Fidel Castro. JFK had some doubts about the wisdom of the plan, as the last thing he wanted, he said, was “direct, overt” intervention by the American military in Cuba. The Soviets would likely see this as an act of war and might retaliate. The operation was a disaster, JFK was blamed, and he felt misled by the military.
From the start of his presidency, Kennedy feared that the Pentagon brass would overreact to Soviet provocations and drive the country into a disastrous nuclear conflict. There was reason for his concern, as many generals and admirals thought the Korean War was not won because President Truman refused to allow Douglas MacArthur to use nuclear weapons. So in 1961, JFK faced a Joint Chiefs of Staff that believed the United States could fight a nuclear conflict and win. The Air Force, led by its chief of staff, Gen. Curtis LeMay, consumed the lion’s share of the Department of Defense’s budget at the time. It was the foremost proponent of this concept of a massive nuclear response to provocation and a winnable nuclear war – called the “doctrine of massive retaliation”, and the Eisenhower Administration had gone along with this policy.
Kennedy on the other hand thought that a nuclear war would bring mutually assured destruction, not victory. In 1959, U.S. Army chief of staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor had retired to protest the Army’s diminished role in the military. Soon after he published the book, “An Uncertain Trumpet”, which blasted the doctrine of massive retaliation and argued for a concept he called “flexible response”. This involved a strategy of calibrated force that aimed at mutual deterrence at strategic, tactical, and conventional levels, giving the United States the capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of warfare, not limited only to nuclear weapons. The new President was attracted by this and became an admirer of Taylor. The Pentagon brass resisted Taylor’s ideas, did not accept “flexible response”, and regarded Kennedy as too reluctant to put the nation’s nuclear advantage to use, and thus resisted ceding him exclusive control over decisions about a first nuclear strike.
In April 1961 JFK created the Cuba Study Group to perform an ‘autopsy’ on the disastrous events surrounding the Bay of Pigs. He named Taylor to head the group, which met for six weeks from April to May 1961. The Taylor report exposed the military and political flaws that had doomed the invasion even before it began. It also found that the opposition to Castro was so dispirited that it could not be relied on in another action. Taylor’s superb handling of the report made him an instant hit with the Kennedy brothers. He was soon to be rewarded with a formal advisory post.
After World War II the city of Berlin was divided into four segments, and these were occupied by the Soviet Union, the U.S., Britain and France. This despite the fact that Berlin was deep within East Germany. Once the Iron Curtain went up people trying to flee Communist rule in Eastern Europe – and particularly in East Germany – could not immigrate out. Their one escape route was to go to East Berlin in the Soviet sector and from there cross over into free West Berlin. In time the Soviets and East Germans got fed up with this arrangement. In November 1958, Soviet Premier Khrushchev threatened to turn over control of all lines of communication with West Berlin to East Germany, meaning the western powers would have access to West Berlin only when East Germany permitted it and under its conditions. In May 1960 a summit was called to resolve the Berlin question, but it was cancelled in the fallout from Francis Gary Powers U-2 spy flight, so the question remained alive and festering for the new President in 1961.
The NSC 5412 Group was a secret subcommittee of the U.S. National Security Council initiated during the Eisenhower administration and was responsible for coordinating covert operations between representatives of the CIA, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and President, to ensure that those operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies. But after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, when Kennedy lost faith in most of his military advisers, he asked Taylor to review U.S. paramilitary capabilities. Taylor submitted a report in June 1961 that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. JFK changed the composition of the group to include his brother Robert, and named Taylor chairman of the group.
A week after Kennedy became President, he was handed a report on the situation in South Vietnam. He was heard to mutter, “This is going to be the worst one yet.” By the spring, Kennedy was under increasing pressure to make ever greater commitments to shore up the government of South Vietnam. Introduce American combat troops, he was told, again and again, by the Joint Chiefs, the State Department, the C.I.A., and the government of South Vietnam led by Ngo Dinh Diem. If not, they all predicted, Vietnam could succumb to the Communist guerrillas. Everyone, it seemed, was for making a small war a big one – except Kennedy. He resisted, looking for less dangerous ways to intervene. He assigned Maxwell Taylor to look into the situation in Vietnam.
Typed letter signed, on White House letterhead, Washington, June 26, 1961, marked “Secret”, to Taylor, creating the new White House post called Military Representative of the President, and naming him to it. Taylor would essentially be JFK’s personal chief advisor on military affairs. “In confirmation of our conversation this date, upon your assumption of the position of Military Representative of the President I would like you to undertake the functions generally outlined in the enclosure to this letter. As immediate tasks there under, please take the following actions: a. Assume the chairmanship of the present Committee as my representative. b. Review the planning being done on Berlin and submit to me your comments and recommendations. c. Review the planning on Vietnam and give me your comments thereon, along with your views on how to respond to President Diem’s request for a 100,000 man increase in his army.
“In undertaking these actions, you will wish to confer with the officials responsible for the planning for critical areas such as Southeast Asia and Berlin. With regards to Berlin, I am sure you are aware of the important assistance being rendered by Mr. Dean Acheson with whom you should meet at an early date.”
Here’s how things turned out. The East Germans built the Berlin Wall in August 1961 to stop the flow of emigration out; the U.S. could really do nothing. Taylor went to Vietnam in October 1961 to assess the insurgency and counterinsurgency. He recommended sending an additional 8,000 Americans to Vietnam, to Kennedy’s disappointment. The next month the 5412 Group would initiate Operation Mongoose, designed to change the leadership of South Vietnam. Kennedy recalled Taylor to active service in 1962 and appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within weeks the General became a key participant in the secret meetings to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. Taylor’s “flexible response” concept triumphed, to the chagrin of LeMay and other hard-liners, and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963 as a result. It was one of the signal accomplishments of the Kennedy presidency. Taylor later served President Johnson as ambassador to South Vietnam from 1964-1965.
To prove the defendant's US has betrayed the Republic of Vietnam by this presidential archivist which is why the Paris Peace Accords was not carried out by the defendant's US.
Richard Nixon was elected in 1968 on the basis of his claim to have a plan to end the War in Vietnam, which had dragged on for years and deeply divided the country. However, once in the White House, he continued the war, and on July 25, 1969 set forth what became known as the Nixon Doctrine: “The United States would assist in the defense and developments of allies and friends,” but would not “undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.” This meant in general that allies would share defense burdens with the U.S., and in specific Vietnamization of the war (having South Vietnam forces continue the war with U.S. help, as the U.S. began to withdraw some ground troops). He confirmed this approach on November 3, 1969, in a televised address, outlining Vietnamization of the war and asking that it be given a chance. This led to massive anti-war demonstrations in mid-late November. On April 30, 1970, Nixon asked the American people to support his decision to widen the war by sending troops into Cambodia in response to North Vietnam’s presence in that country. That decision led to more dissent, anger on both sides of the issue, and to the shootings at Kent State in May. And so the war, and a severely divided nation, continued (perhaps hobbled) into 1971.
On February 9, 1971, Nixon issued his Second Annual Report to Congress on American Foreign Policy, which confirmed the Nixon Doctrine and expanded on it in crucial ways. The report maintained: “The Doctrine seeks to reflect these realities: –that a major American role remains indispensable. –that other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours. –that the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines. –that the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.” Thus, as far as Vietnam, the report meant that the U.S. would not abandon its military role, though it would expect South Vietnamese forces to pull their weight so that U.S. ground troops could be withdrawn. And that would take time, which would not satisfy those with doubts about the war. On the other hand, it clearly maintained that there must be a change in relations between the United States, and both China and the Soviet Union, stating: “I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People’s Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations,” signaling that the U.S. was ready to a detente with China. In fact that very month feelers went out that would soon lead to Nixon’s being invited to Beijing. As for the Soviet Union, the report said: “There need be, in all this, no irreconcilable conflict between Soviet interests in Asia and our own,” signaling a willingness to thaw out the Cold War with them as well.
Then in a radio address to the nation on February 25, Nixon summarized the report. Because American allies and friends had “gained new strength and self-confidence” and were “able to participate much more fully not only in their own defense” Nixon said, and because American “adversaries no longer present a solidly united front,” the United States no longer had to be the leader and “the primary supporter and defender” of the free world. Thus, although the United States would keep its commitments and would “make sure our own troop levels or any financial support to other nations is appropriate to current threats and needs”, it would “look to threatened countries and their neighbors to assume primary responsibility for their own defense.” Nixon threw a sop to widespread anti-war sentiment by saying, “We have learned in recent years the dangers of over-involvement,” but countered with a plea for continued involvement: “The other danger—a grave risk we are equally determined to avoid—is under-involvement. After a long and unpopular war, there is temptation to turn inward—to withdraw from the world, to back away from our commitments. That deceptively smooth road of the new isolationism is surely the road to war.” He added a claim that the United States was succeeding in its plans to withdraw from the war in Vietnam, but that North Vietnam refused to accept American peace proposals. In fact, by the end of two more months, he said, the United States would have brought home 260,000 of the 550,000 American soldiers who were in Vietnam when he took office. With American air support but without either American ground troops or advisors, Nixon said, South Vietnamese troops were disrupting the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Communist supply line, which would “save lives and insure the success of our withdrawal program next year.” The United States, he added, had tendered a broad, five-point peace proposal, and that proposal was “supported by every government in Indochina except one – the Government of North Vietnam.” This all amounted to a continuation of the war until the North Vietnamese would withdraw their forces, which they would not do, and the South Vietnamese could defeat them without many American ground troops. All this he claimed would take just another year.
Nixon viewed his knowledge of foreign affairs as his “political strong suit.” Foreign policy issues, he said, are “the most important decisions a President faces.” One of his advisors on these issues was Llewellyn E. Thompson, who was one of the most important American diplomats of the 20th Century. Thompson was the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War, serving two separate tours in the administrations of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. Few Ambassadors faced as many crises as Thompson did in Moscow – the shooting down of a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Russia, the great confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union over Berlin and the building of the Berlin Wall, very difficult summits between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and tensions over the Vietnam War. Thompson ended his first tour in Moscow in 1962, when President Kennedy brought him home to Washington to become his Ambassador-at-Large, as a member of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, advising the President on Soviet affairs. Shortly after returning to Washington, Thompson provided Kennedy with advice that was crucial to avoiding nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Johnson appointed him to the ambassadorship to Moscow in 1967, when he arranged for the Glassboro summit between LBJ and Soviet Premier Kosygin, and he served until 1969.
Nixon knew Thompson well and appreciated his “strong and active interest in our country's efforts to further the cause of peace and international understanding.” In 1956, Thompson, then the Ambassador to Austria, assisted then-Vice President Nixon on his 1956 inspection trip to survey the refugee situation when 180,000 Hungarians fled to Austria as the Soviet Union militarily crushed the Hungarian Revolution. Three years later, Thompson accompanied Vice President Nixon at the opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, part of a cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was at that exhibition that Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev engaged in a series of impromptu hard-hitting ideological debates that covered the range of Soviet-American relations from the threat of atomic war, to the economic progress in both nations. Thompson again helped Nixon when, as a private citizen, Nixon visited the Soviet Union in March 1967 in the first of four foreign study trips that he used as the springboard to launch his campaign for the 1968 Republican presidential nomination. As president, Nixon brought Thompson out of retirement to advise him on the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations with the Soviet Union, with Thompson representing the United States in the SALT talks from 1969 until his death in 1972.
Typed Letter Signed, on White House, Washington, March 10, 1971, to Thompson, sending him his Annual Report to Congress on American Foreign Policy, and very unusually, personally endorsing it by tying it to his own career and experience. “On February 25 I sent a special message on the American foreign policy to the Congress. This report describes our approach to a changing world, notes the progress we have achieved during the past year, and sets forth our assessment of the tasks that lie ahead. In view of your strong and active interest in our country’s efforts to further the cause of peace and international understanding, I wanted you to have a copy of the report.
“While this document is long, over 60,000 words, I would strongly urge when you have a free evening that you read it carefully. Not only does it set forth in depth the Administration’s policies and the reasons for these policies; it also is an accurate reflection of my personal convictions with regard to our national security after almost twenty-five years in public life – as a Congressman, as a Senator, as a participant in decision-making and policy determination at the highest level, and also as one who reflected often on these problems during the years between as a private citizen. I also want to emphasize that the review does not simply represent the views of the President and the White House. The State Department, the Defense Department and other agencies in government, where their interests were involved, participated fully in the months of discussion which resulted in our final conclusions. Consequently, it can truly be said that this document represents the views of the entire Administration.”
The Nixon Doctrine articulated here was in part a success and in part proved wishful thinking. The successes related to his sage realization that the Communist world was not monolithic, and was in fact fragmenting; and that this fragmentation presented an opportunity for the U.S. On July 15, 1971, Nixon announced that he has been invited to China, ending a quarter of a century of hostility in Sino-American relations. And on October 12 of that year, there was a joint announcement issued in Washington and Moscow confirming that Nixon would visit the Soviet Union three months after returning from China. These visits were widely seen as paradigm-shattering and beneficial. The failure: South Vietnam proved unable to survive without American troops.
January 22nd, 1969
President Nixon Appoints Henry Cabot Lodge the Chief American Negotiator to the Paris Peace Talks to End the War in Vietnam
The only official, public negotiations to end the War, and Lodge the sole chief negotiator to meet with the N. Vietnamese in a plenary session.
In February 1953, Henry Cabot Lodge was named U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations by President Eisenhower, with his office elevated to Cabinet level rank. The position then was high profile, and Lodge often engaged in debates with the UN representatives of the Soviet Union that were broadcast or covered on television. On the front lines in the Cold War, in 1959 he escorted Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev on a highly-publicized tour of the United States. Lodge left the ambassadorship during the election of 1960 to run for Vice President on the Republican ticket headed by Richard Nixon. Nixon selected Lodge because the latter had made a name for himself at the United Nations as a foreign-policy expert.
President Kennedy appointed Lodge to the position of Ambassador to South Vietnam, which showed the import U.S. policymakers were coming to place on that nation. Lodge held the post from 1963 to 1964, and again from 1965 to 1967. As ambassador there, Lodge supported President Johnson’s decision to escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War, believing that a Communist takeover in the South would be disastrous for U.S. foreign policy goals.
The original appointment of “Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts” as “Ambassador to head the United States Delegation at the Paris Meetings on Vietnam.”
President Johnson and American military leaders had long insisted that the Vietnam War was going well, and that they could see the light at the end of the tunnel. But in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive in February 1968, when the Communists were able to initiate coordinated attacks on all the regional capitals throughout Vietnam, even in the American compound in Saigon itself, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford issued a report to the President in mid-March that the United States could not win the war. Johnson was stunned, and he in turn stunned a nationwide audience on March 31,1968, announcing he would cease bombing north of the 20th parallel, initiate peace talks to end the war, and not seek denomination or reelection in 1968. The peace talks commenced in Paris on May 10, 1968, with W. Averell Harriman leading the U.S. delegation.
From the outset, the talks were fraught with difficulties. The U.S. insisted on mutual withdrawal of American and North Vietnamese forces, which would leave the Saigon government in control. The North Vietnamese refused to negotiate anything until all bombing of North Vietnam was halted. When the U.S. finally agreed to that condition, the Johnson administration was unable to persuade, cajole, or coerce South Vietnam and its leader President Thieu to participate unless it was recognized as a legitimate party by its foes. It was alleged at the time that both candidates in the 1968 election were using the talks as a political football, with Hubert Humphrey seeking to appeal to pro-peace voters by insisting that the South Vietnamese participate, and more germane, with Nixon leading the South Vietnamese to understand that his administration would give them a better deal if they would continue to delay. Formal negotiations would not begin until January 18, 1969, two days before Nixon took office.
In the immediate aftermath of the 1968 election, it seems that Lodge was Nixon’s foremost advisor on Vietnam. He urged Nixon to appoint a man of stature to negotiate in Paris, and warned him away from a trip to Saigon for strategic reasons. Nixon adopted these suggestions. In fact, on January 5, 1969, fifteen days before his inauguration, President-elect Nixon named Lodge himself to succeed Harriman as chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris talks. This signaled that Nixon was likely to take a hard line in the talks, considering Lodge’s background as a proponent of American policy in Vietnam as promulgated by President Johnson and his chief military commander, Gen. William Westmoreland.
Document Signed as President, Washington, January 22, 1969, just two days after his inauguration, being the original appointment of “Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts” as “Ambassador to head the United States Delegation at the Paris Meetings on Vietnam.” The wording here is highly politically indicative, showing that Nixon avoided using the terms “peace,” “talks,” “negotiations,” or “war.” These were simply “Meetings on Vietnam,” nothing more to be implied. The document is countersigned by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.
On January 25, the first fully attended meeting of the formal Paris peace talks was held. Ambassador Lodge urged an immediate restoration of a genuine Demilitarized Zone as the first “practical move toward peace.” He also suggested a mutual withdrawal of “external” military forces and an early release of prisoners of war. Tran Buu Kiem and Xuan Thuy, heads of the National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese delegations respectively, refused Lodge’s proposals and condemned American “aggression.”
Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, developed a two-track policy where under the Paris negotiators would discuss military matters, while the real political decisions would be made privately, out of the public eye, by the leadership in Washington and Hanoi directly. This would avoid public pressure from all directions, while also preventing the junior partners on either side, South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, from exercising power to preclude a deal from happening. Nixon liked the idea, and determined that political negotiations would emanate from the White House. So as Lodge continued treating with the North Vietnamese in Paris, starting in early August, Kissinger was secretly meeting with North Vietnam’s Le Duc Tho. As the summer turned to fall, however, Kissinger’s approaches to Hanoi failed to elicit an acceptable response, and Nixon adopted a get tough policy to force an accommodation on his terms. In early October the President told Lodge to break off the talks by staging a walk-out at the October 23 plenary session. On the appointed day, Lodge insisted that the talks be adjourned, which they were immediately. Lodge himself had not favored this action, and he suggested that the President use him as a personal intermediary to Hanoi’s leaders who were frequently in Paris. Nixon declined.
The only official, public negotiations to end the Vietnam War were over, never to resume. Nixon went directly to Camp David to work on a foreign policy address to the nation which he delivered on November 3. Dubbed the Silent Majority speech, in it he asked the American people to support his decision to continue the war until the North Vietnamese would accept “honorable” peace terms. On November 20, 1969, seeing no role remaining for a peace negotiator, Lodge resigned. The war did not end until January 23, 1973, four years and one day after Nixon had appointed Lodge to help end the conflict.
Again, the petitioner proves the Vietnam War;
This file contains selected documents regarding the signing of the "Paris Peace Accord" to end the hostilities in South Vietnam.

The file contains the following items: These are to be in laws of the United States of America.

(1) Letter from President Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, January 5, 1973.
[Reassuring Vietnam of US support.]

(2) "Peace With Honor": Radio-television broadcast, President Nixon re: initialing of the Vietnam Agreement, 23 Jan. 1973

(3) News conference statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
January 24, 1973.
[Chapter-by-Chapter analysis of the Paris Agreement, excerpts.]

(4) Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed in Paris and entered into force January 17, 1973.

(5) Act of the International Conference on Vietnam, Signed at Paris and entered into force March 2, 1973

(6) Complaints of Violations of the Cease-fire: United States
Note Verbale transmitted April 10, 1973 for delivery to participants in the International Conference on Vietnam.
_______________________

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First's evidence is The My Lai Massacre and Courts-Martial: An Account


Lt. William Calley
Two tragedies took place in 1968 in Vietnam. One was the massacre by United States soldiers of as many as 500 unarmed civilians-- old men, women, and children-- in My Lai on the morning of March 16. The other was the cover-up of that massacre.
U. S. military officials suspected Quang Ngai Province as being an enemy stronghold. The U. S. targeted the province for the first major U.S. combat operation of the war. Military officials declared the province a "free-fire zone" and subjected it to frequent bombing missions and artillery attacks. By the end of 1967, many dwellings in the province had been destroyed and nearly 140,000 civilians left homeless. Not surprisingly, the U. S. operations led some within the native population of Quang Ngai Province to distrust Americans. In some villages, children hissed at soldiers and adults kept quiet. But the situation was complicated. Other natives detested North Vietnamese Army regulars, and in some native villages, children would gather around American jeeps and try to sell Cokes or offer to polish boots. Soldiers entering a village didn't know quite what to expect.
Two hours of instruction on the rights of prisoners and a wallet-sized card "The Enemy is in Your Hands" seemed to have little impact on American soldiers fighting in Quang Ngai. Military leaders encouraged and rewarded kills in an effort to produce impressive body counts that could be reported to Saigon as an indication of progress. GIs joked that "anything that's dead and isn't white is a VC" for body count purposes. Angered by a local population that said nothing about the VC's whereabouts, soldiers took to calling natives "gooks."
Charlie Company came to Vietnam in December, 1967. It located in Quang Ngai Province in January, 1968, as one of the three companies in Task Force Barker, an ad hoc unit headed by Lt. Col. Frank Barker, Jr. Its mission was to pressure the VC in an area of the province known as "Pinkville." Charlie Company's commanding officer was Ernest Medina, a thirty-three-year-old Mexican-American from New Mexico who was popular with his soldiers. One of his platoon leaders was twenty-four-year-old William Calley. Charlie Company soldiers expressed amazement that Calley was thought by anyone to be officer material. One described Calley as"a kid trying to play war." [LINK TO CHAIN OF COMMAND DIAGRAM] Calley's utter lack of respect for the indigenous population was apparent to all in the company. According to one soldier, "if they wanted to do something wrong, it was alright with Calley." The soldiers of Charlie Company, like most combat soldiers in Viet Nam, scored low on military exams. Few combat soldiers had education beyond high school.
Seymour Hersh wrote that by March of 1968 "many in the company had given in to an easy pattern of violence." Soldiers systematically beat unarmed civilians. Some civilians were murdered. Whole villages were burned. Wells were poisoned. Rapes were common.
On March 14, a small squad from "C" Company ran into a booby trap, killing a popular sergeant, blinding one GI and wounding several others. The following evening, when a funeral service was held for the killed sergeant, soldiers had revenge on their mind. After the service, Captain Medina rose to give the soldiers a pep talk and discuss the next morning's mission. Medina told them that the VC's crack 48th Battalion was in the vicinity of a hamlet known as My Lai 4, which would be the target of a large-scale assault by the company. The soldiers' mission would be to engage the 48th Battalion and to destroy the village of My Lai. By 7am, Medina said, the women and children would be out of the hamlet and all they could expect to encounter would be the enemy. The soldiers were to explode brick homes, set fire to thatch homes, shoot livestock, poison wells, and destroy the enemy. The seventy-five or so American soldiers would be supported in their assault by gunship pilots.
Medina later said that his objective that night was to "fire them up and get them ready to go in there; I did not give any instructions as to what to do with women and children in the village." Although some soldiers agreed with that recollection of Medina's, others clearly thought that he had ordered them to kill every person in My Lai 4. Perhaps his orders were intentionally vague. What seems likely is that Medina intentionally gave the impression that everyone in My Lai would be their enemy.

Ronald Haeberle photo (3/16/1968)
At 7:22 a.m. on March 16, nine helicopters lifted off for the flight to My Lai 4. By the time the helicopters carrying members of Charlie Company landed in a rice paddy about 140 yards south of My Lai, the area had been peppered with small arms fire from assault helicopters. Whatever VC might have been in the vicinity of My Lai had most likely left by the time the first soldiers climbed out of their helicopters. The assault plan called for Lt. Calley's first platoon and Lt. Stephen Brooks' second platoon to sweep into the village, while a third platoon, Medina, and the headquarters unit would be held in reserve and follow the first two platoons in after the area was more-or-less secured. Above the ground, the action would be monitored at the 1,000-foot level by Lt. Col. Barker and at the 2,500-foot level by Oran Henderson, commander of the 11th Brigade, both flying counterclockwise around the battle scene in helicopters.
My Lai village had about 700 residents. They lived in either red-brick homes or thatch-covered huts. A deep drainage ditch marked the eastern boundary of the village. Directly south of the residential area was an open plaza area used for holding village meetings. To the north and west of the village was dense foliage [MAP].
By 8am, Calley's platoon had crossed the plaza on the town's southern edge and entered the village. They encountered families cooking rice in front of their homes. The men began their usual search-and-destroy task of pulling people from homes, interrogating them, and searching for VC. Soon the killing began. The first victim was a man stabbed in the back with a bayonet. Then a middle-aged man was picked up, thrown down a well, and a grenade lobbed in after him. A group of fifteen to twenty mostly older women were gathered around a temple, kneeling and praying. They were all executed with shots to the back of their heads. Eighty or so villagers were taken from their homes and herded to the plaza area. As many cried "No VC! No VC!", Calley told soldier Paul Meadlo, "You know what I want you to do with them". When Calley returned ten minutes later and found the Vietnamese still gathered in the plaza he reportedly said to Meadlo, "Haven't you got rid of them yet? I want them dead. Waste them." Meadlo and Calley began firing into the group from a distance of ten to fifteen feet. The few that survived did so because they were covered by the bodies of those less fortunate.
What Captain Medina knew of these war crimes is not certain. It was a chaotic operation. Gary Garfolo said, "I could hear shooting all the time. Medina was running back and forth everywhere. This wasn't no organized deal." Medina would later testify that he didn't enter the village until 10 a.m., after most of the shooting had stopped, and did not personally witness a single civilian being killed. Others put Medina in the village closer to 9 a.m., and close to the scene of many of the murders as they were happening.
As the third platoon moved into My Lai, it was followed by army photographer Ronald Haeberle, there to document what was supposed to be a significant encounter with a crack enemy battalion. Haeberle took many pictures [HAEBERLE PHOTOS]. He said he saw about thirty different GIs kill about 100 civilians. Once Haeberle focused his camera on a young child about five feet away, but before he could get his picture the kid was blown away. He angered some GIs as he tried to photograph them as they fondled the breasts of a fifteen-year-old Vietnamese girl.
An army helicopter piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson arrived in the My Lai vicinity about 9 a.m. Thompson noticed dead and dying civilians all over the village. Thompson repeatedly saw young boys and girls being shot at point-blank range. Thompson, furious at what he saw, reported the wanton killings to brigade headquarters [THOMPSON'S STORY].
Meanwhile, the rampage below continued. Calley was at the drainage ditch on the eastern edge of the village, where about seventy to eighty old men, women, and children not killed on the spot had been brought. Calley ordered the dozen or so platoon members there to push the people into the ditch, and three or four GIs did. Calley ordered his men to shoot into the ditch. Some refused, others obeyed. One who followed Calley's order was Paul Meadlo, who estimated that he killed about twenty-five civilians. (Later Meadlo was seen, head in hands, crying.) Calley joined in the massacre. At one point, a two-year-old child who somehow survived the gunfire began running towards the hamlet. Calley grabbed the child, threw him back in the ditch, then shot him.

Ronald Haeberle photo (3/16/68)
Hugh Thompson, by now almost frantic, saw bodies in the ditch, including a few people who were still alive. He landed his helicopter and told Calley to hold his men there while he evacuated the civilians. (One account reports Thompson told his helicopter crew chief to "open up on the Americans" if they fired at the civilians, but Thompson later said he did not remember having done so.) He put himself between Calley's men and the Vietnamese. When a rescue helicopter landed, Thompson had the nine civilians, including five children, flown to the nearest army hospital. Later, Thompson was to land again and rescue a baby still clinging to her dead mother.

Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson
By 11 a.m., when Medina called for a lunch break, the killing was nearly over. By noon, "My Lai was no more": its buildings were destroyed and its people dead or dying. Soldiers later said they didn't remember seeing "one military-age male in the entire place". By night, the VC had returned to bury the dead. What few villagers survived and weren't already communists, became communists. Twenty months later army investigators would discover three mass graves containing the bodies of about 500 villagers.
II.
The cover-up of the My Lai massacre began almost as soon as the killing ended. Official army reports of the operation proclaimed a great victory: 128 enemy dead, only one American casualty (one soldier intentionally shot himself in the foot). The army knew better. Hugh Thompson had filed a complaint, alleging numerous war crimes involving murders of civilians. According to one of Thompson's crew members, "Thompson was so pissed he wanted to turn in his wings". An order issued by Major Calhoun to Captain Medina to return to My Lai to do a body count was countermanded by Major General Samuel Koster, who asked Medina how many civilians has been killed. "Twenty to twenty-eight," was his answer. The next day Colonel Henderson informed Medina that an informal investigation of the My Lai incident was underway-- and most likely gave the Captain "a good ass-chewing" as well. Henderson interviewed a number of GIs, then pronounced himself "satisfied" by their answers. No attempt was made to interview surviving Vietnamese. In late April, Henderson submitted a written report indicating that about twenty civilians had been inadvertently killed in My Lai. Meanwhile, Michael Bernhart, a Charlie Company GI severely troubled by what he witnessed at My Lai discussed with other GIs his plan to write a letter about the incident to his congressman. Medina, after learning of Bernhart's intentions, confronted him and told him how unwise such an action, in his opinion, would be.

Ronald Ridenhour
If not for the determined efforts of a twenty-two-year-old ex-GI from Phoenix, Ronald Ridenhour, what happened on March 16, 1968 at My Lai 4 may never have come to the attention of the American people. Ridenhour served in a reconnaissance unit in Duc Pho, where he heard five eyewitness accounts of the My Lai massacre. He began his own investigation, traveling to America headquarters to confirm that Charlie Company had in fact been in My Lai on the date reported by his witnesses. Ridenhour was shocked by what he learned [RIDENHOUR STORY]. When he was discharged in December, 1968, Ridenhour said "I wanted to get those people. I wanted to reveal what they did. My God, when I first came home, I would tell my friends about this and cry-literally cry." In March, 1969, Ridenhour composed a letter detailing what he had heard about the My Lai massacre [LINK TO LETTER] and sent it to President Nixon, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous members of Congress. Most recipients simply ignored the letter, but a few, most notably Representative Morris Udall, aggressively pushed for a full investigation of Ridenhour allegations.
By late April, General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, had turned the case over to the Inspector General for investigation. Over the next few months, dozens of witnesses were interviewed. It became apparent to all connected with the investigation that war crimes had been committed. In June, 1969, William Calley was flown back from Vietnam to appear in a line-up for identification by Hugh Thompson. By August, the matter was in the hands of the army's Criminal Investigation Division for a determination as to whether criminal charges should be filed against Calley and other massacre participants. On September 5, formal charges, included six specifications of premeditated murder, were filed against Calley.

Defense attorney George Latimer with Calley
Calley hired as his attorney George Latimer, a Salt Lake City lawyer with considerable military experience, having served on the Military Court of Appeals. Latimer pronounced himself impressed with Calley. "You couldn't find a nicer boy," he said, adding that if Calley was guilty of anything it was only following orders "a bit too diligently."
Meanwhile, the issue of the My Lai massacre had gotten the attention of President Nixon. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird briefed Nixon at his San Clemente retreat. The White House proceeded with caution, sensing the potential of the incident to embarrass the military and undermine the war effort. The President characterized what happened at My Lai as an unfortunate aberration, as "an isolated incident."
In November, 1969, the American public began to learn the details of what happened at My Lai 4. The massacre was the cover story in both Time and Newsweek. CBS ran a Mike Wallace interview with Paul Meadlo. Seymour Hersh published in-depth accounts based on his own extensive interviews. Life magazine published Haeberle graphic photographs.
Reaction to the reports of the massacre varied. Some politicians, such as House Armed Services Subcommittee Chair L. Mendel Rivers maintained that there was no massacre and that reports to the contrary were merely attempts to build opposition to the Vietnam War. Others called for an open, independent inquiry. The Administration took a middle course, deciding on a closed-door investigation by the Pentagon, headed by William Peers, a blunt three-star general.
For four months the Peers Panel interviewed 398 witnesses, ranging from General Koster to the GIs of Charlie Company. Over 20,000 pages of testimony were taken. The Peers Report criticized the actions of both officers and enlisted men. The report recommended action against dozens of men for rape, murder, or participation in the cover-up.
III.
The Army's Criminal Investigation Division continued its separate investigation. Most of the enlisted men who committed war crimes were no longer members of the military, and thus immune from prosecution by court-martial. A 1955 Supreme Court decision, Toth vs Quarles, held that military courts cannot try former members of the armed services "no matter how intimate the connection between the offense and the concerns of military discipline." Decisions were made to prosecute a total of twenty-five officers and enlisted men, including General Koster, Colonel Oran Henderson, and Captain Medina. In the end, however, only few would be tried and only one, William Calley, would be found guilty. The top officer charged, General Samuel Koster, who failed to report known civilian casualties and conducted a clearly inadequate investigation was, according to General Peers, the beneficiary of a whitewash, having charges against him dropped and receiving only a letter of censure and reduction in rank. Colonel Henderson was found not guilty on all charges after a trial by court martial. Peers again expressed his disapproval, writing "I cannot agree with the verdict. If his actions are judged as acceptable standards for an officer in his position, the Army is indeed in deep trouble."

