Turn Over Control of A-10 Thunderbolt II to US Army
The Air Force is failing in its close air support (CAS) of the US Army, by trying to phase out it's most effective CAS weapon, to fund the failing and ineffective F-35.
Despite huge cost over runs that are hurting the American taxpayers, the F-35 Lightning II has proven to be ineffective and is not living up to its expectations. Every test produces yet another failure to meet this aircraft's projected capabilities.
For some reason, the US Air Force is doggedly determined to salvage the F-35, even at the expense of proven, effective air craft. The cancellation of the vastly superior F-22, to save the F-35, is the most heinous example of what has occurred so far. Now, the Air Force is seeking to eliminate the A-10 Thunderbolt II in order to transfer that aircraft's funding over to F-35 efforts. The US Air force has largely forgotten that one of their primary reasons for existing is to support the US Army. The two most important support services they provide to the US Army is airlift and Close Air Support (CAS). In the vast consensus of ground troops that have been supported by A-10s, this is the most effect CAS aircraft ever made. It is easy to maintain, economical, and easily upgraded.
However, the Air Force is determined to replace the A-10 with the F-35. The only advantage the F-35 has over the A-10 is speed. The A-10 has the ability to loiter in the combat zone for hours providing selective CAS as need by the ground troops, it's ease of maintenance is vastly superior to the F-35, it's reload and turn-around time is a fraction of the F-35s, the A-10 has a much higher and more diverse payload for different scenarios, and it's combat survivability is far beyond anything the F-35 advocates could hope for.
Despite the A-10's vastly superior close air support capabilities over the F-35, the air Force is determined to eliminate the A-10 to rescues the largely inferior F-35. It has been a long known fact, in the Army, that the Air Force greatly despises it's close air support mandate. Therefore, we propose the following changes to federal regulations:
1. Change the Key West Agreement to allow the US Army to take possession of all US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, all support equipment, and supplies.
2. Require the US Air force to train US Army personnel on A-10 support, maintenance, and operations.
3. Provide the US Army the necessary budget increase to effectively operate the A-10; deduct these budget components from the US Air Force if necessary.
While this transition would create a bubble in close air support for a short time, this is vastly outweighed by the following advantages:
1. It relieves the US Air Force of the close air support role it's leaders have held in contempt for so long.
2. Control of the A-10 fleet provides the US Army with a more effective, and faster means of providing close air support to it's ground forces; inter-service liaison delays are largely eliminated.
3. Keeping the close air support within the US Army, will create more reasonable and efficient budgets, with regards to the close air support role.
Any ground, combat leader, that has been
For some reason, the US Air Force is doggedly determined to salvage the F-35, even at the expense of proven, effective air craft. The cancellation of the vastly superior F-22, to save the F-35, is the most heinous example of what has occurred so far. Now, the Air Force is seeking to eliminate the A-10 Thunderbolt II in order to transfer that aircraft's funding over to F-35 efforts. The US Air force has largely forgotten that one of their primary reasons for existing is to support the US Army. The two most important support services they provide to the US Army is airlift and Close Air Support (CAS). In the vast consensus of ground troops that have been supported by A-10s, this is the most effect CAS aircraft ever made. It is easy to maintain, economical, and easily upgraded.
However, the Air Force is determined to replace the A-10 with the F-35. The only advantage the F-35 has over the A-10 is speed. The A-10 has the ability to loiter in the combat zone for hours providing selective CAS as need by the ground troops, it's ease of maintenance is vastly superior to the F-35, it's reload and turn-around time is a fraction of the F-35s, the A-10 has a much higher and more diverse payload for different scenarios, and it's combat survivability is far beyond anything the F-35 advocates could hope for.
Despite the A-10's vastly superior close air support capabilities over the F-35, the air Force is determined to eliminate the A-10 to rescues the largely inferior F-35. It has been a long known fact, in the Army, that the Air Force greatly despises it's close air support mandate. Therefore, we propose the following changes to federal regulations:
1. Change the Key West Agreement to allow the US Army to take possession of all US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs, all support equipment, and supplies.
2. Require the US Air force to train US Army personnel on A-10 support, maintenance, and operations.
3. Provide the US Army the necessary budget increase to effectively operate the A-10; deduct these budget components from the US Air Force if necessary.
While this transition would create a bubble in close air support for a short time, this is vastly outweighed by the following advantages:
1. It relieves the US Air Force of the close air support role it's leaders have held in contempt for so long.
2. Control of the A-10 fleet provides the US Army with a more effective, and faster means of providing close air support to it's ground forces; inter-service liaison delays are largely eliminated.
3. Keeping the close air support within the US Army, will create more reasonable and efficient budgets, with regards to the close air support role.
Any ground, combat leader, that has been
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