Captain Ernest Medina
Captain Ernest Medina faced charges of murdering 102 Vietnamese civilians. The charges were based on the prosecution's theory of command responsibility: Medina, as the officer in charge of Charlie Company should be accountable for the actions of his men. If Medina knew that a massacre was taking place and did nothing to stop it, he should be found guilty of murder. (Medina was originally charged also with dereliction of duty for participating in the cover-up, but the offense was dropped because the statute of limitations had run.) Medina was subjected to a lie-detector test which tended to show he responded truthfully when he said that he did not intentionally suggest to his men that they kill unarmed civilians. The same test, however, tended to show that his contention that he first heard of the killing of unarmed civilians about 10 to 10:30 A.M. was not truthful, and that he in fact knew non-combatants were being killed sometime between 8 A.M. and 9AM, when there would still have been time to prevent many civilian deaths. The prosecution, led by Major William Eckhardt, was unable, however, to get the damaging lie-detector evidence admitted. Medina's lawyer, flamboyant defense attorney F. Lee Bailey, conducted a highly successful defense, forcing the prosecution to drop key witnesses and keeping damaging evidence, such as Ronald Haeberle photographs, from the jury. After fifty-seven minutes of deliberation, the jury acquitted Medina on all charges. (Months later, when a perjury prosecution was no longer possible, Medina admitted that he had suppressed evidence and lied to the brigade commander about the number of civilians killed.)

Prosecutor Captain Aubrey Daniel
The strongest government case was that against Lt. William Calley. On November 12, 1970, in a small courthouse in Fort Benning, Georgia, young Prosecutor Aubrey Daniel stood to deliver his opening statement: "I want you to know My Lai 4. I will try to put you there." Captain Daniel told the jury of six military officers the shocking story of Calley's role in My Lai's tragedy: his machine-gunning of people in the plaza area south of the hamlet; his orders to men to execute men, women, and children in the eastern drainage ditch; his butt-stroking with his rifle of an old man; his grabbing of a small child and his throwing of the child into the ditch, then shooting him at point-blank range. Daniel told the jury that at the close of evidence he would ask them to "in the name of justice" convict the accused of all charges.
Daniel built the prosecution's case methodically. For days, the grisly evidence accumulated without a single witness directly placing Calley at the scene of a shooting. One of the early witnesses was Ronald Haeberle, the army photographer whose pictures brought home the horror of My Lai [TESTIMONY OF HAEBERLE]. Another was Hugh Thompson, My Lai hero. Defense attorney Latimer's handling on cross of Haeberle, Thompson, and other witnesses led many courtroom observers to conclude that his glowing reputation was undeserved. His questioning of Haeberle, whose credibility was largely irrelevant, was pointless. His attempt to question Thompson's heroism "failed utterly," according to Richard Hammer, author of The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley.
In the second week of the trial Daniel began to call his more incriminating witnesses. Robert Maples, a machine gunner in the first platoon, testified that he saw Calley near the eastern drainage ditch, firing at the people below. Maples said that Calley asked him to use his machine gun on the Vietnamese in the ditch, but that he refused [TESTIMONY OF MAPLES]. Dennis Conti provided equally damning evidence. Conti testified that he was ordered to round up people, mostly women and children, and bring them back to Calley on the trail south of the hamlet. Calley, Conti said, told us to make them "squat down and bunch up so they couldn't get up and run." Minutes later Calley and Paul Meadlo "fired directly into the people. There were burst and shots for two minutes. The people screamed and yelled and fell." Conti said that Meadlo "broke down" and began crying [TESTIMONY OF CONTI].

Witness Paul Meadlo
The prosecution's final witness was its most anticipated witness. Paul Meadlo had been promised immunity from military prosecution in return for his testimony in the Calley case, but when he was called earlier in the trial, Meadlo had refused to answer questions about March 16, 1968, claiming his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself. Daniel called Meadlo to the stand for a second time, and the ex-GI, who had lost a foot to a mine shortly after the massacre, limped to the stand in his green short-sleeve shirt and green pants. Judge Kennedy warned Meadlo that if he refused to answer questions, two U. S. marshals would take him into custody. Meadlo said he would testify. He told the jury that Calley had left him with a large group of mostly women and children south of the hamlet saying, "You know what to do with them, Meadlo." Meadlo thought Calley meant he should guard the people, which he did. Meadlo told the jury what happened when Calley returned a few minutes later:
He said, "How come they're not dead?" I said, I didn't know we were supposed to kill them." He said, I want them
dead." He backed off twenty or thirty feet and started shooting into the people -- the Viet Cong -- shooting automatic. He was
beside me. He burned four or five magazines. I burned off a few, about three. I helped shoot ‘em.
Q: What were the people doing after you shot them?
A: They were lying down.
Q: Why were they lying down?
A: They were mortally wounded.
Q: How were you feeling at that time?
A: I was mortally upset, scared, because of the briefing we had the day before.
Q: Were you crying?
A: I imagine I was....
Daniel then asked Meadlo about the massacre at the eastern drainage ditch, and in the same almost emotionless voice, Meadlo recounted the story, telling the jury that Calley fired from 250 to 300 bullets into the ditch. One exchange was remarkable:
Q: What were the children in the ditch doing?
A: I don't know.
Q: Were the babies in their mother's arms?
A: I guess so.
Q: And the babies moved to attack?
A: I expected at any moment they were about to make a counterbalance.
Q: Had they made any move to attack?
A: No.
At the end of Meadlo's testimony, Aubrey Daniel rested the for the prosecution[MEADLO TESTIMONY].
The defense strategy had two main thrusts. One was to suggest that the stress of combat, the fear of being in an area thought to be thick with the enemy, sufficiently impaired Calley's thinking that he should not be found guilty of premeditated murder for his killing of civilians. Latimer relied on New York psychiatrist Albert LaVerne to advance this defense argument [LAVERNE TESTIMONY]. The second argument of the defense was that Calley was merely following orders: that Captain Ernest Medina had ordered that civilians found in My Lai 4 be killed and was the real villain in the tragedy.
On February 23, 1971, William Calley took the stand. He told the jury he couldn't remember a single army class on the Geneva Convention, but that he did know he could be court-martialed for refusing to obey an order. He testified that Medina had said the night before that there would be no civilians in My Lai, only the enemy. He said that while he was in the village, Medina called and asked why he hadn't "wasted" the civilians yet. He admitted to firing into a ditch full of Vietnamese, but claimed that others were already firing into the ditch when he arrived. Calley said, "I felt then--and I still do-- that I acted as directed, I carried out my orders, and I did not feel wrong in doing so" [CALLEY TESTIMONY].
Ernest Medina was called as a witness of the court. Medina directly contradicted Calley's testimony. Medina said he was asked at the briefing on March 15 whether "we kill women and children," and-- looking straight at Calley behind the defense table--he said to the GIs "No, you do not kill women and children...Use common sense." At the close of his testimony, Medina saluted Judge Kennedy, then marched past Calley's table without glancing at him [MEDINA TESTIMONY].
It was time for summations. George Latimer for the defense argued that Medina was lying about not giving the order to kill civilians, that Medina knew perfectly well what was going on in the village, and now he and the army were trying to make Calley a scapegoat [LATIMER SUMMATION]. Aubrey Daniel for the prosecution asked the jury who will speak for the children of My Lai. He pointed out that Calley as a U. S. officer took an oath not to kill innocent women and children, and told the jury it is "the conscience of the United States Army"[DANIEL SUMMATION].
After thirteen days of deliberations, the longest in U. S. court-martial history, the jury returned its verdict: guilty of premeditated murder on all specifications. After hearing pleas on the issue of punishment, jury head Colonel Clifford Ford pronounced Calley's sentence: "To be confined at hard labor for the length of your natural life; to be dismissed from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances."
IV.
Opinion polls showed that the public overwhelmingly disapproved of the verdict in the Calley case [OPINION POLLS]. President Nixon ordered Calley removed from the stockade (after spending a single weekend there) and placed under house arrest. He announced that he would review the whole decision. Nixon's action prompted Aubrey Daniel to write a long and angry letter in which he told the President that "the greatest tragedy of all will be if political expediency dictates the compromise of such a fundamental moral principle as the inherent unlawfulness of the murder of innocent persons"[AUBREY LETTER]. On November 9, 1974, the Secretary of the Army announced that William Calley would be paroled. In 1976, Calley married. In August 2009, while speaking at a Kiwanis meeting in his hometown of Columbus, Georgia, 66-year-old Calley offered a public apology for his role at My Lai: "Not a day goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened that day at My Lai. I am very sorry."
My Lai mattered. Two weeks after the Calley verdict was announced, the Harris Poll reported for the first time that a majority of Americans opposed the war in Viet Nam. The My Lai episode caused the military to re-evaluate its training with respect to the handling of noncombatants. Commanders sent troops in the Desert Storm operation into battle with the words, "No My Lais-- you hear?"
Collected, transcribed, and edited by:
Larry W. Jewell
jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu

o ABC News Network | © 2019 ABC News Internet Ventures. All rights reserved.

Vietnam War photographer on taking My Lai massacre photos: 'It was just unreal'

• By
• ANTHONY RIVAS
May 28, 2019, 6:05 AM ET
PlayRonald L. Haeberle/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty Images
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8/page 22
18 USC§ 2381 [8/22] Treason (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 807; Pub. L. 103–322,
The Kissinger said, “Hanoi wanted victory.” And then, he sold the Republic of Vietnam to Vietnamese communist regime or so-called is communism.
Kissinger: Vietnam failures `we did to ourselves'
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton speaks at a conference on the Vietnam War, "The American Experience in Southeast Asia, 1946-1975", sponsored by the Department of State's Office of the Historian, Wednesday, Sept. 29, 2010, at the State Department in Washington. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)
By Robert Burns
AP National Security Writer / September 29, 2010
Text size – +
WASHINGTON—Henry Kissinger, who helped steer Vietnam policy during the war's darkest years, said Wednesday he is convinced that "most of what went wrong in Vietnam we did to ourselves" -- beginning with underestimating the tenacity of North Vietnamese leaders.
Offering a somber assessment of the conflict, which ended in 1975 with the humiliating fall of Saigon, Kissinger lamented the anguish that engulfed a generation of Americans as the war dragged on.
And he said the core problem for the U.S. was that its central objective of preserving an independent, viable South Vietnamese state was unachievable -- and that the U.S. adversary was unbending.
"America wanted compromise," he said. "Hanoi wanted victory."
Kissinger spoke at a State Department conference on the history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. The department in recent months has published a series of reports, based on newly declassified documents, covering U.S. decision-making on Vietnam in the final years of the war.
Kissinger was national security adviser and secretary of state under President Richard M. Nixon and continued in the role of chief diplomat during the administration of President Gerald R. Ford.
In introducing Kissinger, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton -- who opposed the war as a college student and has written that she held contradictory feelings about expressing her opposition -- spoke in broad terms about how the conflict influenced her generation's view of the world.
"Like everyone in those days, I had friends who enlisted -- male friends who enlisted -- were drafted, resisted, or became conscientious objectors; many long, painful, anguished conversations," she said. "And yet, the lessons of that era continue to inform the decisions we make."
Kissinger offered a more personal, extensive assessment of the war that killed more than 58,000 U.S. servicemen.
He said he regretted that what should have been straightforward disagreements over the U.S. approach to Vietnam became "transmuted into a moral issue -- first about the moral adequacy of American foreign policy altogether and then into the moral adequacy of America."
"To me, the tragedy of the Vietnam war was not that there were disagreements -- that was inevitable, given the complexity of the (conflict) -- but that the faith of Americans in each other became destroyed in the process," he said.
He called himself "absolutely unreconstructed" on that point.
"I believe that most of what went wrong in Vietnam we did to ourselves," he said, adding, "I would have preferred another outcome -- at least another outcome that was not so intimately related to the way that we tore ourselves apart."
In hindsight, Kissinger said, it is clear just how steadfast the North Vietnamese communists were in their goal of unification of the North and the South, having defeated their French colonial rulers in 1954.
Historians are coming to the same conclusion.
In his account of the conflict, "Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975," military historian John Prados wrote, "The (North) had a well-defined goal -- reunification of the country -- and an absolute belief in its cause."
Kissinger credited his North Vietnamese adversary in the peace negotiations -- Le Duc Tho -- with skillfully and faithfully carrying out his government's instructions to outmaneuver the Americans.
"He operated on us like a surgeon with a scalpel -- with enormous skill," Kissinger said.
Washington and Hanoi signed a peace accord in January 1973, and Kissinger and Tho were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace prize that year for their role in the negotiation. Tho declined the award-
The peace accords provided a way out of Vietnam for the U.S., but it left South Vietnam vulnerable to a communist takeover.
"We knew it was a precarious agreement," Kissinger said, and that the conflict was not really over. But Washington also was convinced that the South Vietnamese could hold off the communists, barring an all-out invasion.
Kissinger joked that his long negotiating sessions with Tho took a heavy and lasting toll.
"I would look a lot better if I had never met him," he said.
A flavor of the negotiating difficulties is revealed in a newly declassified transcript of a meeting between Kissinger and Tho in Paris on May 21, 1973, in which they discussed problems implementing the peace accords.
"We have been meeting for only 45 minutes and already you have totally confused us," Kissinger told Tho.
To which Tho replied: "No, you are not confused yourself. You make the problem confused."
------
Online:
Most recent volume of State Department reports on Vietnam: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/147900.htm
© Copyright 2010 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

__________________________________________________________

9/page23
From page……………………………………………………………….. 255 to 257
10 U.S. Code § 2733 [9] Property loss; personal injury or death: incident to non-combat activities of Department of Army, Navy, or Air Force
Never over-promise and under deliver. General William Westmoreland should have followed that advice when he addressed the National Press Club fifty years ago today. Instead, the commanding general of U.S. military forces in Vietnam gave his audience an upbeat assessment of the war in South Vietnam, going so far as to say it had reached the point “where the end begins to come into view.” He was tragically wrong.
Westmoreland took charge of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam in March 1964. A highly decorated veteran of World War II and the Korean War, he looked like a general straight out of central casting. Time magazine was so taken with him that it named him its Man of the Year for 1965.
When Westmoreland first took command in Saigon, the United States had fewer than 17,000 military “advisors” on the ground in South Vietnam. Their job was to train and advise the South Vietnamese military in the fight against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Westmoreland continually pressed Washington to send combat troops. He got his wish in March 1965 when the first Marines hit the shores of Da Nang. The American phase of the Vietnam War had begun. But as President John F. Kennedy had predicted just a few years earlier, the result had been like taking a drink—the fix quickly wore off and more troops were needed. By late summer 1967, the United States had 450,000 troops in Vietnam.
The Americanization of the war deepened the U.S. role in Vietnam. It didn’t, however, bring South Vietnam closer to victory. South Vietnamese governments came and went as a series of generals battled for control. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese held their own even though the U.S. military owned the skies and enjoyed a lopsided firepower advantage on the ground.
The lack of progress on the battlefield eroded public support for the war. In October 1967, Gallup found for the first time ever that more Americans (46 percent) thought that it had been a mistake to send U.S. troops to fight in Vietnam than thought it hadn’t (44 percent). Perhaps even more significant for a president just a year away from running for re-election, the percentage of Americans doubting the wisdom of the war had doubled from just two years earlier. The trend was not LBJ’s friend.
Discussions inside the administration gave LBJ no reason to believe that he would soon have good news for the American public. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, one of the architects of the Americanization of the war, had concluded by the spring of 1967 that the war couldn’t be won and pressed Johnson to scale back the U.S. effort. Meanwhile, Westmoreland, with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that the war could be won, but only if he sent 200,000 more troops and widened the aerial campaign.
Unable to accept McNamara’s conclusion and reluctant to embrace the military’s push for a wider war, LBJ turned his attention to shoring up public support. He ordered U.S. officials in Saigon to highlight evidence showing that the United States was winning the war. The White House created a group to share favorable information with opinion leaders and news outlets. And at the recommendation of the so-called Wise Men, a group of former senior foreign policy officials convened to advise LBJ, Westmoreland was ordered home to reassure the American public that the war was going well.
_________________
10/page 23
From page……………………………………………………………….. 257 to 262
22 U.S.C. §§ 1571_1604. [10] P.L 329, 81st Congresses - 63 Stat- 714- December 23, 1950
(Please also see 10/ page 23)
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE IN INDOCHINA
AGREEMENT SIGNED AT SAIGON DECEMBER 23, 1950; ENTERED INTO FORCE DECEMBER 23, 1950
V. SAI G. de LATTRE

(Seal)
The Government of the United States of America, and the Governments of Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam:
�Recognizing the common interest of the free peoples of the world in the maintenance of the independence, peace, and security of nations devoted to the principles of freedom;
�Considering that the Governments of Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam are engaged in a cooperative effort toward these goals as members of the French Union;
�Considering that, in furtherance of those common principles, the Government of the United States of America has enacted Public Law 329, 81st Congress, which permits the United States of America to furnish military assistance to certain other nations dedicated to those principles:
�Desiring to set forth the understandings which shall govern the furnishings of military assistance by the United States of America under Public Law 329, 81st Congress, to the forces of the Associated States and the French Union in Indochina,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Any assistance furnished under this agreement will be governed by the following basic considerations:
1. All equipment, material and services, made available by the United States of America under the terms of this agreement to the States signatory to it, in accordance with their needs, will be furnished under such provisions, and subject to such terms, conditions and termination provisions of Public Law 329, 81st Congress, as amended, as affect the furnishing of such assistance, and such other applicable United States of America law as may hereafter come into effect.
2. In accordance with the principles of mutual aid, each Government receiving equipment, material, or services from the Government of the United States of America under this agreement agrees to facilitate the production, transport, within its means, and the transfer to the Government of
146
the United States of America for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions of purchase as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in their territories.
The conditions governing such transfers will be the object of particular agreements and will take into account the needs of these states and the normal requirements of the French Union with respect to internal consumption and commercial export of such materials.
Article II
The signatory powers, recognizing that the effectiveness of military assistance will be enhanced if maximum use is made of existing facilities,
Have resolved that:
1. The Governments of Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam shall cooperate to assure the efficient reception, distribution and maintenance of such equipment and materials as are furnished by the United States of America for use in Indochina.
2. Each Government receiving aid from the United States of America shall, unless otherwise agreed to by the Government of the United States of America, retain title to all such equipment, material or services so transferred.
3. Each Government receiving aid from the United States of America shall also retain full possession and control of the equipment, material or services to which they have such title, taking into account the accords and agreements which now exist between Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam.
4. With respect to aid received from the United States of America, each State shall designate a member or representative of the High Military Committee and authorize such person to receive from the Government of the United States of America the title to the materials received. Each State shall, as the need exists, provide for such extensions of that authority as may be necessary to insure the most efficient reception, distribution and maintenance of such equipment and materials as are furnished by the United States of America.
5. For aid received from the United States of America destined exclusively for forces of the French Union in Indochina, the Commander in Chief of the French Forces in the Far East or his delegates shall be the person authorized to accept title.
Article III
Taking into consideration the military conventions concluded between France and the Governments of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, each Government receiving grants of equipment, material or services from the
147
Government of the United States of America pursuant to this agreement,
Undertakes:
1. To use effectively such assistance only within the framework of the mutual defense of Indochina.
2. To take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this agreement.
3. To take security measures which will be agreed upon with the United States of America in each case to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified articles, services, or information received under this agreement.
4. To take appropriate action to prevent the illegal transportation into, out of, and within the area of Indochina, including the territorial waters thereof, of any equipment or materials substitutable for, or of similar category to, those being supplied by the United States of America under this agreement.
5. To provide local currency for such administrative and operating expenses of the Government of the United States of America as may arise in Indochina in connection with this agreement, taking into account ability to provide such currency. An Annex to this agreement will be agreed between the United States of America on one hand the States of Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam on the other, with a view to making arrangements for the provision of local currency within the limits of an overall sum to be fixed by common agreement.
6. To enter into any necessary arrangements of details with the Government of the United States of America with respect to the patents,
the use of local facilities, and all other matters relating to operations in connection with furnishings and delivering of materials in accordance with this agreement.
7. To consult with the Government of the United States of America, from time to time, to establish means for the most practicable technical utilization of the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement.
Article IV
To facilitate operations under this agreement, each Government agrees:
1. To grant, except when otherwise agreed, duty-free treatment and exemption from taxation upon importation, exportation, or movement within Indochina, of products, material or equipment furnished by the United States in connection with this agreement.
2. To receive within its territory such personnel of the United States of America as may be required for the purposes of this agreement and to extend to such personnel facilities freely and fully to carry out their assigned responsibilities, including observation of the progress and the technical use made of the assistance granted. Such personnel will in their relations to the Government of the country, to which they are assigned, operate as part of the diplomatic mission under the direction and control of the Chief of such mission of the Government which they are serving.
148
Article V
1. This agreement shall enter into force upon signature. Any party may withdraw from this agreement by giving written notice to all other parties three months in advance.
2. The Annexes to this agreement form an integral part hereof.
3. This agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations in compliance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
In witness whereof the respective representatives, duly authorized for this purpose, have signed the present agreement. Done in quintuplicate in the English, Cambodian, French and Vietnamese languages at Saigon on this 23 day of December, 1950.
All texts will be authentic, but in case of divergence, the English and French shall prevail.
DONALD R. HEATH
HUU VORAVONG





14/page 36
USC§ 2151 n [14] Human rights and development assistance - Dec. 20, 1975, (a)  Violations barring assistance; assistance
From page ………………………………………………………………..262 to 270
WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT. IMAGES MAY BE DISTURBING FOR SOME VIEWERS.
Vietnam -- a war and a country with which America has never come to terms.
There were those who fought in it and some who died in it. There were those who fought against it and paid their own price. And there were those who were fortunate -- those with money, clout and deferments.
Fifty years ago, as Richard Nixon assumed the presidency; these clashing forces came to a head. And Nixon, even as he desperately sought to extricate the United States, called on the "silent majority" to stand up in support of the war.
All of this came as proof of another terrible price emerged: the atrocities of My Lai.
Watch "Fortunate Sons" TONIGHT at 10 ET on ABC
Ronald L. Haeberle/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty Images
Vietnamese civilians killed by US Army soldiers during pursuit of Vietcong militia, as per order of Lieut. Wm. Calley Jr., March 16, 1968, in My Lai, South Vietnam.
(MORE: Iconic war images shown for first time in Vietnam)
The rampage now known as the My Lai massacre occurred March 16, 1968. U.S. troops stormed the Vietnam village, using automatic weapons and bayonets to slaughter as many as 500 people, including children and the elderly. Soldiers raped women and girls, and then killed them.
On Nov. 12, 1969, it all came to light: The story broke through the Dispatch News Service and was picked up by dozens of newspapers.
Nothing can explain away the atrocity. But to give it context, it's useful to remember that it was often unclear at the time which civilians could be trusted in Vietnam. The Viet Cong, the organization fighting with North Vietnam against South Vietnam and the U.S., was hiding in plain sight.
"The villagers, in the daytime, it was just normal attire," Tiney Corbett, Jr., a Vietnam War veteran and Bronze Star recipient, told ABC News. "Some of these same folks ... might be your barber in the daytime and in the night, he might be the one that comes to try to kill you."
Ronald L. Haeberle/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty Images
An American soldier burns houses during the My Lai massacre, March 16, 1968, in My Lai, South Vietnam.
This mentality was an underlying force behind the My Lai massacre. Kenneth Hodges, a U.S. Army squad leader who was at My Lai at the time, told ABC News that troops entered My Lai under the assumption that the people there were Viet Cong or sympathizers of the group.
"The day before the assault on My Lai, the company commander got the whole unit together," Hodges said. "They said that we could expect heavy resistance going in. Heavy resistance meant that the enemy is there and they are ready for a fight. … Orders were to kill or destroy everything in the village."
(MORE: Vietnam War veterans' kids say Agent Orange impact 'a nightmare')
"On the way going up toward the village there was an old man, a boy, and one was a girl pleading, 'No [Viet Cong], no [Viet Cong],'" Ronald Haeberle, a former Army photographer on the My Lai mission, told ABC News. "All of a sudden, the GI next to me opens up and shoots them. I took a picture."
"We came upon this group of people and the soldiers were harassing them, trying to get at this one girl in the back [to] take her blouse off," he continued. "We started to walk in the opposite direction. I heard firing -- two M16 automatic [rifles] shooting all these people. It was women, old men, children -- all noncombatants. Especially the babies. I mean, it was just unreal."
AP
Ronald L. Haeberle, 28, a former army photographer in Vietnam, claims that he witnessed the alleged massacre of Vietnamese Civilians in March 1968 by United States soldiers in a photo dated Nov. 22, 1969.more +
Pham Thanh Cong, a survivor of My Lai, told ABC News that American troops killed everyone else in his immediate family. Another 170 people were slaughtered at a single location in the village.
"They stood at this ditch and used machine guns to shoot the villagers dead and push them into the ditch," Haeberle said.
Haeberle had two cameras with him that day. One was his personal camera with color film, which he took back to the U.S. with him instead of turning it over to the military. Those pictures were first published by The Plain Dealer, a Cleveland newspaper.
The pictures made the story of the massacre inescapable.
Opposition to the war had already begun to swell prior to news of the My Lai massacre. In July of 1969, David Harris, husband to folk singer Joan Baez, was arrested for resisting the draft. Harris founded the organization known as The Resistance, which encouraged men of draft age to refuse to cooperate with draft laws.
"The fact was, this war was wrong. And I don't mean just wrong as a mistake in policy, which it was, but it was much more than that," Harris told ABC News. "It was wrong with a capital 'W.' It was the kind of wrong you send people to prison for war crimes about."
"He decided," Clara Bingham, author of "Witness to the Revolution," told ABC News, "that the best way to oppose the war was not to desert -- to run away to Canada. He thought, 'Send me to jail.' Raise your hand and say, 'I won't go. Hell no, I won't go.'"
Bettmann Archive
Thousands of anti-Vietnam demonstrators march through Oakland Calif., Nov. 20, 1965.
Along with Harris' efforts, which had widespread impact as the courts filled with draft resisters, other groups had begun organizing anti-war efforts, including David Mixner, who helped found the Vietnam Moratorium Committee.
"These marches were not about politics. [it was] about life and saving lives," Mixner told ABC News.
(MORE: Vietnam veterans reconnect during visit to Hanoi Hilton prison: 'It's closure for us')
On Oct.15, 1969, more than 2 million Americans participated in a nationwide "Moratorium" -- an anti-war effort "to show Americans that the anti-war movement [was] mainstream. It [incorporated] mothers, old people, working-class people and people from the middle of the country," according to Bingham. Church services, marches, teach-ins, sit-ins took place across the country, from large cities like Boston and New York to small towns in the Midwest.
At the time of the Moratorium, former Secretary of State John Kerry had returned to the United States after serving in Vietnam as a swift boat skipper and earning a Silver Star, a Bronze Star and three Purple Hearts.
Deeply questioning the American mission in Vietnam, Kerry said, "I wanted to find a way to try to end the war that I'd fought in because I thought we needed to and began that process."
Warren K Leffler/PhotoQuest/Getty Images
American soldier John Kerry, spokesman for the VVAW (Vietnam Veterans Against the War), speaks to the press at an outdoor event in Washington D.C., April 21, 1971. more +
Still serving in the U.S. Navy, Kerry took a vacation day and volunteered to fly a speaker around events in New York state.
"I saw this ... massive coalition of energy," Kerry told ABC News. "It had a big impression on me that I wasn't sort of alone sitting there, stewing in my feelings about the war. I mean, it was the birth of my activism, yeah."
When Kerry left the Navy at the end of 1969, his participation in the anti-war movement only grew. In April 1971, Kerry marched on Washington with about 5,000 other veterans, and he went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and asked the defining question of the time: "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die in Vietnam?"
"When I criticized the war, some people obviously didn't like that," he said. "But a lot of us felt it was important to tell the truth about what was happening over there in order to try to save lives, and I think, ultimately, the efforts to end the war did save lives. I feel that very, very strongly."
On Jan. 28, 1973, a day after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords by the governments of the U.S., South Vietnam and North Vietnam, a cease-fire went into effect. By the end of March, the last U.S. combat troops departed.
The rancorous consequences of Vietnam continue to this day. And those who fought -- unfairly conflated with those who ordered the fighting -- suffer to this day.
"Every American should remember that war, and every American should be taught about it," Harris said. "It's still there in the memory bank, but I think we as a country have not come to terms with it. We have not faced up to what we did. We have not made amends for it. We killed more than 2 million people for no good reason. You can't just walk away from that."
We have been here before.
In 1971, a military jury rendered a verdict that a young service member named Lt. William Calley was guilty of war crimes in connection with the massacre at the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai. Throughout Calley’s trial, there had been massive public outcry proclaiming his innocence. Even if this man had committed the acts for which he had been accused, his supporters said, they took place in the fog of war, and he’d spent months watching his friends be maimed or killed. Two days after he was sentenced to life in prison for murder, then-President Richard Nixon intervened to remove him from prison.
And two days after that, the 29-year-old judge advocate who prosecuted Calley took the extraordinary step of writing the president a letter. That letter is worth rereading in light of Trump’s apparently planned actions. It speaks to our moment and Trump’s contemplated pardons every bit as much as it spoke to Nixon’s clemency for Calley. “I would have hoped,” wrote Capt. Aubrey Daniel:
that all leaders of this nation, which is supposed to be the leader within the international community for the protection of the weak and the oppressed regardless of nationality, would have either accepted and supported the enforcement of the laws of this country as reflected by the verdict of the court or not made any statement concerning the verdict until they had had the same opportunity to evaluate the evidence that the members of the jury had.
Calley was the only person convicted of war crimes in connection with My Lai—the most notorious abuse committed by the United States during the Vietnam War. On March 16, 1968, roughly a hundred American soldiers stormed the village of My Lai, killing 504 unarmed civilians, including 17 pregnant women and 56 infants. Calley was ultimately convicted of murdering at least 22 Vietnamese civilians and sentenced to life in prison. Following Calley’s conviction on April 1, 1971, President Nixon ordered Calley removed from the stockade and placed under house arrest, where he would remain for three years before his release at the hands of a federal court order.
In response to revelations that Trump may pardon accused or convicted war criminals, commentators are rightly pointing to the specter of My Lai, Calley and Nixon.
Meanwhile, some former military officials have taken the unusual step of going on the record to express grave concern about the message the president’s decision might send to U.S. troops. Current senior officials have not yet spoken out publicly, although some have reportedly warned that if the U.S. is seen as not respecting laws of war, U.S. troops would be at a greater risk of being mistreated or killed should they be captured on the battlefield. Given the apolitical nature of military leadership and the extreme disincentives for disagreeing publicly with the commander-in-chief, it’s hardly surprising that there hasn’t been an outcry or formal protest from the U.S. military about the rumored pardons. It’s also why it’s so striking that an officer as junior as Aubrey Daniel publicly opposed Nixon’s decision to ease Calley’s punishment.
Parsing through Daniel’s remarkable letter may be helpful now that the country seems to have arrived at another inflection point for the president’s relationship to the prosecution of war crimes. Note that Trump’s contemplated action is far more dramatic than Nixon’s was. Nixon did not pardon Calley. He did not even commute his sentence. He merely changed his conditions of confinement after his conviction and pending appeal.
By contrast, Trump is reportedly contemplating actual pardons, including, in at least one case, a pardon granted before the trial process is even complete. So what Daniel said about Nixon’s action rings even truer about what Trump is supposedly planning. As Charles Lane of the
Washington Post has pointed out, pardoning a service member
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26 U.S. C. § 7701(a) (1) (2) (5)-[17] Definitions
Henry Kissinger’s Most Callous and Inhumane Quotes
February 12, 2016
It was quite a sight this past week to see Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton cozy up to former Secretary of State, and international war criminal, Henry Kissinger for his endorsement. Clinton was gushing as she talked about her old friend and mentor and Kissinger returned the compliments calling Clinton one of the best Secretaries of States in recent time.
Undoubtedly he was thinking about the way she had orchestrated the bombing of Libya that led that country to its present day state of chaos and destruction.
In 1973 Le Duc Tho, the lead negotiator at the Paris Peace Accords for Vietnam, refused the Nobel Peace Prize as U.S. aerial bombardments continued to rain down on his country. Tho said at the time that there was no way he could share the award with Henry Kissinger who he considered “the destroyer of his country”. Kissinger was not just responsible for the destruction of Vietnam but also Laos and Cambodia and the slaughter of millions in those countries. Kissinger’s crimes also include the brutal invasion of East Timor in 1975 and the overthrow of Chile’s Allende in 1973. It is for these reasons we are running these 10 infamous quotes of Kissinger that originally appeared in an Alternet article by Fred Branfman in April 2013.
Resumen Latinoamericano North American Bureau
TOP TEN KISSINGER QUOTES
1. Soviet Jews: “The emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union is not an objective of American foreign policy. And if they put Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern.” (link)
2. Bombing Cambodia: “[Nixon] wants a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia. He doesn’t want to hear anything about it. It’s an order, to be done. Anything that flies on anything that moves.” (link) (Emphasis added)
3. Bombing Vietnam: “It’s wave after wave of planes. You see, they can’t see the B-52 and they dropped a million pounds of bombs … I bet you we will have had more planes over there in one day than Johnson had in a month … each plane can carry about 10 times the load of World War II plane could carry.” (link)
4. Khmer Rouge: “How many people did (Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister Ieng Sary) kill? Tens of thousands? You should tell the Cambodians (i.e., Khmer Rouge) that we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in the way. We are prepared to improve relations with them. Tell them the latter part, but don’t tell them what I said before.” (from November 26, 1975 Meeting With Thai Foreign Minister.)
5. Dan Ellsberg: “Because that son-of-a-bitch—First of all, I would expect—I know him well—I am sure he has some more information—I would bet that he has more information that he’s saving for the trial. Examples of American war crimes that triggered him into it…It’s the way he’d operate….Because he is a despicable bastard.” (Oval Office tape, July 27, 1971)
6. Robert McNamara: “Boohoo, boohoo … He’s still beating his breast, right? Still feeling guilty. ” (Pretending to cry, rubbing his eyes.)
7. Assassination: “It is an act of insanity and national humiliation to have a law prohibiting the President from ordering assassination.” (Statement at a National Security Council meeting , 1975)
8. Chile: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves.” (link)
9. Illegality-Unconstitutionality: “The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer.” (from March 10, 1975 Meeting With Turkish Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel in Ankara, Turkey)
10. Himself: “Americans like the cowboy … who rides all alone into the town, the village, with his horse and nothing else … This amazing, romantic character suits me precisely because to be alone has always been part of my style or, if you like, my technique.” (November 1972 Interview with Oriana Fallaci)
http://www.rawstory.com/2016/02/here-are-the-top-10-most-callous-and-inhumane-henry-kissinger-quotes/
Kissinger was asked by the assistant to the president, John Ehrlichman, "How long do you figure the South Vietnamese can survive under this agreement?" Ehrlichman reported that Kissinger answered, "I think that if they're lucky they can hold out for a year and a half." When Kissinger's assistant John Negroponte opined that the agreement was not in the best interests of South Vietnam, Kissinger asked him, "Do you want us to stay there forever?"
Nixon yearned to be remembered by history as a great foreign policy president; he needed a noncommunist South Vietnam on that ledger in order to sustain a legacy that already included détente with the Soviets and an opening with China. If South Vietnam was going down the tubes, it could not be on Nixon's watch. "What really matters now is how it all comes out," Nixon wrote in his diary in April 1972. "Both Haldeman and Henry seem to have an idea — which I think is mistaken — that even if we fail in Vietnam we can survive politically. I have no illusions whatsoever on that score, however. The US will not have a credible policy if we fail, and I will have to assume responsibility for that development."
* * *
No Peace, No Honor draws on recently declassified records to show that the true picture is worse than either of these perspectives suggests. The reality was the opposite of the decent interval hypothesis and far beyond Nixon's and Kissinger's claims. The record shows that the United States expected that the signed treaty would be immediately violated and that this would trigger a brutal military response. Permanent war (air war, not ground operations) at acceptable cost was what Nixon and Kissinger anticipated from the so-called peace agreement. They believed that the only way the American public would accept it was if there was a signed agreement. Nixon recognized that winning the peace, like the war, would be impossible to achieve, but he planned for indefinite stalemate by using the B-52s to prop up the government of South Vietnam until the end of his presidency. Just as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution provided a pretext for an American engagement in South Vietnam, the Paris Accords were intended to fulfill a similar role for remaining permanently engaged in Vietnam. Watergate derailed the plan.
The declassified record shows that the South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, and the United States disregarded key elements of the treaty because all perceived it was in their interest to do so. No one took the agreement seriously because each party viewed it as a means for securing something unstated. For the United States, as part of the Nixon Doctrine, it was a means of remaining permanently involved in Southeast Asia; for the North Vietnamese, it was the means for eventual conquest and unification of Vietnam; for the South Vietnamese, it was a means for securing continued support from the United States.
The truth has remained buried for so long because Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did everything possible to deny any independent access to the historical record. As witnesses to history, they used many classified top-secret documents in writing their respective memoirs but later made sure that everyone else would have great difficulty accessing the same records. They have limited access to personal papers, telephone records, and other primary source materials that would allow for any independent assessments of the record pertaining to the evolution of negotiating strategies and compromises that were raised at different stages of the protracted process. The late Admiral Elmo "Bud" Zumwalt, Jr., former chief of naval operations said that "Kissinger's method of writing history is similar to that of communist historians who took justifications from the present moment and projected backwards, fact by fact, in accounting for their country's past. Under this method, nothing really was as it happened." This is how the administration's history of "peace with honor" was written.
The personal papers of Henry Kissinger are deposited in the Library of Congress with a deed of gift restricting access until five years after his death. For years we have been denied access to the full transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations. Verbatim hand-written transcripts of the secret meetings in Paris were kept by Kissinger's assistants, Tony Lake, Winston Lord, and John Negroponte. Negroponte gave a complete set of these meeting notes to Kissinger for writing his memoirs, but they were never returned. In his deposition to the Kerry Committee investigation, which examined virtually all aspects of the MIA issue and gave special attention to the Paris negotiations, Winston Lord stated that there were "verbatim transcripts of every meeting with the Vietnamese. I'm talking now about the secret meetings, because I took, particularly toward the beginning, and we got some help at the end, the notes as did Negroponte or Smyser or Rodman and so on." Only now have notes of these secret back-channel meetings become available. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese have published their own narrative translation of the Kissinger-Tho negotiations.
This is the story of a peace negotiation that began with Lyndon Johnson in 1968 and ended with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. Many secret meetings were involved. The principal sources include transcript-like narratives of documents from Hanoi archives that have been translated by Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu and published as Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris; declassified meeting transcripts from a congressional investigation of MIAs in Southeast Asia; declassified meeting notes from the papers of Tony Lake and memoranda of conversations from recently declassified materials in the National Archives or presidential libraries. These three have been triangulated to connect minutes as well as linkages between events. In many cases, I have been able to fill in classified sections through materials in back-channel cables from Kissinger to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker or President Nixon.
Here, then, is the emerging story of what Nixon called "peace with honor" but was, in fact, neither. This story of diplomatic deception and public betrayal has come to the light only because of the release of documents and tapes that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger sought to bury for as long as possible. Prior to these declassifications, we knew only what Nixon or Kissinger wanted us to know about the making of war and shaping of the so-called honorable peace in Vietnam
(3) News conference statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
January 24, 1973.

(Presidential Documents, Vol. 9 (1973), pp. 64-70)

(Excerpts)

DR. KISSINGER. Ladies and gentlemen, the President last evening presented the outlines of the agreement and by common agreement between us and the North Vietnamese we have today released the texts. And I am here to explain, to go over briefly what these texts contain, and how we got there, what we have tried to achieve in recent months and where we expect to go from here.

Let me begin by going through the agreement, which you have read.

PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

Chapter 1: Vietnamese National Rights

The agreement, as you know, is in nine chapters. The first affirms the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, agreements which established two zones, divided by a military demarcation line.

Chapter II: Ceasefire and Withdrawal

Chapter II deals with the cease-fire. The cease-fire will go into effect at 7 o'clock Washington time on Saturday night
[January 27]. The principal provisions of Chapter II deal with permitted acts during the cease-fire and with what the
Obligations of the various parties are with respect to the cease-fire.

Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal of American and all other foreign forces from Vietnam within a period of 60 days.
And it specifies the forces that have to be withdrawn. These are in effect all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. We are permitted to retain economic advisers and civilian technicians serving in certain of the military branches.

Chapter II further deals with the provisions for resupply and for the introduction of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any military force into South Vietnam from outside of South Vietnam, which is to say that whatever forces may be in South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam, specifically North Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforcements replacements or any other form of augmentation by any means whatsoever. With respect to military equipment, both sides are permitted to replace all existing military equipment on a one-to-one basis under international supervision and control.

There will be established, as I will explain when I discuss the protocols, for each side, three legitimate points of entry through which all replacement equipment has to move. These legitimate points of entry will be under international supervision.

Chapter III: Return of POWs

Chapter III deals with the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians as well as with the question of civilian detainees within South Vietnam.

This, as you know, throughout the negotiations, presented enormous difficulties for us. We insisted throughout that the question of American prisoners of war and of American civilians captured throughout Indochina should be separated from the issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel detained-partly because of the enormous difficulty of classifying the Vietnamese civilian personnel by categories of who was detained for reasons of the civil war and who was detained for criminal activities, and secondly, because it was foreseeable that negotiations about the release of civilian detainees would be complex and difficult and because we did not want to have the issue of American personnel mixed up with the issues of civilian personnel in South Vietnam.

This turned out to be one of the thorniest issues that was settled at some point and kept reappearing throughout the negotiations. It was one of the difficulties we had during the December negotiations.

As you can see from the agreement, the return of American military personnel and captured civilians is separated in terms of obligation, and in terms of the time frame, from the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel.

The return of American personnel and the accounting of missing in action is unconditional and will take place within the same time frame as the American withdrawal.

The issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel will be negotiated between the two Vietnamese parties over a period of 3 months, and as the agreement says, they will do their utmost to resolve this question within the 3 month period.

So I repeat, the issue is separated, both in terms of obligation and in terms of the relevant time frame from the return of American prisoners, which is unconditional.

We expect that American prisoners will be released at intervals of 2 weeks or fifteen days in roughly equal installments. We have been told that no American prisoners are held in Cambodia. American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi. They will be received by American medical evacuation teams and flown on American airplanes from Hanoi to places of our own choice, probably Vientiane.

There will be international supervision of both this provision and of the provision for the missing in action. And all American prisoners will, of course, be released, within 60 days of the signing of the agreement. The signing will take place on January 27, in two installments, the significance of which I will explain to you when I, have run through the provisions of the agreement and the associated protocols.

Chapter IV: Self-determination for South Vietnam

Chapter IV of the agreement deals with the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. Its first provision contains a joint statement by the United States and North Vietnam in which those two countries jointly recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, in which those two countries jointly affirm that the South Vietnamese people shall decide for themselves the political system that they shall choose and jointly affirm that no foreign country shall impose any political tendency on the South Vietnamese people.

The other principal provisions of the agreement are that in implementing the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, the two South Vietnamese parties will decide, will agree among each other, on free elections, for offices to be decided by the two parties, at a time to be decided by the two parties. These elections will be supervised and organized first by an institution which has the title of National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, whose members will be equally appointed by the two sides, which will operate on the principle of unanimity, and which will come into being after negotiation between the two parties, who are obligated by this agreement to do their utmost to bring this institution into being within 90 days.

Leaving aside the technical jargon, the significance of this part of the agreement is that the United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose any political solution on the people of South Vietnam. The United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose a coalition government or a disguised coalition government on the people of South Vietnam.

If you examine the provisions of this chapter, you will see, first, that the existing government in Saigon can remain in office; secondly, that the political future of South Vietnam depends on agreement between the South Vietnamese parties and not on an agreement that the United States has imposed on these parties; thirdly, that the nature of this political evolution, the timing of this political evolution, is left to the South Vietnamese parties, and that the organ that is created to see to it that the elections that are organized will be conducted properly, is one in which each of the South Vietnamese parties has a veto.

The other significant provision of this agreement is the requirement that the South Vietnamese parties will bring about a reduction of their armed forces, and that the forces being reduced will be demobilized.

Chapter V: Reunification and the DMZ

The next chapter deals with the reunification of Vietnam and the relationship between North and South Vietnam. In the many negotiations that I have conducted over recent weeks, not the least arduous was the negotiation conducted with the ladies and gentlemen of the press, who constantly raised issues with respect to sovereignty, the existence of South Vietnam as a political entity, and other matters of this kind. I will return to this issue at the end when I sum up the agreement, but it is obvious that there is no dispute in the agreement between the parties that there is an entity called South Vietnam, and that the future unity of Vietnam, as it comes about, will be decided by negotiation between North and South Vietnam, that it will not be achieved by military force, indeed, that the use of military force with respect to bringing about unification, or any other form of coercion, is impermissible according to the terms of this agreement.

Secondly, there are specific provisions in this chapter with respect to the Demilitarized Zone. There is a repetition of the agreement of 1954 which makes the demarcation line along the 17th Parallel provisional, which means pending reunification.
There is a specific provision that both North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line, and there is another provision that indicates that among the subjects that can be negotiated will be modalities of civilian movement across the demarcation line, which makes it clear that military movement across the Demilitarized Zone is in all circumstances prohibited.

Now, this may be an appropriate point to explain what our position has been with respect to the DMZ. There has been a great deal of discussion about the issue of sovereignty and about the issue of legitimacy, which is to say which government is in control of South Vietnam, and, finally, about why we laid such great stress on the issue of the Demilitarized Zone.

We had to place stress. On the issue of the Demilitarized Zone because the provisions of the agreement with respect to infiltration, with respect to replacement, with respect to any of the military provisions, would have made no sense whatsoever if there was not some demarcation line that defined where South Vietnam began. If we had accepted the preposition that would have in effect eroded the Demilitarized Zone, then the provisions of the agreement with respect to restrictions about the introduction of men and materiel into South Vietnam would have been unilateral restrictions applying only to the United States and only to our allies. Therefore, if there was to be any meaning to the separation of military and political issues, if there was to be any permanence to the military provisions that had been negotiated, then it was essential that there was a definition of where the obligations of this agreement began. As you can see from the text of the agreement, the principles that we defended were essentially achieved.

Chapters VI and VII: International Machinery; Laos and Cambodia

Chapter VI deals with the international machinery, and we will discuss that when I talk about the associated protocols of the agreement.

Chapter VII deals with Laos and Cambodia. Now, the problem of Laos and Cambodia has two parts. One part concerns those obligations which can be undertaken by the parties signing the agreement-that is to say, the three Vietnamese parties and the United States-those measures that they can take which affect the situation in Laos and Cambodia.

A second part of the situation in Laos has to concern the nature of the civil conflict that is taking place within Laos and Cambodia and the solution of which, of course, must involve as well the two Laotian parties and the innumerable Cambodian factions.

Let me talk about the provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and Cambodia and our firm expectations as to the future in Laos and Cambodia.

The provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos and
Cambodia reaffirm, as an obligation to all the parties, the provisions of the 1954 agreement on Cambodia and of the 1962 agreement on Laos, which affirm the neutrality and right to self-determination of those two countries. They are, therefore, consistent with our basic position with respect also to South Vietnam.

In terms of the immediate conflict, the provisions of the agreement specifically prohibit the use of Laos and Cambodia for military and any other operations against any of the signatories of the Paris Agreement or against any other country. In other words, there is a flat prohibition against the use of base areas in Laos and Cambodia.

There is a flat prohibition against the use of Laos and Cambodia for infiltration into Vietnam or, for that matter, into any other country.

Finally, there is a requirement that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and it is clearly understood that North Vietnamese troops are considered foreign with respect to Laos and Cambodia.

Now, as to the conflict within these countries which could not be formally settled in an agreement which is not signed by the parties of that conflict, let me make this statement, without elaborating it: It is our firm expectation that within a short period of time there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos which, in turn, will lead to a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos and, of course, to the end of the use of Laos as a corridor of infiltration.

Secondly, the situation in Cambodia, as those of you who have studied it will know, is somewhat more complex because there are several parties headquartered in different countries. Therefore, we can say about Cambodia that it is our expectation that a de facto cease-fire will come into being over a period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement.

Our side will take the appropriate measures to indicate that it will not attempt to change the situation by force. We have reason to believe that our position is clearly understood by all concerned parties, and I will not go beyond this in my statement.

Chapters VIII and IX: Normalizing Relations; Implementation

Chapter VIII deals with the relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

As I have said in my briefings on October 26 and on December 16, and as the President affirmed on many occasions, the last time in his speech last evening, the United States is seeking a peace that heals. We have had many armistices in Indochina. We want a peace that will last.

And, therefore, it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to move from hostility to normalization and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation. And we believe that under conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the humane aspirations of all the people of Indochina, And we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace.

Chapter IX of the agreement is the usual implementing provision.

So much for the agreement.

PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS

Prisoners of War

Now, let me say a word about the protocols. There are four protocols or implementing instruments to the agreement: on the return of American prisoners, on the implementation and institution of an international control commission, on the regulations with respect to the cease-fire and the implementation and institution of a joint military commission among the concerned parties, and a protocol about the deactivation and removal of mines.

I have given you the relevant provisions of the protocol concerning the return of prisoners. They will be returned at periodic intervals in Hanoi to American authorities and not to American private groups. They will be picked up by American airplanes, except for prisoners held in the southern part of South Vietnam, which will be released at designated points in the South, again, to American authorities.

We will receive on Saturday, the day of the signing of the agreement, a list of all American prisoners held throughout Indochina. And both parties, that is to say, all parties have an obligation to assist each other in obtaining information about the prisoners, missing in action, and about the location of graves of American personnel throughout Indochina.

The International Commission has the right to visit the last place of detention of the prisoners, as well as the place from which they are released.

International Commission of Control and Supervision [ICCS]

Now, to the International Control Commission. You will remember that one of the reasons for the impasse in December was the difficulty of agreeing with the North Vietnamese about the size of the International Commission, its function, or the location of its teams.

On this occasion, there is no point in rehashing all the differences. It is, however, useful to point out that at that time the proposal of the North Vietnamese was that the International Control Commission have a membership of 250, no organic logistics or communication, dependent entirely for its authority to move on the party it was supposed to be investigating; and over half of its personnel were supposed to be located in Saigon, which is not the place where most of the infiltration that we were concerned with was likely to take place.

We have distributed to you an outline of the basic structure of this Commission. Briefly stated, its total number is 1,160, drawn from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. It has a headquarters in Saigon. It has seven regional teams, 26 teams based in localities throughout Vietnam which were chosen either because forces were in contact there or because we estimated that these were the areas where the violations of the cease-fire were most probable.

There are 12 teams at border crossing points. There are seven teams that are set aside for points of entry, which have yet to be chosen, for the replacement of military equipment. That is for Article 7 of the agreement. There will be three on each side and there will be no legitimate point of entry into South Vietnam other than those three points. The other border and coastal teams are there simply to make certain that no other entry occurs, and any other entry is by definition illegal. There has to be no other demonstration except the fact that it occurred.

This leaves one team free for use, in particular, at the discretion of the Commission. And, of course, the seven teams that are being used for the return of the prisoners can be used at the discretion of the Commission after the prisoners are returned.

There is one reinforced team located at the Demilitarized Zone and its responsibility extends along the entire Demilitarized Zone. It is in fact a team and a, half. It is 50 percent larger than a normal border team and it represents one of the many compromises that were made, between our insistence on two teams and their insistence on one team. By a brilliant stroke, we settled on a team and a half.

With respect to the operation of the International Commission, it is supposed to operate on the principle of unanimity, which is to say that its reports, if they are Commission reports, have to have the approval of all four members. However, each member is permitted to submit his own opinion, so that as a practical matter any member of the Commission can make a finding of a violation and submit a report, in the first instance to the parties.

The International Commission will report for the time being to the four parties to the agreement. An international conference will take place, we expect, at the Foreign Ministers' level within a month of signing the agreement.

That international conference will establish a relationship
between the International Commission and itself, or any other international body that is mutually agreed upon, so that the International Commission is not only reporting to the parties that it is investigating. But, for the time being, until the international conference has met, there was no other practical group to which the International Commission could report.
Cease-fire and Joint Military Commissions

In addition to this international group, there are two other institutions that are supposed to supervise the cease-fire. There is, first of all, an institution called the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which is composed of ourselves and the three Vietnamese parties, which is located in the same place as the International Commission, charged with roughly the same functions, but, as a practical matter, it is supposed to conduct the preliminary investigations, its disagreements are automatically referred to the International Commission, and, moreover, any party can request the International Commission to conduct an investigation regardless of what the Four-Party Commission does and regardless of whether the Four-Party Commission has completed its investigation or not.

After the United States has completed its withdrawal, the Four-Party Military Commission will be transformed into a Two-Party Commission composed of the two South Vietnamese parties. The total number of supervisory personnel, therefore, will be in the neighborhood of 4,500 during the period that the Four-Party Commission is in existence, and in the neighborhood of about 3,000 after the Four-Party Commission ceases operating and the Two-Party Commission comes into being.

Deactivation and Removal of Mines

Finally, there is a protocol concerning the removal and deactivation of mines which is self-explanatory and simply explains-discusses the relationship between our efforts and the efforts of the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] concerning the removal and deactivation of mines which is one of the obligations we have undertaken in the agreement.
Signing
The Documents

Now, let me point another problem. On Saturday, January 27, the Secretary of State on behalf of the United States will sign the agreement bringing the cease-fire and all the other provisions of the agreement and the protocols into force. He will sign in the morning a document involving four parties and in the afternoon a document between us and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. These documents are identical, except that the preamble differs in both cases.

The reason for this somewhat convoluted procedure is that, while the agreement provides that the two South Vietnamese parties should settle their disputes in an atmosphere of national reconciliation and concord, I think it is safe to say that they have not yet quite reached that point; indeed, that they have not yet been prepared to recognize each other's existence.

This being the case, it was necessary to devise one document in which neither of the South Vietnamese parties was mentioned by name and, therefore, no other party could be mentioned by name, on the principle of equality. So the four-party document, the document that will have four signatures can be read with great care and you will not know until you get to the signature page whom exactly it applies to. It refers only to the parties participating in the Paris Conference, which are, of course, well known to the parties participating in the Paris Conference.

It will be signed on two separate page. The United States and the GVN [Government of the Republic of Vietnam] are signing on one page and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its ally are signing on a separate page. And this procedure has aged us all by several years.

Then there is another document which will be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the afternoon. That document, in its operative provisions, is word for word the same as the document which will be signed in the morning, and which contains the obligations to which the two South Vietnamese parties are obligated.

It differs from that document only in the preamble and in its concluding paragraph. In the preamble, it says the United States; with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, and the DRV, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the rest is the same, and then the concluding paragraph has the same adaptation. That document, of course, is not signed by ether Saigon or its opponent and, therefore, their obligations are derived from the Four-party document.

I do not want to take any time in going into the abstruse
legalisms, I simply wanted to explain to you why there were two different signature ceremonies, and why, when we handed out the text of the agreement, we appended to the document which contains the legal obligations which apply to everybody-namely, the four parties-why we appended another section that contained a different preamble and a different implementing paragraph which is going to be signed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

This will be true with respect to the agreement and three of the protocols. The fourth protocol, regarding the removal of mines, applies only to the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and, therefore, we are in the happy position of having to sign only one document.

SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

Now, then let me summarize for you how we got to this point, and some of the aspects of the agreement that we consider significant, and then I will answer your questions.

As you know, when I met with this group on December 16, we had to report that the negotiations in Paris seemed to have reached a stalemate. We had not agreed at that time, although we didn't say so on the-we could not find a formula to take into account the conflicting views with respect to signing. There were disagreements with respect to the DMZ and with the associated aspects of what identity South Vietnam was to have in the agreement.

There was a total deadlock with respect to the protocols, which I summed up in the December 16 press conference. The North Vietnamese approach to international control and ours were so totally at variance that it seemed impossible at that point to come to any satisfactory conclusion. And there began to be even some concern that the separation which we thought we had achieved in October between the release of our prisoners and the question of civilian prisoners in South Vietnam was breaking down.

When we reassembled on January 8, we did not do so in the most cordial atmosphere that I remember. However, by the morning of January 9, it became apparent that both sides were determined to make a serious effort to break the deadlock in negotiations. And we adopted a mode of procedure by which issues in the agreement
and issues of principle with respect to the protocols were
discussed at meetings between Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and myself, while concurrently an American team headed by Ambassador Sullivan and a Vietnamese team headed by Vice Minister Thach would work on the implementation of the principles as they applied to the protocols.

For example, the Special Adviser and I might agree on the
principle of border control posts and their number, but then
the problem of how to locate them, according to what criteria, and with what mode of operation presented enormous difficulties.

Let me on this occasion also point out that these negotiations required the closest cooperation throughout our Government, between the White House and the State Department, between all the elements of our team, and that, therefore, the usual speculation of who did what to whom is really extraordinarily misplaced.

Without a cooperative effort by everybody, we could not have achieved what we have presented last night and this morning,

The Special Adviser and I then spent the week, first on working out the unresolved issues in the-agreement, and then the unresolved issues with respect to the protocols, and finally, the surrounding circumstances of schedules and procedures. Ambassador Sullivan remained behind to draft the implementing provisions of the -agreements that had been achieved during the week. The Special Adviser and I remained in close contact.

So by the time we met again yesterday, the issues that remained were very few, indeed, were settled relatively rapidly. And I may on this occasion also point out that while the North Vietnamese are the most difficult people to negotiate with that I have ever encountered when they do not want to settle, they are also the most effective that I have dealt with when they finally decide to settle. So that we have gone through peaks and valleys in these negotiations
Of extraordinary intensity

Now then, let me sum up where this agreement bas left us, first, with respect to what we said we would try to achieve, then with respect to some of its significance, and, finally, with respect to the future.

First, when I met this group on October 26 and delivered myself of some epigrammatic phrases, we obviously did not want to give a complete checklist and we did not want to release the agreement as t then stood, because it did not seem to us desirable to provide a checklist against which both sides would then have to measure success and failure in terms of their prestige.

At that time, too, we did not say that it had always been foreseen that there would be another three or four days of negotiation after this tentative agreement, had been reached.
The reason why we asked for another negotiation was because it seemed to us at that point that for a variety of reasons, which I explained then and again on December 16, those issues could not be settled within the time frame that the North Vietnamese expected.

It is now a matter of history, and it is, therefore, not essential to go into a debate of on what we based this judgment. But that was the reason why the agreement was not signed on October 31, and not any of the speculations that have been so much in print and on television.

Now, what did we say on October 26 we wanted to achieve? We said, first of all, that we wanted to make sure that the control machinery would be in place at the time of the cease-fire. We did this because we had information that there were plans by the other side to mount a major offensive to coincide with the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

This objective has been achieved by the fact that the protocols will be signed on the same day as the agreement, by the fact that the International Control Commission and the Four-Party Military Commission will meet within 24 hours of the agreement going into effect, or no later than Monday morning, Saigon time, that the regional teams of the International Control Commission will be in place 48 hours thereafter, and that all other teams will be in place within 15 and a maximum of 30 days after that.

Second, we said that we wanted to compress the time interval between the cease-fires we expected in Laos and Cambodia and the cease-fire in Vietnam.

For reasons which I have explained to you, we cannot be as
specific about the cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia as we can about the agreements that are being signed on Saturday, but we can say with confidence that the formal cease-fire in Laos will go into effect in a considerably shorter period of time than was envisaged in October, and since the cease-fire in Cambodia depends to some extent on developments in Laos, we expect the same to be true there.

We said that certain linguistic ambiguities should be removed. The linguistic ambiguities were produced by the somewhat extraordinary negotiating procedure whereby a change in the English text did not always produce a correlative change in the Vietnamese text. All the linguistic ambiguities to which we referred in October have, in fact, been removed. At that time I mentioned only one, and therefore I am free to recall it.

I pointed out that the United States position had consistently been a rejection of the imposition of a coalition government on the people of South Vietnam. I said then that the National Council of Reconciliation was not a coalition government, nor was it conceived as a coalition government.

The Vietnamese language text, however, permitted an interpretation of the words "administrative structure" as applied to the National Council of Reconciliation which would have lent itself to the interpretation that it came close or was identical with a coalition government.

You will find that in the text of this agreement the words "administrative structure" no longer exist and therefore this particular, shall we say, ambiguity has been removed.

I pointed out in October that we had to find a procedure for signing which would be acceptable to all the parties for whom obligations were involved. This has been achieved.

I pointed out on October 26 that we would seek greater precision with respect to certain 'obligations particularly, without spelling them out, as they applied to the Demilitarized Zone and to the obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That too, has been achieved.

And I pointed out in December that we were looking for some means, some expression, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam, would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force.

This is now explicitly provided, and we have achieved
formulations in which in a number of paragraphs, such as Article 14, 18(e) and 20, there are specific references to the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

There are specific references, moreover, to the same thing in Article 6 and Article 11 of the ICCS protocol. There are specific references to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination.

And, therefore, we believe that we have achieved the substantial adaptations that we asked for on October 26. We did not increase our demands after October 26 and we substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought.

Now then, it is obvious that a war that has lasted for 10 years will have many elements that cannot be completely satisfactory to all the parties concerned. And in the two periods where the North Vietnamese were working with dedication and seriousness on a conclusion, the period in October and the period after we resumed talks on January 8, it was always clear that a lasting peace could come about only if neither side sought to achieve everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties been a rejection of the imposition of a coalition government on the people of South Vietnam. I said then that the National Council of Reconciliation was not a coalition government, nor was it conceived as a coalition government.

The Vietnamese language text, however, permitted an interpretation of the words "administrative structure" as applied to the National Council of Reconciliation which would have lent itself to the interpretation that it came close or was identical with a coalition government.

You will find that in the text of this agreement the words "administrative structure" no longer exist and therefore this particular, shall we say, ambiguity has been removed.

I pointed out in October that we had to find a procedure for signing which would be acceptable to all the parties for whom obligations were involved. This has been achieved.

I pointed out on October 26 that we would seek greater precision with respect to certain obligations particularly, without spelling them out, as they applied to the Demilitarized Zone and to the obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. That, too, has been achieved.

And I pointed out in December that we were looking for some means, some expression, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam, would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force.

This is now explicitly provided, and we have achieved formulations in which in a number of paragraphs, such as Article 14, IB(e) and 20, there are specific references to the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

There are specific references, moreover, to the same thing in Article 6 and Article 11 of the ICCS protocol. There are specific references to the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination.

And, therefore, we believe that we have achieved the substantial adaptations that we asked for on October 26. We did not increase our demands after October 26 and we substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought.

Now then, it is obvious that a war that has lasted for 10 years will have many elements that cannot be completely satisfactory to all the parties concerned. And in the two periods where the North Vietnamese were working with dedication and seriousness on a conclusion, the period in October and the period after we resumed talks on January 8, it was always clear that a lasting peace could come about only if neither side sought to achieve everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties concerned. And therefore, it is also clear that whether this agreement brings a lasting peace or not depends not only on its provisions but also on the spirit in which it is implemented.

It will be our challenge in the future to move the controversies that could not be stilled by any one document from the level of military conflict to the level of positive human aspirations, and to absorb the enormous talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks of construction rather than in tasks of destruction.

We will make a major effort to move to create a framework where we hope in a short time the animosities and the hatred and the suffering of this period will be seen as aspects of the past, and where the debates concern differences of opinion as to how to achieve positive goals.

Of course, the hatreds will not rapidly disappear, and, of course, people who have fought for 25 years will not easily give up their objectives, but also people who have suffered for 25 years may at last come to know that they can achieve their real satisfaction by other and less brutal means.

The President said yesterday that we have to remain vigilant, and so we shall, but we shall also dedicate ourselves to positive efforts. And as for us at home, it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of moral insight. And now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which should preserve the dignity and the self-respect of all of the parties, together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America.
Now, I will be glad to answer any questions.
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31/page 103
From page………………………………………………………………… 297 to 379
50 U.S. Code § 4105 [31] – Prisoner of War
So herein a statute is acceptability in evidence of the petitioner of the Vietnam War:
No Chapters and no Articles of Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 had cheating the benefits of prisoner of war when the Government of the United States of America has solemnly signed on this International Agreement but also approved by the United States Congress which is why the proxy war of the United States of America has directly controlled and ruled from the central government to the local governments of the Republic of Vietnam by the fighting anti-communism of the Americanism- and then, the Government of the United States of America has sold the Republic of Vietnam and the Southern Officers to communism. Especially, when the Government of the United States of America does not only have great power but also has luxuriously been a modern civilization that is why the United States of America has fooled a weak nation of the Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people who were not educated less than pieces of knowledge of the American people by the proxy war and prisoner of war. Where is the ethical conscience of the American Government putting where?
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
________________________________________
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
Article 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.
Article 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further Endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
Article 4
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.
Article 5
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
Article 6
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in Articles 10, 23, 28, 33, 60, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 109, 110, 118, 119, 122 and 132, the High Contracting Parties may conclude other special agreements for all matters concerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of prisoners of war, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
Prisoners of war shall continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the Convention is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent
agreements, or where more favorable measures have been taken with regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict.
Article 7
Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Article 8
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers.
The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case exceed their mission under the present Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they carry out their duties.
Article 9
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.
Article 10
The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers by virtue of the present Convention.
When prisoners of war do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization provided for in the first paragraph above, the Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an organization, to undertake the functions performed under the present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the Parties to a conflict.
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions of this Article, the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.
Any neutral Power or any organization invited by the Power concerned or offering itself for these purposes, shall be required to act with a sense of responsibility towards the Party to the conflict on which persons protected by the present Convention depend, and shall be required to furnish sufficient assurances that it is in a position to undertake the appropriate functions and to discharge them impartially.
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made by special agreements between Powers one of which is restricted, even temporarily, in its freedom to negotiate with the other Power or its allies by reason of military events, more particularly where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory of the said Power is occupied.
Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of a Protecting Power, such mention applies to substitute organizations in the sense of the present Article.
Article 11
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of protected persons, particularly in cases of disagreement between the Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the disagreement.
For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either at the invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, -propose to the Parties to the conflict a meeting of their representatives, and in particular of the authorities responsible for prisoners of war, possibly on neutral territory suitably chosen. The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the proposals made to them for this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if necessary, propose for approval by the Parties to the conflict a person belonging to a neutral Power, or delegated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, who shall be invited to take part in such a meeting.
PART II
GENERAL PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 12
Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.
Nevertheless if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.
Article 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
Article 14
Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honor.
Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favorable as that granted to men.
Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining Power may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights such capacity confers except in so far as the captivity requires.
Article 15
The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance and for the medical attention required by their state of health.
Article 16
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria. PART III
CAPTIVITY
SECTION I
BEGINNING OF CAPTIVITY
Article 17
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.
If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. AS far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war, who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
Article 18
All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military documents shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment.
At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power shall supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none.
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war.
Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank and unit of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power, or which are changed into such currency at the prisoner's request, shall be placed to the credit of the prisoner's account as provided in Article 64.
The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for reasons of security; when such articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money impounded shall apply.
Such objects, likewise the sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining Power and the conversion of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their initial shape to prisoners of war at the end of their captivity.
Article 19
Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.
Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.
Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.
Article 20
The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions similar to those for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food and potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take all suitable precautions to ensure their safety during evacuation, and shall establish as
soon as possible a list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated. .;
If prisoners of war must, during evacuation, pass through transit camps, their stay in such camps shall be as brief as possible.
SECTION 11
INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Chapter I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Article 21
The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary.
Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in so far as is allowed by the laws of the Power on which they depend. Such measures shall be taken particularly in cases where this may contribute to the improvement of their state of health. No prisoner of war shall be compelled to accept liberty on parole or promise.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall notify the adverse Party of the laws and regulations allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on parole or promise. Prisoners of war who are paroled or who have given their promise in conformity with the laws and regulations so notified are bound on their personal honor scrupulously to fulfill, both towards the Power on which they depend and towards the Power which has captured them, the engagements of their paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they depend is bound neither to require nor to accept from them any service incompatible with the parole or promise given.
Article 22
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular
cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as possible to a more favorable climate.
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with their consent.
Article 23
No prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.
Prisoners of war shall have shelters against air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the same extent as the local civilian population. With the exception of those engaged in the protection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards, they may enter such shelters as soon as possible after the giving of the alarm. Any other protective measure taken in favor of the population shall also apply to them.
Detaining Powers shall give the Powers concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers. all useful information regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps.
Whenever military considerations permit, prisoner of war camps shall be indicated in the day-time by the letters PW or PG, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air. The Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. Only prisoner of war camps shall be marked as such.
Article 24
Transit or screening camps of a permanent kind shall be fitted out under conditions similar to those described in the present Section, and the prisoners therein shall have the same treatment as in other camps.
Chapter II
QUARTERS FOOD AND CLOTHING OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 25
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as regards total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. All precautions must be taken against the danger of fire.
In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated, separate dormitories shall be provided for them.
Article 26
The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labor on which they are employed.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.
Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession.
Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.
Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.
Article 27
Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities by the Detaining Power, which shall make allowance
for the climate of the region where the prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces captured by the Detaining Power should, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.
The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining Power. In addition, prisoners of war who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever the nature of the work demands.
Article 28
Canteens shall be installed in all camps, where prisoners of war may procure foodstuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use. The tariff shall never be in excess of local market prices.
The profits made by camp canteens shall be used for the benefit of the prisoners; a special fund shall be created for this purpose. The prisoners' representative shall have the right to collaborate in the management of the canteen and of this fund.
When a camp is closed down, the credit balance of the special fund shall be handed to an international welfare organization, to be employed for the benefit of prisoners of war of the same nationality as those who have contributed to the fund. In case of a general repatriation, such profits shall be kept by the Detaining Power, subject to any agreement to the contrary between the Powers concerned.
Chapter III
HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION
Article 29
The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.
Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women prisoners of war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for them.
Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished, prisoners of war shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; the necessary installations, facilities and time shall be granted them for that purpose.
Article 30
Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war may have the attention they require, as well as appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set aside for cases of contagious or mental disease.
Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the near future. Special facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in particular to the blind, and for their rehabilitation, pending repatriation.
Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if possible, of their nationality.
Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination. The detaining authorities shall, upon request, issue to every prisoner who has undergone treatment, an official certificate indicating the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration and kind of treatment received. A duplicate of this certificate shall be forwarded to the Central Prisoners of War Agency.
The costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of prisoners of war in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances, and spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
Article 31
Medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be held at least once a month. They shall include the checking and the recording of the weight of each prisoner of war. Their purpose shall be, in particular, to supervise the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of prisoners and to detect contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria and venereal disease. For this purpose the most efficient methods available shall be employed, e.g. periodic mass miniature radiography for the early detection of tuberculosis.
Article 32
Prisoners of war who, though not attached to the medical service of their armed forces, are physicians, surgeons, dentists, nurses or medical orderlies, may be required by the Detaining Power to exercise their medical functions in the interests of prisoners of war dependent on the same Power. In that case they shall continue to be prisoners of war, but shall receive the same treatment as corresponding medical personnel retained by the Detaining Power. They shall be exempted from any other work under Article 49.
Chapter IV
MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND CHAPLAINS
RETAINED TO ASSIST PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 33
Members of the medical personnel and chaplains while retained by the Detaining Power with a view to assisting prisoners of war, shall not be considered as prisoners of war. They shall, however, receive as a minimum the benefits and protection of the present Convention, and shall also be granted all facilities necessary to provide for the medical care of, and religious ministration to prisoners of war.
They shall continue to exercise their medical and spiritual functions for the benefit of prisoners of war, preferably those belonging to the armed forces upon which they depend, within the scope of the military laws and regulations of the Detaining Power and under the control of its competent services, in accordance with their professional etiquette. They shall also benefit by the following facilities in the exercise of their medical or spiritual functions:
(a) They shall be authorized to visit periodically prisoners of war situated in working detachments or in hospitals outside the camp. For this purpose, the Detaining Power shall place at their disposal the necessary means of transport.
(b) The senior medical officer in each camp shall be responsible to the camp military authorities for everything connected with the activities of retained medical personnel. For this purpose, Parties to the conflict shall agree at the outbreak of hostilities on the subject of the corresponding ranks of the medical personnel, including that of societies mentioned in Article 26 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949. This senior medical officer, as well as chaplains, shall have the right to deal with the competent authorities of the camp on all questions relating to their duties. Such authorities shall afford them all necessary facilities for correspondence relating to these questions.
(c) Although they shall be subject to the internal discipline of the camp in which they are retained, such personnel may not be compelled to carry out any work other than that concerned with their medical or religious duties.
During hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall agree concerning the possible relief of retained personnel and shall settle the procedure to be followed.
None of the preceding provisions shall relieve the Detaining Power of its obligations with regard to prisoners of war from the medical or spiritual point of view.
Chapter V
RELIGIOUS INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES
Article 34
Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities.
Adequate premises shall be provided where religious services may be held.
Article 35
Chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy Power and who remain or are retained with a view to assisting prisoners of war, shall be allowed to minister to them and to exercise freely their ministry amongst prisoners of war of the same religion, in accordance with their religious conscience. They shall be allocated among the various camps and labor detachments containing prisoners of war belonging to the same forces. speaking the same language or practicing the same religion. They shall enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means of transport provided for in Article 33, for visiting the prisoners of war outside their camp. They shall be free to correspond, subject to censorship, on matters concerning their religious duties with the ecclesiastical authorities in the country of detention and with international religious organizations. Letters and cards which they may send for this purpose shall be in addition to the quota provided for in Article 71.
Article 36
Prisoners of war, who are ministers of religion, without having officiated as chaplains to their own forces, shall be at liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to the members of their community. For this purpose, they shall receive the same treatment as the chaplains retained by the Detaining Power. They shall not be obliged to do any other work.
Article 37
When prisoners of war have not the assistance of a retained chaplain or of a prisoner of war minister of their faith, a minister belonging to the prisoners, or a similar denomination, or in his absence a qualified layman, if such a course is feasible from a confessional point of view, shall be appointed, at the request of the prisoners concerned, to fill this office. This appointment, subject to the approval of the Detaining Power, shall take place with the agreement of the community of prisoners concerned and, wherever necessary, with the approval of the local religious authorities of the same faith. The person thus appointed shall comply with all regulations established by the Detaining Power in the interests of discipline and military security.
Article 38
While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst prisoners, and shall take the measures necessary to ensure the exercise thereof by providing them with adequate premises and necessary equipment.
Prisoners shall have opportunities for taking physical exercise, including sports and games, and for being out of doors. Sufficient open spaces shall be provided for this purpose in all camps.
Chapter VI
DISCIPLINE
Article 39
Every prisoner of war camp shall be put under the immediate authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power. Such officer shall have in his possession a copy of the present Convention; he shall ensure that its provisions are known to the camp staff and the guard and shall be responsible, under the direction of his government, for its application.
Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers, must salute and show to all officers of the Detaining Power the external marks of respect provided for by the regulations applying in their own forces.
Officer prisoners of war are bound to salute only officers of a higher rank of the Detaining Power; they must, however, salute the camp commander regardless of his rank.
Article 40
The wearing of badges of rank and nationality, as well as of decorations, shall be permitted.
Article 41
In every camp the text of the present Convention and its Annexes and the contents of any special agreement provided for in Article 6, shall be posted, in the prisoners' own language, at places where all may read them. Copies shall be supplied, on request, to the prisoners who cannot have access to the copy which has been posted.
Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind relating to the conduct of prisoners of war shall be issued to them in a language which they understand. Such regulations, orders and publications shall be posted in the manner described above and copies shall be handed to the prisoners' representative. Every order and command addressed to prisoners of war individually must likewise be given in a language which they understand.
Article 42
The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances.
Chapter VII
RANK OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 43
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall communicate to one another the titles and ranks of all the persons mentioned in Article 4 of the present Convention, in order to ensure equality of treatment between prisoners of equivalent rank. Titles and ranks which are subsequently created shall form the subject of similar communications.
The Detaining Power shall recognize promotions in rank which have been accorded to prisoners of war and which have been duly notified by the Power on which these prisoners depend.
Article 44
Officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and age.
In order to ensure service in officers' camps, other ranks of the same armed forces who, as far as possible, speak the same language, shall be assigned in sufficient numbers, account being taken of the rank of officers and prisoners of equivalent status. Such orderlies shall not be required to perform any other work.
Supervision of the mess by the officers themselves shall be facilitated in every way.
Article 45
Prisoners of war other than officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated with the regard due to their rank and age.
Supervision of the mess by the prisoners themselves shall be facilitated in every way.
Chapter VIII
TRANSFER OF PRISONERS OF WAR AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN CAMP
Article 46
The Detaining Power, when deciding upon the transfer of prisoners of war, shall take into account the interests of the prisoners themselves, more especially so as not to increase the difficulty of their repatriation.
The transfer of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions not less favorable than those under which the forces of the Detaining Power are transferred. Account shall always be taken of the climatic conditions to which the prisoners of war are accustomed and the conditions of transfer shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war during transfer with sufficient food and drinking water to keep them in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take adequate precautions especially in case of transport by sea or by air, to ensure their safety during transfer, and shall draw up a complete list of all transferred prisoners before their departure.
Article 47
Sick or wounded prisoners of war shall not be transferred as long as their recovery may be endangered by the journey, unless their safety imperatively demands it.
If the combat zone draws closer to a camp, the prisoners of war in the said camp shall not be transferred unless their transfer can be carried out in adequate conditions of safety, or if they are exposed to greater risks by remaining on the spot than by being transferred.
Article 48
In the event of transfer, prisoners of war shall be officially advised of their departure and of their new postal address. Such notifications shall be given in time for them to pack their luggage and inform their next of kin.
They shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and the correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited, if the conditions of transfer so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry, which shall in no case be more than twenty-five kilograms per head.
Mail and parcels addressed to their former camp shall be forwarded to them without delay. The camp commander shall take, in agreement with the prisoners' representative, any measures needed to ensure the transport of the prisoners' community property and of the luggage they are unable to take with them in consequence of restrictions imposed by virtue of the second paragraph of this Article.
The costs of transfers shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
SECTION 111
LABOUR OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 49
The Detaining Power may utilize the labor of prisoners of war who are physically fit, taking into account their age, sex, rank and physical aptitude, and with a view particularly to maintaining them in a good state of physical and mental health.
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do supervisory work. Those not so required may ask for other suitable work which shall, so far as possible, be found for them.
If officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, it shall be found for them, so far as possible, but they may in no circumstances be compelled to work.
Article 50
Besides work connected with camp administration, installation or maintenance, prisoners of war may be compelled to do only such work as is included in the following classes:
(a) Agriculture;
(b) Industries connected with the production or the extraction of raw materials, and manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical industries; public works and building operations which have no military character or purpose;
(c) Transport and handling of stores which are not military in character or purpose;
(d) Commercial business, and arts and crafts;
(e) Domestic service;
(f) Public utility services having no military character or purpose.
Should the above provisions be infringed, prisoners of war shall be allowed to exercise their right of complaint, in conformity with Article 78.
Article 51
Prisoners of war must be granted suitable working conditions, especially as regards accommodation, food, clothing and equipment; such conditions shall not be inferior to those enjoyed by nationals of the Detaining Power employed in similar work; account shall also be taken of climatic conditions.
The Detaining Power, in utilizing the labor of prisoners of war, shall en sure that in areas in which prisoners are employed, the national legislation concerning the protection of labor, and, more particularly, the regulations for the safety of workers, are duly applied.
Prisoners of war shall receive training and be provided with the means of protection suitable to the work they will have to do and similar to those accorded to the nationals of the Detaining Power. Subject to the provisions of Article 52, prisoners may be submitted to the normal risks run by these civilian workers.
Conditions of labor shall in no case be rendered more arduous by disciplinary measures.
Article 52
Unless he is a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature.
No prisoner of war shall be assigned to labor which would be looked upon as humiliating for a member of the Detaining Power's own forces.
The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labor.
Article 53
The duration of the daily labor of prisoners of war, including the time of the journey to and fro, shall not be excessive, and must in no case exceed that permitted for civilian workers in the district, who are nationals of the Detaining Power and employed on the same work.
Prisoners of war must be allowed, in the middle of the day's work, a rest of not less than one hour. This rest will be the same as that to which workers of the Detaining Power are entitled, if the latter is of longer duration. They shall be allowed in addition a rest of twenty-four consecutive hours every week, preferably on Sunday or the day of rest in their country of origin. Furthermore, every prisoner who has worked for one year shall be granted a rest of eight consecutive days, during which his working pay shall be paid him.
If methods of labor such as piece-work are employed, the length of the working period shall not be rendered excessive thereby.
Article 54
The working pay due to prisoners of war shall be fixed in accordance with the provisions of Article 62 of the present Convention.
Prisoners of war who sustain accidents in connection with work, or who contract a disease in the course, or in consequence of their work, shall receive all the care their condition may require. The Detaining Power shall furthermore deliver to such prisoners of war a medical certificate enabling them to submit their claims to the Power on which they depend, and shall send a duplicate to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123.
Article 55
The fitness of prisoners of war for work shall be periodically verified by medical examinations at least once a month. The examinations shall have particular regard to the nature of the work which prisoners of war are required to do.
If any prisoner of war considers himself incapable of working, he shall be permitted to appear before the medical authorities of his camp. Physicians or surgeons may recommend that the prisoners who are, in their opinion, unfit for work, be exempted there from.
Article 56
The organization and administration of labor detachments shall be similar to those of prisoner of war camps.
Every labor detachment shall remain under the control of and administratively part of a prisoner of war camp. The military authorities and the commander of the said camp shall be responsible, under the direction of their government, for the observance of the provisions of the present Convention in labor detachments.
The camp commander shall keep an up-to-date record of the labor detachments dependent on his camp, and shall communicate it to the delegates of the Protecting Power, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or of other agencies giving relief to prisoners of war, who may visit the camp.
Article 57
The treatment of prisoners of war who work for private persons, even if the latter are responsible for guarding and protecting them, shall not be inferior to that which is provided for by the present Convention. The Detaining Power, the military authorities and the commander of the camp to which such prisoners belong shall be entirely responsible for the maintenance, care, treatment, and payment of the working pay of such prisoners of war.
Such prisoners of war shall have the right to remain in communication with the prisoners' representatives in the camps on which they depend.
SECTION IV
FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 58
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, and pending an arrangement on this matter with the Protecting Power, the Detaining Power may determine the maximum amount of money in cash or in any similar form, that prisoners may have in their possession. Any amount in excess, which was properly in their possession and which has been taken or withheld from them, shall be placed to their account, together with any monies deposited by them, and shall not be converted into any other currency without their consent.
If prisoners of war are permitted to purchase services or commodities outside the camp against payment in cash, such payments shall be made by the prisoner himself or by the camp administration who will charge them to the accounts of the prisoners concerned. The Detaining Power will establish the necessary rules in this respect.
Article 59
Cash which was taken from prisoners of war, in accordance with Article 18, at the time of their capture, and which is in the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be placed to their separate accounts, in accordance with the provisions of Article 64 of the present Section.
The amounts, in the currency of the Detaining Power, due to the conversion of sums in other currencies that are taken from the prisoners of war at the same time, shall also be credited to their separate accounts.
Article 60
The Detaining Power shall grant all prisoners of war a monthly advance of pay, the amount of which shall be fixed by conversion, into the currency of the said Power, of the following amounts:
Category I: Prisoners ranking below sergeant: eight Swiss francs.
Category II: Sergeants and other non-commissioned officers, or prisoners of equivalent rank: twelve Swiss francs.
Category m: Warrant officers and commissioned officers below the rank of major or prisoners of equivalent rank: fifty Swiss francs.
Category IV: Majors, lieutenant-colonels, colonels or prisoners of equivalent rank: sixty Swiss francs.
Category V: General officers or prisoners of equivalent rank: seventy-five Swiss francs.
However, the Parties to the conflict concerned may by special agreement modify the amount of advances of pay due to prisoners of the preceding categories.
Furthermore, if the amounts indicated in the first paragraph above would be unduly high compared with the pay of the Detaining Power's armed forces or would, for any reason, seriously embarrass the Detaining Power, then, pending the conclusion of a special agreement with the Power on which the prisoners depend to vary the amounts indicated above, the Detaining Power:
(a) Shall continue to credit the accounts of the prisoners with the amounts indicated in the first paragraph above;
(b) May temporarily limit the amount made available from these advances of pay to prisoners of war for their own use, to sums which are reasonable , but which, for Category I, shall never be inferior to the amount that the Detaining Power gives to the members of its own armed forces.
The reasons for any limitations will be given without delay to the Protecting Power.
Article 61
The Detaining Power shall accept for distribution as supplementary
pay to prisoners of war sums which the Power on which the prisoners depend may forward to them,
on condition that the sums to be paid shall be the
same for each prisoner of the same category, shall be payable to all prisoners
of that category depending on that Power, and shall be placed in their separate accounts, at the
earliest opportunity, in accordance with the provisions
of Article 64. Such supplementary pay shall not relieve the Detaining Power
of any obligation under this Convention.
Article 62
Prisoners of war shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by the detaining authorities direct. The rate shall be fixed by the said authorities, but shall at no time be less than one-fourth of one Swiss franc for a full working day. The Detaining Power shall inform prisoners of war, as well as the Power on which they depend, through the intermediary of the Protecting Power, of the rate of daily working pay that it has fixed.
Working pay shall likewise be paid by the detaining authorities to prisoners of war permanently detailed to duties or to a skilled or semi-skilled occupation in connection with the administration, installation or maintenance of camps, and to the prisoners who are required to carry out spiritual or medical duties on behalf of their comrades.
The working pay of the prisoners' representative, of his advisers, if any, and of his assistants, shall be paid out of the fund maintained by canteen profits. The scale of this working pay shall be fixed by the prisoners, representative and approved by the camp commander. If there is no such fund, the detaining authorities shall pay these prisoners a fair working rate of pay.
Article 63
Prisoners of war shall be permitted to receive remittances of money addressed to them individually or collectively.
Every prisoner of war shall have at his disposal the credit balance of his account as provided for in the following Article, within the limits fixed
by the Detaining Power, which shall make such payments as are requested. Subject to financial or monetary restrictions which the Detaining Power regards as essential, prisoners of war may also have payments made abroad. In this case payments addressed by prisoners of war to dependants shall be given priority.
In any event, and subject to the consent of the Power on which they depend, prisoners may have payments made in their own country, as follows: the Detaining Power shall send to the aforesaid Power through the Protecting Power a notification giving all the necessary particulars concerning the prisoners of war, the beneficiaries of the payments, and the amount of the sums to be paid, expressed in the Detaining Power's currency. The said notification shall be signed by the prisoners and countersigned by the camp commander. The Detaining Power shall debit the prisoners' account by a corresponding amount; the sums thus debited shall be placed by it to the credit of the Power on which the prisoners depend.
To apply the foregoing provisions, the Detaining Power may usefully consult the Model Regulations in Annex V of the present Convention.
Article 64
The Detaining Power shall hold an account for each prisoner of war, showing at least the following:
1. The amounts due to the prisoner or received by him as advances of pay, as working pay or derived from any other source; the sums in the currency of the Detaining Power which were taken from him; the sums taken from him and converted at his request into the currency of the said Power.
2. The payments made to the prisoner in cash, or in any other similar form; the payments made on his behalf and at his request; the sums transferred under Article 63, third paragraph.
Article 65
Every item entered in the account of a prisoner of war shall be countersigned or initialed by him, or by the prisoners' representative acting on his behalf.
Prisoners of war shall at all times be afforded reasonable facilities for consulting and obtaining copies of their accounts, which may likewise be inspected by the representatives of the Protecting Powers at the time of visits to the camp.
When prisoners of war are transferred from one camp to another, their personal accounts will follow them. In case of transfer from one Detaining Power to another, the monies which are their property and are not in the currency of the Detaining Power will follow them. They shall be given certificates for any other monies standing to the credit of their accounts.
The Parties to the conflict concerned may agree to notify to each other at specific intervals through the Protecting Power, the amount of the accounts of the prisoners of war.
Article 66
On the termination of captivity, through the release of a prisoner of war or his repatriation, the Detaining Power shall give him a statement, signed by an authorized officer of that Power, showing the credit balance then due to him. The Detaining Power shall also send through the Protecting Power to the government upon which the prisoner of war depends, lists giving all appropriate particulars of all prisoners of war whose captivity has been terminated by repatriation, release, escape, death or any other means, and showing the amount of their credit balances. Such lists shall be certified on each sheet by an authorized representative of the Detaining Power.
Any of the above provisions of this Article may be varied by mutual agreement between any two Parties to the conflict.
The Power on which the prisoner of war depends shall be responsible for settling with him any credit balance due to him from the Detaining Power on the termination of his captivity.
Article 67
Advances of pay, issued to prisoners of war in conformity with Article 60, shall be considered as made on behalf of the Power on which they depend. Such advances of pay, as well as all payments made by the said Power under Article 63, third paragraph, and Article 68, shall form the subject of arrangements between the Powers concerned, at the close of hostilities.
Article 68
Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of any injury or other disability arising out of work shall be referred to the Power on which he depends, through the Protecting Power. In accordance with Article 54, the Detaining Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner of war concerned with a statement showing the nature of the injury or disability, the circumstances in which it arose and particulars of medical or hospital treatment given for it. This statement will be signed by a responsible officer of the Detaining Power and the medical particulars certified by a medical officer.
Any claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect of personal effects, monies or valuables impounded by the Detaining Power under
Article 18 and not forthcoming on his repatriation, or in respect of loss alleged to be due to the fault of the Detaining Power or any of its servants, shall likewise be referred to the Power on which he depends. Nevertheless, any such personal effects required for use by the prisoners of war whilst in captivity shall be replaced at the expense of the Detaining Power. The Detaining Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner of war with a statement, signed by a responsible officer, showing all available information regarding the reasons why such effects, monies or valuables have not been restored to him. A copy of this statement will be forwarded to the Power on which he depends through the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123.
SECTION V
RELATIONS OF PRISONERS OF WAR WITH THE EXTERIOR
Article 69
Immediately upon prisoners of war falling into its power, the Detaining Power shall inform them and the Powers on which they depend, through the Protecting Power, of the measures taken to carry out the provisions of the present Section. They shall likewise inform the parties concerned of any subsequent modifications of such measures.
Article 70
Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise in case of sickness or transfer to hospital or another camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, on the other hand, a card similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of his capture, address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner.
Article 71
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining Power deems it necessary to limit the number of letters and cards sent by each prisoner of war, the said number shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly, exclusive of the capture cards provided for in Article 70, and conforming as closely as possible to the models annexed to the present Convention. Further limitations may be imposed only if the Protecting Power is satisfied that it would be in the interests of the prisoners of war concerned to do so owing to difficulties of translation caused
by the Detaining Power's inability to find sufficient qualified linguists to carry out the necessary censorship. If limitations must be placed on the correspondence addressed to prisoners of war, they may be ordered only by the Power on which the prisoners depend, possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed by the most rapid method at the disposal of the Detaining Power; they may not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reasons.
Prisoners of war who have been without news for a long period, or who are unable to receive news from their next of kin or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those who are at a great distance from their homes, shall be permitted to send telegrams, the fees being charged against the prisoners of war's accounts with the Detaining Power or paid in the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by-this measure in cases of urgency.
As a general rule, the correspondence of prisoners of war shall be written in their native language. The Parties to the conflict may allow correspondence in other languages.
Sacks containing prisoner of war mail must be securely sealed and labeled so as clearly to indicate their contents, and must be addressed to offices of destination.
Article 72
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to receive by post or by any other means individual parcels or collective shipments containing, in particular, foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies and articles of a religious, educational or recreational character which may meet their needs, including books, devotional articles, scientific equipment, examination papers, musical instruments, sports outfits and materials allowing prisoners of war to pursue their studies or their cultural activities.
Such shipments shall in no way free the Detaining Power from the obligations imposed upon it by virtue of the present Convention.
The only limits which may be placed on these shipments shall be those proposed by the Protecting Power in the interest of the prisoners themselves, or by the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization giving assistance to the prisoners, in respect of their own shipments only, on account of exceptional strain on transport or communications.
The conditions for the sending of individual parcels and collective relief shall, if necessary, be the subject of special agreements between the Powers concerned, which may in no case delay the receipt by the prisoners of relief supplies. Books may not be included in parcels of clothing and foodstuffs. Medical supplies shall, as a rule, be sent in collective parcels.
Article 73
In the absence of special agreements between the Powers concerned on the conditions for the receipt and distribution of collective relief shipments, the rules and regulations concerning collective shipments, which are annexed to the present Convention, shall be applied.
The special agreements referred to above shall in no case restrict the right of prisoners' representatives to take possession of collective relief shipments intended for prisoners of war, to proceed to their distribution or to dispose of them in the interest of the prisoners.
Nor shall such agreements restrict the right of representatives of the Protecting Power, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization giving assistance to prisoners of war and responsible for the forwarding of collective shipments, to supervise their distribution to the recipients.
Article 74
All relief shipments for prisoners of war shall be exempt from import, customs and other dues.
Correspondence, relief shipments and authorized remittances of money addressed to prisoners of war or dispatched by them through the post office, either direct or through the Information Bureaus provided for in Article 122 and the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, shall be exempt from any postal dues, both in the countries of origin and destination, and in intermediate countries.
If relief shipments intended for prisoners of war cannot be sent through the post office by reason of weight or for any other cause, the cost of transportation shall be borne by the Detaining Power in all the territories under its control. The other Powers party to the Convention shall bear the cost of transport in their respective territories.
In the absence of special agreements between the Parties concerned, the costs connected with transport of such shipments, other than costs covered by the above exemption, shall be charged to the senders.
The High Contracting Parties shall Endeavour to reduce, so far as possible, the rates charged for telegrams sent by prisoners of war, or addressed to them.
Article 75
Should military operations prevent the Powers concerned from fulfilling their obligation to assure the transport of the shipments referred to in Articles 70, 71, 72 and 77, the Protecting Powers concerned, the Inter national Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization duly approved by the Parties to the conflict may undertake to ensure the conveyance of such shipments by suitable means (railway wagons, motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft, etc.). For this purpose, the High Contracting Parties shall Endeavour to supply them with such transport and to allow its circulation, especially by granting the necessary safe-conducts.
Such transport may also be used to convey:
(a) Correspondence lists and reports exchanged between the Central Information Agency referred to in Article 123 and the National Bureau referred to in Article 122;
(b) Correspondence and reports relating to prisoners of war which the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other body assisting the prisoners, exchange either with their own delegates or with the Parties to the conflict.
These provisions in no way detract from the right of any Party to the conflict to arrange other means of transport, if it should so prefer, nor preclude the granting of safe-conducts, under mutually agreed conditions, to such means of transport.
In the absence of special agreements, the costs occasioned by the use of such means of transport shall be borne proportionally by the Parties to the conflict whose nationals are benefited thereby.
Article 76
The censoring of correspondence addressed to prisoners of war or dispatched by them shall be done as quickly as possible. Mail shall be censored only by the dispatching State and the receiving State, and once only by each.
The examination of consignments intended for prisoners of war shall not be carried out under conditions that will expose the goods contained in them to deterioration; except in the case of written or printed matter , it shall be done in the presence of the addressee, or of a fellow-prisoner duly delegated by him. The delivery to prisoners of individual or collective consignments shall not be delayed under the pretext of difficulties of censorship.
Any prohibition of correspondence ordered by Parties to the conflict, either for military or political reasons, shall be only temporary and its duration shall be as short as possible.
Article 77
The Detaining Powers shall provide all facilities for the transmission, through the Protecting Power or the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, of instruments, papers or documents intended for prisoners of war or dispatched by them, especially powers of attorney and wills.
In all cases they shall facilitate the preparation and execution of such documents on behalf of prisoners of war; in particular, they shall allow them to consult a lawyer and shall take what measures are necessary for the authentication of their signatures.
SECTION VI
RELATIONS BETWEEN PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE AUTHORITIES
Chapter I
COMPLAINTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR
RESPECTING THE CONDITIONS OF CAPTIVITY
Article 78
Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.
They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Powers either through their prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary, direct, in order to draw their attention to any points on which they may have complaints to make regarding their conditions of captivity.
These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor considered to be a part of the correspondence quota referred to in Article 71. They must be transmitted immediately. Even if they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give rise to any punishment.
Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the needs of the prisoners of war to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.
Chapter II
PRISONER OF WAR REPRESENTATIVES
Article 79
In all places where there are prisoners of war, except in those where there are officers, the prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies, prisoners' representatives entrusted with representing them before the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization which may assist them. These prisoners' representatives shall be eligible for re-election.
In camps for officers and persons of equivalent status or in mixed camps, the senior officer among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners' representative. In camps for officers, he shall be assisted by one or more advisers chosen by the officers; in mixed camps, his assistants shall be chosen from among the prisoners of war who are not officers and shall be elected by them.
Officer prisoners of war of the same nationality shall be stationed in labor camps for prisoners of war, for the purpose of carrying out the camp administration duties for which the prisoners of war are responsible. These officers may be elected as prisoners' representatives under the first paragraph of this Article. In such a case the assistants to the prisoners' representatives shall be chosen from among those prisoners of war who are not officers.
Every representative elected must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has the right to commence his duties. Where the Detaining Power refuses to approve a prisoner of war elected by his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform the Protecting Power of the reason for such refusal.
In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the same nationality, language and customs as the prisoners of war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed in different sections of a camp, according to their nationality, language or customs, shall have for each section their own prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs.
Article 80
Prisoners' representatives shall further the physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of prisoners of war.
In particular, where the prisoners decide to organize amongst themselves a system of mutual assistance, this organization will be within the
province of the prisoners' representative, in addition to the special duties entrusted to him by other provisions of the present Convention.
Prisoners' representatives shall not be held responsible, simply by reason of their duties, for any offences committed by prisoners of war.
Article 81
Prisoners' representatives shall not be required to perform any other work, if the accomplishment of their duties is thereby made more difficult.
Prisoners' representatives may appoint from amongst the prisoners such assistants as they may require. All material facilities shall be granted them, particularly a certain freedom of movement necessary for the accomplishment of their duties (inspection of labor detachments, receipt of supplies, etc.).
Prisoners' representatives shall be permitted to visit premises where prisoners of war are detained, and every prisoner of war shall have the right to consult freely his prisoners' representative.
All facilities shall likewise be accorded to the prisoners' representatives for communication by post and telegraph with the detaining authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and their delegates, the Mixed Medical Commissions and with the bodies which give assistance to prisoners of war. Prisoners' representatives of labor detachments shall enjoy the same facilities for communication with the prisoners' representatives of the principal camp. Such communications shall not be restricted, nor considered as forming a part of the quota mentioned in Article 7 1.
Prisoners' representatives who are transferred shall be allowed a reasonable time to acquaint their successors with current affairs.
In case of dismissal, the reasons therefore shall be communicated to the Protecting Power.
Chapter III
PENAL AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
I. General provisions
Article 82
A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall
be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.
If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.
Article 83
In deciding whether proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a prisoner of war shall be judicial or disciplinary, the Detaining Power shall ensure that the competent authorities exercise the greatest leniency and adopt, wherever possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures.
Article 84
A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.
In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defense provided for in Article 105.
Article 85
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.
Article 86
No prisoner of war may be punished more than once for the same act, or on the same charge.
Article 87
Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of the Detaining Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed forces of the said Power who have committed the same acts.
When fixing the penalty, the courts or authorities of the Detaining Power shall take into consideration, to the widest extent possible, the fact that the accused, not being a national of the Detaining Power, is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent of his own will. The said courts or authorities shall be at liberty to reduce the penalty provided for the violation of which the prisoner of war is accused, and shall therefore not be bound to apply the minimum penalty prescribed.
Collective punishment for individual acts, corporal punishments, imprisonment in premises without daylight and, in general, any form of torture or cruelty, are forbidden.
No prisoner of war may be deprived of his rank by the Detaining Power, or prevented from wearing his badges.
Article 88
Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are prisoners of war undergoing a disciplinary or judicial punishment, shall not be subjected to more severe treatment than that applied in respect of the same punishment to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power of equivalent rank.
A woman prisoner of war shall not be awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe, or treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a woman member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence.
In no case may a woman prisoner of war be awarded or sentenced to a punishment more severe, or treated whilst undergoing punishment more severely, than a male member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence.
Prisoners of war who have served disciplinary or judicial sentences may not be treated differently from other prisoners of war.
II. Disciplinary sanctions
Article 89
The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:
1. A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war would otherwise receive under
the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty days.
2. Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention.
3. Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.
4. Confinement.
The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers.
In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.
Article 90
The duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed thirty days. Any period of confinement awaiting the hearing of a disciplinary offence or the award of disciplinary punishment shall be deducted from an award pronounced against a prisoner of war.
The maximum of thirty days provided above may not be exceeded, even if the prisoner of war is answerable for several acts at the same time when he is awarded punishment, whether such acts are related or not.
The period between the pronouncing of an award of disciplinary punishment and its execution shall not exceed one month.
When a prisoner of war is awarded a further disciplinary punishment, a period of at least three days shall elapse between the execution of any two of the punishments, if the duration of one of these is ten days or more.
Article 91
The escape of a prisoner of war shall be deemed to have succeeded when:
1. He has joined the armed forces of the Power on which he depends, or those of an allied Power;
2. He has left the territory under the control of the Detaining Power, or of an ally of the said Power;
3. He has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which he depends, or of an allied Power, in the territorial waters of the Detaining Power, the said ship not being under the control of the last named Power.
Prisoners of war who have made good their escape in the sense of this Article and who are recaptured shall not be liable to any punishment in respect of their previous escape.
Article 92
A prisoner of war who attempts to escape and is recaptured before having made good his escape in the sense of Article 91 shall be liable only to a disciplinary punishment in respect of this act, even if it is a repeated offence.
A prisoner of war who is recaptured shall be handed over without delay to the competent military authority.
Article 88, fourth paragraph, notwithstanding, prisoners of war punished as a result of an unsuccessful escape may be subjected to special surveillance. Such surveillance must not affect the state of their health, must be undergone in a prisoner of war camp, and must not entail the suppression of any of the safeguards granted them by the present Convention.
Article 93
Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance if the prisoner of war is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in respect of an offence committed during his escape or attempt to escape.
In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offences committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence against life or limb, such as offences against public property, theft without intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only.
Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt to escape shall be liable on this count to disciplinary punishment only.
Article 94
If an escaped prisoner of war is recaptured, the Power on which he depends shall be notified thereof in the manner defined in Article 122, provided notification of his escape has been made.
Article 95
A prisoner of war accused of an offence against discipline shall not be kept in confinement pending the hearing unless a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power would be so kept if he were accused of a similar offence , or if it is essential in the interests of camp order and discipline .
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement awaiting the disposal of an offence against discipline shall be reduced to an absolute minimum and shall not exceed fourteen days.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall apply to prisoners of war who are in confinement awaiting the disposal of offences against discipline.
Article 96
Acts which constitute offences against discipline shall be investigated immediately.
Without prejudice to the competence of courts and superior military authorities, disciplinary punishment may be ordered only by an officer having disciplinary powers in his capacity as camp commander, or by a responsible officer who replaces him or to whom he has delegated his disciplinary powers.
In no case may such powers be delegated to a prisoner of war or be exercised by a prisoner of war.
Before any disciplinary award is pronounced, the accused shall be given precise information regarding the offences of which he is accused, and given an opportunity of explaining his conduct and of defending himself. He shall be permitted, in particular, to call witnesses and to have recourse, if necessary, to the services of a qualified interpreter. The decision shall be announced to the accused prisoner of war and to the prisoners' representative.
A record of disciplinary punishments shall be maintained by the camp commander and shall be open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power.
Article 97
Prisoners of war shall not in any case be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons, penitentiaries, convict prisons, etc.) to undergo disciplinary punishment therein.
All premises in which disciplinary punishments are undergone shall conform to the sanitary requirements set forth in Article 25. A prisoner of war undergoing punishment shall be enabled to keep himself in a state of cleanliness, in conformity with Article 29.
Officers and persons of equivalent status shall not be lodged in the same quarters as non-commissioned officers or men.
Women prisoners of war undergoing disciplinary punishment shall be confined in separate quarters from male prisoners of war and shall be under the immediate supervision of women.
Article 98
A prisoner of war undergoing confinement as a disciplinary punishment shall continue to enjoy the benefits of the provisions of this Convention except in so far as these are necessarily rendered inapplicable by the mere fact that he is confined. In no case may he be deprived of the benefits of the provisions of Articles 78 and 126.
A prisoner of war awarded disciplinary punishment may not be deprived of the prerogatives attached to his rank.
Prisoners of war awarded disciplinary punishment shall be allowed to exercise and to stay in the open air at least two hours daily.
They shall be allowed, on their request, to be present at the daily medical inspections. They shall receive the attention which their state of health requires and, if necessary, shall be removed to the camp infirmary or to a hospital.
They shall have permission to read and write, likewise to send and receive letters. Parcels and remittances of money, however, may be withheld from them until the completion of the punishment; they shall meanwhile be entrusted to the prisoners' representative, who will hand over to the infirmary the perishable goods contained in such parcels.
m. Judicial proceedings
Article 99
No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.
No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his defense and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel.
Article 100
Prisoners of war and the Protecting Powers shall be informed as soon as possible of the offences which are punishable by the death sentence under the laws of the Detaining Power.
Other offences shall not thereafter be made punishable by the death penalty without the concurrence of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend.
The death sentence cannot be pronounced on a prisoner of war unless the attention of the court has, in accordance with Article 87, second paragraph, been particularly called to the fact that since the accused is not a national of the Detaining Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent of his own will.
Article 101
If the death penalty is pronounced on a prisoner of war, the sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of at least six months from the date when the Protecting Power receives, at an indicated address, the detailed communication provided for in Article 107.
Article 102
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.
Article 103
Judicial investigations relating to a prisoner of war shall be conducted as rapidly as circumstances permit and so that his trial shall take place as soon as possible. A prisoner of war shall not be confined while awaiting trial unless a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power would be so confined if he were accused of a similar offence, or if it is essential to do so in the interests of national security. In no circumstances shall this confinement exceed three months.
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement awaiting trial shall be deducted from any sentence of imprisonment passed upon him and taken into account in fixing any penalty.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall apply to a prisoner of war whilst in confinement awaiting trial.
Article 104
In any case in which the Detaining Power has decided to institute judicial proceedings against a prisoner of war, it shall notify the Protecting Power as soon as possible and at least three weeks before the opening of the trial. This period of three weeks shall run as from the day on which such notification reaches the Protecting Power at the address previously indicated by the latter to the Detaining Power.
The said notification shall contain the following information:
1. Surname and first names of the prisoner of war, his rank, his army, regimental, personal or serial number, his date of birth, and his profession or trade, if any;
2. Place of internment or confinement;
3. Specification of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned, giving the legal provisions applicable;
4 . Designation of the court which will try the case, like wise the date and place fixed for the opening of the trial.
The same communication shall be made by the Detaining Power to the prisoners' representative.
If no evidence is submitted, at the opening of a trial, that the notification referred to above was received by the Protecting Power, by the prisoner of war and by the prisoners' representative concerned, at least three weeks before the opening of the trial, then the latter cannot take place and must be adjourned.
Article 105
The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of his prisoner comrades, to defense by a qualified advocate or counsel of his own choice, to the calling of witnesses and, if he deems necessary, to the services of a competent interpreter. He shall be advised of these rights by the Detaining Power in due time before the trial.
Failing a choice by the prisoner of war, the Protecting Power shall find him an advocate or counsel, and shall have at least one week at its disposal for the purpose. The Detaining Power shall deliver to the said Power, on request, a list of persons qualified to present the defense. Failing a choice of an advocate or counsel by the prisoner of war or the Protecting Power, the Detaining Power shall appoint a competent advocate or counsel to conduct the defense.
The advocate or counsel conducting the defense on behalf of the prisoner of war shall have at his disposal a period of two weeks at least before the opening of the trial, as well as the necessary facilities to prepare the defense of the accused. He may, in particular, freely visit the accused and interview him in private. He may also confer with any witnesses for the defense, including prisoners of war. He shall have the benefit of these facilities until the term of appeal or petition has expired.
Particulars of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned, as well as the documents which are generally communicated to the accused by virtue of the laws in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power, shall be communicated to the accused prisoner of war in a language which he understands, and in good time before the opening of the trial. The same communication in the same circumstances shall be made to the advocate or counsel conducting the defense on behalf of the prisoner of war.
The representatives of the Protecting Power shall be entitled to attend the trial of the case, unless, exceptionally, this is held in camera in the interest of State security. In such a case the Detaining Power shall advise the Protecting Power accordingly.
Article 106
Every prisoner of war shall have, in the same manner as the members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon him, with a view to the quashing or revising of the sentence or the reopening of the trial. He shall be fully informed of his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within which he may do so.
Article 107
Any judgment and sentence pronounced upon a prisoner of war shall be immediately reported to the Protecting Power in the form of a sunray communication, which shall also indicate whether he has the right of appeal with a view to the quashing of the sentence or the reopening of the trial. This communication shall likewise be sent to the prisoners' representative concerned. It shall also be sent to the accused prisoner of war in a language he understands, if the sentence was not pronounced in his presence. The Detaining Power shall also immediately communicate to the Protecting Power the decision of the prisoner of war to use or to waive his right of appeal.
Furthermore, if a prisoner of war is finally convicted or if a sentence pronounced on a prisoner of war in the first instance is a death sentence, the Detaining Power shall as soon as possible address to the Protecting Power a detailed communication containing:
1. The precise wording of the finding and sentence;
2. A summarized report of any preliminary investigation and of the trial, emphasizing in particular the elements of the prosecution and the defense;
3. Notification, where applicable, of the establishment where the sentence will be served.
The communications provided for in the foregoing subparagraphs shall be sent to the Protecting Power at the address previously made known to the Detaining Power. Article 108
Sentences pronounced on prisoners of war after a conviction has become duly enforceable, shall be served in the same establishments and under the same conditions as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. These conditions shall in all cases conform to the requirements of health and humanity.
A woman prisoner of war on whom such a sentence has been pronounced shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be under the supervision of women.
In any case, prisoners of war sentenced to a penalty depriving them of their liberty shall retain the benefit of the provisions of Articles 78 and 126 of the present Convention. Furthermore, they shall be entitled to receive and dispatch correspondence, to receive at least one relief parcel monthly, to take regular exercise in the open air, to have the medical care required by their state of health, and the spiritual assistance they may desire. Penalties to which they may be subjected shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article 87, third paragraph.
PART IV
TERMINATION OF CAPTIVITY
SECTION I
DIRECT REPATRIATION AND ACCOMMODATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
Article 109
Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to travel, in accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.
Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall Endeavour, with the cooperation of the neutral Powers concerned, to make arrangements for the accommodation in neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war referred to in the second paragraph of the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity.
No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph of this Article may be repatriated against his will during hostilities.
Article 110
The following shall be repatriated direct:
1. Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished?
2. Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
3. Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely and permanently diminished.
The following may be accommodated in a neutral country:
1. Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year of the date of the wound or the beginning of the illness, if treatment in a neutral country might increase the prospects of a more certain and speedy recovery.
2. Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously threatened by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might remove such a threat.
The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a neutral country must fulfill in order to permit their repatriation shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement between the Powers conceded. In general, prisoners of war who have been accommodated in a neutral country, and who belong to the following categories, should be repatriated:
1. Those whose state of health has deteriorated so as to fulfill the conditions laid down for direct repatriation;
2. Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even after treatment, considerably impaired.
If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties to the conflict conceded, to determine the cases of disablement or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in accordance with the principles laid down in the Model Agreement conceding direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries of wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations conceding Mixed Medical Commissions annexed to the present Convention. Article 111
The Detaining Power, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend, and a neutral Power agreed upon by these two Powers, shall Endeavour to conclude agreements which will enable prisoners of war to be interned in the territory of the said neutral Power until the close of hostilities.
Article 112
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Mixed Medical Commissions shall be appointed to examine sick and wounded prisoners of war, and to make all appropriate decisions regarding them. The appointment, duties and functioning of these Commissions shall be in conformity with the provisions of the Regulations annexed to the present Convention.
However, prisoners of war who, in the opinion of the medical authorities of the Detaining Power, are manifestly seriously injured or seriously sick, may be repatriated without having to be examined by a Mixed Medical Commission.
Article 113
Besides those who are designated by the medical authorities of the Detaining Power, wounded or sick prisoners of war belonging to the categories listed below shall be entitled to present themselves for examination by the Mixed Medical Commissions provided for in the foregoing Article:
1. Wounded and sick proposed by a physician or surgeon who is of the same nationality, or a national of a Party to the conflict allied with the Power on which the said prisoners depend, and who exercises his functions in the camp.
2. Wounded and sick proposed by their prisoners' representative.
3. Wounded and sick proposed by the Power on which they depend, or by an organization duly recognized by the said Power and giving assistance to the prisoners.
Prisoners of war who do not belong to one of the three foregoing categories may nevertheless present themselves for examination by Mixed Medical Commissions, but shall be examined only after those belonging to the said categories.
The physician or surgeon of the same nationality as the prisoners who present themselves for examination by the Mixed Medical Commission, likewise the prisoners' representative of the said prisoners, shall have permission to be present at the examination.
Article 114
Prisoners of war who meet with accidents shall, unless the injury is self-inflicted, have the benefit of the provisions of this Convention as regards repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country.
Article 115
No prisoner of war on whom a disciplinary punishment has been imposed and who is eligible for repatriation or for accommodation in a neutral country, may be kept back on the plea that he has not undergone his punishment.
Prisoners of war detained in connection with a judicial prosecution or conviction and who are designated for repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, may benefit by such measures before the end of the proceedings or the completion of the punishment, if the Detaining Power consents.
Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the names of those who will be detained until the end of the proceedings or the completion of the punishment.
Article 116
The costs of repatriating prisoners of war or of transporting them to a neutral country shall be borne, from the frontiers of the Detaining Power, by the Power on which the said prisoners depend.
Article 117
No repatriated person may be employed on active military service.
SECTION 11
RELEAS E AND REPATRIATION OF PR I S ONER S OF W AR
AT THE CLOSE OF HOSTILITIES
Article 118
Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.
The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportionment shall be carried out on the following basis:
(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend shall bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The Parties concerned shall agree between themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining costs of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners of war.
Article 119
Repatriation shall be effected in conditions similar to those laid down in Articles 46 to 48 inclusive of the present Convention for the transfer of prisoners of war, having regard to the provisions of Article 118 and to those of the following paragraphs.
On repatriation, any articles of value impounded from prisoners of war under Article 18, and any foreign currency which has not been converted into the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be restored to them. Articles of value and foreign currency which, for any reason whatever, are not restored to prisoners of war on repatriation shall be dispatched to the Information Bureau set up under Article 122.
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and any correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited, if the conditions of repatriation so require, to what each prisoner can reasonably carry. Each prisoner shall in all cases be authorized to carry at least twenty-five kilograms.
The other personal effects of the repatriated prisoner shall be left in the charge of the Detaining Power which shall have them forwarded to him as soon as it has concluded an agreement to this effect, regulating the conditions of transport and the payment of the costs involved, with the Power on which the prisoner depends.
Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the punishment. The same shall apply to, prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence.
Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the names of any prisoners of war who are detained until the end of the proceedings or until punishment has been completed.
By agreement between the Parties to the conflict, commissions shall be established for the purpose of searching for dispersed prisoners of war and
of assuring their repatriation with the least possible delay.
SECTION 111
DEATH OF PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 120
Wills of prisoners of war shall be drawn up so as to satisfy the conditions of validity required by the legislation of their country of origin, which will take steps to inform the Detaining Power of its requirements in this respect. At the request of the prisoner of war and, in all cases, after death, the will shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a certified copy shall be sent to the Central Agency.
Death certificates in the form annexed to the present Convention, or lists certified by a responsible officer, of all persons who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau established in accordance with Article 122. The death certificates or certified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in the third paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of death, the cause of death, the date and place of burial and all particulars necessary to identify the graves.
The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded by a medical examination of the body with a view to confirming death and enabling a report to be made and, where necessary, establishing identity.
The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity are honorably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any time. Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power shall be interred in the same place.
Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his express wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the death certificate of the deceased.
In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded with a Graves Registration Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these graves and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes, which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the wishes of the home country.
Article 121
Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. Statements shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all measures for the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.
PART V
INFORMATION BUREAUX AND RELIEF SOCIETIES
FOR PRISONERS OF WAR
Article 122
Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power. Neutral or non-belligerent Powers who may have received within their territory persons belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, shall take the same action with respect to such persons. The Power concerned shall ensure that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau is provided with the necessary accommodation, equipment and staff to ensure its efficient working. It shall be at liberty to employ prisoners of war in such a Bureau under the conditions laid down in the Section of the present Convention dealing with work by prisoners of war.
Within the shortest possible period, each of the Parties to the conflict shall give its Bureau the information referred to in the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of this Article regarding any enemy person belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, who has fallen into its power. Neutral or non-belligerent Powers shall take the same action with regard to persons belonging to such categories whom they have received within their territory.
The Bureau shall immediately forward such information by the most rapid means to the Powers conceded, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise of the Central Agency provided for in Article 123.
This information shall make it possible quickly to advise the next of kin concerned. Subject to the provisions of Article 17, the information shall include, in so far as available to the Information Bureau, in respect of each prisoner of war, his surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number, place and full date of birth, indication of the Power on which he depends, first name of the father and maiden name of the mother, name and address of the person to be informed and the address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.
The Information Bureau shall receive from the various departments’ concerned information regarding transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admissions to hospital, and deaths, and shall transmit such information in the manner described in the third paragraph above.
Likewise, information regarding the state of health of prisoners of war who are seriously ill or seriously wounded shall be supplied regularly, every week if possible.
The Information Bureau shall also be responsible for replying to all enquiries sent to it concerning prisoners of war, including those who have died in captivity; it will make any enquiries necessary to obtain the information which is asked for if this is not in its possession.
All written communications made by the Bureau shall be authenticated by a signature or a seal.
The Information Bureau shall furthermore be charged with collecting all personal valuables, including sums in currencies other than that of the Detaining Power and documents of importance to the next of kin, left by prisoners of war who have been repatriated or released, or who have escaped or died, and shall forward the said valuables to the Powers concerned. Such articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which shall be accompanied by statements giving clear and full particulars of the identity of the person to whom the articles of the parcel. Other personal effects of such prisoners of war shall be transmitted under arrangements agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict concerned.
Article 123
A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency shall be created in a neutral country. The International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the organization of such an Agency.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all the information it may obtain through official or private channels respecting prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the Power on which they depend. It shall receive from the Parties to the conflict all facilities for effecting such transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of the Central Agency, are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or of the relief Societies provided for in Article 125.
Article 124
The national Information Bureau and the Central Information Agency shall enjoy free postage for mail, likewise all the exemptions provided for in Article 74, and further, so far as possible, exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly reduced rates.
Article 125
Subject to the measures which the Detaining Powers may consider essential to ensure their security or to meet any other reasonable need, the representatives of religious organizations, relief societies, or any other organization assisting prisoners of war, shall receive from the said Powers, for themselves and their duly accredited agents, all necessary facilities for visiting the prisoners, distributing relief supplies and material, from any source, intended for religious, educational or secretive purposes, and for assisting them in organizing their leisure time within the camps. Such societies or organizations may be constituted in the territory of the Detaining Power or in any other country, or they may have an international character.
The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies and organizations whose delegates are allowed to carry out their activities in its territory and under its supervision, on condition, however, that such limitation shall not hinder the effective operation of adequate relief to all prisoners of war.
The special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this field shall be recognized and respected at all times.
As soon as relief supplies or material intended for the above mentioned purposes are handed over to prisoners of war, or very shortly afterwards, receipts for each consignment, signed by the prisoners' representative, shall be forwarded to the relief society or organization making the shipment. At the same time, receipts for these consignments shall be supplied by the administrative authorities responsible for guarding the prisoners.
PART VI
EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION
SECTION I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 126
Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labor, and shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war; they shall also be allowed to go to the places of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They shall be able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.
Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted. Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure.
The Detaining Power and the Power on which the said prisoners of war depend may agree, if necessary, that compatriot of these prisoners of war be permitted to participate in the visits.
The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.
Article 127
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmers of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population.
Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.
Article 128
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal Council and, during hostilities, through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application thereof.
Article 129
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defense, which shall not be less favorable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the present Convention.
Article 130
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.
Article 131
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article.
Article 132
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the least possible delay.
SECTION 11
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 133
The present Convention is established in English and in French. Both texts are equally authentic. The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official translations of the Convention to be made in the Russian and Spanish languages.
Article 134
The present Convention replaces the Convention of 27 July 1929, in relations between the High Contracting Parties.
Article 135
In the relations between the Powers which are bound by The Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that of July 29, 1899, or that of October 18, 1907, and which are parties to the present Convention, this last Convention shall be complementary to Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of The Hague.
Article 136
The present Convention, which bears the date of this day, is open to signature until February 12, 1950, in the name of the Powers represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva on April 21, 1949; furthermore, by Powers not represented at that Conference, but which are parties to the Convention of July 27, 1929.
Article 137 The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and the ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.
A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and certified copies of this record shall be transmitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.
Article 138
The present Convention shall come into force six months after not less than two instruments of ratification have been deposited.
Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contracting Party six months after the deposit of the instrument of ratification.
Article 139
From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to any Power in whose name the present Convention has not been signed, to accede to this Convention.
Article 140
Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, and shall take effect six months after the date on which they are received.
The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the accessions to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.
Article 141
The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give immediate effect to ratifications deposited and accessions notified by the Parties to the conflict before or after the beginning of hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate by the quickest method any ratifications or accessions received from Parties to the conflict.
Article 142
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to denounce the present Convention.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification thereof has been made to the Swiss Federal Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until after operations connected with the release and repatriation of the persons protected by the present Convention have been terminated.
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
Article 143
The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Swiss Federal Council shall also inform the Secretariat of the United Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received by it with respect to the present Convention.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having deposited their respective full powers, have signed the present Convention.
DONE at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949, in the English and French languages. The original shall be deposited in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal Council shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the signatory and acceding States.



32/page 110
From page……………………………………………………………….380 to 420
28 U.S.C § 1346 [32] the United States as the defendant
The United States as the defendant of the Republic of Vietnam because of President Kennedy has had orders to assassinate President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam and later President Nixon did fool the Republic of Vietnam of the proxy war of the United States of America because he was liar and threatened to behead off President Nguyen Van Thieu if the Thieu did not agree to sign on the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973. In prove, Therefore, he would like to carry out the self-evidence truths of some of the American Presidents as a defendant of the Vietnam War because of no the United States Constitution, no the United States Congress, and no American law had enacted the assassination any foreign leaders and fooled the foreign nations of the United States policy. The only have those American presidents did. Here are:
First, President Kennedy has orders to assassinate President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (See 1/ page 5 are from page 165 to 166)
Second, President Nixon is:
Exposing Nixon's Vietnam Lies

No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam'
By LARRY BERMANAUG. 12, 2001
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Prologue
And Exclusive: After resigning over the Watergate political-spying scandal, President Nixon sought to rewrite the history of his Vietnam War strategies to deny swapping lives for political advantage, but newly released documents say otherwise, writes James DiEugenio.
By James DiEugenio
The great enemy of clear language is insincerity.
George Orwell
President Richard Nixon spent New Year's Eve 1972 watching his beloved Washington Redskins defeat the Dallas Cowboys 26-3. Afterward, Nixon wrote in his diary, "As the year 1972 ends I have much to be thankful for — China, Russia, May 8, the election victory, and, of course, while the end of the year was somewhat marred by the need to bomb Hanoi-Haiphong, that decision, I think, can make the next four years much more successful than they otherwise might have been. 1973 will be a better year."
It was a fair assessment of 1972. It was, of course, wildly wrong about the years to come, thanks to Watergate, but on that New Year's Eve, Nixon had reason to be optimistic. His biggest foreign policy problem, inherited from LBJ, had been the ongoing Vietnam War. Heading into 1973, it seemed likely that a peace treaty was just around the corner. Indeed, as he wrote, peace negotiations were getting restarted. The New York Times reported that Hanoi's negotiator, Le Duc Tho, was en route to Paris for a new round of meetings with Henry Kissinger. As we now know, Tho was first making a secret stop in Beijing in order to consult with Chou Enlai. The Chinese premier summarized the state of affairs nicely. He began by noting that Nixon's effort "to exert pressure through bombing has failed." Observing that Nixon faced numerous international and domestic problems, Chou advised Tho to "adhere to principles but show the necessary flexibility" that would produce a settlement. "Let the Americans leave as quickly as possible. In half a year or one year the situation will change," Chou Enlai advised Le Duc Tho. As he knew full well, 150,000 North Vietnamese troops were still in the South. The North was positioned for eventual victory; America was fed up with the war to the point of exhaustion. The ally that America had long supported, and continued to guarantee the safety of, was facing almost certain doom.
While Le Duc Tho was in China, Strom Thurmond, South Carolina's senior Republican senator and one of Nixon's strongest supporters, penned a personal message to the president. Nixon had always valued Thurmond's advice and support. In 1968, Thurmond had delivered the crucial Republican southern delegates to Nixon's nomination for president. A certified hawk on the war and a strong supporter of the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam, Thurmond wrote to the president on January 2 that any final settlement negotiated in Paris between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho that allowed North Vietnam's troops to remain in the South would be viewed as a betrayal of those who had fought and died in the war. "I am pleased that the bombing of North Vietnam has brought the communists to the negotiating table. This proves once again that the firmness of your policies brings results. It is my hope that the forthcoming negotiations will produce a revised draft agreement, which will explicitly provide that all non-south Vietnamese troops will be required to evacuate South Vietnamese territory. I am deeply concerned that past draft agreements indicate that North Vietnamese troops would be allowed to remain in South Vietnam. This could be the foundation for North Vietnam to take over South Vietnam after our final withdrawal in the future. In such an outcome, history will judge that the sacrifice of American lives was in vain."
Three weeks later, on Tuesday, January 23, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris, the test of his assumption was launched. Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger, about to conclude their Nobel Prize-winning negotiations on the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, were joking together. Kissinger said, "I changed a few pages in your Vietnamese text last night, Mr. Special Advisor, but it only concerned North Vietnamese troops. You won't notice it until you get back home." They shared a good laugh.
* * *
Two years later there would be no laughter.
By 1975, Watergate had unraveled the presidency of Richard Nixon. Throughout the negotiation and signing of the agreement, Kissinger and Nixon had privately promised to South Vietnam's president, Nguyen Van Thieu, that America would intervene if any hostilities broke out between North and South, but Thieu knew that these promises were fragile. In a final plea for assistance, President Thieu penned a personal letter to a man he had never met, President Gerald Ford: "Hanoi's intention to use the Paris agreement for a military take over of South Vietnam was well-known to us at the very time of negotiating the Paris Agreement...Firm pledges were then given to us that the United States will retaliate swiftly and vigorously to any violation of the agreement...We consider those pledges the most important guarantees of the Paris Agreement; those pledges have now become the most crucial ones to our survival."
But President Ford had already accepted the political reality that Congress would not fund another supplemental budget request and that America's involvement in Vietnam would soon be over. Reviewing the first draft of his address to a joint session of Congress, the president read his speechwriter's proposed words: "And after years of effort, we negotiated a settlement which made it possible for us to remove our forces with honor and bring home our prisoners." Ford crossed out the words with honor.
Henry Kissinger also knew that American honor was in danger. In the cabinet room on April 16, the secretary read aloud a letter from Sirik Matak, one of the Cambodian leaders who had refused the American ambassador's invitation to evacuate Phnom Penh. The letter was written just hours before Mitak's execution: "Dear Excellency and Friend, I thank you very sincerely for your letter and your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people, which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it. You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But, mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad, because we are all born and must die one day. I have committed this mistake of believing in you, the Americans."
In Saigon, the fate of thousands of Vietnamese was on the line. The American ambassador, Graham Martin, cabled Kissinger that "the one thing that would set off violence would be a sudden order for American evacuation. It will be universally interpreted as a most callous betrayal, leaving the Vietnamese to their fate while we send in the marines to make sure that we get all ours out." Martin pleaded with Kissinger to delay the evacuation for as long as possible because any signs of the Americans' taking leave could set off panic and "would be one last act of betrayal that would strip us of the last vestige of honor."
Nonetheless, evacuation plans proceeded. By April 29, the situation at the American embassy was in chaos as Ambassador Martin flagrantly disregarded the president's evacuation order. By April 30, the top-secret transmissions came in quick bursts from the CH-46 Sea Night helicopters and the larger CH-53 Sea Stallions, which were ferrying evacuees from the American embassy rooftop to the U.S. fleet offshore. All communications between the pilots and their Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center were simultaneously transmitted to U.S. command-and-control authorities in Hawaii and Washington. The final transmissions confirmed the bitter end of the evacuation.
"All of the remaining American personnel are on the roof at this time and Vietnamese are in the building," reported the pilot of a CH-53. "The South Vietnamese have broken into the Embassy; they are rummaging around...no hostile acts noticed," reported another transmission. From the embassy rooftop, Marine Major James Kean described the chaos below as similar to a scene from the movie On the Beach.
Finally, at 7:51 A.M. Saigon time, the embassy's Marine ground security force spotted the CH-46 and its call sign, "Swift 22." It was the last flight from Saigon that would take the Marines home.
The final transmission from the CH-46 arrived with just seven words: "All the Americans are out, Repeat Out."
But not everyone was out. A breakdown in communication had occurred between those running the evacuation from the ground and those offshore, with the fleet controlling the helicopters and those making the decisions in Hawaii and Washington. "It was the Vietnam war all over again," observed Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. "It was not a proud day to be an American." There, on the embassy rooftop, over 420 Vietnamese stared into the empty skies looking for signs of returning American helicopters. Just hours earlier, they had been assured by well-intentioned Marines, "Khong ai se bi bo lai" ("No one will be left behind").
The helicopters did not return.
From the White House, President Gerald Ford issued an official statement: "The Government of the Republic of Vietnam has surrendered. Prior to its surrender, we have withdrawn our Mission from Vietnam. Vietnam has been a wrenching experience for this nation...History must be the final judge of that which we have done or left undone, in Vietnam and elsewhere. Let us calmly await its verdict."
* * *
It has been over thirty years since the United States and Vietnam began talks intended to end the Vietnam War. The Paris Peace Talks began on May 13, 1968, under the crystal chandeliers in the ballroom of the old Majestic Hotel on Avenue Kleber and did not end until January 27, 1973, with the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam at the International Conference Center in Paris. Despite the agreement, not a moment of peace ever came to Vietnam. This book uses a cache of recently declassified documents to offer a new perspective on why the country known as South Vietnam ceased to exist after April 1975.
Since the very first days of his presidency in January 1969, Richard Nixon had sought an "honorable peace" in Vietnam. In January 1973 he characterized the Paris agreement as having achieved those lofty goals: "Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us, but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina."
A speakers' kit assembled within the White House on the evening of the president's announcement of the cease-fire described the final document as "a vindication of the wisdom of the President's policy in holding out for an honorable peace — and his refusal to accept a disguised and dishonorable defeat. Had it not been for the President's courage — during four years of unprecedented vilification and attack — the United States would not today be honorably ending her involvement in the war, but would be suffering the consequences of dishonor and defeat...The difference between what the President has achieved and what his opponents wanted, is the difference between peace with honor, and the false peace of an American surrender."
A White Paper drafted for distribution to members of Congress offered more barbed attacks on his critics.
For four agonizing years, Richard Nixon has stood virtually alone in the nation's capital while little, petty men flayed him over American involvement in Indochina. For four years, he has been the victim of the most vicious personal attacks. Day and night, America's predominantly liberal national media hammered at Mr. Nixon, slicing from all sides, attacking, hitting, and cutting. The intellectual establishment — those whose writings entered America into the Vietnam war — pompously postured from their ivy hideaways, using their inordinate power to influence public opinion...No President has been under more constant and unremitting harassment by men who should drop to their knees each night to thank the Almighty that they do not have to make the same decisions that Richard Nixon did. Standing with the President in all those years were a handful of reporters and number of newspapers — nearly all outside of Washington. There were also the courageous men of Congress who would stand firm beside the President. But most importantly there were the millions upon millions of quite ordinary Americans — -the great Silent Majority of citizens — who saw our country through a period where the shock troops of leftist public opinion daily propagandized against the President of the United States. They were people of character and steel.
Meanwhile, the North Vietnam heralded the Paris agreement as a great victory. Radio Hanoi, in domestic and foreign broadcasts, confined itself for several days to reading and rereading the Paris text and protocols. From the premier's office in Hanoi came the declaration that the national flag of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) should be flown throughout the country for eight days, from the moment the cease-fire went into effect on January 28 through February 4. For three days and nights, Hanoi's streets were filled with crowds of people celebrating the fact that in 60 days there would be no foreign troops in Vietnam.
The Nhan Dan editorial of January 28 titled "The Great Historic Victory of Our Vietnamese People," observed, "Today, 28 January, the war has ended completely in both zones of our country. The United States and other countries have pledged to respect our country's independence, sovereignty, reunification, and territorial integrity. The United States will withdraw all U.S. troops and the troops of other foreign countries and their advisors and military personnel dismantle U.S. military bases in the southern part of our country and respect our southern people's right to self-determination and other democratic freedoms."
Premier Pham Van Dong was more forthcoming to American broadcaster Walter Cronkite that "the Paris Agreement marked an important victory of our people in their resistance against U.S. aggression, for national salvation. For us, its terms were satisfactory...The Paris agreement paved the way for our great victory in the Spring of 1975 which put an end to more than a century of colonial and neo-colonial domination over our country and restored the independence, freedom and unity of our homeland."
Perhaps the most honest response came from a young North Vietnamese cadre by the name of Man Duc Xuyen, living in Ha Bac province in North Vietnam. In a postcard, he extended Tet New Year wishes to his family. "Dear father, mother and family," the letter began. "When we have liberated South Viet-Nam and have unified the country, I will return."
Only in South Vietnam was there no joy or celebration over the signing of the Paris agreement. By the terms of the deal, over 150,000 North Vietnamese troops remained in the South, whereas the United States, over the course of Nixon's presidency, had unilaterally withdrawn over 500,000 of its own troops. President Nguyen Van Thieu and his fellow countrymen understood that the diplomatic battle had been won by Le Duc Tho. President Thieu was agreeing to nothing more than a protocol for American disengagement. True, President Nixon had guaranteed brutal retaliation if the North resumed any aggression. But could these guarantees be trusted? The fate of his country depended on them. Twenty-eight months later, South Vietnam would disappear.
* * *
To date, there have been two quite different explanations for the failure of the Paris Accords and the subsequent end of the country known as South Vietnam.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger have always maintained that they won the war and that Congress lost the peace. The treaty itself, they said, although not perfect, was sound enough to have allowed for a political solution if North Vietnam had not so blatantly violated it. North and South Vietnam could have remained separate countries. When the North did violate the agreement, Watergate prevented the president from backing up his secret guarantees to President Thieu. Kissinger goes even further, insisting there was nothing secret about the promises Nixon made to Thieu. In any case, by mid-1973 Nixon was waging a constitutional battle with Congress over executive privilege and abuse of powers; he could hardly start a new battle over war powers to defend South Vietnam. "By 1973, we had achieved our political objective: South Vietnam's independence had been secured," Nixon later told Monica Crowley, former foreign policy assistant and confidante, "But by 1975, the Congress destroyed our ability to enforce the Paris agreement and left our allies vulnerable to Hanoi's invading forces. If I sound like I'm blaming Congress, I am."
Kissinger has put it this way: "Our tragedy was our domestic situation...In April [1973], Watergate blew up, and we were castrated...The second tragedy was that we were not permitted to enforce the agreement...I think it's reasonable to assume he [Nixon] would have bombed the hell out of them during April."
The other explanation for the failure of the Paris Accords is known as the "decent interval." This explanation is far less charitable to Nixon or Kissinger because it is premised on the assumption that by January 1973, U.S. leaders cared only about securing the release of American POWs and getting some type of accounting on MIAs, especially in Laos. The political future of South Vietnam would be left for the Vietnamese to decide; we just did not want the communists to triumph too quickly. Kissinger knew that Hanoi would eventually win. By signing the peace agreement, Hanoi was not abandoning its long-term objective, merely giving the U.S. a fig leaf with which to exit. In his book Decent Interval, Frank Snepp wrote: "The Paris Agreement was thus a cop-out of sorts, an American one. The only thing it definitely guaranteed was an American withdrawal from Vietnam, for that depended on American action alone. The rest of the issues that had sparked the war and kept it alive were left essentially unresolved — and irresolvable."
Kissinger was asked by the assistant to the president, John Ehrlichman, "How long do you figure the South Vietnamese can survive under this agreement?" Ehrlichman reported that Kissinger answered, "I think that if they're lucky they can hold out for a year and a half." When Kissinger's assistant John Negroponte opined that the agreement was not in the best interests of South Vietnam, Kissinger asked him, "Do you want us to stay there forever?"
Nixon yearned to be remembered by history as a great foreign policy president; he needed a noncommunist South Vietnam on that ledger in order to sustain a legacy that already included détente with the Soviets and an opening with China. If South Vietnam was going down the tubes, it could not be on Nixon's watch. "What really matters now is how it all comes out," Nixon wrote in his diary in April 1972. "Both Haldeman and Henry seem to have an idea — which I think is mistaken — that even if we fail in Vietnam we can survive politically. I have no illusions whatsoever on that score, however. The US will not have a credible policy if we fail, and I will have to assume responsibility for that development."
* * *
No Peace, No Honor draws on recently declassified records to show that the true picture is worse than either of these perspectives suggests. The reality was the opposite of the decent interval hypothesis and far beyond Nixon's and Kissinger's claims. The record shows that the United States expected that the signed treaty would be immediately violated and that this would trigger a brutal military response. Permanent war (air war, not ground operations) at acceptable cost was what Nixon and Kissinger anticipated from the so-called peace agreement. They believed that the only way the American public would accept it was if there was a signed agreement. Nixon recognized that winning the peace, like the war, would be impossible to achieve, but he planned for indefinite stalemate by using the B-52s to prop up the government of South Vietnam until the end of his presidency. Just as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution provided a pretext for an American engagement in South Vietnam, the Paris Accords were intended to fulfill a similar role for remaining permanently engaged in Vietnam. Watergate derailed the plan.
The declassified record shows that the South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, and the United States disregarded key elements of the treaty because all perceived it was in their interest to do so. No one took the agreement seriously because each party viewed it as a means for securing something unstated. For the United States, as part of the Nixon Doctrine, it was a means of remaining permanently involved in Southeast Asia; for the North Vietnamese, it was the means for eventual conquest and unification of Vietnam; for the South Vietnamese, it was a means for securing continued support from the United States.
The truth has remained buried for so long because Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did everything possible to deny any independent access to the historical record. As witnesses to history, they used many classified top-secret documents in writing their respective memoirs but later made sure that everyone else would have great difficulty accessing the same records. They have limited access to personal papers, telephone records, and other primary source materials that would allow for any independent assessments of the record pertaining to the evolution of negotiating strategies and compromises that were raised at different stages of the protracted process. The late Admiral Elmo "Bud" Zumwalt, Jr., former chief of naval operations said that "Kissinger's method of writing history is similar to that of communist historians who took justifications from the present moment and projected backwards, fact by fact, in accounting for their country's past. Under this method, nothing really was as it happened." This is how the administration's history of "peace with honor" was written.
The personal papers of Henry Kissinger are deposited in the Library of Congress with a deed of gift restricting access until five years after his death. For years we have been denied access to the full transcripts of Kissinger's negotiations. Verbatim hand-written transcripts of the secret meetings in Paris were kept by Kissinger's assistants, Tony Lake, Winston Lord, and John Negroponte. Negroponte gave a complete set of these meeting notes to Kissinger for writing his memoirs, but they were never returned. In his deposition to the Kerry Committee investigation, which examined virtually all aspects of the MIA issue and gave special attention to the Paris negotiations, Winston Lord stated that there were "verbatim transcripts of every meeting with the Vietnamese. I'm talking now about the secret meetings, because I took, particularly toward the beginning, and we got some help at the end, the notes as did Negroponte or Smyser or Rodman and so on." Only now have notes of these secret back-channel meetings become available. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese have published their own narrative translation of the Kissinger-Tho negotiations.
This is the story of a peace negotiation that began with Lyndon Johnson in 1968 and ended with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. Many secret meetings were involved. The principal sources include transcript-like narratives of documents from Hanoi archives that have been translated by Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu and published as Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris; declassified meeting transcripts from a congressional investigation of MIAs in Southeast Asia; declassified meeting notes from the papers of Tony Lake and memoranda of conversations from recently declassified materials in the National Archives or presidential libraries. These three have been triangulated to connect minutes as well as linkages between events. In many cases, I have been able to fill in classified sections through materials in back-channel cables from Kissinger to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker or President Nixon.
Here, then, is the emerging story of what Nixon called "peace with honor" but was, in fact, neither. This story of diplomatic deception and public betrayal has come to the light only because of the release of documents and tapes that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger sought to bury for as long as possible. Prior to these declassifications, we knew only what Nixon or Kissinger wanted us to know about the making of war and shaping of the so-called honorable peace in Vietnam.
Excerpted from No Peace, No Honor by Larry Berman. Copyright © 2001 by Larry Berman. Excerpted by permission. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Another exact evidence of the American presidents of the Vietnam War had proved:
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Exclusive: After resigning over the Watergate political-spying scandal, President Nixon sought to rewrite the history of his Vietnam War strategies to deny swapping lives for political advantage, but newly released documents say otherwise, writes James DiEugenio.
By James DiEugenio
Richard Nixon spent years rebuilding his tattered reputation after he resigned from office in disgrace on Aug. 9, 1974. The rehabilitation project was codenamed “The Wizard.” The idea was to position himself as an elder statesman of foreign policy, a Wise Man. And to a remarkable degree through the sale of his memoirs, his appearance with David Frost in a series of highly rated interviews, and the publication of at least eight books after that Nixon largely succeeded in his goal.
There was another aspect of that plan: to do all he could to keep his presidential papers and tapes classified, which, through a series of legal maneuvers, he managed to achieve in large part. Therefore, much of what he and Henry Kissinger wrote about in their memoirs could stand, largely unchallenged.




President Richard Nixon with his then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in 1972.
It was not until years after his death that the bulk of the Nixon papers and tapes were opened up to the light of day. And Kissinger’s private papers will not be declassified until five years after his death. With that kind of arrangement, it was fairly easy for Nixon to sell himself as the Sage of San Clemente, but two new books based on the long-delayed declassified record one by Ken Hughes and the other by William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball undermine much of Nixon’s rehabilitation.
For instance, in 1985 at the peak of President Ronald Reagan’s political power Nixon wrote No More Vietnams, making several dubious claims about the long conflict which included wars of independence by Vietnam against both France and the United States.
In the book, Nixon tried to insinuate that Vietnam was not really one country for a very long time and that the split between north and south was a natural demarcation. He also declared that the Vietnam War had been won under his administration, and he insisted that he never really considered bombing the irrigation dikes, using tactical nuclear weapons, or employing the strategy of a “decent interval” to mask an American defeat for political purposes.
Nixon’s Story
In No More Vietnams, Nixon said that after going through a series of option papers furnished to him by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, he decided on a five-point program for peace in Vietnam. (Nixon, pgs. 104-07) This program consisted of Vietnamization, i. e., turning over the fighting of the war to the South Vietnamese army (the ARVN); pacification, which was a clear-and-hold strategy for maintaining territory in the south; diplomatic isolation of North Vietnam from its allies, China and the Soviet Union; peace negotiations with very few preconditions; and gradual withdrawal of American combat troops. Nixon asserted that this program was successful.
But the currently declassified record does not support Nixon’s version of history, either in the particulars of what was attempted or in Nixon’s assessment of its success.
When Richard Nixon came into office he was keenly aware of what had happened to his predecessor Lyndon Johnson, who had escalated the war to heights that President Kennedy had never imagined, let alone envisaged. The war of attrition strategy that LBJ and General William Westmoreland had decided upon did not work. And the high American casualties it caused eroded support for the war domestically. Nixon told his Chief of Staff Bob Haldeman that he would not end up like LBJ, a prisoner in his own White House.
Therefore, Nixon wanted recommendations that would shock the enemy, even beyond the massive bombing campaigns and other bloody tactics employed by Johnson. As authors Burr and Kimball note in their new book Nixon’s Nuclear Specter, Nixon was very much influenced by two modes of thought.
First, as Vice President from 1953-61, he was under the tutelage of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight Eisenhower, who advocated a policy of nuclear brinksmanship, that is the willingness to threaten nuclear war if need be. Dulles felt that since the United States had a large lead in atomic weapons that the Russians would back down in the face of certain annihilation.
Nixon was also impressed by the alleged threat of President Eisenhower to use atomic weapons if North Korea and China did not bargain in good faith to end the Korean War. Nixon actually talked about this in a private meeting with southern politicians at the 1968 GOP convention. (Burr and Kimball, Chapter 2)
Dulles also threatened to use atomic weapons in Vietnam. Burr and Kimball note the proposal by Dulles to break the Viet Minh’s siege of French troops at Dien Bien Phu by a massive air mission featuring the use of three atomic bombs. Though Nixon claimed in No More Vietnams that the atomic option was not seriously considered (Nixon, p. 30), the truth appears to have been more ambiguous, that Nixon thought the siege could be lifted without atomic weapons but he was not against using them. Eisenhower ultimately vetoed their use when he could not get Great Britain to go along.
Playing the Madman
Later, when in the Oval Office, Nixon tempered this nuclear brinksmanship for the simple reason that the Russians had significantly closed the gap in atomic stockpiles. So, as Burr and Kimball describe it, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to modify the Eisenhower-Dulles brinksmanship with the “uncertainty effect” or as Nixon sometimes called it, the Madman Theory. In other words, instead of overtly threatening to use atomic bombs, Nixon would have an intermediary pass on word to the North Vietnamese leadership that Nixon was so unhinged that he might resort to nuclear weapons if he didn’t get his way. Or, as Nixon explained to Haldeman, if you act crazy, the incredible becomes credible:
“They’ll believe any threat of force that Nixon makes because it’s Nixon. I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that ‘for God’s sake you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry, and he has his hand on the nuclear button.’”
Nixon believed this trick would work, saying “Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”
Kissinger once told special consultant Leonard Garment to convey to the Soviets that Nixon was somewhat nutty and unpredictable. Kissinger bought into the concept so much so that he was part of the act: the idea was for Nixon to play the “bad cop” and Kissinger the “good cop.”
Another reason that Nixon and Kissinger advocated the Madman Theory was that they understood that Vietnamization and pacification would take years. And they did not think they could sustain public opinion on the war for that long. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers both thought they could, their opinions were peripheral because Nixon and Kissinger had concentrated the foreign policy apparatus in the White House.
Playing for Time
Privately, Nixon did not think America could win the war, so he wanted to do something unexpected, shocking, “over the top.” As Burr and Kimball note, in 1969, Nixon told his speechwriters Ray Price, Pat Buchanan and Richard Whalen: “I’ve come to the conclusion that there’s no way to win the war. But we can’t say that, of course. In fact we have to seem to say the opposite, just to keep some degree of bargaining leverage.”
In a phone call with Kissinger, Nixon said, “In Saigon, the tendency is to fight the war for victory. But you and I know it won’t happen it is impossible. Even Gen. Abrams agreed.”
These ideas were expressed very early in 1969 in a document called NSSM-1, a study memorandum as opposed to an action memorandum with Kissinger asking for opinions on war strategy from those directly involved. The general consensus was that the other side had “options over which we have little or no control” which would help them “continue the war almost indefinitely.” (ibid, Chapter 3)
Author Ken Hughes in Fatal Politics agrees. Nixon wanted to know if South Vietnam could survive without American troops there. All of the military figures he asked replied that President Nguyen van Thieu’s government could not take on both the Viet Cong and the regular North Vietnamese army. And, the United States could not help South Vietnam enough for it to survive on its own. (Hughes, pgs. 14-15)
As Hughes notes, Nixon understood that this bitter truth needed maximum spin to make it acceptable for the public. So he said, “Shall we leave Vietnam in a way that by our own actions consciously turns the country over to the Communists? Or shall we leave in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as a free people? My plan will end American involvement in a way that will provide that chance.” (ibid, p. 15)
If the U.S. media allowed the argument to be framed like that, which it did, then the hopeless cause did have a political upside. As Kissinger told Nixon, “The only consolation we have is that the people who put us into this position are going to be destroyed by the right. They are going to be destroyed. The liberals and radicals are going to be killed. This is, above all, a rightwing country.” (ibid, p. 19)
Could anything be less honest, less democratic or more self-serving? Knowing that their critics were correct, and that the war could not be won, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to portray the people who were right about the war as betraying both America and South Vietnam.
Political Worries
Just how calculated was Nixon about America’s withdrawal from Vietnam? Republican Sen. Hugh Scott warned him about getting out by the end of 1972, or “another man may be standing on the platform” on Inauguration Day 1973. (ibid, p. 23) Nixon told his staff that Scott should not be saying things like this in public.
But, in private, the GOP actually polled on the issue. It was from these polls that Nixon tailored his speeches. He understood that only 39 percent of the public approved a Dec. 31, 1971 withdrawal, if it meant a U.S. defeat. When the question was posed as withdrawal, even if it meant a communist takeover, the percentage declined to 27 percent. Nixon studied the polls assiduously. He told Haldeman, “That’s the word. We say Communist takeover.” (ibid, p. 24)
The polls revealed another hot button issue: getting our POW’s back. This was even more sensitive with the public than the “Communist takeover” issue. Therefore, during a press conference, when asked about Scott’s public warning, Nixon replied that the date of withdrawal should not be related to any election day. The important thing was that he “didn’t want one American to be in Vietnam one day longer than is necessary to achieve the two goals that I have mentioned: the release of our prisoners and the capacity of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves against a Communist takeover.” He then repeated that meme two more times. The press couldn’t avoid it. (Hughes, p. 25)
Still, although Nixon and Kissinger understood they could not win the war in a conventional sense, they were willing to try other methods in the short run to get a better and quicker settlement, especially if it included getting North Vietnamese troops out of South Vietnam. Therefore, in 1969, he and Kissinger elicited suggestions from inside the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA, and Rand Corporation, through Daniel Ellsberg. These included a limited invasion of North Vietnam and Laos, mining the harbors and bombing the north, a full-scale invasion of North Vietnam, and operations in Cambodia.
Or as Kissinger put it, “We should develop alternate plans for possible escalating military actions with the motive of convincing the Soviets that the war may get out of hand.” Kissinger also said that bombing Cambodia would convey the proper message to Moscow.
If anything shows that Kissinger was as backward in his thinking about Indochina as Nixon, this does. For as Burr and Kimball show — through Dobrynin’s memos to Moscow — the Russians could not understand why the White House would think the Kremlin had such influence with Hanoi. Moscow wanted to deal on a variety of issues, including arms agreements and the Middle East.
So far from Kissinger’s vaunted “linkage” theory furthering the agenda with Russia, it’s clear from Dobrynin that it hindered that agenda. In other words, the remnants of a colonial conflict in the Third World were stopping progress in ameliorating the Cold War. This was the subtotal of the Nixon/Kissinger geopolitical accounting sheet.
Judging Kissinger on Vietnam
Just how unbalanced was Kissinger on Vietnam? In April 1969, there was a shoot-down of an American observation plane off the coast of Korea. When White House adviser John Ehrlichman asked Kissinger how far the escalation could go, Kissinger replied it could go nuclear.
In a memo to Nixon, Kissinger advised using tactical nuclear weapons. He wrote that “all hell would break loose for two months”, referring to domestic demonstrations. But he then concluded that the end result would be positive: “there will be peace in Asia.”
Kissinger was referring, of course, to the effectiveness of the Madman Theory. In reading these two books, it is often hard to decipher who is more dangerous in their thinking, Nixon or Kissinger.
In the first phase of their approach to the Vietnam issue, Nixon and Kissinger decided upon two alternatives. The first was the secret bombing of Cambodia. In his interview with David Frost, Nixon expressed no regrets about either the bombing or the invasion. In fact, he said, he wished he had done it sooner, which is a puzzling statement because the bombing of Cambodia was among the first things he authorized. Nixon told Frost that the bombing and the later invasion of Cambodia had positive results: they garnered a lot of enemy supplies, lowered American casualties in Vietnam, and hurt the Viet Cong war effort.
Frost did not press the former president with the obvious follow-up: But Mr. Nixon, you started another war and you helped depose Cambodia’s charismatic ruler, Prince Sihanouk. And because the Viet Cong were driven deeper into Cambodia, Nixon then began bombing the rest of the country, not just the border areas, leading to the victory of the radical Khmer Rouge and the deaths of more than one million Cambodians.
This all indicates just how imprisoned Nixon and Kissinger were by the ideas of John Foster Dulles and his visions of a communist monolith with orders emanating from Moscow’s Comintern, a unified global movement controlled by the Kremlin. Like the Domino Theory, this was never sound thinking. In fact, the Sino-Soviet border dispute, which stemmed back to 1962, showed that communist movements were not monolithic. So the idea that Moscow could control Hanoi, or that the communists in Cambodia were controlled by the Viet Cong, this all ended up being disastrously wrong.
As Sihanouk told author William Shawcross after the Cambodian catastrophe unfolded, General Lon Nol, who seized power from Prince Sihanouk, was nothing without the military actions of Nixon and Kissinger, and “the Khmer Rouge were nothing without Lon Nol.” (Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 391)
But further, as Shawcross demonstrates, the immediate intent of the Cambodian invasion was to seek and destroy the so-called COSVN, the supposed command-and-control base for the communist forces in South Vietnam supposedly based on the border inside Cambodia. No such command center was ever found. (ibid, p. 171)
Why the Drop in Casualties?
As for Nixon’s other claim, American casualties declined in Indochina because of troop rotation, that is, the ARVN were pushed to the front lines with the Americans in support. Or as one commander said after the Cambodian invasion: it was essential that American fatalities be cut back, “If necessary, we must do it by edict.” (ibid, p. 172)
But this is not all that Nixon tried in the time frame of 1969-70, his first two years in office. At Kissinger’s request he also attempted a secret mission to Moscow by Wall Street lawyer Cyrus Vance. Part of Kissinger’s linkage theory, Vance was to tell the Soviets that if they leaned on Hanoi to accept a Nixonian framework for negotiations, then the administration would be willing to deal on other fronts, and there would be little or no escalation. The negotiations on Vietnam included a coalition government, and the survival of Thieu’s government for at least five years, which would have been two years beyond the 1972 election. (As we shall see, this is the beginning of the final “decent interval” strategy.)
The Vance mission was coupled with what Burr and Kimball call a “mining ruse.” The Navy would do an exercise to try and make the Russians think they were going to mine Haiphong and five other North Vietnamese harbors. Yet, for reasons stated above, Nixon overrated linkage, and the tactic did not work. But as Kissinger said, “If in doubt, we bomb Cambodia.” Which they did.
As the authors note, Nixon had urged President Johnson in 1967 to extend the bombing throughout Indochina, into Cambodia and Laos. Johnson had studied these and other options but found too many liabilities. He had even studied the blockading of ports but concluded that Hanoi would compensate for a blockade in a relatively short time by utilizing overland routes and off-shore unloading.
But what Johnson did not factor in was the Nixon/Kissinger Madman Theory. For example, when a State Department representative brought up the overall military ineffectiveness of the Cambodian bombing, Kissinger replied, “That doesn’t bother me we’ll hit something.” He also told an assistant, “Always keep them guessing.” The problem was, the “shock effect” ended up being as mythical as linkage.
In 1969, after the failure of the Vance mission, the mining ruse, the warnings to Dobrynin, and the continued bombing of Cambodia, which went on in secret for 14 months, Nixon still had not given up on his Madman Theory. He sent a message to Hanoi saying that if a resolution was not in the works by November, “he will regretfully find himself obliged to have recourse to measures of great consequence and force.”
What were these consequences? Nixon had wanted to mine Haiphong for a long time. But, as did Johnson, he was getting different opinions about its effectiveness. So he considered massive interdiction bombing of the north coupled with a blockade of Sihanoukville, the Cambodian port that was part of the Ho Chi Minh trail apparatus on the west coast of Cambodia.
Plus one other tactic: Kissinger suggested to his staff that the interdiction bombing use tactical nuclear weapons for overland passes near the Chinese border. But the use of tactical nukes would have created an even greater domestic disturbance than the Cambodian invasion had done. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird objected to the whole agenda. He said it would not be effective and it would create too much domestic strife.
Backing Up Threats
So Nixon and Kissinger decided on something short of the nuclear option. After all, Nixon had sent a veiled ultimatum to Hanoi about “great consequence and force.” They had to back it up. The two decided on a worldwide nuclear alert instead, a giant nuclear war exercise that would simulate actual military maneuvers in attempting to mimic what the U.S. would do if it were preparing for a nuclear strike.
As Burr and Kimball write, this was another outmoded vestige of 1950s Cold War thinking: “It was intended to signal Washington’s anger at Moscow’s support of North Vietnam and to jar the Soviet leaders into using their leverage to induce Hanoi to make diplomatic concessions.” (Burr and Kimball, Chapter 9)
It was designed to be detected by the Soviets, but not detectable at home. For instance, the DEFCON levels were not actually elevated. The alert went on for about three weeks, with all kinds of military maneuvers at sea and on land. Finally, Dobrynin called for a meeting. Kissinger was buoyant. Maybe the ploy had worked.
But it didn’t. The ambassador was angry and upset, but not about the alert. He said that while the Russians wanted to deal on nuclear weapons, Nixon was as obsessed with Vietnam as LBJ was. In other words, Dobrynin and the Soviets were perceptive about what was really happening. Nixon tried to salvage the meeting with talk about how keeping American fatalities low in Vietnam would aid détente, which further blew the cover off the nuclear alert.
Burr and Kimball show just how wedded the self-styled foreign policy mavens were to the Madman Theory. After the meeting, Nixon realized he had not done well in accordance with the whole nuclear alert, Madman idea. He asked Kissinger to bring back Dobrynin so they could play act the Madman idea better.
The authors then note that, although Haiphong was later mined, the mining was not effective, as Nixon had been warned. In other words, the Madman idea and linkage were both duds.
Nixon and Kissinger then turned to Laird’s plan, a Vietnamization program, a mix of U.S. troop withdrawals, turning more of the fighting over to the ARVN, and negotiations. The November 1969 Madman timetable was tossed aside and the long haul of gradual U.S. disengagement was being faced. Accordingly, Nixon and Kissinger started sending new messages to the north. And far from isolating Hanoi, both China and Russia served as messengers for these new ideas.
The White House told Dobrynin that after all American troops were out, Vietnam would no longer be America’s concern. In extension of this idea, America would not even mind if Vietnam was unified under Hanoi leadership.
Kissinger told the Chinese that America would not return after withdrawing. In his notebooks for his meeting with Zhou En Lai, Kissinger wrote, “We want a decent interval. You have our assurances.” (Burr and Kimball, Epilogue)
Timing the Departure
But when would the American troops depart? As Ken Hughes writes, Nixon at first wanted the final departure to be by December of 1971. But Kissinger talked him out of this. It was much safer politically to have the final withdrawal after the 1972 election. If Saigon fell after, it was too late to say Nixon’s policies were responsible. (Fatal Politics, p. 3)
Kissinger also impressed on Nixon the need not to announce a timetable in advance. Since all their previous schemes had failed, they had to have some leverage for the Paris peace talks.
But there was a problem. The exposure of the secret bombing of Cambodia began to put pressure on Congress to begin to cut off funding for those operations. Therefore, when Nixon also invaded Laos, this was done with ARVN troops. It did not go very well, but that did not matter to Nixon: “However Laos comes out, we have got to claim it was a success.” (Hughes, p. 14)
While there was little progress at the official negotiations, that too was irrelevant because Kissinger had arranged for so-called “secret talks” at a residential home in Paris. There was no headway at these talks until late May 1971. Prior to this, Nixon had insisted on withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam.
But in May, Kissinger reversed himself on two issues. First, there would be no American residual force left behind. Second, there would be a cease-fire in place. That is, no withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. As Kissinger said to Nixon, they would still be free to bomb the north, but “the only problem is to prevent the collapse in 1972.” (ibid, pgs. 27-28) The Decent Interval strategy was now the modus operandi.
And this strategy would serve Nixon’s reelection interests, too. As Kissinger told Nixon, “If we can, in October of ’72 go around the country saying we ended the war and the Democrats wanted to turn it over to the communists then we’re in great shape.” To which Nixon replied, “I know exactly what we’re up to.” (ibid, p. 29) Since this was all done in secret, they could get away with a purely political ploy even though its resulted in the needless deaths of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians. All this was done to make sure Nixon was reelected and the Democrats looked like wimps.
Kissinger understood this linkage between the war’s illusionary success and politics. He reminded Nixon, “If Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam go down the drain in September of 1972, they they’ll say you went into those … you spoiled so many lives, just to wind up where you could have been in the first year.” (ibid, p. 30)
In fact, the President’s February 1972 trip to China was directly related to the slow progress on Vietnam. Kissinger said, “For every reason, we’ve got to have a diversion from Vietnam in this country for awhile.” To which Nixon replied, “That’s the point isn’t it?” (ibid, p.32)
A Decent Interval
In preparations for China, Kissinger told Zhou En Lai that Nixon needed an interval of a year or two after American departure for Saigon to fall. (ibid, p. 35) He told Zhou, “The outcome of my logic is that we are putting a time interval between the military outcome and the political outcome.” (ibid, p. 79)
But aware of this, Hanoi made one last push for victory with the Easter Offensive of 1972. Remarkably successful at first, air power managed to stall it and then push it back. During this giant air operation, Nixon returned to his Foster Dulles brinksmanship form, asking Kissinger, should we “take the dikes out now?”
Kissinger replied, “That will drown about 200,000 people.”
Nixon said, “Well no, no I’d rather use a nuclear bomb. Have you got that ready?”
When Kissinger demurred by saying Nixon wouldn’t use it anyway, the President replied, “I just want you to think big Henry, for Christ’s sake.” (Burr and Kimball, Epilogue)
The American press took the wrong message from this. What it actually symbolized was that Saigon could not survive without massive American aid and firepower. (Hughes, p. 61) But even with this huge air campaign, the Pentagon figured that the north could keep up its war effort for at least two more years, even with interdiction bombing.
The political ramification of the renewed fighting was that it pushed the final settlement back in time, which Nixon saw as a political benefit, a tsunami for his reelection.
Nixon: “The advantage, Henry, of trying to settle now, even if you’re ten points ahead, is that that will ensure a hell of a landslide.”
Kissinger: “If we can get that done, then we can screw them after Election Day if necessary. And I think this could finish the destruction of McGovern” [the Democratic presidential nominee].
Nixon: “Oh yes, and the doves, which is just as important.”
The next day, Aug. 3, 1972, Kissinger returned to the theme: “So we’ve got to find some formula that holds the thing together a year or two, after which, after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a backwater no one will give a damn.” (Hughes, pgs. 84-85)
All of this history renders absurd the speeches of Ronald Reagan at the time: “President Nixon’s idealism is such that he believes the people of South Vietnam should have the opportunity to live under whatever form of government they themselves choose.” (Hughes, p. 86) While Reagan was whistling in the dark, the Hanoi negotiator Le Duc Tho understood what was happening. He even said to Kissinger, “reunification will be decided upon after a suitable interval following the signing.”
Kissinger and Nixon even knew the whole election commission idea for reunification was a joke. Kissinger called it, “all baloney. There’ll never be elections.” Nixon agreed by saying that the war will then resume, but “we’ll be gone.” (ibid, p. 88)
Thieu’s Complaint
The problem in October 1972 was not Hanoi; it was President Thieu. He understood that with 150,000 North Vietnamese regulars in the south, the writing was on the wall for his future. So Kissinger got reassurances from Hanoi that they would not use the Ho Chi Minh Trail after America left, though Kissinger and Nixon knew this was a lie. (ibid, p. 94)
When Thieu still balked, Nixon said he would sign the agreement unilaterally. How badly did Kissinger steamroll Thieu? When he brought him the final agreements to sign, Thieu noticed that they only referred to three countries being in Indochina: Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam. Kissinger tried to explain this away as a mistake. (Hughes, p. 118)
When Kissinger announced in October 1972 that peace was at hand, he understood this was false but it was political gold.
Nixon: “Of course, the point is, they think you’ve got peace. . . but that’s all right,. Let them think it.” (ibid, p. 132)
Nixon got Senators Barry Goldwater and John Stennis to debate cutting off aid for Saigon. This got Thieu to sign. (ibid, p. 158)
In January 1973, the agreement was formalized. It was all a sham. There was no lull in the fighting, there were no elections, and there was no halt in the supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As the military knew, Saigon was no match for the Viet Cong and the regular army of North Vietnam. And Thieu did not buy the letters Nixon wrote him about resumed bombing if Hanoi violated the treaty.
But Nixon had one more trick up his sleeve, which he pulled out as an excuse for the defeat in his 1985 book, No More Vietnams. He wrote that Congress lost the “victory” he had won by gradually cutting off aid to Indochina beginning in 1973. (Nixon, p. 178)
It’s true that the Democratic caucuses did vote for this, but anyone can tell by looking at the numbers that Nixon could have sustained a veto if he tried. And, in fact, he had vetoed a bill to ban American bombing in Cambodia on June 27 with the House falling 35 votes short in the override attempt.
Rep. Gerald Ford, R-Michigan, rose and said, “If military action is required in Southeast Asia after August 15, 1973, the President will ask congressional authority and will abide by the decision that is made by the House and Senate.”
The Democrats didn’t buy Ford’s assurance. So Ford called Nixon and returned to the podium to say Nixon had reaffirmed his pledge. With that, the borderline Republicans joined in a shut-off vote of 278-124. In the Senate the vote was 64-26. (Hughes, p. 165)
Having Congress take the lead meant that Nixon did not have to even think of revisiting Vietnam. He could claim he was stabbed in the back by Congress. As Hughes notes, it would have been better for Congress politically to double the funding requests just to show it was all for show.
As Hughes writes, this strategy of arranging a phony peace, which disguised an American defeat, was repeated in Iraq. President George W. Bush rejected troop withdrawals in 2007 and then launched “the surge,” which cost another 1,000 American lives but averted an outright military defeat on Bush’s watch. Bush then signed an agreement with his hand-picked Iraqi government, allowing American troops to remain in Iraq for three more years and passing the disaster on to President Barack Obama.
Hughes ends by writing that Nixon’s myth of a “victory” in Vietnam masks cowardice for political courage and replaces patriotism with opportunism. Nixon prolonged a lost war. He then faked a peace. And he then schemed to shift the blame onto Congress.
As long as that truth is masked, other presidents can play politics with the lives hundred of thousands of innocent civilians, and tens of thousands of American soldiers.
At Nixon’s 1994 funeral, Kissinger tried to commemorate their legacy by listing their foreign policy achievements. The first one he listed was a peace agreement in Vietnam. The last one was the airing of a human rights agenda that helped break apart the Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. These two books make those declarations not just specious, but a bit obscene.
James DiEugenio is a researcher and writer on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and other mysteries of that era. His most recent book is Reclaiming Parkland.


---------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Letter from President Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, January 5, 1973.

(Released Apr. 30, 1975)

January 5, 1973

Dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 20, 1972.

There is nothing substantial that I can add to my many previous messages, including my December 17 letter, which clearly stated my opinions and intentions. With respect to the question of North Vietnamese troops, we will again present your views to the Communists as we have done vigorously at every ether opportunity in the negotiations. The result is certain to be once more the rejection of our position. We have explained to you repeatedly why we believe the problem of North Vietnamese troops is manageable under the agreement, and I see no reason to repeat all the arguments.

We will proceed next week in Paris along the lines that General Haig explained to you. Accordingly, if the North Vietnamese meet our concerns on the two outstanding substantive issues in the agreement, concerning the DMZ and type method of signing and if we can arrange acceptable supervisory machinery, we will proceed to conclude the settlement. The gravest consequence would then ensue if your government chose to reject the agreement and split off from the United States. As I said in my December 17 letter,
"I am convinced that your refusal to join us would be an invitation to disaster-to the loss of all that we together have fought for over the past decade. It would be inexcusable above all because we will have lost a just and honorable alternative. "

As we enter this new round of talks, I hope that our countries will now show a united front. It is imperative for our common objectives that your government takes no further actions that complicate our task and would make more difficult the acceptance of the settlement by all parties. We will keep you informed of the negotiations in Paris through daily briefings of Ambassador
[Pham Dang] Lam.

I can only repeat what I have so often said: The best guarantee for the survival of South Vietnam is the unity of our two countries which would be gravely jeopardized if you persist in your present course. The actions of our Congress since its return have clearly borne out the many warnings we have made.

Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam. So once more I conclude with an appeal to you to close ranks with us.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

His Excellency Nguyen Van Thieu President of the Republic of Vietnam Saigon.

----------------------------------------------------------------
(2) "Peace With Honor": Radio-television broadcast, President Nixon re: initialing of the Vietnam Agreement, 23 Jan. 1973

(Text from PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, vol. 9 (1973), pp. 43-5)

Good evening. I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.

The following statement is being issued at this moment in
Washington and Hanoi:

At 12:30 Paris time today [Tuesday], January 23, 1973, the
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The agreement will be formally signed by the parties
participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris.

The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia. .

That concludes the formal statement.

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation from this room of January 25 and May 8, [1972] I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor.

In the settlement that has now been agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met. A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m., this Saturday, January 27, Washington time. Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future, without outside interference.

By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closet consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected.

The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam.

We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves.

We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that heals, and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia, but contributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world.

This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict.

First, to the people and Government of South Vietnam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future, friends in peace as we have been allies in war.

To the leaders of North Vietnam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part; we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal. But just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so, too, will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace.

To the other major powers that have been involved even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last.

And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor possible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly our efforts to secure peace would not only have violated our understanding with North Vietnam, it would have seriously harmed and possibly destroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I know that you now can understand why, during these past several weeks, I have not made any public statements about those efforts.

The important thing was not to talk about peace, but to get peace and to get the right kind of peace. This we have done.

Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. Let us be proud of the 2 1/2 million young Americans who served in Vietnam, who served with honor and distinction in one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Vietnam might live in freedom and so that the world might live in peace.

In particular, I would like to say a word to some of the bravest people I have ever met-the wives, the children, the families of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died and those who suffered would not have died and suffered in vain, and so that, where this generation knew war, the next generation would know peace. Nothing means more to me at this moment than the fact that your long vigil is coming to an end.

Just yesterday, a great American, who once occupied this office, died. In his life President [Lyndon B.] Johnson endured the vilification of those who sought to portray him as a man of war.
But there was nothing he cared about more deeply than achieving a lasting peace in the world.

I remember the last time I talked with him. It was just the day after New Year's. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace, and I was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he.

And I know he would join me in asking for those who died and for those who live, let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last.

Thank you and good evening.

---------------------------------------------------------------

This is special evidence of the Vietnam War,
Nixon threatens President Thieu
President Richard Nixon warns South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in a private letter that his refusal to sign any negotiated peace agreement would render it impossible for the United States to continue assistance to South Vietnam.
Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had been working behind the scenes in secret negotiations with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris to reach a settlement to end the war. However, Thieu stubbornly refused to even discuss any peace proposal that recognized the Viet Cong as a viable participant in the post-war political solution in South Vietnam. As it turned out, the secret negotiations were not close to reaching an agreement because the North Vietnamese launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam in March 1972. With the help of U.S. airpower and advisers on the ground, the South Vietnamese withstood the North Vietnamese attack, and by December, Kissinger and North Vietnamese representatives were back in Paris and close to an agreement.
Among Thieu’s demands was the request that all North Vietnamese troops had to be withdrawn from South Vietnam before he would agree to any peace settlement. The North Vietnamese walked out of the negotiations in protest. In response, President Nixon initiated Operation Linebacker II, a massive bombing campaign against Hanoi, to force the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. After 11 days of intense bombing, Hanoi agreed to return to the talks in Paris. When Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the main North Vietnamese negotiator, met again in early January, they quickly worked out a settlement. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 23 and a cease-fire went into effect five days later.
Again, President Thieu refused to sign the Accords, but Nixon promised to come to the aid of South Vietnam if the communists violated the terms of the peace treaty, and Thieu agreed to sign. Unfortunately for Thieu and the South Vietnamese, Nixon was forced from office by the Watergate scandal in August 1974, and no U.S. aid came when the North Vietnamese launched a general offensive in March 1975. South Vietnam succumbed in 55 days.
_________________________________
Finally
Transcript: Bush Talks to O'Reilly
Published September 28, 2004
Fox News
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This is a partial transcript from the September 27, 2004 edition of "The O'Reilly Factor," that has been edited for clarity.
Watch Part II and III of the interview on Tuesday, September 28 and Wednesday, September 29 at 8 p.m. and 11 p.m. ET! Catch "The O'Reilly Factor" weeknights at 8 p.m. and 11 p.m. ET and listen to the "Radio Factor"weekdays on Westwood One.
BILL O'REILLY, HOST: OK. First of all, I want to thank you for talking with me, since so few people will.
(LAUGHTER)
GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: Well, it's a big gamble on my part.
O'REILLY: No, it isn't, not really though. You, we talked four and a half years ago...
BUSH: I'm teasing...
O'REILLY: The South Vietnamese didn't fight for their freedom, which is why they don't have it today.
BUSH: Yes.
O'REILLY: Do you think the Iraqis are going to fight for their freedom?
BUSH: Absolutely.
O'REILLY: You do.


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That is why he would like to prove the history of the international relations between the Government of the United States of America and the Republic of Vietnam. Since the Government of the United States of America has endorsed only recognized one sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the United States of America did not only made the international relationship but also did recognized self-determination of Southern Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam by the protocols of the international relations and the United States Congress has approved by the America law which why the Government of the United States of America has had betrayals the Republic of Vietnam and South people.
In fact that the Government of the United States of America did not only tear shred the American law, the United States treaties, and the protocols of the international relations on oneself. Let's the United States welcome to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or so-called is communism. When North Vietnam has never had any protocols of the international relations with the Government of the United States of America or no the United States treaties or no the United States law, or no the United States Congress endorsements, let’s the United States has sold off the Republic of Vietnam to communism without had protocols of the international relations formally.
More information about Vietnam is available on the Vietnam Country Page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet.
U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS
The United States established diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1950, following its limited independence within the French Union; France continued to oversee Vietnam’s defense and foreign policy. In 1954, Vietnamese nationalists fighting for full independence defeated France, and the now-divided Vietnam entered into two decades of civil war. The United States did not recognize North Vietnam’s government, maintaining the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam, supporting the South against the North, and entering the war on the South’s side. In 1975, the United States closed its Embassy and evacuated all Embassy personnel just prior to South Vietnam’s surrender to North Vietnamese forces.
Vietnam was reunified under communist rule. In 1978, it invaded Cambodia following border clashes. U.S. policy held that normalization of its relations with Vietnam be based on withdrawal of the Vietnamese military from Cambodia as part of a comprehensive political settlement and on continued cooperation on prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issues and other humanitarian concerns. In 1995, the United States announced the formal normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. In 2015, the United States and Vietnam marked the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations, and in May 2016, President Obama visited Vietnam to celebrate the Comprehensive Partnership between the two countries. In May 2017, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc visited the United States to discuss opportunities to further strengthen the Comprehensive Partnership.
The United States supports a strong, independent, and prosperous Vietnam that respects human rights and the rule of law. U.S. relations with Vietnam have become increasingly cooperative and comprehensive, guided by the 2013 U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, an overarching framework for advancing the bilateral relationship, the 2015 bilateral Joint Vision Statement, and the Joint Statement issued during Vietnamese Prime Minister Phuc’s visit to the United States in May 2017. This partnership underscores the enduring U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific and provides a mechanism to facilitate cooperation in areas including political and diplomatic relations, trade and economic ties, defense and security, science and technology, education and training, environment and health, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, war legacy issues, protection and promotion of human rights, people-to-people ties, and culture, sports, and tourism. The United States supports Vietnam’s law enforcement professionalization, regional cross-border cooperation, and implementation of international conventions and standards. Vietnam is a partner in nonproliferation regimes, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and takes advantage of expertise, equipment, and training available under the Export Control and Related Border Security program. In 2016, the United States and Vietnam signed a letter of agreement to increase cooperation on law enforcement and the justice sector and the two countries are working jointly to implement the agreement. The United States and Vietnam hold annual dialogues on labor and human rights.
The United States considers achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for in Indochina to be one of its highest priorities with Vietnam. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command conducts four major investigation and recovery periods a year in Vietnam, during which specially trained U.S. military and civilian personnel investigate and excavate hundreds of cases in pursuit of the fullest possible accounting. Vietnamese-led recovery teams have become regular participants in these recovery missions since August 2011.
Vietnam remains heavily contaminated by explosive remnants of war, primarily in the form of unexploded ordnance (UXO) including extensive contamination by cluster munitions dating from the war with the United States. The United States is the largest single donor to UXO/mine action in Vietnam, and the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on continued unexploded ordnance cooperation in December 2013. U.S. efforts to address legacy issues such as UXO/demining, MIA accounting, and remediation of Agent Orange (a defoliant used by U.S. forces) provided the foundations for the U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship. The United States and Vietnam are committed to strengthen defense cooperation between the two countries as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011 and the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations signed in 2015, giving priority to humanitarian cooperation, war legacy issues, maritime security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Many of these topics are discussed in annual bilateral defense discussions. In May 2016, the United States fully lifted its ban on the sale of lethal weapons to Vietnam and continued to provide Vietnam with maritime security assistance – including through the Maritime Security Initiative, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and Foreign Military Financing. In 2017, the United States transferred a Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to help improve Vietnam’s law enforcement capabilities. Also in 2017, the United States and Vietnam established a working group for the Cooperative Humanitarian and Medical Storage Initiative, which will advance cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The United States reaffirmed its support for Vietnam’s peacekeeping efforts with an aim of assisting Vietnam’s first deployment of UN peacekeeping forces by 2018.
U.S.-Vietnam people-to-people ties have flourished. Nearly 21,000 Vietnamese now study in the United States. The new Fulbright University Vietnam, which matriculated its first cohort in Fall 2017, will help bring world-class, independent education to Vietnam. Over 21,000 Vietnamese are members of the Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative. The United States and Vietnam signed a Peace Corps country agreement in 2016.
U.S. Assistance to Vietnam
In the 1980s, Vietnam introduced market reforms, opened up the country for foreign investment, and improved the business climate. It became one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Vietnam’s rapid economic transformation and global integration has lifted millions out of poverty and has propelled the country to the ranks of lower-middle-income status. U.S. assistance in Vietnam focuses on consolidating gains to ensure sustainable economic development while promoting good governance and the rule of law. Assistance projects aim to deepen regulatory reforms, improve the capacity and independence of Vietnam’s judicial and legislative bodies, and promote more effective public participation in the law and regulation-making processes. The United States assists the Government of Vietnam to bring its laws and practices into compliance with international labor standards and effectively enforce labor laws and uphold workers’ rights. U.S. assistance also seeks to support Vietnam’s response to climate change and other environmental challenges, including remediating Agent Orange/dioxin contamination, strengthening the country’s health and education systems, and assisting vulnerable populations. The United States and Vietnam successfully concluded the first phase of dioxin remediation at Danang International Airport in 2017 and are discussing continued collaboration on the clean-up of dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa Air Base. Both sides also pledged to combat climate change via climate mitigation and adaptation measures.
Bilateral Economic Relations
Since entry into force of the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement in 2001, trade between the two countries and U.S. investment in Vietnam have grown dramatically. The United States and Vietnam have concluded a trade and investment framework agreement; they also have signed textile, air transport, and maritime agreements. U.S. exports to Vietnam include agricultural products, machinery, yarn/fabric, and vehicles. U.S. imports from Vietnam include apparel, footwear, furniture and bedding, agricultural products, seafood, and electrical machinery. U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade has grown from $451 million in 1995 to nearly $52 billion in 2016. In 2016, Vietnam was America’s fastest growing export market. U.S. exports to Vietnam grew by 77 percent between 2014-2016. U.S. exports to Vietnam were worth over $10 billion in 2016, and U.S. imports in 2016 were worth $42 billion. U.S. investment in Vietnam has grown significantly over the past eight years to nearly $10 billion. The United States and Vietnam intend to establish the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Commission on Civil Nuclear Cooperation to facilitate the implementation of the 123 Agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear activity, which came into force in October 2014. An expanding civil nuclear partnership will help reduce emissions from the global power sector and establish the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation.
Vietnam’s Membership in International Organizations
Vietnam and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Vietnam will host APEC in 2017.
Bilateral Representation
The U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam is Daniel J. Kritenbrink. He was confirmed by the Senate on October 26, 2017 and presented his credentials to Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang on November 6, 2017. Other principal embassy officials are listed in the Department’s Key Officers List.
Vietnam maintains an embassy in the United States at 1233 20th Street, NW, #400, Washington DC 20036 (tel. 202-861-0737).
More information about Vietnam is available from the Department of State and other sources, some of which are listed here:
CIA World Factbook Vietnam Page
U.S. Embassy
USAID Vietnam Page
History of U.S. Relations With Vietnam
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Countries Page
U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics
Export.gov International Offices Page
Library of Congress Country Studies
Travel Information

He would like to carry out these government employees when they were violated the United States Constitution, Congress bills and the American laws because they are contemptuous for the United States Congress and their oath loyalty with the Constitutional.
First of all, the masterminds of the betrayal the Republic of Vietnam are the Kissinger, and General William Westmoreland that declared and said, " Vietnam failures we did to ourselves." and his quotes, "the Vietnam War requested us to emphasize the national interest rather than abstract principle, what president Nixon and I tried to do was unnatural. And that is why we did not make it."
Obviously, however, General William Westmoreland of the United States Army Command in Vietnam commented: "We (the United States) have not lost the battle in Vietnam. But we have not kept our commitment to the Republic of Vietnam Army. On behalf of the United States Army, I apologize to the South Vietnamese Army veterans because we abandoned you. ”(On behalf of United States Armed Forces, I would like to apologize to the veterans of the South Armed Forces for abandoning you guys.

The General Who Lost Vietnam
By Mark Thompson @MarkThompson_DCSept. 30, 2011
Follow @TIME

Sorley's latest
Even now, the easiest way to get into an argument at a V.F.W. bar is to mention Vietnam. Seared into all who fought it — and many who merely lived through it — that conflict remains a bitter stew of second-guessing and recriminations. Historian Lewis Sorley — author of 1999’s well-regarded A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of American’s Last Years in Vietnam — now zeroes in on General William Westmoreland. Not only is Sorley — a third-generation graduate of West Point — a Vietnam veteran and a historian, but he worked for Westmoreland as well. Alas, as a historian, he passed on the opportunity to answer Battleland‘s questions about what Vietnam should teach us about Afghanistan, and who, if anyone, is today’s Westmoreland, during our email chat earlier this week:
What’s the most important thing you learned writing Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam?
The most important, and also the saddest, is that in Vietnam and thereafter Westmoreland was willing to shade or misremember or deny or invent the record when his perceived interests were at stake. This was true in matters both great and small.
A very significant instance was his determination to arbitrarily hold down the estimate of enemy strength during a 1967 order of battle controversy. Although Westmoreland denied it, he imposed a ceiling on the reported number of enemy by instructing his intelligence officers to adhere to a “command position” of not more than 300,000, even though newly acquired and more accurate data developed in his own headquarters then indicated a much higher figure. And, to further demonstrate “progress” in reducing enemy strength, Westmoreland arbitrarily and entirely on his own removed from the order of battle several categories of enemy forces that had long been carried there, including during the three years Westmoreland had already been in command of U.S. forces in Vietnam.
A more minor case, but one revealing of Westmoreland’s character, stemmed from his unwillingness to level with his senior Marine subordinate at the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Westmoreland established a headquarters known as MACV Forward in the northern provinces of South Vietnam and put his deputy, General Creighton Abrams, in charge, placing him over the Marines and also the Army forces in that region.
This infuriated the Marines, who viewed it as evidence that Westmoreland lacked confidence in them. Westmoreland held a press conference in which he categorically denied any such loss of confidence. But in a contemporaneous cable to General Earle Wheeler, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Westmoreland complained that “the military professionalism of the Marines falls far short of the standards that should be demanded by our armed forces. Indeed they are brave and proud, but their standards, tactics, and lack of command supervision throughout their ranks require improvement in the national interest.” And, he added, “I would be less than frank if I did not say that I feel somewhat insecure with the situation in Quang Tri province, in view of my knowledge of their shortcomings. Without question, many lives would be saved if their tactical professionalism were enhanced.”
Years later, when Marine Corps historians were at work on their history of the war, Westmoreland met with them. Of course they raised this issue, leading Westmoreland to declare vehemently that establishing MACV Forward “had not a damned thing to do with my confidence in General Cushman or the Marines, not a damned thing.” That again was not only false but, given the existing paper trail, reckless as well.
These two instances are illustrative of many, many more, ranging from his actions or lack of action in combat situations to his determination to take over the war and win it with U.S. forces to his resultant failure to build up South Vietnamese forces to the validity of body count to the decision to close Khe Sanh to his actions when Lang Vei was overrun to denying predictions he had made of an early end to the war to claims of not being surprised at Tet 1968 to denying a post-Tet request for many additional U.S. forces.
Lewis Sorley
Is your subtitle — The General Who Lost Vietnam — fair?
Yes, eminently. General Westmoreland had complete freedom of action in deciding how to prosecute the war within South Vietnam. He decided to conduct of a war of attrition, using search and destroy tactics, in which the measure of merit was body count.
The premise was that, if he could kill enough of the enemy, they would lose heart and cease their aggression against the South Vietnamese. In his single-minded pursuit of that objective, Westmoreland (despite his repeated claims to the contrary) essentially ignored two other crucial aspects of the war, improvement of South Vietnam’s armed forces and pacification.
Implementing the attrition strategy, Westmoreland typically employed a series of large unit sweeps conducted in the deep jungle regions along South Vietnam’s western borders. These operations were designed to seek out enemy forces and engage them in decisive battle. This proved possible only with enemy cooperation, since they could break contact and limit casualties as they wished by withdrawing into sanctuaries across the border.
Over time Westmoreland asked for and received large numbers of U.S. troops, eventually totaling well over half a million. And he was able to inflict massive casualties on the enemy. This did not, however, achieve the postulated outcome. The enemy did not lose heart, did not cease aggression. Instead he simply sent more and more replacements to make up his losses. Westmoreland’s first resort in claiming progress in the war was always body count, but in fact this was meaningless. All the enemy’s losses were quickly made up. Westmoreland was on a treadmill.
There were available better concepts of how to prosecute the war. Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson put one forth in the PROVN Study, a “Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam.” That document held that Westmoreland’s approach was not working and could not work because it ignored the real war in South Vietnam’s hamlets and villages, where the covert enemy infrastructure was through coercion and terror dominating the rural populace.
Publication of the PROVN Study, whose precepts were later implemented with great success by Westmoreland’s successor, illustrated a matter of fundamental importance. Not later than the autumn of 1966 the leaders of both services involved in fighting the ground war in Vietnam—Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson and Marine Commandant General Wallace Greene—both saw Westmoreland’s approach as fatally flawed and agreed on a viable alternative.
General Westmoreland’s close associate, General William DePuy, later admitted the futility of the Westmoreland way of war. “We ended up,” he said, “with no operational plan that had the slightest chance of ending the war favorably.” Westmoreland could not or would not ever bring himself to acknowledge that reality.
The result of his manic commitment to the war of attrition was that Westmoreland squandered four years of his troops’ bravery and support by the public, the Congress, and even much of the news media for American involvement in the war. Yes, Westmoreland was the general who lost Vietnam.
Assuming you believe the subtitle to be accurate, who were GEN Westmoreland’s biggest accomplices in the loss? In order, from most culpable down.

There are a number of contenders for the top places on such a roster. Among them are, of course, Lyndon Johnson himself, Robert McNamara, and General Earle Wheeler.
The problem begins with the fact that nobody in the chain of command was really competent to critique Westmoreland’s performance. Lyndon Johnson had no understanding of military affairs whatever, nor did Robert McNamara. General Earle Wheeler was essentially a staff officer with virtually no troop leading experience, much less combat acumen.
General Harold K. Johnson was an authentic battlefield hero, and as noted above was fundamentally at odds with Westmoreland’s approach, but he was not in the chain of command. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he theoretically had some influence there, at least to the extent he could shape the collective viewpoint, but even then LBJ and McNamara were famously impervious to advice from the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, almost by default, Westmoreland was left to go his own way, year after bloody year.
Military historian Russell Weigley rendered a succinct judgment on LBJ: “No capable war President would have allowed an officer of such limited capacities as General William C. Westmoreland to head Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for so long.”
While there is much to criticize LBJ for in his conduct of the war, one cannot help having some sympathy for the dilemma posed by the often wildly conflicting advice he was getting from his senior aides and advisors, including those in uniform. General Wheeler was often just flat wrong in what he told the President. When major U.S. ground force deployments were under consideration in July 1965, for example, LBJ worried that North Vietnam would respond by pouring in more men of its own. He need not be concerned, soothed Wheeler, because the “weight of judgment” was that the enemy “can’t match us on a buildup.” That turned out to be one of the classic misjudgments of the war, comparable in magnitude and consequence to General MacArthur’s assurances to President Truman that Chinese forces would not enter the Korean War.
If pressed to rank the miscreants, I would place Wheeler first, then LBJ, and then McNamara, with all entitled to recognition as important accomplices in dooming the endeavor.
Contrarily, I would not so stigmatize another important player often criticized by others, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. He spoke up in Honolulu, during an important U.S. planning conference in February 1966, observing that “we can beat up North Vietnamese regiments in the high plateau for the next twenty years and it will not end the war.” Westmoreland’s later dismissive comment was that “Ambassador Lodge does not have a deep feel of military tactics and strategy.”
What myths or misperceptions surround Westmoreland that you would like to clear up, if any?

Westmoreland is often described as a “Boy Scout,” usually implying, it appears, that he was well-intentioned but naïve. He was certainly naïve, but the Boy Scouts need to be defended here. Their orientation, indeed the core of Scouting’s values, is selflessness and service to others. Westmoreland’s devotion to advancing his own interests, even when necessary by misrepresentation was fundamentally at odds with what Scouting is all about.
You worked for GEN Westmoreland when he was Army Chief of Staff. What was your impression of the man when you were working for him? Would he be upset if he were alive to read this book today?
Most younger officers who worked around General Westmoreland, excepting only a very few among his many aides-de-camp or executive officers and the like, had no personal relationship with this difficult and distant man. There was no warmth, no apparent interest in his associates as people. Some staff officers who briefed him one-on-one at deskside were dismayed when Westmoreland occupied himself by signing photographs of himself, one after another, during their presentations.
Westmoreland’s own book about himself gives some indication of how he would react to this more recent one. Wrote Kevin Buckley in a scathing review, “From the beginning Westmoreland probably expected to write a memoir of victory similar to Crusade in Europe…and the defeat in Vietnam has not deterred him from this.”
Finally, Department of Motor Vehicles who is Barbara P. Schmidt, and the Jackie Chahal that they deprived the plaintiff of particular rights under the United States Constitution because of he did not only violate any traffic laws and any American laws but also had put a label mental case on his head. Let them advise him to a writ of mandate to low court's local when no Californian law and no American law had to order them to force an innocent American citizen to ought to do their orders. Therefore, they are government employee, but they were violated by Federal Tort Claims Act.
_______________
35/ page 153
28 U.S. Code § 1502- [35] Treaty cases
From …………………………………………………………………434 to 511
Especial proving 28 U.S. Code § 1502- [35] Treaty cases
1. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1571_1604. [10] P.L 329, 81st Congresses - 63 Stat- 714- December 23, 1950
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE IN INDOCHINA
AGREEMENT SIGNED AT SAIGON DECEMBER 23, 1950; ENTERED INTO FORCE DECEMBER 23, 1950
10/page 23-(Also see page 260- 264)
2. Geneva Agreements
20-21 July 1954
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam
20 July 1954
3. Paris peace Accords on January 27, 1973

CHAPTER I
Provisional Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone
Article 1
A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of VietNam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south.
The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (see Map No. 1).
It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 Kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities.
Article 2
The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force.
Article 3
When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control.
Article 4
The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast.
All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.
Article 5
To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.
Article 6
No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.
Article 7
No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission.
Article 8
Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission.
Article 9
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone.
CHAPTER II
Principles and Procedure Governing Implementation of the Present Agreement
Article 10
The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.
Article 11
In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties.
Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the ceasefire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows:
Northern Viet-Nam at 8.00 a.m. (local time) on 27 July 1954
Central Viet-Nam at 8.00 a.m. (local time) on 1 August 1954
Southern Viet-Nam at 8.00 a.m. (local time) on 11 August 1954
It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be taken as local time.
From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force.
Article 12
All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:
(a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines),
booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces;
(b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line:
(1) The forces of either party shall be provisonally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party.
(2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population.
Article 13
From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand.
The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission.
Article 14
Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones on either side of the provisional military demarcation line:
(a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement;
(b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it.
Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notice shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung (lie Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors.
The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements.
(c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.
(d) From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district.
Article 15
The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles:
(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed within three hundred (300) days, as laid down in Article 2 of the present Agreement;
(b) Within either territory successive withdrawals shall be made by sectors, portions of sectors or provinces. Transfers from one regrouping zone to another shall be made in successive monthly instalments proportionate to the number of troops to be transferred;
(c) The two parties shall undertake to carry out all troop withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims of the present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act and shall take no step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals and transfers. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible;
(d) The two parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage of any public property and no injury to the life and property of the civil population. They shall permit no interference in local civil administration;
(e) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer
(f) The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later the Joint Commission, shall determine by common agreement the exact procedure for the disengagement of the combatants and for troop withdrawals and transfers, on the basis of the principles mentioned above and within the framework laid down below:
1. The disengagement of the combatants, including the concentration of the armed forces of all kinds and also each party's movements into the provisional assembly areas assigned to it and the other party's provisional withdrawal from it, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective.
The general delineation of the provisional assembly areas is set out in the maps annexed to the present Agreement
In order to avoid any incidents, no troops shall be stationed less than 1,500 metros from the lines delimiting the provisional assembly areas.
During the period until the transfers are concluded, all the coastal islands west of the following lines shall be included in the Haiphong perimeter:
- meridian of the southern point of Kebao Island
- northern coast of Ile Rousse (excluding the island), extended as far as the meridian of Campha-Mines
- meridian of Campha-Mines.
2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the following and within the following periods (from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement):
Forces of the French Union
Hanoi perimeter - 80 days
Haiduong perimeter - 100 days
Haiphong perimeter - 300 days
Forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam
Ham Tan and Xuyenmoc provisional assembly area - 80 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area - first instalment- 80 days
Plaine des Jones provisional assembly area-100 days
Central Viet-Nam provisional assembly area - second instalment-100 days
Point Camau provisional assembly area- 200 days
Central Viet-Nam provisions 1 assembly area - last instalment- 300 days

CHAPTER III
Ban on the Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Arms, and Munitions. Military Bases
Article 16
With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited.
It is understood, however, that the rotation of units and Groups of personnel, the arrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnel onto temporary duty basis end tithe return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam shall be permitted under the conditions laid down below:
(a) Rotation of units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article l of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2
However, under the heading of individual personnel not more than fifty (50) men, including officers, shall during any one month be permitted to enter that part of the country north of the provisional military demarcation line on a temporary duty basis or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside Viet-Nam.
(b) "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or groups of personnel by other units of the same echelon or by personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do their overseas service there;
(c) The units rotated shall never be larger than a battalion-or the corresponding echelon for air and naval forces;
(d) Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis, provided, however, that in any one quarter neither party shall introduce more than fifteen thousand five hundred (15,500) members of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy.
(e) Rotation units (defined in paragraph (c) of this Article) and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentioned in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through the entry points enumerated in Article 20 below;
(f) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departure of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and individual personnel in or from Viet-Nam shall be submitted daily to the Joint Commission and the International Commission.
All the above-mentioned notifications and reports shall indicate the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number of persons arriving or departing;
(g) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.
Article 17
(a) With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited
(b) It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics. Such replacements of war material, arms and munitions shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationed north of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in article 1 of the present Agreement, during the withdrawal period provided for in Article 2.
Naval craft may perform transport operations between the regrouping zones.
(c) The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph (b) of this Article, shall be introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below. War material, arms and munitions to be replaced shall be shipped from VietNam only through the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below;
(d) Apart from the replacements permitted within the limits laid down in paragraph (b) of this Article, the introduction of war material, arms and munitions of all types in the form of unassembled parts for subsequent assembly is prohibited;
(e) Each party shall notify the Joint Commission and the International Commission at least two days in advance of any arrivals or departures which may take place of war material, arms and munitions of all types.
In order to justify the requests for the introduction into Viet-Nam of arms, munitions and other war material (as defined in paragraph (a) of this Article) for replacement purposes, a report concerning each incoming shipment shall be submitted to the Joint Commission and the International Commission. Such reports shall indicate the use made of the items so replaced;
(f) The International Commission, through its Inspection Teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article, at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.
Article 18
With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.
Article 19
With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the re-grouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.
Article 20
The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and replacements of material are fixed as follows:
-Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen;
-Zone to the south of the provisional military demarcation line: Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tanchau.
CHAPTER IV
Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
Article 21
The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:
(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Viet-Nam, French and other nationalities captured since the beginning of hostilities in Viet-Nam during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Viet-Nam shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre.
(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.
(c) All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or the zone of their choice.
CHAPTER V
Miscellaneous
Article 22
The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.
Article 21
In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a specific period after the entry into force of the Armistice Agreement, permit the graves service personnel of the other party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures and the time limit for the performance of this task. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.
Article 24
The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet-Nam.
For the purposes of the present Article, the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.
Article 25
The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint groups and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.
Article 26
The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.
Article 27
The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for ensuring the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all elements and military personnel under their command.
The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.
CHAPTER VI
Joint Commission and International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam
28.
Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.
29.
An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution.
30.
In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions by the two parties a Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-Nam.
31.
The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties.
32.
The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General,
The Joint Commission shall set up joint groups the number of which shall be determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composed of an equal number of officers from both parties. Their location on the demarcation line between the re-grouping zones shall be determined by the parties whilst taking into account the powers of the Joint Commission.
33.
The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the following provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities:
(a) A simultaneous and general cease-fire in Viet-Nam for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.
(b) A re-groupment of the armed forces of the two parties.
(c) Observance of the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and of the demilitarized sectors.
Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to execute the said provisions, shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these provisions, and shall endeavour to solve such disputed questions as may arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions.
34.
An International Commission shall be set up for the control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.
It shall be presided over by the Representative of India.
35.
The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States. The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, Vinh, DongHoi, Muong-Sen, Tourane, Quinhon, Nhatrang, Bangoi, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques, Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the demarcation lines between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarized zones. Within the limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfillment of their tasks (provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require. Beyond the zones of action as defined above, the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the present agreement.
36.
The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation inspection and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:
(a) Control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties effected within the framework of the regroupment plan.
(b) Supervise the demarcation lines between the regrouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones.
(c) Control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian Internees.
(d) Supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel and of all kinds of arms, munitions and war material.
37.
The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.
38.
The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, their investigation and their observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission.
39.
If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall study the reports and the conclusions of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.
40.
When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.
41.
The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 42. If the votes are divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.
The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.
42.
When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely:
(a) Refusal by the armed forces of one party to effect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan;
(b) Violation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other party; the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.
43.
If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommendation of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.
If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 42, it shall submit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference.
The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered.
44.
The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to fulfil the tasks provided for in article 36.
45.
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos.
The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.
46.
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.
47.
All the provisions of the present Agreement, save the second sub-paragraph of Article 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.
Done in Geneva at 2400 hours on the 20th of July 1954 in French and in Viet-Namese, both texts being equally authentic.
Annex to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam
I. Delineation of the provisional military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone (Article 1 of the Agreement; reference map: Indo-China 1/100,000 1)
(a) The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as follows, reading from east to west:
the mouth of the Song Ben Hat (Cue Tung River) and the course of that river (known as the Rao Thanh in the mountains) to the village of Bo Ho Su, then the parallel of Bo Ho Su to the Laos-Viet-Nam frontier.
(b) The dimilitarized zone shall be delimited by Trung Gia Military Commission in accordance-with the provisions of article 1 of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam.
II. General delineation of the provisional assembly areas (Article 15 of the Agreement; reference maps: Indo-China 1/400,000)
(a) NORTH VIET-NAM
Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the French Union forces
1. The perimeter of Hanoi is delimited by the arc of a circle with a radius of 15 kilometres, having as its centre the right bank abutment of Doumer Bridge and running westwards from the Red River to the Rapids Canal in the north-east.
In this particular case no forces of the French Union shall be stationed less than 2 kilometres from this perimeter, on the inside thereof.
2. The perimeter of Haiphong shall be delimited by the Song-Van-Uc as far as Kim Thanh and a line running from the Song-Van-Uc three kilometres north-east of Kim Thanh to cut Road No. 18 two kilometres east of Mao-Khe. Thence a line running three kilometres north of Road 18 to Cho-Troi and a straight line from Cho-Troi to the Mong-Duong ferry.
3. A corridor contained between:
In the south, the Red River from Thanh-Tri to Bang-Nho, thence a line joining the latter point to Do-My (southwest of Kesat), Gia-Loc and Tien Kieu;
In the north, a line running along the Rapids Canal at a distance of 1,500 metres to the north of the Canal, passing three kilometres north of Pha-Lai and Seven Pagodas and thence parallel to Road No. 18 to its point of intersection with the perimeter of Haiphong.
NOTE: Throughout the period of evacuation of the perimeter of Hanoi, the river forces of the French Union shall enjoy complete freedom of movement on the Song-Van-Uc. And the forces
of the People's Army of Viet-Nam shall withdraw three kilometres south of the south bank of the Song-Van-Uc.
Boundary between the perimeter of Hanoi and the perimeter of Haiduong
A straight line running from the Rapids Canal three kilometres west of Chi-ne and ending at Do-My (eight kilometres south-west of Kesat).
(b) CENTRAL VIET-NAM
Delineation of the boundary of the provisional assembly area of the forces of the Viet-Nam People's Army south of the Col des Nuages parallel
The perimeter of the Central Viet-Nam area shall consist of the administrative boundaries of the provinces of Quang-Ngai and Binh-Dinh as they were defined before the hostilities.
(c) SOUTH VIET-NAM
Three provisional assembly areas shall be provided for the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam.
The boundaries of these areas are as follows:
1. Xuyen-Moc, Ham-Tan Area
Western boundary: The course of the Song-Ray extended northwards as far as Road No. 1 to a point thereon eight kilometres east of the intersection of Road No. 1 and Road No. 3.
Northern boundary: Road No. 1 from the above-mentioned intersection to the intersection with Route Communale No. 9 situated 27 kilometres west-south-west of Phanthiet and from that intersection a straight line to Kim Thanh on the coast.
2. Plaine des Jones Area
Northern boundary: The Viet-Nam Cambodia frontier.
Western boundary: A straight line from Tong-Binh to Binh-Thanh.
Southern boundary: Course of the Fleuve Anterieur (Mekong) to ten kilometres south-east of Cao Lanh. From that point, a straight line as far as Ap-My-Dien, and from Ap-My-Dien a line parallel to and three kilometres east and then south of the Tong Doc-Loc Canal, this line reaches My-Hanh-Dong and thence Hung-Thanh-My.
Eastern boundary: A straight line from Hung-Thanh-My running northwards to the Cambodian frontier son, Doi-Bao-Voi.
3. Point Camau Area
Northern boundary: The Song-Cai-lon from its mouth to its junction with the Rach-NuocTrong, thence the Rach-Nuoc-Trong to the bend five kilometres north-east of Ap-Xeo-La. Thereafter a line to the Ngan-Dua Canal and following that Canal as far as Vinh-Hung. Finally, from Vinh-Hung a north-south line to the sea.
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia 20 July 1954

CHAPTER I
Principles and Conditions Governing Execution of the Cease- Fire
Article 1
As from twenty-third July 1954 at 0800 hours (Pekin mean time) complete cessation of all hostilities throughout Cambodia shall be ordered and enforced by the Commanders of the Armed Forces of the two parties for all troops and personnel of the land, naval and air forces under their control.
Article 2
In conformity with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, there shall be a simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Cambodia, in all the combat areas and for all the forces of the two parties.
To obviate any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the ending of hostilities and all other operations arising from cessation of hostilities are in fact simultaneous,
(a) due allowance being made for the time actually required for transmission of the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces of both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Cambodia shall become effective at 8 hours (local time) on 7 August 1954. It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be taken as local time.
(b) Each side shall comply strictly with the time-table jointly agreed upon between the parties for the execution of all operations connected with the cessation of hostilities.
Article 3
All operations and movements connected with the execution of the cessation of hostilities must be carried in a safe and orderly fashion.
(a) Within a number of days to be determined by the Commanders of both sides, after the cease-fire has been achieved, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous devices placed by it. Should it be impossible to complete removal and neutralization before departure, the party concerned will mark the spot by placing visible signs. Sites thus cleared of mines and any other obstacles to the free movement of the personnel of the International Commission and the Joint Commission shall be notified to the latter by the local military Commanders.
(b) Any incidents that may arise between the forces of the two sides and may result from mistakes or misunderstandings shall be settled on the spot so as to restrict their scope.
(c) During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.
CHAPTER II
Procedure for the Withdrawal of the Foreign Armed Forces and Foreign Military Personnel from the Territory of Cambodia
Article 4
1. The withdrawal outside the territory of Cambodia shall apply to:
(a) the armed forces and military combatant personnel of the French Union:
(b) the combatant formations of all types which have entered the territory of Cambodia from other countries or regions of the peninsula:
(c) all the foreign elements (or Cambodians not natives of Cambodia) in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Viet-Nam military units.
2. The withdrawals of the forces and elements referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and their military supplies and materials must be completed within 90 days reckoning from the entry into force of the present Agreement.
3. The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals of all the forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of the Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take any action likely to create difficulties for such withdrawals. They shall assist one another as far as possible.
4. While the withdrawals are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of public property or any attack on the life or property of the civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.
5. The Joint Commission and the International Supervisory Commission shall supervise the execution of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal.
6. The Joint Commission in Cambodia shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals of the forces on the basis of the above-mentioned principles.
CHAPTER III.
Other Questions
A. the Khmer armed forces, natives of Cambodia
Article 5
The two parties shall undertake that within thirty days after the cease-fire order has been proclaimed, the Khmer Resistance Forces shall be demobilized on the spot; simultaneously, the troops of the Royal Khmer Army shall abstain from taking any hostile action against the Khmer Resistance Forces.
Article 6
The situation of these nationals shall be decided in the light of the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at the Geneva Conference, reading as follows:
"The Royal Government of Cambodia, In the desire to ensure harmony and agreement among the peoples of the Kingdom Declares itself resolved to take the necessary measures to integrate all citizens, without discrimination, into the national community and to guarantee them the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms for which the Constitution of the Kingdom provides; Affirms that all Cambodian citizens may freely Participate as electors or candidates in general elections by secret ballot."
No reprisals shall be taken against the said nationals or their families, each national being entitled to the enjoyment, without any discrimination as compared with other nationals, of all constitutional guarantees concerning the protection of person and property and democratic freedoms.
Applicants therefore may be accepted for service in the Regular Army or local police formations if they satisfy the conditions required for current recruitment of the Army and Police Corps.
The same procedure shall apply to those persons who have returned to civilian life and who may apply for civilian employment on the same terms as other nationals.
B. Ban on the Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Armaments and Munitions.
Military Bases
Article 7
In accordance with the Declaration made by the Delegation of Cambodia at 2400 hours on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers:
"The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other States, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principles of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.”During the period which will elapse between the date of the cessation of hostilities in VietNam and that of the final settlement of political problems in this country, the Royal Government of Cambodia will not solicit foreign aid in war material, personnel or instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of the territory."
C. Civilian Internees and Prisoners of War.
Burial
Article 8
The liberation and repatriation of all civilian internees and prisoners of war detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:
(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of whatever nationality, captured since the beginning of hostilities in Cambodia during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Cambodia shall be liberated after the entry into force of the present Armistice Agreement
(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.
(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.
Article 9
After the entry into force of the present Agreement, if the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Cambodian shall, within a specified period, authorize the exhumation and removal of the bodies of deceased military personnel of the other party, including the bodies of prisoners of war or personnel deceased and buried on Cambodian territory.
The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is to be carried out and the time limit within which it must be completed.
CHAPTER IV
Joint Commission and International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia
Article 10
Responsibility for the execution of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.
Article 11
An International Commission shall be responsible for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Phnom-Penh.
Article 12
The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.
The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Phnom-Penh, Kompong-Cham, Kratie, Svay-Rieng, Kampot. These points of location may be altered at a later date by agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the International Commission.
The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering on the land and sea frontiers of Cambodia. The mobile teams shall have the right to move freely within the limits of their zones of action, and they shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision, summoning of witnesses needed for enquiries, security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams, etc.). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.
Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Cambodian Commander, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them under the present Agreement.
Article 13
The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present Agreement. For this purpose it shall fully the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:
(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected;
(b) Control the release of prisoners- of war and civilian internees;
(G) Supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Cambodia, the application of the Cambodian declaration concerning the introduction into Cambodia of military personnel and war materials on grounds of foreign assistance.
Article 14
A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.
The Joint Commission may form joint groups the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.
The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Cambodia for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.
It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavor to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The Joint Commission may send joint groups to follow the forces in their movements; such groups shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.
Article 15
The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the parties concerned.
Article 16
The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above and as soon as possible, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Joint Commission or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.
Article 17
The inspection teams shall transmit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigations and observations; furthermore, they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.
Article 18
If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or threat of a serious violation, the International Commission shall be informed, the Commission shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures to be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.
Article 19
When the Joint Commission is unable to reach agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.
Article 20
The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by a majority vote, subject to the provisions of article 21. If the votes are equally divided, the Chairman's vote shall be decisive.
The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said Agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.
Article 21
On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular,
(a) Refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for the withdrawal plan,
(b) Violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces, the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.
Article 22
If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.
If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 21, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to members of the Conference.
The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.
Article 23
The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to perform the tasks prescribed in article 13.
Article 25
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Laos.
The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for coordinating their work and for relations between them.
Article 25
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and in Laos, and having regard to the development of the situation in Viet-Nam and in Laos, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously.
CHAPTER V
Implementation
Article 26
The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.
Article 27
The present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall apply to all the armed forces of either party.
Article 28
The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of their functions.
Article 29
The Joint Commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of the Commands of the two parties, shall assist the parties in the implementation of all the clauses of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities, ensure liaison between the two parties, draw up plans for the implementation of the Agreement, and endeavour to settle any dispute arising out of the implementation of the said clauses and plans.
Article 30
The costs involved in the operation of the Joint Commission shall be shared equally between the two parties.
Article 31
The signatories of the present Agreement on the cessation of hostilities and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all military personnel under their command.
Article 32
The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary be examined by the Commands of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.
Article 33
All the provisions of the present Agreement shall enter into force at 00 hours (Geneva time) on 23 July 1954.
Done at Geneva on 20 July 1954.
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos
20 July 1954
CHAPTER I
Cease-Fire and Evacuation of Foreign Armed Forces and Foreign Military Personnel
Article 1.
The Commanders of the armed forces of the parties in Laos shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Laos by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces.
Article 2.
In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout the territory of Laos in all combat areas and for all forces of the two parties.
In order to prevent any mistake or misunderstanding and to ensure that both the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and movements of the opposing forces are in fact simultaneous,
(a) Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the cease-fire order down to the lowest echelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the complete and simultaneous cease-fire throughout the territory of Laos shall become effective at 8 hours local time on 6 August 1954. It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be taken as local time.
(b) The Joint Commission for Laos shall draw up a schedule for the other operations resulting from the cessation of hostilities.
NOTE: The cease-fire shall become effective 15 days after the entry into force of the present Agreement.
Article 3
All operations and movements entailed by the cessation of hostilities and re-grouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion:
(a) Within a number of days to be determined on the spot by the Joint Commission in Laos each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines, booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substance placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there.
(b) As regards the security of troops on the move following the lines of communication in accordance with tile schedule previously drawn up by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos and the safety of the assembly areas, detailed measures shall be adopted in each case by the Joint Armistice Commission in Laos. In particular, while the forces of one party are withdrawing by a line of communication passing through the territory of the other party (road or waterways) the forces of the latter party shall provisionally withdraw two kilometres on either side of such line of communication, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movement of the civil population.
Article 4
The withdrawals and transfers of military forces, supplies and equipment shall be effected in accordance with the following principles:
(a) The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, supplies and equipment of the two parties shall be completed within a period of 120 days from the day on which the Armistice Agreement enters into force.
The two parties undertake to communicate their transfer plans to each other, for information, within 25 days of the entry into force of the present Agreement.
(b) The withdrawals of the Viet-Namese People's Volunteers from Laos to Viet-Nam shall be effected by provinces. The position of those volunteers who were settled in Laos before the hostilities shall form the subject of a special convention.
(c) The routes for the withdrawal of the forces of the French Union and Viet-Namese People's Volunteers in Laos from Laotian territory shall be fixed on the spot by the Joint Commission.
(d) The two parties shall guarantee that the withdrawals and transfers of all forces will be effected in accordance with the purposes of this Agreement, and that they will not permit any hostile action or take action of any kind whatever which might hinder such withdrawals or transfers. The parties shall assist each other as far as possible.
(e) While the withdrawals and transfers of the forces are proceeding, the two parties shall not permit any destruction or sabotage of any public property or any attack on the life or property of the local civilian population. They shall not permit any interference with the local civil administration.
(f) The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall supervise the implementation of measures to ensure the safety of the forces during withdrawal and transfer.
(g) The Joint Commission in Laos shall determine the detailed procedures for the withdrawals and transfers of the forces in accordance with the above-mentioned principles.

Article 5
During the days immediately preceding the cease-fire each party undertakes not to engage in any large-scale operation between the time when the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities is signed at Geneva and the time when the cease-fire comes into effect.
CHAPTER II
Prohibition of the Introduction of Fresh Troops, Military Personnel, Armaments and Munitions
Article 6
With effect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the introduction into Laos of any reinforcements of troops or military personnel from outside Laotian territory is prohibited.
Nevertheless, the French High Command may leave a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian national army in the territory of Laos; the strength of such personnel shall not exceed one thousand five hundred (1,500) officers and noncommissioned officers.
Article 7
Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout the territory of Laos.
Article 8
The High Command of the French forces shall maintain in the territory of Laos the personnel required for the maintenance of two French military establishments, the first at Seno and the second in the Mekong valley, either in the province of Vientiane or downstream from Vientiane.
The effectives maintained in these military establishments shall not exceed a total of three thousand five hundred (3,500) men.
Article 9
Upon the entry into force of the present Agreement and in accordance with the declaration made at the Geneva Conference by the Royal Government of Laos on 20 July 1954,(2) the introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and military equipment of all kinds is prohibited, with the exception of a specified quantity of armaments in categories specified as necessary for the defence of Laos.
Article 10
The new armaments and military personnel permitted to enter Laos in accordance with the terms of Article 9 above shall enter Laos at the following points only: Luang-Prabang, XiengKhouang, Vientiane, Seno, Pakse, Savannakhet and Tchepone.
CHAPTER III
Disengagement of the Forces-Assembly Areas-Concentration Areas
Article 11
The disengagement of the armed forces of both sides, including concentration of the armed forces, movements to rejoin the provisional assembly areas allotted to one party and provisional withdrawal movements by the other party, shall be completed within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days after the cease fire.
Article 12
The Joint Commission in Laos shall fix the site and boundaries:
- of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the Vietnamese People's Volunteer forces
- of the five (5) provisional assembly areas for the reception of the
French forces in Laos
- of the twelve (12) provisional assembly areas, one to each province, for the reception of the fighting units of "Pathet Lao".
- The forces of the Laotian National Army shall remain in situ during the entire duration of the operations of disengagement and transfer of foreign forces and fighting units of "Pathet Lao".
Article 13
The foreign Forces shall be transferred outside Laotian territory as follows:
(1) French Forces:
The French forces will be moved out of Laos by road (along routes laid down by the Joint Commission in Laos) and also by air and inland waterway;
(2) Vietnamese People's Volunteer forces:
These forces will be moved out of Laos by land, along routes and in accordance with a schedule to be determined by the Joint Commission in Laos in accordance with principle of simultaneous withdrawal of foreign forces.
Article 14
Pending a political settlement, the fighting units of "Pathet Lao"; concentrated in the provisional assembly areas, shall move into the Provinces of Phongsaly and Sam-Neua except for any military personnel who wish to be demobilized where they are. They will be free to move between these two Provinces in a corridor along the frontier between Laos and Viet-Nam bounded on the south by the line SOP KIN, NA MI, SOP SANG-MUONG SON.
Concentration shall be completed within one-hundred-and-twenty (120) days from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement.
Article 15
Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations for their activities during the hostilities and also undertakes to guarantee their democratic freedoms.
CHAPTER IV
Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
Article 16
The liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees detained by each of the two parties at the coming into force of the present Agreement shall be carried out under the following conditions:
(a) All prisoners of war and civilian internees of Laotian and other nationalities captured, since the beginning of hostilities in Laos during military operations or in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Laos shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire comes into effect.
(b) The term "civilian internees" is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed strife between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.
(c) All foreign prisoners of war captured by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to the destination of their choice.
CHAPTER V
Miscellaneous
Article 17
The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons under their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of the present Agreement are suitably punished.
Article 18
In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of graves has been established, the Commander of the forces of either party shall, within a specified period after the entry into force of the present Agreement, permit the graves service of the other party to enter that part of Laotian territory under his military control for the purpose of finding and removing the bodies of deceased military personnel of that party, including the bodies of deceased prisoners of war.
The Joint Commission shall fix the procedures by which this task is carried out and the time limits within which it must be completed. The Commanders of the forces of each party shall communicate to the other all information in his possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party.
Article 19
The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each party shall respect the territory under the military control of the other party, and engage in no hostile act against the other party.
For the purposes of the present article the word "territory" includes territorial waters and air space.
Article 20
The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall afford full protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint Commission and its joint organs and to the International Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the functions and tasks assigned to them by the present Agreement.
Article 21
The costs involved in tile operation of the Joint Commission and its joint groups and of the International Commission and its inspection teams shall be shared equally between the two parties.
Article 22
The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be responsible for the observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders of the forces of the two parties shall, within their respective commands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the present Agreement by all military personnel under their command.
Article 23
The procedures laid down in the present Agreement shall, whenever necessary, be examined by the Commanders of the two parties and, if necessary, defined more specifically by the Joint Commission.
CHAPTER VI
Joint Commission and International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos
Article 24
Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities shall rest with the parties.
Article 25
An International Commission shall be entrusted with control and supervision over the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos. It shall be composed of representatives of the following States: Canada, India and Poland.
It shall be presided over by the Representative of India. Its headquarters shall be at Vientiane.
Article 26
The International Commission shall set up fixed and mobile inspection teams, composed of an equal number of officers appointed by each of the above-mentioned States.
The fixed teams shall be located at the following points: Pakse Seno, Tchepone, Vientiane, Xieng-Khonang, Phongsaly, Sophao (province of Samneua). These points of location may, at a later date, be altered by agreement between the Government of Laos and the International Commission.
The zones of action of the mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land frontiers of Laos. Within the limits of their zones of action they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authorities all facilities they may require for the fulfilment of their tasks (provision of personnel, access to documents needed for supervision,
summoning of witnesses needed for holding enquiries, the security and freedom of movement of the inspection teams etc...). They shall have at their disposal such modern means of transport, observation and communication as they may require.
Outside the zones of action defined above, the mobile teams may, with the agreement of the Command of the party concerned, move about as required by the tasks assigned to them by the present agreement.
Article 27
The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the execution by the parties of the provisions of the present agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfil the functions of control, observation, inspection and investigation connected with the implementation of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and shall in particular:
(a) Control the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and see that frontiers are respected.
(b) Control the release of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
(c) Supervise, at ports and airfields and along all the frontiers of Laos, the implementation of the provisions regulating the introduction into Laos of military personnel and war materials.
(d) Supervise the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to rotation of personnel and to supplies for French Union security forces maintained in Laos.
Article 28
A Joint Commission shall be set up to facilitate the implementation of the clauses relating to the withdrawal of foreign forces.
The Joint Commission shall form joint groups, the number of which shall be decided by mutual agreement between the parties.
The Joint Commission shall facilitate the implementation of the clauses of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities relating to the simultaneous and general cease-fire in Laos for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties.
It shall assist the parties in the implementation of the said clauses; it shall ensure liaison between them for the purpose of preparing and carrying out plans for the implementation of the said clauses; it shall endeavour to settle any disputes between the parties arising out of the implementation of these clauses. The joint groups shall follow the forces in their movements and shall be disbanded once the withdrawal plans have been carried out.
Article 29
The Joint Commission and the Joint Groups shall be composed of an equal number of representatives of the commands of the parties concerned.
Article 30
The International Commission shall, through the medium of the inspection teams mentioned above, and as soon as possible either on its own initiative, or at the request of the Joint Commission, or of one of the parties, undertake the necessary investigations both documentary and on the ground.
Article 31
The inspection teams shall submit to the International Commission the results of their supervision, investigation and observations, furthermore they shall draw up such special reports as they may consider necessary or as may be requested from them by the Commission. In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the findings of each member shall be transmitted to the Commission.
Article 32
If an inspection team is unable to settle an incident or considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the International Commission shall be informed; the latter shall examine the reports and findings of the inspection teams and shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, ending of the violation or removal of the threat of violation.
Article 33
When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation of a provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.
Article 34
The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in article 35. If the votes are equally divided the chairman's vote shall be decisive.
The International Commission may make recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos, in order to ensure more effective execution of the said agreement. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.
Article 35
On questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, and in particular:
(a) Refusal by foreign armed forces to effect the movements provided for in the withdrawal plan;
(b) Violation or threat of violation of the country's integrity by foreign armed forces, the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous.
Article 36
If one of the parties refuses to put a recommendation of the International Commission into effect, the parties concerned or the Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference.(3) If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the cases provided for in article 35, it shall transmit a majority report and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference. The International Commission shall inform the members of the Conference of all cases in which its work is being hindered.
Article 37
The International Commission shall be set up at the time of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it may be able to fulfil the tasks prescribed in article 27.
Article 38
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos shall act in close cooperation with the International Commissions in Viet-Nam and Cambodia.
The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be responsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them.
Article 39
The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos may, after consultation with the International Commissions in Cambodia and Viet-Nam having regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Viet-Nam, progressively reduce its activities. Such a decision must be reduced unanimously [sic]. These recommendations shall be adopted unanimously.


CHAPTER VII
Article 40
All the provisions of the present Agreement, save paragraph (a) of Article 2, shall enter into force at 24 hours (Geneva time) on 22 July 1954.
Article 41
Done in Geneva (Switzerland) on 20 July 1954, at 24 hours, in the French language.
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China

21 July 1954
FINAL DECLARATION, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.
1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.
2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.
3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.
4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.
5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities
in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.
6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to VietNam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in VietNam.
7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned. the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.
8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.
9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.
10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Intros and Viet-Nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.
11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.
12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.
13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission; in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.
Source: The Avalon Project, Yale Law School
American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 Basic Documents Volumes I and II Department of State Publication 6446 General Foreign Policy Series 117 Washington, DC : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957
_____________
3. The Paris Peace Accords in January 27, 1973

He would like to totally summary of the Paris Peace Accords in which has the Nine Chapters and the twenty-three Articles, but, no chapters and no articles had sold the Republic of Vietnam to Socialist of the Republic of Vietnam and no had imprisoned the Southern officers-in the meanwhile,
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam in which
Cease-fire in-place and troop withdrawal – the United States pledged to cease hostilities (ground, air, naval, deactivate or destroy mines in all waterways). Cease-fire in-place also applied to other belligerents. The United States should have total withdrawal to be completed within 60 days.
In prove, the Paris Peace Accords has to order that Four-Power Joint Military Commission (see Article 16) will oversee cease-fire and troop and adviser withdrawal, to be completed in 60 days, and Military bases of the United States to be dismantled in same period.
Ironically, this United States Treaty to be International Agreement, it did no introduction (by either Vietnamese party) of new troops, advisers, etc. or arms and war materials into their respective cease-fire zones; this article to be supervised by Four-Power Joint Military Commission (created in Article 16) which is why the lack of the importance of Agreement of the Government of the United States of America had no care to enemy of North Vietnam.
All parties committed to no further acts of force on ground, in the air, and on the sea. This prohibition also included terrorism and reprisals. Both Vietnamese sides were permitted to replace arms and war materials destroyed, damaged, or worn-out, under supervision of the Joint Military Commission.
Return of all captured military personnel and foreign civilians within 60 day period, also under supervision of the Joint Military Commission.
The self evident truth, this Agreement has never had allowed each party to use force in order to revenge each other. Even good, the inmates are civilians and soldiers to must release within 60 days. That is why, he was imprisoned by this Paris Peace Accords when the masterminds of this Agreement had belongs to the Government of the United States of America.
In condition, Exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-determination -- six articles dealt with declaration of this right, asserting the 1954 division of Vietnam as provisional and not political or territorial in nature (citing the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference).
North and South Vietnam must have to begin peaceful negotiations on establishing normal relations and reunification.
Implementation of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace would be under three bodies (see Articles 16, 17, and 18): the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, and the International Commission on Control and Supervision. Article 19 provided for an International Conference (within thirty days) to acknowledge the signed agreements, guarantee the ending of the war, the peace of Indochina, and the right of self-determination by the South Vietnamese people. On the contrary, he was lost Exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-determination by the Government of the United States of America. In prove, in April 30, 1975, the North Vietnamese Army invaded the Republic of Vietnam by force. In the meanwhile, General William Westmoreland of the US Army Command in Vietnam commented and said: "We (the United States) have not lost the battle in Vietnam. But we have not kept our commitment to the Republic of Vietnam Army. On behalf of the United States Army, I apologize to the South Vietnamese Army veterans because we have abandoned you. ”(On behalf of the United States Armed Forces, I would like to apologize to the veterans of the South Armed Forces for abandoning you guys. For this reason, How would does Congress Government think about this true evidence?
In conclusion, the Agreement has declared to rebuilding for injured war in which Articles 21 and 22 anticipated reconciliation and normalization of relations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The former promised postwar reconstruction aid. But no promised took his real property to transfer to Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Signatories

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (Paris, 27January1973)
AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIET-NAM
The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam,
With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,
Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to respect and to implement them:
Chapter I
THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL RIGHTS
Article 1
The United States and all other countries respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam.
Chapter II
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES - WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS,
Article 2
A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T. [Greenwich Mean Time], on January 27, 1973.
At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.
The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this Article shall be durable and without limit of time.
Article 3
The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to ensure a lasting and stable peace.
As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect: (a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.
(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.
(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Viet-Nam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:
- All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;
- All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.
Article 4
The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam.
Article 5
Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.
Article 6
The dismantlement of all military bases in South Viet-Nam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this agreement.
Article 7
From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Article 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the
Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.
THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
Article 8
(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.
(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures
as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.
(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Viet-Nam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.
Chapter IV
THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Article 9
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:
(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.
(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.
(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.
Article 10
The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Viet-Nam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.
Article 11
Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:
- achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;
- ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and
right to free enterprise.
Article l2
(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity, After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Viet-Nam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese
people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.
(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and insurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and
Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties.
The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.
Article 13
The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet-Nam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the
two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectiveness and to demobilize the troops being reduced? The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.
Article 14
South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Viet-Nam provided for in Article 9 (b).
Chapter V
THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM
Article 15
The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and
South Viet-Nam-Pending reunification:
(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.
(b) North and South Viet-Nam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.
(c) North and South Viet-Nam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to re-establishing-normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line,
(d) North and South Viet-Nam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops; military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam.
THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Article 16
(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:
- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;
- Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;
- Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Viet-Nam;
- Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);
- Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);
- Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties;
- Article 8 (b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.
(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.
(c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.
(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.
Article 17
(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:
- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;
- Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;
- Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;
- Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this Article;
- Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Viet-Nam;
- Article 1 3, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.
(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.
(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Viet-Nam,
Article 18
(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.
(b) Until the International Conference provided for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:
- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;
- Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;
- Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Viet-Nam;
- Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);
- Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);
- Article 8 (a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.
The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.
(c) Until the International Conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:
- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;
- Article 3 (b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;
- Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;
- Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this Article;
- Article 8 (c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Viet-Nam;
- Article 9 (b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Viet-Nam;
- Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.
The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.
(d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this Commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the Commission.
(e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Viet-Nam.
(f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.
(g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Viet-Nam. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the Commission's tasks
of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18 (c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the request of the government formed after the general
elections in South Viet-Nam provided for in Article 9 (b).
(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision. The relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference.
Article 19
The parties agree on the convening of an International Conference within thirty days of the signing of this Agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.
The United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam will propose to the following parties that they participate in this International Conference: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam.
Chapter VII
REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS
Article 20
(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia's and the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao people's' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and
territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.
The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.
(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.
(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.
(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
Chapter VIII
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
Article 21
The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.
Article 22
The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.
Chapter IX
OTHER PROVISIONS
Article 23
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this Agreement and its Protocols. Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three, in English and Vietnamese. The English and Vietnamese texts are official and equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM:
(Signed): (Signed):
William P. Rogers Tran Van Lam
Secretary of State Minister for Foreign Affairs
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE PROVISIONAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM: OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET-NAM:
(Signed): (Signed):
Nguyen Duy Trinh Nguyen Thi Binh
Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and- this Geneva Convention was confirmed prisoners of war in order treat equality which is why the government of the United States of America did not only approve but also hadn't carried out the agreement to why didn't the American Government compensate the prisoner of war of the Vietnam War of the America?
Attachment
Court of appeal On March term.....2019

1. May 15, 2018
California Court Of Appeal -First Appellate District- 350 McAllister Street-San Francisco , California 94102.

2. April 21, 2017
Court of Appeal- Office of the Clerk- First Appellate District- 350 McAllister Street-San Francisco , California 94102.
3. June 24, 2010
In the Court of Appeal of the States of California- First Appellate District- Division Five

4. He has had making an appointment for Prisoner of War of the US.
U.S. Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor General by Valerie H. Hall

5. He has had making an appointment for Mental case problems in August 17, 2015 .
U.S. Department of Justice- Office of the Solicitor General by OSG/Kec

6. Government Claims Program- gcinfo@dgs.ca.gov.
Re. Claim 17006626 for Bright Quang.Feb. 23, 2018

7. Civil Unlimited- Case summary -
Case: No. CIV538988 - Events& Orders of Court-
April 24, 2018 by Superior Court of California , County of San Mateo- Hall of Justice

8. CIV538988 Conference
Confidential Document: 532272
Superior Court of California , County of San Mateo- Hall of Justice- 400 County Center, Room A- Redwood City, CA 94063

9. Joseph E. Bergron . Judge of the superior Court. July 13, 2010 . Superior Court of California , County of San Mateo- Hall of Justice- 400 County Center, Room A- Redwood City, CA 94063

10. Certificate of Dismissal From Camp . Number 239 GRT. Camp Dai Binh Lam Dong: 25807806142
Socialist Republic of Vietnam by Judge: Phi Son, July
5,1981/ Prisoner : Nguyen , Quang Xuan,

11. Small Business. Licensed Number 04350154-32XOI621847. Tax Paid Name: Huyen T. Nu Thi Ngu

12. Nguyen's family is Bright Quang $ Ngu Huyen

13. Certificate of Registration of Copyrights: Road to the United States 1&2, Vietnamese American Arts, The Gift, How Good Should I Dream

14. California Department of Motor Vehicles-Customer/Receipt Copy 01/09/15

15. Driver Medical Evaluation: 2009, 2010 & 2012

16. San Mateo Medical Center: Audiogram/ 12/14/05

17. Order of Suspension/Revocation;
Number: 13953,14103 & 14105